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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines how national environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
in Sweden and the United States (US) tried to diffuse cleaner production technologies in the pulp
and paper industry from 1980-1998. The environmental organizations were: Greenpeace
Sweden, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, Environmental Defense, Greenpeace USA,
and Natural Resources Defense Council. The technologies they tried to diffuse reduced dioxins
and other organochlorines from mills that bleach pulp for making white paper products. Totally
chlorine-free (TCF) bleaching emerged as the cleanest bleaching technology in commercial use:
it eliminated organochlorine water pollution. The Swedish environmental organizations, with
help from Greenpeace Germany, were more successful at diffusing TCF bleaching.
The success in Sweden emerged because the environmental organizations created market
demand for TCF paper: they formed collaborative relations with major buyers of bleached paper,
proved that TCF paper was a technically viable alternative, and connected environmentally-
minded consumers with like-minded manufacturers. Supporting their success were: a longer
history of market campaigns to transform paper bleaching, the lack of opposition to TCF paper in
Germany (a major consumer of Swedish bleached pulp), and massive seal and fish die-offs in
1988. The failure in the US occurred because the environmental organizations did not create
market demand: they disagreed on environmental goals, they did not succeed in forming
collaborative alliances with major purchasers in favor of TCF paper, and they could not
overcome a sophisticated counter-campaign from environmental laggards in the American pulp
and paper industry.
This dissertation proposes that success in the face of strident industry opposition entails changing
organizing strategy: national environmental groups need to engage in sectoral organizing. In
sectoral organizing environmental groups work to create a more environmentally sustainable
busies sector, rather than addressing a single problem within that sector. Sectoral organizing
creates opportunities for achieving challenging goals by collaborating with consumers across
multiple environmental problems, addressing the low hanging fruit first, then moving to more
complex problems. By creating trust, credibility, and legitimacy with consumers, environmental
organizations are more likely to succeed in the face of opposition from environmental laggards.
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1 Changing the course of production: leadership from environmental organizations
"Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of
the producer ought to be attended to, only in so far as it may be necessary for
promoting that of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it
would be absurd to attempt to prove it."
Adam Smith'
In 1991 the global retail furnishing giant IKEA entered into a collaborative project with
Greenpeace Sweden to green its catalogue paper. A few months later IKEA decided to print its
catalogues on totally chlorine-free or TCF paper -- paper bleached without using any chlorinated
compounds. It was a major victory for European environmentalists promoting more
environmentally friendly paper. IKEA's decision was one in a string of decisions that seemed to
herald a dramatic global greening in the manufacture of white paper products. A few years later,
however, the exciting greening trends in the paper industry came to a screeching halt. The 15'h
of April 1998 was a somber day for environmentalists who had spent over a decade wrangling
with the paper industry to prevent water pollution. On that day the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (US EPA) issued new water regulations for pulp and paper mills that make
bleached paper. The regulations codified into law only what environmental laggards in the paper
industry were willing to accept. The regulations had global significance. As a nation, the US is
the world's largest manufacturer of bleached paper products.
Why did American environmentalists meet with such failure? Why did the European
environmentalists meet with such success? What lessons can environmental organizations and
scholars of them learn from the Swedish and American campaigns to transform one of the
world's largest manufacturing sectors? In this research paper I examine how environmental
organizations in Sweden and the United States attempted to change bleaching processes in the
1 As cited by Hays, 1987, pp. 542-543.
paper industry from 1980-1998. I consider the strategic choices they made, the institutional
barriers and opportunities they confronted, and the conditions conducive to success as well as
failure. My research goals are two-fold:
* To inform the strategic thinking of environmental organizations engaged in trying to
effect technology change.
* Building from theories of social movement organizations and interest groups, to
develop a framework for understanding how environmental organizations try to
affect technology change and when they are likely to succeed or fail.
Environmental organizations are the focus of my research because they are willing to be
leaders, to promote the cleanest production technologies, in the face of opposition. In the
contested terrain of technology politics it is often environmentalists who press for change amid
resistance from environmental laggards. When pulp and paper manufacturers resisted demands
for chlorine-free paper products, regulators and politicians in Sweden and the US only required
incremental change, enough to state they had taken action; they were unwilling to press the entire
industry to achieve the environmental performance levels possible with the cleanest production
technologies in commercial use.
With government leaders unwilling to lead, environmentalists are turning to the market to
try and diffuse the cleanest production technologies and their associated products. To succeed in
market politics environmental groups need to develop solutions. They need to define
environmentally preferable products, demonstrate that they are viable alternatives, and create
demand for the products. Creating market demand will require that environmental organizations
collaborate, develop working relationships, with institutional consumers with purchasing power.
Alliances between environmentalists and corporate consumers, like the Greenpeace Sweden-
IKEA alliance, will be necessary for greening industrial sectors in the face of opposition.
Opposition from environmental laggards whose markets are threatened by technological
innovation, however, will complicate efforts to diffuse the cleanest production technologies and
products on the market. With their comparatively vast financial resources, technical knowledge,
relations with buyers, as well as with their failure to invest in the cleanest production
technologies, laggards will work tirelessly to stop environmental progress.
Since the pulp and paper campaigns offer only limited guidance on how environmental
organizations might succeed in the face of strident opposition, I speculate that environmentalists
will need to engage in new forms of organizing to achieve their technology goals, what I call
sectoral and lifecycle organizing. In sectoral organizing environmental organizations work to
create a more environmentally sustainable business sector by simultaneously targeting multiple
environmental problems within that sector (rather than a single environmental problem, such as
dioxins in water pollution from pulp and paper mills). By working with consumers to address
multiple environmental problems within their business sector, environmental groups create
opportunities for developing the trust and legitimacy necessary for fostering change on the issues
where opposition is the greatest. In lifecycle organizing environmental groups try to affect
technology change by working with actors across the lifecycle of a product or material, thereby
creating an opportunity to unite all those who have been adversely affected by the activities of
environmental laggards. The combination of broad alliances and consumer collaborations across
an entire industry sector will create new, more diffuse opportunities for change that will be
harder for environmental laggards to defend against.
With environmental organizations greening business outside the domain of conventional
government politics, I argue that we are witnessing the emergence of market politics, where
production and consumption decisions, like government policy, are open to public input.
Political theory needs to adjust to the reality that politics is no longer solely the domain of
government. The concept of interest group pluralism, where government decisions emerge from
the competition of interest groups trying to influence legislators and regulators, needs to be
extended to the market. I see the emergence ofproduction pluralism, where non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) press their demands for cleaner products and production processes directly
with corporations. The campaigns of environmentalists to transform the pulp and paper industry
indicate that production pluralism will develop more rapidly among corporate consumers,
companies that sell directly to households and are concerned with maintaining a healthy brand
name, rather than manufacturers of raw materials.
1.1 Rachel Carson starts the call for ecologically-designed technologies
Environmentalists are well-known as critics of technology. More obscure is their
advocacy for cleaner and safer products and technologies. Yet the call for cleaner technologies
started when Rachel Carson published Silent Spring in 1962. Along with revealing the potent
toxicity of organochlorine and organophosphate pesticides, Carson called for replacing these
chemicals with safer substitutes:
A truly extraordinary variety of alternatives to the chemical control of insects is available.
Some are already in use and have achieved brilliant success. Others are in the stage of
laboratory testing. Still others are little more than ideas in the minds of imaginative
scientists, waiting for the opportunity to put them to the test. All have this in common:
they are biological solutions, based on understanding of the living organisms they seek to
control, and of the whole fabric of life to which these organisms belong.'
Nine years later, Barry Commoner published The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and
Technology, in which he too emphasized the role of technology in damaging ecosystems and
called for redirecting technology development to be consistent with nature:
In sum, present productive technologies need to be redesigned to conform as closely as
possible to ecological requirements, and most of the present industrial, agricultural, and
transportation enterprises reorganized in accordance with these new designs. In effect, a
Carson, 1962, p. 278.
major part of the new productive enterprises constructed on the basis of postwar,
ecologically faulty technology simply has to be rebuilt along ecological sound lines.
Beginning in the late 1960s environmental organizations moved to implement the ideas
advocated by environmental pioneers like Rachel Carson and Barry Commoner. A notable early
victory was when Environmental Defense2 and other environmentalists succeeded through
litigation in prompting the US Government to ban the use of DDT -- one of the organochlorine
pesticides fingered by Carson in Silent Spring -- in 1972.3 The use of the courts reflected the
direction that environmental organizations took in trying to effect technology change: create
leverage for technology change through government action, either in the courts; with legislatures,
or through regulatory agencies.
In the 1970s, with landmark national environmental laws passed in the United States and
in Europe, industries began to invest in environmental technologies. In most cases, however, the
environmental technologies were "end-of-the-pipe" technologies, designed to capture pollution
after it was created and before it was released to the air and water. Between 1972 and 1996
American taxpayers and businesses "spent at least $700 billion on water pollution control,
mostly on construction grants for municipal sewage treatment facilities and end-of-pipe
industrial controls."4 The emphasis on pollution control technologies rather than on technologies
that would conform as closely as possible to ecological requirements, as advocated for by
Commoner and Carson, was a strategic choice made by business leaders. They did not want
their prerogative to choose technologies interfered with, the environmental historian Samuel
Hays found:
In environmental affairs the central concern of corporate leaders was the threat of
scrutiny of, or interference with, their technologies and processes of production. They
Commoner, 1971, p. 283.
2 Formerly Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). EDF shortened its name to Environmental Defense in 1998.
3 Primack and von Hippel, 1974, pp. 132-139.
4 Davies and Mazurek, 1998, p. 70.
were willing to accept [pollution] controls such as ambient air water standards, but they
were hostile to a more direct system of supervision such as ... direct evaluation of
technologies.
Yet when governments required changes in manufacturing processes or products,
pollution from the targeted chemical declined dramatically. For example, the banning of lead as
a gasoline additive in 1986 dramatically reduced lead in air emissions. They declined by 98%
between 1970 and 1995; the most significant decline of the US' criteria air pollutants. 2 "The
reason there is so much less lead in the environment -- and in children's blood -- is that lead has
been almost entirely eliminated from the manufacture of gasoline." 3
The elimination of lead in gasoline and the banning of DDT as a pesticide are examples
of pollution prevention.4 The environmental advantages of pollution prevention over pollution
control have long been recognized. Over 20 years ago Dr. Joseph Ling (former vice president of
environmental engineering and pollution control at 3M) described the limitations of pollution
control technologies:
conventional [end-of-pipe] controls, at some point, create more pollution than they
remove and consume resources out of proportion to the benefits derived. What emerges
is an environmental paradox. It takes resources to remove pollution; pollution removal
generates residue; it takes more resources to dispose of this residue and disposal of
residue also produces pollution.5
Since the emergence of the concept of pollution prevention in the 1980s, other similar concepts
that emphasize upstream solutions to environmental problems have emerged, including cleaner
production, sustainable production, and sustainable design. All of these concepts promote the
Hays, 1987, p. 324.
2 Davies and Mazurek, 1998, see Figure 3, p. 63.
3 Commoner, 1990, p. 42.
4 The US EPA defines as pollution prevention as "any practice which (i) reduces the amount of any hazardous
substance, pollutant, or contaminant entering any waste stream or otherwise released into the environment ...; and
(ii) reduces the hazards to public health and the environment associated with the release of such substances,
pollutants, or contaminants" (Public Law 101-508--November 5, 1990). Really this is the definition for source
reduction in the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990. But for the US EPA pollution prevention and source reduction
are synonymous (Browner, 1993).
s Ling, 1979, p. xi.
development and use of technologies and products that use less material, are less toxic, and are
more environmentally compatible.
Despite the environmental improvements and potential for financial benefits that accrue
to businesses implementing pollution prevention techrologies, the widespread movement to
environmentally sustainable production technologies has not emerged as Rachel Carson and
Barry Commoner advocated for over 30-40 years ago. For example, Rachel Carson highlighted
the environmental hazards of organophosphate pesticides in Silent Spring. Today roughly 77
million pounds of organophosphate pesticides are used in the US and most Americans have a
body burden, carry in their bodies, some of these chemicals.' Protecting the prerogative of
businesses to decide where they invest their money, as noted by Hays above, is among the
reasons why businesses are not adopting pollution prevention technologies.
1.2 Catalyzing change in the paper industry
My research begins from the point of view that environmental organizations played in the
past and will continue to play in the future a lead role in promoting more environmentally
friendly materials, products, and production processes. To learn how national environmental
organizations try to promote the use of cleaner technologies and to understand when they are
likely to succeed, I examine the campaigns of national environmental organizations to change the
course of bleached pulp and paper production in Sweden and the US. My research centers on
three questions:
" What factors affect the strategic choices of environmental organizations?
m How do national environmental organizations try to cultivate change in government and
market institutions?
= When, under what conditions, are environmental organizations likely to succeed in
effecting technology change?
'CDC, 2003.
The next chapter offers preliminary answers to these questions by reviewing social
movement and interest group theories relevant to national environmental organizations. Chapter
3 defines how the causal conditions important to influencing decisions made by pulp and paper
manufacturers, institutional and household consumers of paper, and regulatory agencies will be
evaluated.
The next three chapters establish the historical context that environmental organizations
would step into in Sweden and the US in the 1980s as well as the technological gains they had
helped to achieve by 1998. Chapter 4 defines the rise of bleached paper products beginning in
the 1800s and how fiber supply, consumer demand, and technology innovation shaped the
development of these products. The main story line here is, white paper products have been
produced and in demand for hundreds of years. Chapter 5 defines the technological state of
bleached pulp and paper production at three points in time for both Sweden and the US: mid-
1980s; mid-1990s; and 1998. The chapter introduces the technologies that environmentalists
would promote and oppose and concludes with the levels of technology diffusion achieved in
each nation. Chapter 6 presents the roots of the environmental movements from which the
Swedish and American paper campaigns emerged and how they would shape the campaigns of
the 1980s and 1990s.
The next four chapters detail the actions taken by environmental organizations in Sweden
(Chapters 7 and 8) and the US (Chapters 9 and 10), their successes and failures, and the reasons
for the outcomes. These chapters cover the period from 1986-1998 and the strategic actions of
five environmental organizations: Greenpeace Sweden and the Swedish Society for Nature
Conservation (SSNC) in Sweden; and Environmental Defense, Greenpeace USA, and the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in the US.
Chapter 11 assesses the factors that affect the strategic choices of environmental
organizations, emphasizing the need to think more broadly than the most prominent explanatory
variables -- sources of funding and organizational ideology/values -- invoked to explain the
behavior of national environmental organizations. Chapter 12 begins by describing how
environmental organizations tried to catalyze the development and diffusion of cleaner
production technologies in the paper industry. It then examines why the national environmental
organizations succeeded and failed in their attempts to green paper production through
government and market politics. Within each institutional context I assess the level of
responsiveness of targets to the goals of environmental organizations and the causal conditions
affecting outcomes. In the analyses of the responsiveness of targets and causal conditions I
examine all the cases together (not distinguishing between those in Sweden and those in the US)
and comparatively (comparing different national outcomes). Chapter 13 concludes with a set of
recommendations on how environmental organizations might succeed in promoting the cleanest
production technologies in the face of strident opposition, akin to the opposition American
environmentalists confronted in trying to change the paper industry.
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2 The literature: marshalling resources and connecting values to catalyze change in
the face of organized opposition
The literature on national environmental organizations encompasses an amalgam of
scholars, with the greatest concentration of research eIerging from political scientists, although
sociologists, 2 environmental historians,3 and investigative journalists4 have all performed
research in this area. Often their unit of analysis is broader than "environmental organizations."
Examples include: voluntary associations, public interest groups, citizen groups, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), advocacy networks, and social movement organizations.5
Environmental organizations or groups, I use the terms interchangeably, are a subset of these
broader units of analysis, although in some scholarship they are a prominent subset.6 While the
breadth of the research covers the affects of environmental group actions on a broad range of
institutions, the depth of the research relates to institutions of government.
In this chapter I pose my three research questions to the literature. What I find is social
movements theory is best prepared to answer the first question: what factors affect the strategic
choices of environmental organizations? Concerned with the formation and maintenance of
social movement organizations, social movement scholars have developed frameworks for
assessing and predicting organizational behavior.
For example, see: Berry, 1977; Berry, 1999; Bosso, 1994; Dalton, 1994; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Mitchell, Mertig,
and Dunlap, 1992; Shaiko, 1999; Wapner, 1996; and Vogel, 1978.
2 For example, see: McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994; and Szasz, 1994.
3 For example, see: Bartlett, 1995; Gottlieb, 1993; and Hays, 1987.
4 For example, see: Dowie, 1995; Dowie, 2001; and Shabecoff, 2000.
5 For examples of: voluntary associations see Wilson (1995); public interest groups see Berry (1977); citizen groups
see Berry (1999); NGOs see Princen and Finger, eds. (1994); advocacy networks see Keck and Sikkink (1998); and
social movement organizations see McCarthy and Zald (1977).
6 For examples, see: Berry, 1977; Berry, 1999; Keck and Sikkink, 1998.
Since my empirical research centers on how environmental groups try to affect change in
a specific issue campaign,' I am interested in the actions environmentalists take to try to
persuade decision makers to make different choices. From this context the relevant literature
begins to blend across scholars from social movement theory and interest group theory.
Finally I examine the elements scholars identify as necessary for success, for bringing
about change in the world. Because the institutional boundaries of my empirical research is
defined by the actions of environmental groups in their issue campaigns, my interest is in how
these organizations succeed in catalyzing change across market as well as government
institutions. The result is an array of necessary elements that vary across institutional actors.
The literature on success overwhelmingly emerges from political scientists.
I decided not to build from a single theoretical domain for two reasons. First, I wanted to
review scholarship that would be relevant to my empirical research. Since environmentalists that
campaigned for change in the paper industry targeted both markets and the state, I include
literature that covers initiatives of environmental organizations to change either state or non-state
actors. Second, I included research that had no theoretical grounding -- for example, the research
of the investigative journalist, Mark Dowie (1995) -- because he has valuable insights into the
behavior of environmental organizations, despite lacking a consistent theoretical perspective.
2.1 Scholars miss technological affects of environmental organizations
In reviewing the literature on environmental organizations it became clear that
"technology change" was not a topic of research interest. Instead the research on national
environmental organizations 2 has overwhelmingly focused on policy change. The lack of
I define an environmental issue campaign as an initiative that tries to bring about change in governmental
institutions, corporations, communities, or individuals to solve an environmental problem.
2 There are roughly a dozen major national environmental organizations in the US. The three that were most active
in campaigning on the pulp and paper industry were: Environmental Defense, Greenpeace USA, and Natural
scholarship on the role of environmental organizations in trying to transform technological
development stems in part from the approach of the organizations themselves. Attempts to
change policy have been the most visible aspect of national environmental campaigns, with
government institutions their primary target. Up through the 1980s it was rare for national
environmental organizations to run campaigns directly targeted at changing corporate behavior,
with the exception of legal challenges through the courts. Environmental Defense, for example,
did not begin working collaboratively with corporations until 1990 when it began a project with
McDonald's.'
But the lack of scholarship on technology also reflects, at least in political science, the
typical perception that production and corporate decisions are outside the domain of "public"
policy. As the political scientist David Vogel (1996) wrote:
Political scientists have written extensively on the ideology and organizational structure
of public interest organizations and their impacts on public policy. But largely because
they have tended to reify politics by identifying it with government, they have neglected
one of the movement's most important and original contributions to American politics: its
efforts to challenge business directly. Acting on the assumption that business itself
constitutes a system of power or 'private government' -- one whose power is comparable,
if not greater than, that of the 'official' government -- activists have also frequently
lobbied the corporation itself.2
The activists directly lobbying corporations that Vogel highlighted were the early initiatives of a
few public interest organizations, including the Ralph Nader-inspired Project on Corporate
Responsibility, to bring about changes in corporate accountability and governance in the 1970s.
The initiatives cited by Vogel did not encompass product or technology change to address
environmental concerns. Yet with the emergence of the corporate accountability movement in
the 1970s came more initiatives to pressure corporations directly; although, as noted above,
Resources Defense Council. In Sweden, Greenpeace Sweden and the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation
were most active on the pulp and paper industry.
'EDF, 1990.
2 Vogel, 1996, p. 15.
national environmental groups were slow to become involved in corporate accountability
campaigns.
At a more fundamental level is whether business decisions should only be considered
private. Certainly most Americans consider corporations to be private institutions: the general
conviction among Americans is that "decisions that determine what is produced and by what
technological means ought to remain in private, generally corporate hands."2 Yet corporate
activities affect public goods like clean air and water and corporations benefit from many
government actions such as building infrastructure. As the political scientist Robert Dahl wrote
in 1970:
Whatever may be the optimal way of governing the great corporation, surely it is a
delusion to consider it a private enterprise. ... Why should people with shares be given
the privileges of citizenship in the government of the firm when citizenship is denied to
other people who also make vital contributions to the firm?3
A nuanced critique of this position by Vogel (1978) agrees that "the social impact of the
corporation does resemble that of a government," but it is disingenuous to view corporations like
governments because "the most important decisions made by any firm are out of the control of
those who govern it; they are dictated by the imperatives of a market economy." The only way
Vogel foresaw a company making "decisions not dominated by the logic of capital
accumulation" was through the "direct intervention of the government." 4
Given that corporate activities clearly affect public goods like clean air and water, I see
efforts to change these actions as falling within the domain of public policy research. While no
public interest or environmental organization has changed the logic of capital accumulation,
there is wide latitude within that "logic" to reshape markets, technologies, and their
1 Vogel, 1978.
2 Commoner, 1990, p. 170.
3 Dahl, 1970, pp. 120, 123; as cited in Vogel, 1978, p. 6.
4 Vogel, 1978, p. 225.
environmental impacts. As I will document later in my research on the pulp and paper industry,
environmental organizations have tried with limited success to green markets and promote the
development and diffusion of cleaner production technologies.
A result of political scientists emphasizing the policy affects of national environmental
organizations is, they missed a goal of some environmentalists: to change the course of
production. As the environmental historian Samuel Hays concluded, environmentalists were
often "pioneers in advocating new technologies that, when they later became more widespread,
few associated with them."I
2.2 Values and resources: the factors that shape strategic choices
The two prominent strands of social movement theory, new social movements theory and
resource mobilization theory, impart two different perspectives on the attributes that most
influence the behavior of social movement organizations. New social movements theory
emphasizes the role of organizational values, beliefs, and ideology, while resource mobilization
theory emphasizes the role of resources in shaping organizational behavior.2 It is my position
that the strategic choices made during an issue campaign will reflect the interaction of both
organizational values and resources.
2.2.1 New social movement theory: the role of values in environmental organizations
New socials movements theory3 emerged in the 1980s as social movement scholars
sought explanations "for the rise of the social movements of the past two decades in the
appearance of new grievances and aspirations."4 Core elements of new social movements theory
as identified by the sociologist Bert Klandermans (1990) include the following. A different set
Hays, 1987, p. 529.
2 For example, see Klandermans, 1990; Morris and Mueller, eds., 1992.
3 New social movement theory is also referred to as the "social constructionist" perspective (Mueller, 1992) and the
"social construction of protest" (Klandermans, 1990).
4 Klandermans, 1990, p. 26.
of values: "New social movements do not accept the premises of a society based on economic
growth." An "extensive use of unconventional forms of action" and a preference for small-scale,
decentralized, and democratic organizations. And explanations for participation in new social
movements that emphasize new aspirations in the "change from materialist to post-materialist
values;" as well as a loss of identity caused by the strains of industrialization and
bureaucratization.'
Building from new social movements theory, Russell Dalton in his research on European
environmental organizations concluded that it is from ideology2 that organizational decisions
emerge: The "ideological identity of an organization guides its choices of what'goals to pursue,
what tactics are appropriate to its position," "what resources are available for mobilization," and
"what to expect from the government and other political actors." 3 The principal criterion Dalton
used to identify ideology was the organization's view of the sociopolitical order: was it more
accepting or challenging of the political structure? He named the more challenging groups
"ecologically-oriented" and the more accepting groups "conservation-oriented."
Dalton concluded that ecologically-oriented groups are generally more critical "of the
environmental records of major business and political institutions;" and that their tactics are
more likely to involve direct action and less likely to involve direct lobbying of government
officials than conservation groups .' Conservation-oriented groups "generally accept the existing
sociopolitical order and the norms of this social system." Their tactics are less likely to involve
direct action and more likely to involve direct lobbying of government officials. They also are
more likely to receive funding from governments or corporations, and possess large endowments
' Ibid., pp. 26-28.
2 A group's ideology is its "'attachment to some particular set of beliefs"' (Dalton, 1994, p. 10; citing social
movement scholar, Chris Tilly's definition of ideology).
3 Ibid., pp. 15 and 250.
that generate investment income.2 Both ecological- and conservation-oriented groups with mass
memberships rely heavily on membership dues for revenues.' See Table 2.1 for a listing of the
characteristics of the two orientations.
Table 2.1 Characteristics of conservation- and ecological-oriented ideologies (Dalton, 1994)
Characteristics Conservation Orientation Ecological Orientation
" Accepting: generally accept - Challenging: criticize
View of sociopolitical order the existing sociopolitical accumulation of wealth and
order and the norms of this unrestrained economic growth
social system
= Heavy reliance on mass = Heavy reliance on mass
Key resources membership membership
= More likely to receive = More likely to rely on sale of
government and corporate group merchandise
grants
* Species protection - Nuclear power
Campaign issues - Habitat protection * Industrial pollution
E Preservation of natural - Toxic chemicals
resources = Acid rain
Tactics - Greater emphasis on m Greater emphasis on direct
govemment lobbying action
Dalton's dichotomy of conservation- and ecological-orientations among environmental
organizations does not, however, reflect important splits in the values of what he calls
ecologically-oriented organizations. In their research on the American environmental movement
the investigative journalist Mark Dowie (1995) and the environmental historian Robert Gottlieb
(1993) both emphasize a split in Dalton's ecologically-oriented organizations. Gottlieb describes
it as a split between mainstream and alternative or grassroots groups. The alternative ecological
groups closely resemble Dalton's definition of ecological groups. The principal differences are
alternative ecological groups are more likely to work at the grassroots level, do not have mass
memberships, and therefore lack the professional staff. And the mainstream ecological groups
closely resemble the conservation-oriented groups, with the primary difference being the
Ibid., pp. 208-209; 174; and 96.
2 1bid., pp. 47, 96; and 208-209.
campaign issues are ecological- rather than conservation-oriented. To reflect this split, I have
divided Dalton's ecological groups into mainstream and alternative ecological groups (see Table
2.2).
Table 2.2 The mainstream/alternative dichotomy among ecologically-oriented
environmental organizations (Dowie, 1995; Gottlieb, 1993)
Characteristics Ecological Orientation
Mainstream Groups Alternative Groups
View of sociopolitical order - Greater trust in - Distrust of government
government and and corporations
corporations
Key resources - Money from - Money from
memberships, foundations
foundations, and - Volunteer time from
corporations community members
- Expert staff
Campaign Issues Are similar: protect public and environmental health
Goals - More acceptable to - Challenging of the
government officials sociopolitical order
Alliances - Other mainstream - Grassroots groups
groups - Labor
- Corporations
Tactics Information (lobbying) - Information
- Litigation - Direct action
Targets - Government - Government
institutions in a nation's institutions at
capitol local/state level
- Corporations
2.2.2 A resources perspective: it is money that affects strategic choices
Those with a resource perspective see organizational choices influenced by gathering and
using resources. Social movements, McCarthy and Zald (1977) emphasized in their pioneering
article on resource mobilization theory, need resources to engage in social conflict and they must
accumulate resources to achieve collective purposes. The accumulation of resources leads to
"some minimal form of organization." 2 Since resources in a social movement organization are
'Ibid., p. 96.
2 McCarthy and Zald, 1977, cited from reprint in McCarthy and Zald, 1987, p. 18.
limited, staff seek resources from outside the organization, including: "legitimacy, money,
facilities, and labor."' In competing for resources organizations alter their goals and tactics to
align with their sources of resources, e.g., foundations. 2
Money and staff are the prime resources of national environmental organizations, with
members and external networks among the secondary resources. But it is money that analysts of
the environmental movement like Dowie (1995; 2001) and Gottlieb (1993) have identified as the
principal factor affecting the strategic choices of national environmental groups.
The financial resources available to national environmental organizations blossomed
starting in the 1970s. In the US membership in 11 national environmental groups increased from
3.5 million in 1970 to 8.5 million in 1990 (see Table 2.3). For most mass membership
organizations members are "checkbook" participants -- their participation is limited to writing
checks. 3 For example, leaders of Environmental Defense "look upon their support base as
contributors rather than members. As a result, they do not attempt to mobilize their contributors
as volunteers to sign petitions or write letters to members of Congress." 4 Greenpeace Sweden,
like Greenpeace in other nations, is similar to Environmental Defense where "active involvement
is limited to a few full-time professionals, while 'membership' is a matter of paying dues." 5
With the growing memberships came larger budgets and staffs. The budget of
Environmental Defense, for example, grew from $0.7 million in 1971to $16.9 million in 1990.6
The organizations invested much of their increased revenue in professional staff: lawyers for
initiating lawsuits, proposing legislation, and watchdogging the regulatory agencies; scientists
'McCarthy and Zald, 1977, cited from reprint in McCarthy and Zald, 1987, pp. 18 and 22.
2 McCarthy and Zald, 1977, cited from reprint in McCarthy and Zald, 1987, p. 19.
3 For example, see Jamison et al., 1990; Shaiko, 1999.
4 Shaiko, 1999, p. 81.
s Jamison et al., 1990, p. 58.
6 EDF, 1971; EDF, 1990.
for defining problems and countering industry arguments; economists for showing the benefits of
regulations; fundraisers and development officers; and administrators for managing the
organization.' Today national environmental organizations receive money from membership
dues, gifts and endowments from individuals, marketing group merchandise, grants from
governments, foundations, and corporations, and income from investments.2
Table 2.3 Membership in American environmental groups,
1970-1990
Group 1970 1980 1990
Defenders of Wildlife 13,000 50,000 75,000
Environmental Defense Fund 11,000 46,000 150,000
Friends of the Earth 6,000 n.a. 9,000
lzaak Walton League 54,000 52,000 50,000
National Audubon Society 105,000 400,000 575,000
National Park and 50,000 31,000 100,000
Conservation Association
National Wildlife Federation 3,100,000 4,000,000 5,800,000
Natural Resources Defense non- 42,000 125,000
Council member
Nature Conservancy 22,000 n.a. 600,000
Sierra Club 113,000 181,000 630,000
Wilderness Society 54,000 45,000 350,000
Total 3,528,000 4,847,000 8,464,000
Sources:
A challenge movement organizations confront as they become established is avoiding
cooptation by the sources of funding. The social movement scholar Doug McAdam defines
"cooptation" as when the "establishment of external support linkages ... grants considerable
control over movement affairs to the source from which the resources are obtained."4 Dowie
(1995) has been an articulate voice among many5 on the cooptation of the American
environmental movement. He concludes that for national environmental groups, it is money that
1Dowie, 1995; Gottlieb, 1993; Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap, 1992.
2 Dalton, 1994, p. 95.
3 Berry, 1999; Bosso, 1994.
4 McAdam, 1982, p. 55.
5 For others, see Bosso, 1994; Gottlieb, 1993.
"sets agenda, strategy, targets, and priorities. ... All four major sources of environmental
philanthropy in the United States -- direct mail money, large donors, foundations, and
corporations -- set the parameters within which organizations must function to survive."'
To fuel membership growth American environiental groups invested in direct mail
solicitation, which contributed to the groups' skyrocketing membership. Yet direct mail
solicitation increased the pressure to win: "The essence of their [direct mail consultants] counsel
is that to succeed in the political direct mail business you have to win, look like you're winning,
or look like you're going to win."2 Dowie (1995) observes that many of the mainstream groups
opted for "looking like they are winning" and compromised on goals so they would have
"victories" to report in their mailings.3
Dowie (2001) has also emphasized the increasing role of foundations in affecting the*
agendas of environmental organizations:
The clear, though rarely uttered message from the largest environmental grantmakers is
this: be cautious reformers, challenge specific violators, take the worst of them to court,
lobby for environmental regulations, educate the public, but don't rock (or knock) the
industrial boat if you intend to rely on significant foundation funding.4
To receive "more and larger grants" from environmentally conservative foundations, many
environmental organizations are setting less challenging goals, notes Dowie.5
Corporate donations also can affect organizational goals. The political scientist
Christopher Bosso explains that corporate money can leave environmental groups vulnerable to
threats of withdrawal if the corporation disagrees with any of the group's activities. For
example, General Electric withdrew its funding for The National Audubon Society's popular
'Dowie, 1995, p. 41.
2 Ibid., p. 45.
' Ibid., p. 45.
4 Dowie, 2001, p. 94.
5 Ibid., p. 94.
"World of Audubon" public television documentary series after Audubon aired a program
critical of federally subsidized cattle grazing practices.'
From the perspective of Dowie and Gottlieb, among others, it is money that defines
mainstream ecological organizations. In this framework money defines organizational values
and goals. And organizations with money do not pursue challenging goals.
2.2.3 Resources and values: an integrated perspective
The problem with the "money defines values" line of reasoning is, examples that
undermine it are readily available. Greenpeace USA, for example, is a multi-million dollar
organization based in Washington, DC. Yet it engages in direct action, forms alliances with
grassroots groups, and pursues environmentally challenging goals.
The organizational behavior of Greenpeace reveals the difficulty of separating values
from money. Are organizations accepting money for less environmentally challenging projects
being co-opted by the money they receive or are they merely pursuing money that fits their
organizational values? There are certainly examples of environmental organizations that forego
money because it would compromise their goals. Dowie cites the Native Forest Council of the
pacific northwest as such an example. When the Council held onto its position of zero-cut policy
in public forests it did not receive money to participate in a forestry coalition for the region in the
mid-i990s. 2
The strength of the money argument is not that money affects the goals and tactics of
individual organizations, but rather that money affects the goals and tactics of the entire
environmental movement: corporate and environmentally conservative foundation money selects
for organizations with values more accepting of the sociopolitical order. Those organizations
'Bosso, 1994, pp. 38-39.
2 Dowie, 2001, p. 100.
with values more challenging of the sociopolitical order will be selected against and
marginalized in the long-term unless they can secure other sources of money. What the money
argument implies is that the current trajectory of the environmental movement will be towards
the more accepting, less environmentally demanding organizations because the sources of money
tend to be conservative and system protective.'
It is my position that the strategic choices of environmental organizations flow from the
interaction of organizational values, resources (staff as well as money), and the historical context
of an organization's founding. I add the historical element because the context of an
organization's founding -- its members, sources of funding, goals, and tactics -- can continue to
reverberate throughout an organization over time. The political scientist Jeffrey Berry, in his
research on public interest groups, referred to the historical element as an organization's
"strategic disposition:"
The initial goals of a group have important implications for what may be termed the
'strategic predispositions' of the organization. Many public interest groups are set up to
perform their advocacy work in a particular manner ... Consequently, from the day of
their inception, most organizations are inclined toward some strategies and tactics and
away from others.2
An organization's founding conditions and values and will affect the resources -- money
and staff -- it collects. The resources will in turn re-affirm or alter the organization's values.
The resource environment will affect which organizations grow, stagnate, or die; with funding
sources selecting for organizations with compatible values. Alternative ecological-oriented
organizations will couple with foundations receptive to more fundamental challenges of the
status quo and conversely, mainstream ecological organizations will couple with more
environmentally conservative foundations and other similar funders.
'Ibid.
2 Berry, 1977, p. 264.
2.3 Connecting with "friends:" coalitions, alliances, and networks
Berry observed in his research on public interest organizations that "coalitions are
extremely popular among public interest lobbies."' Coalitions come in many forms, varying in
degree of organizational formality (ad hoc versus formal organization) and members (all from
the same movement versus from a variety of interest groups).
At the formal end are coalitions. The political scientist James Wilson defines a coalition
as "an ongoing mechanism for explicitly coordinating some or all of the actions of the members;
it is an organization of organizations." 2 For example, the Clean Water Network is a coalition of
1,100 organizations that endorse a common platform.
A less formal grouping of organizations is what Wilson calls, an ad hoc alliance: "loose,
cooperative relations between two or more associations with respect to the attainment of a
particular end or the performance of a specific task. ... They represent temporary arrangements
for sharing resources and especially for managing communications." 3 Ad hoc alliances often
form to lobby on specific issues, then dissolve after Congress or a regulatory agency either kills
or passes the measures.
At the most informal level are what the political scientists Margaret Keck and Kathryn
Sikkink call advocacy networks: "forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal,
and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange" that "plead the causes of other or
defend a cause or proposition."4 Participants in advocacy networks come from many
institutions, including: local social movements, foundations, the media, intergovernmental
'Ibid., p. 254.
2 Wilson, 1995, p. 267.
'Ibid., p. 278.
4 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 8.
organizations, parts of governments, as well as NGOs. Common beliefs hold them together.'
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) developed a similar concept of "advocacy coalitions," where
common beliefs (values) cause "people from various governmental and private organizations" to
"act in concert."2
The principal explanation for why interest groups participate in coalitions, ad hoc
alliances, or networks is sharing resources, especially information: "the prime currency of
politics is timely and precise information, and to get information one must be prepared to give
it," Wilson (1995) concluded. "To act alone when confronting an important issue is to risk
acting without complete information or in ways that will unwittingly antagonize a prospective
ally." 3 In a similar vein Dalton (1994) concluded that environmental organizations work
together primarily to exchange information and coordinate activities.4 And Keck and Sikkink
(1998) found that while people participate in advocacy networks because they share common
beliefs, it is the ability of advocacy networks to "generate information quickly and accurately,
and deploy it effectively, [that] is their most valuable currency".
The use of cross-interest alliances (e.g., environmental-labor alliances) to maximize
political strength receives little attention in the literature on environmental organizations. The
lack of attention is partially a factor of national environmental groups allying much less
frequently with other causes and interests than among each other. For example, Gottlieb (1993)
concluded that the "policies of the mainstream environmental groups" are "too often concerned
with environmental management without regard to its employment effects." By not allying with
labor, environmentalists have left themselves "open to the charge that they put the environment
Ibid., p. 9.
2 Sabatier, 1993, p. 18.
3 Wilson, 1995, pp. 278-279.
4 Dalton, 1994, pp. 171-173.
ahead of jobs."2 But the lack of attention to cross-interest alliances is also a factor of not looking
for them. David Vogel in his research on business in politics observed that environmental-labor
alliances did impede the success of the business lobby and vice-versa: "when labor was either
neutral or supported the environmentalist position, business did less well. By contrast, the
environmentalists, like industry, triumphed only when organized labor did not oppose them." 3
Based on his research of European environmental groups, Dalton (1994) observed, that
ideological differences were not an impediment to intra-movement alliances. Although he
acknowledged that environmentalists are "sensitive to the various shades of green within the
movement and to the tensions that can result from these differences," Dalton saw "a broad
pattern of cooperation among environmental interest groups." "In overall terms, the interpersonal
and interorganization networks within the environmental movement are dense."4
Yet instances of conflicts among organizations with differing ideologies are common.
For example in the US, Greenpeace USA decided not to participate in meetings of ten prominent
environmental organizations (informally known as the Group of 10)5 in the 1980s because the
organizations would not allow Lois Gibbs, executive director of Citizens for Health,
Environment and Justice, to attend. The Group of 10 disagreed with Gibbs' aggressive tactics in
opposing the siting of hazardous waste facilities.6 In another disagreement that turned public, the
national groups "split along fundamental ideological and tactical lines" over whether to support
or oppose the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Supporting NAFTA were the
1 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 10.
2 Gottlieb, 1993, p. 306.
3 Vogel, 1996, p. 382.
4 Dalton, 1994, pp. 170 and 172.
s The Group of 10 were: Environmental Defense, Environmental Policy Institute, Friends of the Earth, Izaak Walton
League, National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, NRDC, Sierra Club, Wilderness Society, and the
Kendall Foundation (Dowie, 1995, p. 69).
6 Ibid., p. 74. Citizens for Health, Environment and Justice was called the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous
Waste in the 1980s.
Washington, DC and New York based NGOs, including the National Wildlife Federation,
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the World Wildlife Fund, and opposing it were
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, Sierra Club, and a host of grass-roots organizations.'
As these examples indicate, intra-movement conflict is more prevalent than scholars like
Berry (1977) and Dalton (1994) acknowledge. The intra-movement conflict more closely
reflects the theoretical perspective of resource mobilization theorists like McCarthy and Zald
(1977), who concluded that: "Since SMOs [social movement organizations] within the same SMI
[social movement industry] compete with one another for resources, they are led to differentiate
themselves from one another." 2 It is my proposition that intra-environmental movement
competition is more prevalent than scholars like Berry and Dalton acknowledge, and that this
competition will impede environmental organizations, especially those with more challenging
goals, from achieving their goals. This mirrors Dowie's (1995) conclusion that national
environmental organizations are likely to intervene in campaigns initiated by grassroots groups
and to undercut the goals of grassroots groups by offering a compromise solution. I amend
Dowie's proposition to state that the undermining of goals can happen between national
environmental groups as well as between national and grassroots groups.
2.4 Persuading others to change: tactics and strategic approaches
To bring about change environmental organizations use tactics: "specific actions taken to
advocate certain policy positions."3 This section highlights three types of tactics that are widely
used in environmental and related organizations: information, litigation, and direct action.
Another type of tactic that has implications for trying to catalyze technology is also highlighted.
1Princen, 1994, p. 9.
2 McCarthy and Zald, 1977.
3 Berry, 1977, p. 212.
What I call development tactics are increasingly used in efforts to bring about change in
communities and corporations.
2.4.1 Information
In his research on public interest groups who lobby government Berry (1977) concluded
that organizations who rely primarily on the tactics of information' tend to be less challenging
and more trusting of government:
[They] base their efforts on the opinion that government operates the way it does, in part,
because of imperfect information. The key to achieving influence is providing useful
data to policy makers. This philosophy ... considers a good number of people in
government to be open-minded and approving of the group's work. It is much more of
an 'inside' strategy ... Sympathetic people in government are expected to fight for the
'right' policies in a conflictual, but reasonable, political arena.2
Embedded in information is an investment in professional staff. Having the capacity to
translate general environmental values into technical details as well as to extract the
environmental implications from technical data requires professional staff. When the values of
an organization compel it towards certain types of tactics, those tactics in turn dictate a certain
type of staff. The values of the staff in turn affect the financial resources collected by the
organization, which affects the issues selected and the goals for the issue campaigns. Since it is
through staff that organizational values are realized and defined, it is also through staff,
especially the leaders of the organizations, that the values of an organization can shift.
The staff also affect an organization's alliances. Concerns have been raised that
organizations that invest heavily in technical expertise have lost touch with the grassroots
movement and the public outside of Washington, DC. For example, during the 1980s when the
national environmental groups expanded rapidly, they invested their resources in more technical
Information-style tactics used by environmental lobbyists are: face-to-face meetings with legislators or regulators
(personal lobbying), presenting testimony at a congressional hearing, and releasing research results (Ibid., p. 263).
2 Ibid., p. 269.
expertise to fight on Capitol Hill rather than to work with the grassroots.1 And Samuel Hays
found that "Many environmental professionals felt uncomfortable in their association with
popular movements and organizations. In response they sought to transfer action to areas in
which popular influence was limited."2 I will argue below that the ability or inability of
environmental organizations to work with other environmentalists and other types of
organizations will affect its success.
2.4.2 Litigation
For organizations that "rely primarily on legal advocacy, there is great faith in the
fairness of the law," explains Berry (1977). He found that the "lobbyists for these organizations
accord much greater legitimacy to the federal court system than they do to administrative
agencies." 3 Having the capacity to translate general environmental values into legal arguments
requires hiring lawyers. Litigation is only available on regular basis "to those groups that have
made a conscious, organizational decision to allocate resources to legal work on an ongoing
basis."4
When environmental organizations engage in legal action, they move the debate from the
public sphere into the courtrooms, where it becomes a battle between lawyers. Hays (1987)
concluded that the judges have become less receptive to the arguments of environmental groups
in courts, especially when they contest regulatory decisions, because as "the agencies became
more careful with respect to procedure, the court began to defer to their technical expertise." 5
'Dowie, 1995, chapter 3.
2 Hays, 1987, p. 416.
3 Berry, 1977, p. 267.
4 Ibid., p. 225.
5 Hays, 1987, p. 489.
2.4.3 Direct action
With alternative ecological organizations comes a more skeptical view of government
and greater use of direct action as a tactic. Berry (1977) included direct action as part of what he
calls the strategy of embarrassment and confrontation:
The underlying premise of this strategy is that sufficient exposure of bad policy will act
to stimulate governmental officials to change such policy. Lobbyists whose tactics are
guided by this strategy strongly believe that if a minimum of publicity can reveal what
people in government are doing, those same people will find themselves under a new set
of circumstances for future actions in that their behavior will be critically scrutinized. ...
The more a group sees itself, because of its policy views, in an adversary position toward
governmental institutions, the more likely it is to adopt this strategy as its modus
operandi. Groups imbued with this strategy have a rather hostile, untrusting view of
government.'
While scholars have frequently remarked on how the tactics of information and litigation
affect staff, they have not examined how the tactic of direct action affects staff. Yet to perform
direct action on a regular basis, as Greenpeace does, requires investing in direct action teams that
include climbers, divers, handlers of zodiac boats, etc. And once an organization has a direct
action team, it will use them just as another organization will use its lawyers and scientists. Thus
direct action becomes embedded in the organization.
Where the tactics of information and litigation are associated with targeting institutions of
government, the tactic of direct actions is associated with the media. As Wapner (1996) wrote
about Greenpeace:
Through presenting alternative images of the environment, bearing witness, criticizing
predominant modes of conduct, and exposing ecological atrocities, Greenpeace tries to
express itself through communication technologies to joggle the minds of the world. It
literally speaks through the air waves spanning the globe. Satellite dishes, fax machines,
video cameras, and electronic mail services are the tools of Greenpeace's political action.
And these are, essentially, entry ways into the world media network. Global
communication systems are the sites for disseminating an ecological sensibility.2
' Berry, 1977, pp. 268-269.
2 Wapner, 1996, pp. 156-157.
While alternative ecologically oriented groups are more likely to use direct action to
capture media attention, the media is a target of most environmental groups. In his survey
research Dalton learned that media visibility is so vital to environmental groups that "86 percent
of all groups say they are often in contact with the media."' "The populist base of
environmentalism makes the relationship between these groups and the mass media especially
important, because media coverage is vital to developing and mobilizing public support in order
to tilt the political balance."2 The media provide access to possibly the greatest power of
environmentalism, the general public, who are often strong supporters of environmental
protection. Polling data in the US reveals consistent support for environmental initiatives. For
example, when asked whether growth should be sacrificed in order to preserve and protect the
environment, respondents answering yes increased from 38% in 1976 to 64% in 1990; while
those answering no dropped from 21% to 15%; and those answering don't know plummeted from
41% to 21%. 3
Media alone, however, is seldom enough to catalyze change in any organization.
Releasing research results, for example, is a method many environmental groups use to try to
capture media attention: either through a press conference, press release, or direct contact with a
reporter. Yet unless the research contains dramatic findings, "there will be little follow-up by the
press after the initial denials and rebuttals by corporate or government officials." 4 Media-related
actions need to be followed up with lobbying, litigation, or some other tactic.
Dalton, 1994, p. 253.
2 Ibid., p. 175.
3 Kempton, Boster, and Hartley, 1995, p. 4.
4 Berry, 1977, p. 248.
2.4.4 Development
Development is a term I use to encompass projects that combine environmental progress
with economic development. Development tactics are growing in use among environmental
organizations as they expand their work to include targets outside of the institutions of
government. Princen, et al. (1994) in their research on environmental groups in world politics
found that "Instead of calling for action or mobilizing citizens to put pressure on governments,
NGOs often just do the work themselves."I
An example of a development tactic is the "Greenfreeze" refrigerator. In the early 1990s
Greenpeace Germany, two medical doctors, and a small refrigerator manufacturer from the
former East Germany created a new refrigerator -- Greenfreeze -- that used a mixture of propane
and butane instead of ozone depleting chemicals as the refrigerants. The successful marketing of
Greenfreeze by Greenpeace Germany catalyzed the larger refrigerator producers in Europe to
switch to non-ozone depleting refrigerants in their products.2 Another development example is
the World Wildlife Fund project in Zambia to halt poachers from slaughtering wildlife by
involving residents in anti-poaching and conservation operations, and reinvesting revenues from
tourists and safari hunting into local communities.' It is my proposition that development tactics
will become increasingly important as environmental organizations seek to catalyze
technological transformations outside of government action.
2.4.5 Issue framing through ideas
Issue framing is more of a strategic approach rather than a tactic. Typically
environmental groups initiate issue campaigns by trying to create a crisis that decision makers
need to address. The crisis approach to attracting attention, usually media attention, to an issue
' Princen, Finger, and Manno, 1994, p. 227.
2 Verheul and Vergragt, 1994, pp. 316-318.
involves defining the problem and identifying responsible actors. This is what Deborah Stone
calls, causal stories, strategically crafted problems that assign consequences to the actions of
specific individuals or institutions.
[C]ausal theories, like other modes of problem definition, are efforts to control
interpretations and images of difficulties. Political actors create causal stories to describe
harms and difficulties, to attribute them to actions of other individuals and organizations,
and thereby to invoke government power to stop the harm.2
Effective causal stories create outrage. As Stone observes, people "are far more likely to
organize around a threatened or actual loss than around a potential gain. ... Taking away
something a person already has will stimulate strong emotions: anger, resentment, and a sense of
injustice. 3 A common theme in causal stories from anti-toxic activists is: companies knowingly
poison our children, the environment, and us, and the government consciously allows this to
happen. While causal stories are necessary for capturing the attention of decision makers in
government, corporations, and households -- i.e., placing an environmental issue on the public
agenda -- they are insufficient for success.
When environmentalists put forth ideas they become active in solving the problems.
While environmental thinkers like Rachel Carson and to a lesser extent Barry Commoner are
known for developing and promoting ideas that have influenced decision makers, environmental
groups are less recognized for playing this role. Yet a few researchers, notably Princen, et al.
(1994) and Gottlieb (1993), have identified examples of environmental organizations developing
and using ideas to catalyze change.
As Princen, et al. (1994), explain, environmental "NGOs are increasingly prominent
forces in framing environmental issues. They help establish a common language and,
Wapner, 1996, p. 86.
2 Stone, 1988, p. 165.
3 Ibid., p. 175.
sometimes, common world-views."' Princen, et al. observed in their research on environmental
groups in international affairs that "new ideas have not come from governments or even
designated international organizations, but from environmental lobbies and activist groups." 2 For
example, it was "Greenpeace and the Sierra Club that introduced the concepts of zero discharge
and pollution prevention in the Great Lakes area." 3
And the environmental historian Robert Gottlieb learned that it was anti-toxic activists
who developed the concept of toxics use reduction:4 "Initially conceived at a retreat in New York
State in the summer of 1987 attended by organizers from the National Toxics Campaign, the
PIRGs [Public Interest Research Groups], Greenpeace, and Clean Water Action, a new campaign
[toxics use reduction] was launched to advocate changes at the front end of the production
system."5 Gottlieb observed that the concept of toxics use reduction created a "major alternative
environmental policy approach" and an "effective organizing strategy" for antitoxic activists,
"inspired new legislation" (it became embedded in law in a few states, including Massachusetts'
Toxics Use Reduction Act of 1989), and provided an "opportunity to redefine relations among
6
constituent groups," especially labor and the environmental movement.
There lurks within ideas a latent power that environmental organizations have not
aggressively pursued. As John Maynard Keynes wrote in The General Theory ofEmployment,
Interest, and Money, "The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the
Princen, Finger, and Manno, 1994, p. 226.
2Ibid., p. 226.
Ibid., p. 227.
4 Toxics use reduction is when manufacturers address environmental problems by preventing pollution through in-
rocess changes rather than controlling pollution at the end-of-the-pipe (Gottlieb, 1993).
Ibid., pp. 302-303.6 Ibid., p. 303.
world is ruled by little else. ... I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas."
I agree with Princen, et. al., that the development and promotion of innovative ideas and,
I add, challenging technology goals are areas where environmental organizations frequently
exhibit leadership. It is environmental organizations who are willing to promote ideas like zero
discharge and goals to diffuse the cleanest production technologies in the face of opposition.
2.4.6 The dynamics of tactics
Lacking in the analyses on the use of tactics is how target institutions can affect the
tactics and other strategic choices of environmental groups. As Donald Sch6n emphasized in his
research on the diffusion of ideas, the media:
have their own thresholds and place their own criteria on the formulation of ideas to be
diffused. These requirements are not merely technical. There are journalistic
requirements that events fit the prevailing myths of news. There are semantic
requirements for 'catchiness.' The very ability to express an idea in a phrase ... may be
critical. Through such requirements, media transform the ideas themselves.2
To recognize that targets affect tactics and other strategic choices of environmental
organizations is to recognize that change is a dynamic process. The affect of the feedback loops
-- from target actors and opponents to environmental organizations - is twofold. First, I would
expect to see certain tactics associated more frequently with certain institutions (see next section
for details). Second, I would expect that antagonists, those opposed to the goals of
environmental organizations, would affect the ideas, causal stories, and goals of
environmentalists. Environmental groups will need to change their framing of an issue to adjust
to the responses from antagonists.
' Keynes, 1936, p. 383.
2 Sch6n, 1971, p. 135.
Another undeveloped dimension in the literature on tactics is how environmental
organizations target multiple actors, often times simultaneously. The literature largely sees
environmental organizations as targeting single institutional settings -- i.e., government
institutions, civil society, and corporations -- one at a time.1 Princen, et al. (1994) did emphasize
the need for environmental groups to target local (i.e., communities) and global or regional
bodies (e.g., the International Joint Commission) to succeed in international politics. Although
they saw environmentalists being more effective if they operated outside the domain of national
states (discussed in more detail in the next section). And Keck and Sikkink (1998) see advocacy
networks targeting different institutions in a staged process that leads up to government actors
(see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 Stages of advocacy network influence: Keck & Sikkink2
Issue Influence .influence Influence Influence
creation - discursive - institutional - policy change -- state
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organizations
As environmental groups seek to change the forces of production, it is my proposition
that they will target multiple actors simultaneously, moving back and forth between state and
non-state targets both to diffuse their goals and in their search for prominent vulnerable targets.
The model of government as the center of where technology change begins is breaking down.
'For example, see Berry, 1977; Berry, 1999; Hays, 1987; Vogel, 1978; Wapner, 1996.
2 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 25.
2.5 When are environmental organizations likely to catalyze change?
Reflecting the institutional focus of the research, the elements identified by scholars of
environmental (and related) organizations as necessary for environmental success vary with the
institutional target: technical expertise and media for institutions of government; confrontation
and passion for grassroots campaigns targeting corporations; alliances for transnational issue
campaigns; and innovative strategies and tactics for civil society.
2.5.1 Technical expertise versus confrontation
The strategic use of information has been identified by Hays (1987), Berry (1977; 1999),
Keck and Sikkink (1998), Mitchell, et al. (1992), among others, as important to the success of
environmental organizations in creating change in government institutions. Berry (1999)
concluded in The New Liberalism that:
{The] watchword of these organizations [citizen groups] was not 'power to the people'
but 'policy expertise.' The citizen lobbies were built around the most conventional of
political assumptions: information is power. ... The mobilization of resources and their,
conversion into political assets by liberal citizen groups has had a profound effect on the
political agenda. The clearest case is in environmental politics.'
Important to the success of technical expertise, Berry observed, is media attention: "These
groups enjoy extraordinary media attention and respect. Their success with the media is surely
tied to their success in influencing the Congress."2 Success in congressional politics, according
to Berry, results from the combination of: money plus technical expertise (which generates
information) plus media attention.
Berry's positive assessment of the successes of national environmental organizations in
congressional politics contrasts with, yet mirrors the conclusions of Dowie (1995) and Gottlieb
(1993). They found alternative ecological organizations to be very successful at both stopping
the siting of and shutting down waste disposal facilities -- i.e., incinerators and landfills.
It can be argued (though it is difficult to prove) that grassroots environmental resistance
during the past five to ten years has stopped more direct pollution than all the nationals'
litigation combined. What is beyond dispute is that anti-toxics activism has been pivotal
in turning industry toward genuine waste reduction.3
Dowie and Gottlieb attribute the successes of the grassroots (alternative) ecological
groups to their persistence and unwillingness to back down from their goals. "Today, grassroots
anti-toxic environmentalism is a far more serious threat to polluting industries than the
mainstream environmental movement" because they "stubbornly refuse to surrender or
compromise. They simply cannot afford to."4 Living in communities suffering the
consequences of pollution they have the incentive to fight. "Grassroots organizations use many
of the same tactics as mainstream groups -- principally lobbying and negotiation -- but they come
to the table with an indignation that only a victim can display."5 Outrage, persistence, and
unwavering support of a campaign's goals have led to success at the local level.
The similarities between Berry's analysis of mainstream groups and the Dowie/Gottlieb
analysis of alternative groups are that both groups have succeeded in different institutional
contexts using similar tactics. The differences are in terms of: goals, with more environmentally
demanding goals set by the alternative groups; styles, confrontation versus collaboration; and
effects, with the alternative groups having a greater effect in reducing pollution (at least
according to Dowie). The strengths of these two types of environmental organizations -- the
expertise of the mainstream groups and the passion and goals of the alternative groups -- have
left many analysts of the environmental movement, including Dowie and Gottlieb,
recommending better collaboration and cooperation between them.
'Berry, 1999, p. 156.
2 lbid., pp. 156 and 159.
3 Dowie, 1995, p. 133.
4 Dowie, 1995, p. 133.
sIbid., p. 132.
2.5.2 Alliances and networks
Keck and Sikkink's research on advocacy networks reinforces the argument for more
collaboration and better cooperation within the environmental movement. While the theoretical
influence on their research is new social movements theory -- their networks are connected by
common beliefs rather than common resources -- the strength of networks are the people and
organizations involved; i.e., the resources. Networks, Keck and Sikkink conclude, "are more
effective where they are strong and dense. Network strength and density involves the total
number and size of organizations in the network, and the regularity of their exchanges."'
An alliance of mainstream and alternative groups would combine the passion,
knowledge, and environmentally aggressive goals of grassroots groups with the technical and
financial resources of the nationals. To promote intra-movement alliances Dowie recommends
that the mainstream ecological groups reach out to the "state, local, and regional grassroots
organizations."2
A corollary to the value of a mainstream-alternative alliance is the value of
environmentalists allying with other interest groups, especially labor. David Vogel's research
into business and politics (mentioned above), for example, illuminates the value of environment-
labor alliances. Schnaiberg and Gould (1994) conclude that "If environmentalists form new and
enduring coalitions with labor, community, or social equity movement groups or organizations,
they actually have a greater chance of dominating the agenda, through political veto power over
economic elites and their government supporters."'
Environment-business alliances, however, are considered too vulnerable to cooptation by
researchers who support the stronger intra-environmental movement alliance. Schnaiberg and
1 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 206.
2 Dowie, 1995, p. 73.
Gould, for example, note that the formation of alliances between environmental organizations
and "interests of the treadmill" of production (i.e., business) have limited the expansion of
ecological protection and created tensions with "the less powerful [who] are essentially
marginalized in this alliance." 2
I agree that strong alliances within the environmental movement and across other
movements and interests will certainly increase opportunities for success in achieving the goals
of issue campaigns. I disagree with the conclusion that alliances with business interests are
always a bad idea for the environment. That perspective views businesses as a monolith and
ignores the very real differences between manufacturers and users of materials. Since companies
that purchase materials (call them "users") from other companies (call them "material
manufacturers") to assemble a product usually have no financial interest in material production,
they can switch to more environmentally preferable products with little to no adverse economic
effect. The distinction between users and manufacturers creates tensions and opportunities for
environmental change in the market that are not acknowledged by scholars like Schnaiberg and
Gould.
Conversely, when environmental organizations compete rather than cooperate on the
same issue campaign they will be less likely to achieve their goals. When environmental
organizations cannot agree to common goals it becomes easy for antagonists to pit the competing
groups against each, ultimately undermining the campaigns of both organizations. And when
labor allies with business, it seriously weakens opportunities for environmental success,
especially with government institutions.
*Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994, p. 160.
2 ibid., p. 160.
2.5.3 Non-state actors and innovation in tactics
For Princen and Finger (1994) and Wapner (1996) success arises when environmental
organizations target non-state actors' and use a variety of less conventional tactics, including
ideas, symbols (i.e., capturing media attention), direct action, or development to catalyze change.
Princen, et al. (1994), for example, concluded that:
[NGO's are] effective agents of change to the extent that they operate independently of
states and do what states tend not to do. By performing such functions, rather than
lobbying others to perform them, NGOs can make a credible claim on legitimate
environmental representation, and they can do so in ways governments and corporations
cannot.2
When environmental organizations choose to operate outside of state institutions they
expand their potential targets to include individuals, communities, and corporations. In this new
type of organizing environment, environmentalists need to be selective and strategic when
choosing targets. For example, in the context of trying to catalyze technology change in
manufacturers, this would involve identifying and targeting key users of the manufacturer's
products; users, who if they changed their purchasing specifications, could have major
reverberations throughout a material's market. When environmentalists try to change markets
they need to understand how markets operate and who the key players are.
In his research on international environmental NGOs, Wapner (1996) found that the use
of unconventional tactics is an important element in persuading non-state actors to change
behavior.
The idea is to discover unconventional levers of power and employ nontraditional modes
of action [i.e., tactics] that can affect, if only unevenly and imperfectly, the global
community. This involves teasing out and utilizing nonformal channels and mechanisms
of political engagement or, put differently, manipulating forms of power that are
generally considered ineffectual in the larger context of so-called genuine politics.3
While "non-state actors" includes civil society and corporations, Wapner and Princen and Finger primarily mean
civil society.
2 Princen, Finger, and Manno, 1994, p. 230.
3 Wapner, 1996, p. 159.
When environmentalists use unconventional tactics they politicize "the social, economic, and
cultural spheres" of life; they are extending environmental politics to civil society.'
In Wapner's unconventional tactics I see the value of innovative tactics. The notion that
innovation is important to success is not developed in the field of environmental organizations.
Yet innovative tactics and ideas, especially those that catch antagonists by surprise, I argue are
important to the success of issue campaigns. Innovation and surprise help to counter the massive
resource deficit (in relation to antagonists in the business community) environmentalists often
confront in technology campaigns. Vogel (1996), for example, in his research on business and
politics observed that the successes of environmentalists in Congress were in part attributable to
businesses being caught by surprise: The Clean Air Act of 1970 placed strong demands on the
automobile companies, in part, because "they were largely caught unprepared in 1970; however,
seven years later they were well organized for a major legislative struggle." 2
Innovative tactics and new ideas can create new opportunities for change by: catching
opponents off-guard; capturing new resources; and creating incentives, such as a price premium,
for change. Tactical innovation includes using old tactics in new situations, creating new tactics,
and using old tactics in new combinations.
2.5.4 Conditions for success: achieving technology diffusion with resources, alliances, and
innovation
Missing from analyses of the elements important to success is the concept of diffusion:
that success emerges when a campaign grows by having more and more actors adopt and
implement the goals. An issue campaign is similar to the diffusion of ideas as described by
Donald Schn, where ideas "gain widespread acceptance through the efforts of those who push
'Ibid., p. 159.
2 Vogel, 1996, p. 383.
or ride them through the fields of force created by the interplay of interests and commitments.
... When the ideas are taken up by people already powerful in society this gives them a kind of
legitimacy and completes their power to change public policy."I
For an environmental technology campaign to succeed key organizations need to adopt
and implement the campaign's goal. Ideally the goal of diffusion is to reach the point of critical
mass, where diffusion becomes self sustaining.2 As part of the diffusion process, goals, causal
stories, and tactics will need to evolve, especially in response to opponents. As Sch6n observed,
when "ideas enter channels leading public consideration in such a way as to threaten a social
system, they stir up conflict, formal or informal."' When an issue campaign stops adapting --
goals, problems, targets, and tactics remain the same -- to challenges from opponents the
campaign is effectively dead, even if organizations continue to pour resources into it.
Successful technology campaigns will need a mix of elements: resources in the form of
technical expertise, media, and alliances; innovative tactics and ideas; initiatives targeting actors
in multiple institutional settings; and diffusion across a range of organizations. This is a
challenging list of elements to pull together. But it is my contention that these elements are
necessary when the opposition is organized, prepared, and willing to invest considerable
resources to oppose change. Businesses, as discussed below, are becoming more savvy and
aggressive in trying to achieve their goals.
2.6 Failure: the opposition element
When environmental organizations try to affect technology change they will confront
opposition. As Dowie (1995) remarked, few movements "have stimulated such virulent.
Sch6n, 1971, p. 128.
2 "A crucial concept in understanding the social nature of the diffusion process is the critical mass, a point in the
process when diffusion becomes self-sustaining. The notion of the critical mass comes from scholars of social
antagonism against themselves as American environmentalism, which, by its very nature,
threatens the most sacred institution of our culture -- private property." 2 The successes of
environmental groups have "stimulated a well-organized, well-financed backlash." 3 Thus
success will involve effectively countering the ideas and actions of the opposition.
The best analyses I have read on the success of the environmental opposition were
written by the David Vogel (1996) and Samuel Hays (1987).
Vogel identified four key elements to business success in congressional politics:
1. Form a broad coalition (remain united rather than divided).
2. Run a well-organized campaign -- don't get caught by surprise.
3. Make convincing arguments (in the minds of the public and legislators).
4. Have wide geographic distribution.
Vogel identified coalition formation as the "most important factor" affecting the ability of
business to meet its goals: "the broader a coalition it can form to support is policy goals, the
more likely it is to achieve them."4 Especially important for corporations (as well as
environmental organizations) is having labor's support. When "labor was either neutral or
supported the environmentalist position, business did less well. By contrast, the
environmentalists, like industry, triumphed only when organized labor did not oppose them."5
Running a well-organized campaign is a vague concept in success. Vogel highlights two
main points here. First, business must show up. They are unlikely to win unless they organize:
"There is nothing automatic about business access to government." Like any interest group,
business must communicate its positions to legislators and their staffs.6 Second, "don't get
movements, and in recent years the concept has become useful in studies of the diffusion of interactive innovations"
(Rogers, 1995, p. 313).
Schon, 1971, p. 136.
2 Dowie, 1995, p. 83.
' Ibid., p. 83.
4 Vogel, 1996, p. 381.
' Ibid., p. 382.
6 Ibid., p. 383.
caught by surprise." For example, "The major industrial stationary sources of pollution fared
relatively poorly on the PSD [prevention of significant deterioration] issue in 1977, in part
because they were not prepared for the degree of political opposition to their efforts to weaken
PSD requirements."' Today business knows the rules of the anti-environmental lobbying game
and is much less likely to be caught by surprise in Washington, DC.
The third element, making convincing arguments, is a corollary to the first. Business
arguments are more persuasive when their goals connect with employment goals: Congress is
more likely to "respond to labor's concerns about employment" than it is to "industry's
arguments about profits."2 Lastly industry sectors with wide geographic distribution have an
advantage in that they have more representatives and senators who are likely to be persuaded by
their arguments. "The more a company or industry is an important factor in the economy of
either a state or a congressional district, the more likely it is to find a particular congressman or
senator response to its arguments."3
Businesses learned from the legislative battles of the 1970s. Today they pour resources
(especially when compared to environmental organizations) into lobbying legislative bodies and
regulatory agencies, and filing lawsuits. Hays, for example, observes that industries deflected
regulatory demands for more stringent pollution control technology by "arguing that the case for
harm had not been proved. They took up scientific issues as a major strategy of environmental
opposition by demanding far higher levels of proof before regulation." 4 And he concludes that
corporations have "had considerable success in neutralizing the force of positive administrative
action. Despite the drama of events in which public agencies sought to convey the message of
' Ibid., p. 383.
2 Ibid., p. 385.
'Ibid., p. 386.
4 Hays, 1987, pp. 338-339.
persistent victories over the regulated, those very regulated, by the continuous weight of their
demands, were able to shape much of the world of environmental affairs."" At a more general
level, Vogel found that American "business community [has] become significantly more and
better organized [i.e., politically organized] during the last three decades." 2
With years of experience in fighting environmental laws and regulations, the business
sector has become quite adept at opposing change. If environmentalists are going to achieve
their goals of greening industry they will need to learn how to compete effectively with their
antagonists. Vogel's research on business in politics identifies key areas where
environmentalists will need to perform well: alliance formation (both inside and outside of the
movement ), surprise, and persuasiveness (develop compelling ideas and solutions).
2.7 From interest group pluralism to production pluralism?
In the theory of interest group pluralism public policies emerge from interest groups with
competing demands interacting with decision makers in government, be they regulators or
legislators. 3 Central to the concept of interest group pluralism is access: competing groups have
access to politicians or regulators. 4 Implied is that the groups with access have the capacity to
influence decision makers, even if they do not achieve their goal. Pluralists like Vogel (1996)
contend that the "economic, ideological, and political resources available to business to shape
public policy do not provide any unique advantages. They either do not automatically translate
into political influence or they are counterbalanced by similar or equivalent resources available
to other groups in society."' To the degree that environmental organizations are strong and
effective, they lend support to the relevance of interest group theory. Berry's (1999) research on
' Ibid., p. 315.
2 Vogel, 1996, p. 318.
3 Dahl, 1961; Truman, 1951.
4 Truman, 1951.
citizen groups, for example, supports the continuing vitality of interest group theory: "Interest
groups are a vehicle for articulating what we care the most intensely about. Citizen groups, with
their ideological zeal and strong issue focus, offer members a loud, passionate, and aggressive
voice in Washington politics."2
Vogel (1996) presents a nuanced perspective of pluralism, where pluralism alternates
with elitism depending on the level of opposition: "there is no need to choose between the
pluralist and elitist depictions of business power in America," he advises us.3 Rather, whether a
nation tends to pluralism or elitism depends on the level of political opposition: "students of
business power need to pay as much attention to the political organization and influence of non-
business constituencies as they do to that of business." 4
As environmental and other NGOs diversify their institutional targets to include
corporations, civil society, as well as the state, it raises the question of whether pluralism is
spreading to other institutions. Wapner (1996) observed the widening political domain in his
research on international environmental organizations. With the traditional view of politics as
solely the domain of the state yielding to a much broader reality, he concluded that "it is
imperative to expand our notion of politics itself ... to include nonstatist modes of governance."i
While Wapner saw politics expanding to civil society, I see a comparable need to expand
politics to production; especially since (as noted at the outset of this chapter) production
decisions affect the environment, public health, and occupational health. Interest group
pluralism needs to be adapted to the changing world of what is "political." From this perspective
we can begin to think about production pluralism, where competing interests and values,
'Vogel, 1996, p. 300.
2 Berry, 1999, p. 167.
3 Vogel, 1996, p. 314.
4 Ibid., p. 319.
including environmental organizations and the state, seek to change the forces of production. I
define production pluralism as arising when NGOs have access to corporate executives and the
capacity to influence their decisions.
Vogel (1978), however, is pessimistic about the capacity of public interest pressure to
affect corporate change without government support. The public interest movement, he stated,
will not succeed in its efforts to change corporate behavior because it cannot acquire the
resources needed to counterbalance corporate resources independent of "decisions made either
by some public agency, the courts, or the legislature." 2 The only way Vogel foresaw a company
making "decisions not dominated by the logic of capital accumulation" was through the "direct
intervention of the government." 3
And the resource gap between public interest groups and business is wide. Just in terms
of traditional interest group pluralism environmental groups confront a deep resource gap. For
example, the political action committees of energy and natural resource-based corporations
outspent all environmental political action committees by $20.7 million in 1992 ($22 million for
corporations versus $1.3 million for environmental organizations). 4
Another growing advantage for transnational corporations is they increasingly own the
major media outlets and this affects what reporters cover.
[The Founders] didn't count on huge private corporations that would own not only the
means ofjournalism but also vast swaths of the territory that journalism should be
covering. According to a recent study done by the Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press for the Columbia Journalism Review, more than a quarter ofjournalists
polled said they had avoided pursuing some newsworthy stories that might conflict with
the financial interests of their news organizations or advertisers. And many thought that
complexity or lack of audience appeal causes newsworthy stories not to be pursed in the
first place.'
'Wapner, 1996, p. 163.
2 Vogel, 1980, p. 624.
3 Vogel, 1978, p. 225.
4 Dowie, 1995, p. 193.
5 Moyers, 2001, p. 13.
Corporate control of the media means environmental groups will have an even more difficult
time of building public opinion in their favor.
These barriers to state pluralism will hold, and even more so, in production pluralism,
where environmental groups have fewer access points to corporate decision makers. There are
good reasons to be skeptical about the emergence of production pluralism, where multiple actors
attempt to make corporate decisions more publicly accountable. Yet, it is my contention that
social movement organizations, including environmental organizations, are beginning to succeed
in pressuring corporations to change production decisions to reflect demands for improved work
place conditions, better environmental performance, and more equitable wages. Vogel did not
foresee the emergence of sophisticated market campaigns to transform business behavior.
Production pluralism, like interest group pluralism, will only emerge when political opposition
forms to challenge business as usual.
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3 Research design: a comparative historical analysis of environmental campaigns to
transform the paper industry in Sweden and the US, 1980-1998
This is a comparative analysis of how national environmental organizations tried to affect
technology change in the manufacture of bleached pulp and paper in Sweden and the US
between 1980 and 1998. The emphasis of the research is on the issue campaigns run by national
environmental organizations to change bleaching processes. The principal campaigns I examine
are those of: Greenpeace Sweden and the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) in
Sweden; and Environmental Defense and Greenpeace USA in the US. The campaign of another
national environmental group in the US, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), is also
examined, although with less detail because it was involved for a shorter period and did not try to
affect change through the market.
3.1 Selecting the geographical context: Sweden and the US
National environmental groups are the center of my research because they typically take
a leadership role in national-level environmental initiatives. They also have the resources
relative to state and local groups to challenge major industry sectors like the paper industry at the
national level. Yet by focusing on national groups I am vulnerable to criticisms from
environmental movement researchers like Dowie (1995) and Gottlieb (1993) that these
organizations represent the least effective part of the environmental movement; therefore any
victories will represent at best incremental change. While it is beyond the scope of this research
project to assess in detail the role of state and local groups, I note prominent examples of state
and local initiatives, including the campaign of local environmental groups in North Carolina and
Tennessee to dramatically reduce water pollution from the former Champion International mill in
Canton, North Carolina;' the lawsuit by the Surfriders Foundation to require the Louisiana-
Pacific mill in Samoa, California to reduce its wastewater discharges to the Pacific Ocean; and
the promotion of a bill in the Maine legislature to eliminate organochlorine pollution from paper
mills by the Natural Resources Council of Maine and iother environmental groups; These are all
examples from the US because no similar cases of local activism emerged in Sweden. I will also
assess the relevance of the Dowie/Gottlieb critique of national environmental groups as
organizations compromised by money and professional staff.
I chose pulp and paper manufacturing because it is a major global industry sector with
potentially large environmental impacts. Worldwide the pulp and paper industry accounts for
about 2.5 percent of industrial production, employs 3.5 million people, and has $260 billion in
sales.2 The industry's potential environmental impacts mirror its size. The paper industry
consumes 279 million tons of fiber each year, with 160 million tons coming from virgin wood
fiber (i.e., trees). 3 Almost 30% of the virgin wood fiber is from plantation forests,4 which
displace species diverse forests. In the US, 5 the pulp and paper industry is the country's "largest
industrial process water user" as well as the third largest source of toxic chemicals behind the
chemical and primary metal industries, releasing 228 million pounds of toxic chemicals to the
environment or for treatment at waste disposal facilities in 1996.6
I chose Sweden and the US because each nation is a major producer of bleached pulp and
paper products and had active pulp and paper campaigns by at least two national environmental
International Paper now owns Champion International. Champion International sold the Canton mill before being
urchased by International Paper.
IIED, 1996, pp. 18-19.
3 The remaining fiber is from recycled paper (107 million tons) and non-wood sources of fiber (12 million tons)
(Ibid., p. 32).
4 Ibid., p. 34.
5 Lacking global pollution data, I use American data as an indicator of the industry's potential pollution impacts.
6 US EPA, 1998, pp. 159, 172, and 177.
organizations. During the 1980-1998 period the US was the world's largest producer of both
pulp and paper products, while Sweden was the fourth-fifth largest producer of pulp and sixth
largest producer of paper.1 As noted above, two national environmental organizations in Sweden
and three in the US were very active in trying to affect change in the industry. Four of the five
tried to affect change in the market (only NRDC did not) and all five tried to affect change in
government or government-sponsored institutions. By government-sponsored institutions I mean
international or regional bodies like the Helsinki Commission (established to protect the Baltic
Sea) and the Nordic Swan (ecolabeling program of the Nordic countries).
The pulp and paper campaigns in Sweden and the US provide an opportunity to examine
how environmental organizations tried to change the same manufacturing process (the bleaching
of paper), at the same time, and over the same problem (chlorinated organics, especially dioxins,
in water pollution). Initiatives to reduce water pollution from the paper industry blossomed in
both nations when dioxins were discovered in mill effluent in 1987.
Technologically, the industry in both nations was quite similar. Kraft pulping was the
dominant method for extracting cellulose from trees.2 In kraft pulping chemicals dissolve the
lignin-cellulose bond. Both nations used chlorine as the principal bleaching agent for whitening
kraft pulp, which is dark brown.3
Yet there were slight technological differences between the industries that may have
made Swedish manufacturers more receptive to demands for investing in pollution prevention
technologies. By 1980, the majority of Swedish bleached kraft pulp mills had invested in the
pollution prevention technology, oxygen delignification. The use of oxygen in bleaching reduces
the amount of chlorine used in bleaching, thereby reducing the chlorinated organics in mill
' Bonifant and Ratcliffe, 1994. For more details on the industry in each nation see Chapter 5.
2 pulp is the intermediary product between trees and paper.
3 For more details on pulping and bleaching see Chapter 5.
wastewater. In the US, bleached kraft pulp mills invested in the end-of-pipe technology of
secondary wastewater treatment to control water pollution rather than pollution prevention
technologies like oxygen delignification. The slight differences in technology mean the nations
are not perfect comparisons: the paper industry in each nation would confront the problems of
dioxin and other chlorinated organics in wastewater from slightly different technological
orientations. Despite the practical challenge of finding two nations with nearly identical
characteristics for comparative analysis, the campaigns in each nation are illustrative of how
environmental groups try to change technology, the challenges they confront, and causal
conditions affecting success and failure.
3.2 Using comparative historical analysis to define causal conditions
Comparative historical research is a method, as the sociologist Charles Ragin (1987)
explained, for examining "specific historical sequences or outcomes and their causes across a set
of similar cases."' The selection of outcome and specification of causal conditions relevant to
that outcome, Ragin emphasized "are crucially important parts of a comparative investigation." 2
The outcomes I examined for are the technology goals the environmental organizations set for
their pulp and paper campaigns. I ascertained the technology goals of the environmental
organizations through published materials and interviews with staff. The desired goals of all the
organizations involved, as it turns out, were clear and not a matter of debate. Similarly the
technology changes made in the paper industry are well-documented in the industry's trade
press.
In the previous chapter I specified causal conditions that researchers have identified as
important to causing, as well as opposing, change in public and environmental policy. I
' Ragin, 1987, p. 13.
2 Ragin, 1994, p. 119.
examined whether these conditions were important in attempts to change pulp bleaching in
Sweden and the US; and incorporated other conditions that arose in the course of the empirical
research. As Ragin writes, comparative research is a combination of deductive and inductive
reasoning: "deductive because initial theoretical notiohs serve as guides in the examination of
causally relevant similarities and differences. ... It is inductive because the investigator
determines which of the theoretically relevant similarities and differences are operative by
examining empirical cases."1
The research on how environmental groups tried to affect technology change in Sweden
(Chapters 7-8) and the US (Chapters 9-10) provided the data for defining the goals of the
environmental groups, identifying the organizations they targeted, determining the level of
success they achieved with each target actor, identifying and revising the causal conditions most
relevant to change in the paper industry, and assessing the overall affect on technology change in
each nation's industry. The comparative analysis will involve analyzing which causal conditions
were most relevant to environmental organizations achieving, or not achieving, their goals and
how they varied across types of organizations targeted -- i.e., buyers, manufacturers, and
government institutions -- as well as nations. Since each environmental group's campaign
targeted more than one organization, each campaign provides a set of cases for evaluating the
relevant causal conditions. For example, the SSNC targeted buyers of paper, manufacturers of
pulp and paper products, and the Nordic Swan (the ecolabeling program for the Nordic
countries). Each of these targets becomes a case in its own right because it offers an opportunity
to assess the relationship between outcome achieved and causal conditions.
* Ragin, 1987, p. 45.
To assess the level of success achieved by environmental organizations I build from the
work of sociologist William Gamson. In his path-breaking work on evaluating success in social
movement organizations, The Strategy ofProtest (1975, revised 1990), Gamson evaluated
success based on new advantages and acceptance. New advantages is the extent to which the
challenging group achieved its goal.' And acceptance is the degree to which an antagonist
recognizes the challenging group as a valid representative for a set of interests. I will assess the
acceptance, or what Burstein, et al. (1995) call responsiveness, of target actors at three levels:
access, decision, and implementation. 2 Environmental groups achieve access when they are able
to sit at the table with decision makers to define their view of the problem and solutions. While
access is basic to success, it can be a difficult step to accomplish, especially when targeting a
corporation directly. A decision is when the target organization announces -- either privately to
the environmental organization or publicly, usually through a press release -- that it will adopt a
new technology (or policy) or change its purchasing specifications. Implementation is the actual
purchasing of the technology or product; or if a government policy, it is ensuring that others
comply with the regulation.
Burstein, et al. (1995) emphasized two values in analyzing different levels of movement
success. First, it "enables us to distinguish between movements that really produce social change
and those that win only symbolic victories (such as gaining the passage of legislation that is not
subsequently enforced)." Second, it allows us to assess "whether factors that affect success at
one level" (e.g., access) are the "the same as those that influence success at another" level (e.g.,
implementation).3 And by analyzing levels of responsiveness'across institutions (e.g.,
' Gamson, 1990, pp. 29 and 32.
2 Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander (1995) developed a more refined list of types of policy responsiveness: access,
agenda, policy (decision), output (implementation), impact, and structural.
' Ibid., p. 283.
corporations and regulatory agencies) we can develop a better understanding of the challenges
and opportunities environmentalists face when targeting different institutions.
To perform the comparative analysis -- where I assess the causal condition most relevant
to success/failure for target actors in similar institutions (either government institutions,
corporate purchasers of paper products, or manufacturers of bleached pulp) -- I built from the
Boolean approach to qualitative comparison as developed by Ragin (1987). In the Boolean-
based approach the presence or absence of causal conditions under which a certain outcome is
obtained are measured on a nominal-scale; i.e., a condition is either present ("I") or absent ("0").
The "absence of a cause," writes Ragin (1987), "has the same logical status as the presence of a
cause." The result is a "truth table" with all the cases as rows (although cases with exactly the
same presence/absence of causal conditions are treated as a single row) and the causal conditions
as columns.
For my research, the Boolean method of deifining causal conditions as present or absent
was useful because it illuminated patterns between outcomes and causal conditions. For
simplicity and clarity I used "Yes" or "No" rather than "1" or "0." Also in some cases the
conditions were on an ordinal-scale, i.e., they were present, but weakly present. In identifying
causal conditions, I heeded sociologist Stanley Lieberson's warning against making categories of
causal conditions too broad in order to reduce the number of variables to facilitate finding a
clearly relevant independent variable: do not exclude plausible causal variables to simplify
analysis because "the chances of an erroneous conclusion" rise when researchers do not "include
all possible causal variables."' Lieberson's admonitions are important because, to create clear
patterns of causality the tendency is to lump causal conditions together.
1Lieberson, 1992, p. 116.
From the comparative analysis I identified the causal conditions most relevant to creating
environmental change in different institutions. A caveat I recognize the need to highlight is that
these causal conditions are illustrative of a few campaigns to change the pulp and paper industry
as well as the data gleaned from existing literature. As Ragin noted, a downside to the
comparative method is it provides only modest empirical generalizations because of the modest
number of cases available to prove or disprove arguments.'
Finally I assessed the success of the environmental groups in catalyzing change in the
paper industry of their nation as a whole. Ideally, as the diffusion theorist Everett Rogers (1995)
emphasizes, agents of diffusion (he calls them "change agents") seek to create conditions at
which the diffusion of a technology reaches "critical mass," where diffusion becomes self
sustaining.2 To evaluate the degree of diffusion I used Rogers' five-part division of adopters:
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards:
Innovators: the first to develop and/or adopt a technology, representing the first 0-2.5%
to adopt a technology.
Early adopters: the next 13.5% to adopt the technology.
Early majority: the next 34% to adopt the technology.
Late majority: the next 34% to adopt the technology.
Laggards: the late 16% to adopt the technology.'
When environmental groups try to diffuse technology through government action, the
degree of technology diffusion is less of an issue: if a nation's regulatory agency enforces an
environmental law or regulation, adoption is 100%. While implementation is not always a
foregone conclusion, it has meant less need for a refined analysis of diffusion as developed by
Rogers. Yet with the movement away from government regulation to market forces, it raises the
need for more detailed technology diffusion analyses.
1 Ragin, 1987, p. 31.
2 Rogers, 1995, p. 313.
' Ibid., p. 262.
3.3 The data sources: interviews, industry statistics, trade press, print media, and
government publications
To define the causal conditions affecting implementation in corporations and regulatory
agencies I relied upon data from personal interviews and a variety of primary and secondary
literature sources. Interviews were conducted with key individuals in government institutions,
corporations and their trade associations, pulp and paper research institutes, as well as the
environmental organizations. The government institutions included the Swedish Environmental
Protect Agency (SEPA), Swedish Licensing Board, and United States Environmental Protection
Agency (US EPA). The corporations included Champion International, IKEA, Louisiana-
Pacific, Munksj6 Aspa Bruk, SCA Graphics, Sidra Cell, Time Inc., Union Camp, Westvaco, and
Weyerhaeuser. The trade associations were the Alliance for Environmental Technology,
American Forest and Paper Association and Swedish Forest Industries Association. The pulp
and paper research institutes were the Institute of Paper Science and Technology in Atlanta and
the Swedish Pulp and Paper Research Institute in Stockholm. And I interviewed the lead
organizers of the pulp and paper campaigns for each of the environmental groups: Environmental
Defense, Greenpeace Sweden, Greenpeace USA, Greenpeace Germany, Greenpeace
International, NRDC, and the SSNC. For the complete list of individuals interviewed see
Appendix 1.
The interviewing technique was qualitative and open-ended since my goal was to develop
a history of events, which as the sociologist Robert Weiss observes, "no one single person could
have observed in its totality."' "[S]tandardized question won't work" when integrating multiple
perspectives, Weiss explains, "because every respondent will have different observations to
Weiss, 1994, p. 9.
contribute."' My goal was to understand how the actions of environmental organizations shaped
events that affected, or attempted to affect, technology change. Questions asked varied with the
institutional setting of interviewees. Questions for staff in environmental groups focused on their
campaigns: how they developed, who they targeted and how, who they worked with, what was
the outcome, and why. Through the questioning I sought to learn their goals, problem
definitions, alliances, how they selected target organizations and tactics, and what they thought
was effective/ineffective and why. Questions for staff in corporations and regulatory agencies
focused on how and why they made specific decisions, and what influenced their decisions,
including both internal and external factors. And questions for staff in the national trade
associations focused on how they responded to demands from environmentalists to change
production, what they thought were legitimate concerns, and how they explained the final
outcomes in the industry as a whole.
Other primary data sources included annual reports from corporations and environmental
organizations, conference proceedings, Statistics of Paper, Paperboard, and Wood Pulp
(published annually by the American Forest and Paper Association), and internal documents
from the American Forest and Paper Association. 2 Trade press and newsprint media databases
were used to define trends in the rise (and fall) of environmental concerns in bleached paper
production. The Paper Industry Research Association (PIRA) database, "Paperbase
International," was used to track the emergence of environmental concerns with paper bleaching
in the international trade press.3 And Dow Jones Interactive, Lexis-Nexis, and ArtikelSSk were
Ibid., p. 9.
2 The internal AFPA documents were leaked to Greenpeace USA in 1987. Carol Van Strum gave me access to these
documents.
3 Paperbase includes references from over 260 journals from around the world beginning in 1970. It enables
searches by keywords, such as totally chlorine free paper, by nation, and by publication (see www.paperbase.org).
used to track the emergence of concerns with paper bleaching in major newspapers in Sweden
and the United States. Other prominent data sources on the industry included:
" the pulp and paper journals: Pulp and Paper, Pulp and Paper International, Svensk
Papperstidning, and TAPPI Journal;
e Lockwood Post's Directory of the Pulp, Paper, and Allied Trades; North American Pulp and
Paper Fact Book; International Fact and Price Book and International Pulp and Paper
Directory (all published annually by Miller Freeman, Inc.); and
" Stanford Research Institute, Chemical Economic's Handbook (which includes chemical use
by the paper industry sector in Western Europe, Japan, and North America).
I used the combination of data sources to identify the causal conditions that were
operational in each effort to persuade a target actor to adopt the technology goal of the
environmental organizations. The most valuable and insightful resources were the personal
interviews. And by interviewing actors across institutional contexts I developed a more balanced
picture of the conditions important to change (or stasis). The data sources in the literature were
used to confirm and fill-in details missing from the interviews.
'Svensk Papperstidning is the Swedish Pulp and Paper Journal. "TAPPI" stands for the Technical Association of
the Pulp and Paper Industry.
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4 Historic shifts in white paper production: the influence of consumer demand, fiber
supply, and technology innovation, 1800-1969
The writing of this chapter began as a short introduction into the demand for white
papers. Lacking a historical perspective, I hypothesized that demand for white papers was a
phenomenon of the 1950s when advertisers popularized the need for bright, white products.
Historical data, however, revealed my hypothesis to be woefully shortsighted. In fact, demand
for white paper and the association of whiter paper with higher quality dates back at least until
the early 1800s. Associating white paper with high quality was a constant among consumers
from 1800 to 1969. The changes in the 20th century were papers became whiter and more types
of white paper products were added to the market.
Between 1800 and 1969 white paper production under went many transformations: the
number of products, the pounds manufactured, and the whiteness of the papers increased with
product innovations and changes in consumer demand, fiber sources, production methods. To
tell the history, I divide the 170 years of change in white paper production into four periods.
Like interconnected lakes where water flows downstream from one to another, the periods
contain the dominant activities and technologies of that time, yet activities and technologies flow
across periods.
This chapter is a history of the technological development of bleached paper products in
North America and Europe. Technological innovations in the pulp and paper industry flowed
freely across the Atlantic. The development and evolution of the North American paper industry
and markets tracked Europe with a slight difference, the US typically followed Europe in
developing and adopting innovations in pulp and paper manufacturing. To understand the
context in which the technologies and products developed, this chapter also examines the market
and cultural factors that affected their emergence in the US.
The use of hypochlorite to increase rag fiber supply in the early 1800s marked the
beginning of chemical bleaching in the paper industry. Hypochlorite bleaching expanded rag
supply by whitening very dirty and colored rags. The next transformation arose in the second
half of the 19th century when trees replaced rags as the dominant source of fiber for paper. The
change from rag to trees made chemical bleaching essential to producing white printing and
writing papers. The third transformation began in the late 19th century with innovations in
printing technology and the demand from advertisers for whiter paper to better display their color
ads. The final transformation began in the post World War II years when bleached kraft pulp
became the dominant fiber source for bleached paper products. It was also in the 1950s when
advertisers renewed the centuries old association of whiteness with purity and cleanliness to
market disposable paper products.
4.1 White paper before chemical bleaching, 1100-1799
Today's common association of whiter paper with higher quality,' an association slightly
damaged by the bleaching wars of the 1980s and 1990s, is not a phenomenon of the post-World
War II era. It dates back to the early years of papermaking in the US Writing in the 1820s,
American papermaker Zenas Crane identified whiteness as an important criterion of higher
quality: 'higher quality paper meant, higher linen content, more uniform thickness of the sheets
in a ream, few flaws or blemishes, greater smoothness, and whiter color for white paper
[emphasis added]... Fine paper also was stronger and more durable.' 2
The whiter-higher quality association in paper products paralleled the historically high
status bestowed upon white products in western nations, where "white came to symbolize
' Writing in 1992, Claudia Thompson noted that "[P]apers with the highest brightness [i.e., whiteness]" are
mistakenly believed to be "superior to others" (p. 103).
2 Crane as quoted in McGaw (1987), endnote #6, pp. 63-64.
goodness, purity and spiritual cleanliness."' The white toga symbolized citizenship in the
Roman Empire, and could only be worn by Roman males 16 years or older. 2 White gloves were
worn by bishops and cardinals, and no clergy of lower rank, as symbolic of purity from sin since
the 11th century.3
The social preference for white textiles had a direct connection to paper. The rags of
bleached linens or unbleached/undyed, cotton textiles (unbleached cotton is a light beige color)
were the fiber source for papermakers dating back to the 12th century. And papers of the highest
quality and cost-- fine writing and drawing papers, envelopes, and printing paper for books and
journals4 -- were manufactured from the whitest and cleanest of the rags.5 Thus the elevated
status attributed to white textiles extended to paper products.
Rags of cotton and flax6 are excellent materials for papermaking because they contain
high percentages of cellulose, the foundation ingredient in paper: cotton is 90% and flax is 80%
cellulose.7 Cellulose provides the tensile strength and flexibility we associate with paper.
Cellulose fibers from cotton and flax are ideal for making strong papers because of their length.
Longer fibers make stronger papers. Cottonseed fibers average 30 millimeters (mm) and linen
fibers average 55 mm in length.8 That is why Zenas Crane highlighted linen fiber content as an
important criterion of higher quality paper.
Papermakers did not bleach the rags because textile producers had already bleached some
of the rags and bleaching was a labor- and time-intensive process. Until the introduction of
hypochlorite bleaching in the textile industry in the late 18th century, sunlight was the bleaching
Pratt, 1994, p. 21.
2 Ibid.
3 Herbermann, ed., 1909.
4 The low end uses were newspapers and wrapping paper (e.g., for hardware and sugar) (McGaw, 1987, pp. 61-68).
s'Ibid., p. 4 1.
6 Flax is the fiber source for linen.
7 Casey, 1952, p. 1.
8 Smook, 1982, p. 4.
agent for textile manufacturers. Depending on the techniques of the master bleacher, bleaching
involved up to 50 steps and took up to 12 months to complete.' "Most of the material bleached
[by sunlight] was composed of linen fibers. Cotton was considered white enough without
bleaching." 2
Whiteness in paper is not merely a function of a cultural preference for white, it has an
important technical function in printing and writing papers where it facilitates reading: "Ease of
reading is determined in large part by the contrast between the ink and the paper surface. Black
ink on white paper gives the greatest contrast because white paper reflects the greatest amount of
light and black ink reflects the least amount." 3 Yet whiteness, technically referred to as
"brightness" in the paper industry, is not the only factor that facilitates reading: "contrast is not
only of brightness," it is "also one of hue and saturation." 4 "Printing on off-color or tinted
papers gives less contrast than printing on pure white papers, but because the long and short light
rays in ordinary light do not focus well on the retina of the eye, a slightly yellow background is
sometimes preferred." 5 For these reasons off-white or cream-colored papers are more pleasing to
the eye. The printing and writing papers made from rags were an off-white color. The bright,
white papers of today were not common until the post-World War II era.
4.2 Increasing the rag supply with chlorinated bleaching powder, 1800-1865
When the Swedish pharmacist Carl Scheele discovered chlorine in 1774 he created
opportunities for significant change in the centuries old practice of bleaching.6 Textile
manufacturers were the first to harness chlorine's bleaching power, followed quickly by paper
Pratt, 1994.
2 Libby, 1 96 2 , p. 16.
3 Casey, 1952, p. 1150.
4 Ibid.
'Ibid., pp. 1150-1151.
6Pratt, 1994, p. 22.
manufacturers. Making a whiter paper, however, was not the reason why paper manufacturers
adopted chlorine bleaching: they used chlorine to increase fiber supply.
Chlorine gas and chlorine gas in water solution were first used commercially as textile
bleaching agents in the 1780s in the United Kingdom. The use of chlorine gas quickly came to
an end because it "attacked worker's lungs, eyes, and skin, nearly killing them."' Working like
concentrated sunlight, chlorine gas in water quickly became an economical bleaching agent: it
reduced bleaching time from months to a few hours. Chlorine bleaching of textiles grew rapidly
after the Scottish bleacher, Charles Tennant, began manufacturing solid chlorinated bleaching
powder -- called hypochlorite -- in 1799.2 Easily shipped to market and handled by users,
hypochlorite became the favored bleaching agent in the textile industry. 3
Paper makers in Europe and North America rapidly adopted hypochlorite to expand their
fiber supply. With increased paper demand and limited supply of clean rags, chlorinated
bleaching powder enabled papermakers to incorporate previously unusable dirty and dyed rags
into paper. The "introduction of chlorine bleaching in the last decade of the eighteenth century
... opened up the world of the non-white, soiled rag to the eager papermaker, leaving relatively,
few untapped sources of rag available." 4
4.3 Trees, the new fiber source, make hypochlorite essential to white paper, 1866-1899
For the first half of the 19th century papermakers produced high quality, creamy white
paper with little to no bleaching from rags. But the role of bleaching in papermaking changed
when rags could no longer keep pace with paper demand. By the middle of the 19th century
paper makers in Europe and North America confronted a fiber supply problem:
'Ibid.
2 To make bleaching powder manufacturers added chlorine to slaked lime (Pratt, 1994, p. 23).
3 Ibid., p. 23.
4 Magee, 1997, p. 110.
One of the most pressing problems faced by all [western] nations in the nineteenth
century was the failure of the supply of the traditional raw material for papermaking, rag,
to keep up with the demand for paper. It was a problem most acutely felt from 1860
[onwards], and ... the search for its solution became one of the enduring themes [of the
latter half of the 1800s]. 1
With rag costs rising rapidly,2 paper manufacturers searched for alternative sources of cellulose,
experimenting with straw, esparto, hemp, jute, and wood.3 Trees emerged as the primary rag
substitute because they contained enough cellulose to make a decent paper and were readily
available in North America and Scandinavia. 4
Trees in comparison to cotton and linen rags are a poor source of cellulose. Trees have
four disadvantages. First, cellulose fibers from trees are much shorter than from cotton and
linen, resulting in weaker papers (see Table 4.1). Second, on a per pound basis trees only
contain on average 45% cellulose, much less than cotton and flax. The other matter in trees
includes: lignin (21-25%), hemicellulose (25-35%),5 and extractives (2-8%)6 (see Table 4.1).
Third, separating cellulose from the other matter in trees is complicated by the lignin which
creates intricate bonds with the cellulose and hemicellulose, making it "exceedingly difficult to
remove one constituent of the wood without removing or drastically altering some of the other
constituents." 7 Fourth, the presence of lignin causes paper to yellow upon exposure to sunlight.
Bleaching became a critical step in producing printing and writing papers because it addressed
any of the problems: solubilizing and removing much of the non-cellulosic material and
whitening residual contaminants left in the pulp.8
'Ibid., p. 174.
2 For example, prices increased by 348% from 1861 to 1864 for a Philadelphia rag merchant (Magee, 1997, p. 180).
3 McGaw, 1987, p. 197.
4 Ibid. and Magee, 1997.
5 "Hemicellulose" is a polymer of five different sugars, whereas cellulose is a polymer only of glucose (Smook,
1982, p. 6).
6 "Extractives" are the all other category for wood, and include terpenes, resin acids (softwoods), fatty acids, and
?henols (Ibid., p. 6).
Casey, 1952, p. 68.
'Ibid., p. 248.
Table 4.1. Comparison of rag- and tree-based cellulose fibers
Cellulose Fiber length Cellulose content Lignin content Hemicellulose Extractives
source (mm) (% by weight) (% by weight) content (% by weight)
(% by weight)
Linen 55 80% 0% 0% 20%
Cottonseed 30 98% 0% 0% 2%
Hardwood 2 45% 21% 35% 2-8%
Softwood 4 45% 25% 25% 2-8%
Sources: -
At first, bleaching was not part of the technology developed to create paper from wood,
and its absence contributed to the development of a vastly inferior product to rag-based printing
and writing papers. Between 1866 and 1909 four different technologies for separating cellulose
from trees (called "pulping") were commercialized in the US: groundwood (mechanical), soda,
sulfite, and kraft (sulfate) pulping processes. With the exception of soda pulping, all were first
commercialized in Europe (see Table 4.2).
Groundwood pulping, also called mechanical pulping, was the first technology developed
to capture cellulose from trees. Friedrich Keller and Heinrich Voelter commercialized
groundwood pulping in Germany in 1847. They used massive grindstones to scrape fibers from
trees and used water to both cool the stones and to carry away the fibers. The Pagenstecher
brothers were the first to introduce groundwood pulping in the US when they constructed the
Curtisville mill in western Massachusetts in 1867.2
Groundwood pulping is an efficient use of trees because it captures 90-95% of the matter
in trees. 3 Papers made from groundwood pulp, however, yellow upon exposure to sunlight
because of their high lignin content:
Lignin is particularly sensitive to light and undergoes a photochemical reaction in
sunlight leading to a darkening of the lignin. It is this photochemical reactivity of lignin
which is responsible for the rapid deterioration [yellowing] of groundwood papers. ...
'See Smook (1982) for data on "fiber length" column (p. 4) and material content of hardwood and softwood (p. 6).
See Casey (1952, p. 364) for data on material content of linen. See Whistler and Teng (1970, p. 13) for data on
cotton fiber content. In any case where data differs across sources, data from the most recent source is used.
2 McGaw, 1987, p. 201.
3 Smook, 1982, p. 42.
Even a small amount of groundwood in a mixed furnish has a pronounced deleterious
effect on the photochemical stability of the paper.'
Groundwood papers are weak because the grinding of the trees rips the cellulose into
small strands.2 In comparison to the rag papers on the market, which did not yellow and were
strong because of the long flax and cotton fibers, groundwood papers were far inferior.
Papermakers in the 1860s quickly discovered that the papers "became yellow after exposure to
Table 4.2. Wood pulp commercialization
timeline
Pulping Country sunlight" and "tore easily."3 Thus groundwood
Year process commercialized in
1847 Groundwood Germany pulp found its way into low quality products
Pulping
1866 Soda Pulping US
1867 Groundwood US
Pulping
1874 Sulfite Sweden not valued, such as newsprint and wrapping
Pulping
1882 Sulfite US paper.4 In retrospect, the rag papers were over-
Pulping
1885 Kraft Pulping Sweden qualified for end-uses with a short shelf life,
1909 Kraft Pulping US
such as daily newspapers.
Groundwood papers were usually unbleached. While some groundwood pulp made from
hardwoods could be bleached with hypochlorite, it was not until the introduction of hydrogen
peroxide as a bleaching agent in the 19415 that groundwood bleaching became widespread. 6 The
combination of high lignin content and the complexity of the cellulose-lignin bonds made
groundwood bleaching difficult.
7
' Casey, 1952, p. 946.
2 Casey, 1952, p. 196.
3 McGaw, 1987, pp. 202-203.
4 Ibid.
5On the use of hydrogen peroxide as a bleaching agent see Section 4.5.1.
6 Casey, 1952, pp. 250 and 296-297.
7 Ibid., p. 295.
In 1853 Hugh Burgess and Charles Watt patented (in England) a process for breaking
wood apart using chemicals rather than mechanical grinders.' Unable to garner interest in
chemical pulping in England, Burgess immigrated to the US where he started the first chemical
pulp mill in 1866 in eastern Pennsylvania. 2 Called "s6da pulping," it used the alkaline chemical,
sodium hydroxide, to dissolve lignin. In soda pulping the chemicals dissolve the bonds between
cellulose, lignin, and hemicellulose. Ideally the chemicals selectively remove lignin and other
impurities, while isolating and partially purifying the individual fibers.3
Soda pulping, however, had many downsides. It was an expensive process because of the
cost of chemicals.4 It could pulp hardwoods, but not softwoods. The resins5 in softwoods make
separating cellulose from lignin and hemicellulose without severe damage to the cellulose very
difficult.6 Even with the hardwoods, soda pulping degraded the cellulose fibers when dissolving
the lignin-cellulose bond. The result was short, weak fibers that produced weak paper.7
The pulp from soda pulping is dark brown. With a brightness level of 25-45, unbleached
soda pulp could not be used in printing and writing papers.8 The technical term for paper
whiteness is "brightness," which is a measure of the reflectivity of paper.9 The whiteness of
paper is measured on a scale of 1 to 100, where the reflective property of magnesium oxide is
100.10 The use of brightness as a measure of whiteness emerged with the rise of tree-based
papers where it was originally designed "as a test to measure the effectiveness of bleaching in
1Clayton, 1969, p. 348.
2 Ibid., p. 349.
3 Ibid., p. 348; and Casey, 1952, p. 133.
4 Clayton, 1969, pp. 348-35 1.
5 Resins are categorized in the industry as "extractives."
6 Clayton, 1969, p. 350.
7 Casey, 1952, pp. 66 and 159.
8 Casey, 1952, p. 895.
9 Ibid, p. 888.
10 The closer to 100, the brighter the paper is. On brightness, see Paper Task Force, 1995, p. 230.
removing the yellowness of pulps."' Unbleached groundwood pulp, for comparison purposes,
has a brightness of 55-60.2
Because soda pulping creates a dark brown pulp, bleaching is necessary for use in
printing and writing papers. In fact, Burgess and Watt patented the soda process with a
bleaching step of hypochlorite. 3 Bleaching is necessary because soda pulp contains "significant
amounts (1-8%) of non-cellulosic materials," which is mostly lignin. Bleaching dissolves and
whitens the lignin remaining after pulping and increases the permanence of the whiteness. 4
Initially papermakers mixed soda pulp with straw and/or rag to manufacture newsprint.5 But
after the development of sulfite pulping, it found a market niche in combination with sulfite pulp
to manufacture printing and writing papers.
Carl D. Ekman first commercialized sulfite bleaching at the Bergvik Mill in Sweden in
1874. Eight years later Charles S. Wheelwright began the first commercial production of sulfite
pulp in the US at the East Providence mill in Rhode Island.6 In contrast to the alkaline process of
soda pulping, sulfite pulping is an acid-based process that uses sulfur dioxide, sulfurous acid, and
calcium acid sulfite to separate cellulose from lignin and hemicellulose. 7
The sulfite process produced a medium strength paper -- greater strength than soda and
mechanical pulps, but less strength than rag -- at a price cheaper than soda and rag.8 Unbleached
sulfite pulp is much brighter than unbleached soda pulp, 50-65 brightness,9 and is easily bleached
'Casey, 1952, p. 891.
2 Ibid, p. 895.
3 Clayton, 1969, p. 348.
4 Casey, 1952, p. 249.
5 Magee, 1997, p. 177; and McGaw, 1987.
6 Britt, 1970, p. 141.
7 Casey, 1952, p. 74.
8 Clayton, 1969, p. 349; and Casey, 1952, p. 117.
9 Casey, 1952, p. 895.
to a brightness of 78-80 with hypochlorite.1 Sulfite is relatively easy to bleach because the
residual lignin in sulfite is rendered partially soluble by action of sulfite cooking liquor.2
The downsides to sulfite pulping resulted from the use of calcium acid sulfite, which
could only pulp hardwoods and could not be recovered for reuse "because of scaling problems" -
- the hardening of the calcium on pipes and equipment? Unable to recover the chemicals, sulfite
mills discharged them directly to rivers. 4
Because sulfite pulp produced paper with medium strength, it enabled wood to become
more competitive with rag outside of the low-end paper markets. At first, bleached sulfite pulp
was combined with bleached soda pulp to produce medium grade papers. The soda pulp
imparted a high degree of softness, smooth surface, and high opacity.5 As rags became more
scarce, demand for paper increased, and quality of paper from wood increased, bleached sulfite
and soda pulp became the principal inputs into fine printing and writing paper grades. 6 For 40
years, from the 1890s-1930s, they were the dominant inputs into fine paper grades. By the 1930s
the typical furnish for book paper was "20 to 30% sulfite, and 70 to 80% soda or deinked
stock."7
Another chemical pulp came on line in 1885 when the MunksjS soda pulp mill in
Jonkoping, Sweden accidentally produced kraft pulp:
[Q]wing to an error, a digester [the tank where chemicals breakdown, "cook", the wood
chips] was blown [released] before the chips were fully cooked. Instead of discarding the
Casey, 1952, p. 292.
2Ibid., p. 250.
3 In the post-World War II era sulfite pulp mills moved to magnesia-based systems to facilitate chemical recovery
(Libby, 1962, pp. 12-13).
4 Britt, 1970 p. 142.
5 See Casey, 1952, p. 159; and Clayton, 1969, p. 350. "Opacity" refers to the amount of show through with inks
(Casey, 1952, p. 903). "Paper for printing should have high opacity in order to prevent show through of printing on
the back of the printed sheet" (Casey, 1952, p. 1157).
6 Clayton, 1969, p. 350.
7 Deinked stock is recycled, wood-based paper. "Rag or high-quality chemical pulp may be added if the printed
paper must stand considerable handling or folding in use or if permanence is required. ... Up to 30% filler may be
added" (Casey, 1952, p. 1148).
chips, the mill manager ordered them to be passed through a kollergang to make an
inferior grade of paper. The resulting pulp made a paper which, though dark in color,
was far stronger than any paper hitherto known. It was given the name kraft, which
Swedish and also German for strength.
Twenty-four years later kraft pulping was first introduced in the US at the Halifax Paper
Company mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina.2
Kraft (also called "sulfate") pulping, like soda pulping, uses alkaline chemicals. Yet with
slight differences in chemistry3 kraft pulping is able to cook apart the complex resins of
softwoods, making it capable of pulping both softwoods and hardwoods. 4 Kraft softwood pulps
make the strongest tree-based papers because softwoods have longer cellulose fibers than
hardwoods (see Table 4.1). Even with some hardwoods, the gentler kraft process "shows
considerable advantage over the sulphite process," producing "pulps of considerably better
strength." 5
The initial downside to kraft pulp was it defied bleaching. "Freshly made sulfate [kraft]
pulp has a light brown, grayish color, but upon contact with air, it becomes oxidized to a dark
brown color which is difficult to decolorize." 6 Unable to be bleached, kraft pulp was limited to
packaging and wrapping paper end uses.
By the end of the 19th century wood was the dominant source of fiber in Western Europe
and North America. Wood had 67% of the US fiber market by the late 1880s, while rag's share
of the market was only 10%. Other fiber sources were straw, 14%, and "other" (including
recycled paper), 10%.7 Paralleling the rise of wood was the rise of hypochlorite bleaching,
' Clayton, 1969, p. 349.
2 Libby, 1962, p. 13.
3 Sodium hydroxide, an alkaline chemical, is used in both the soda and kraft processes. Unlike soda pulping, kraft
pulping uses sodium sulfide (Casey, 1952, p. 133).
4 Libby, 1962, p. 13.
5 Clayton, 1969, p. 351.
6 Casey, 1952, p. 267.
7 Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding (Magee, 1997, p. 179).
which was critical for tree-based printing and writing papers. With rag fiber, bleaching only had
a modest role: extend the fiber supply to soiled and dyed rags. However, with wood pulps
destined for use in printing and writing papers, bleaching with hypochlorite was essential.' And
hypochlorite use grew much more rapidly per pound 6f paper made from wood because the
"amount of bleach [needed for rags] is much less than that used with wood pulps."2
Through the end of the 19th century rag "remained very much the preferred material for
writing paper as well as for the finer grades of printing paper, although some of the medium
grades of printing paper and the very finest grades of newsprint had begun to use rag in
combination with various proportions of straw, wood, or waste paper." In comparison to wood
pulps, rag pulp was of the highest quality in terms of strength, brightness, and permanence of
brightness (see Table 4.3). The permanence of paper as measured by yellowing results primarily
from lignin content: the more lignin in paper the faster it yellows. "Rag papers have the highest
degree of permanence of the common papers, and are specified when maximum permanence is
required." 4
Rag pulp, however, was the most expensive fiber source. Among the wood pulps, sulfite
was the closest competitor with rag and the combination of sulfite and soda pulps produced an
acceptable medium grade printing and writing papers. Kraft pulp, which would attain market
dominance in bleached papers in the 20th century, was not introduced in the US until 1909. At
first it was relegated to packaging because of its dark brown color and difficulty to bleach.
Unbleached groundwood pulp was not used for printing and writing papers.
2 Casey, 1952, p. 228.
3 Magee, 1997, p. 179.
4 Casey, 1952, pp. 945-946.
By the end of the 19th century a handful of bleached paper products were on the market
(see Table 4.4). With the exception of toilet paper, first introduced in 1871,1 all the bleached
paper products were either for printing or writing. The 20th century would witness a vast
expansion in the number of bleached paper products.
Table 4.3. Comparison of rag and wood fiber sources at the end of the 19th century by properties
important for printing and writing papers
Fiber source
/ pulping Strength Brightness Permanence Yield Cost Markets
process
Rags (cotton Highest Medium Highest, Most Fine and medium
and linen) longest shelf- expensive grade printing and
life writing papers
Trees / Low Low, Lowest, 90-95% Least Newsprint
Groundwood acceptable for least stable expensive
(Mechanical) newsprint paper
Trees, Low Medium with Medium, 45-55% Most Medium.grade
Hardwood / bleaching more stable expensive printing and writing
Soda than wood fiber papers in
groundwood, combination with
less stable sulfite pulp
than rag
Trees, Medium Medium with Medium, 45-55% Moderate Medium grade
Hardwood / (stronger bleaching more stable expense -- printing and writing
Sufite than soda, than cheaper papers in
weaker than groundwood, than soda combination with
.rag and less stable soda pulp
sulfate) than rag
Trees, High Very Low, not applicable 40-50% Moderate Packing and
Hardwood unusable for expense - wrapping papers
and Softwood printing and cheaper
/ Kraft writing papers than soda
Sources: __ ___(until 1930s)
Sources: '
4.4 Advertising and innovation transform markets for white papers, 1900-1945
The decades preceding World War II witnessed the widespread growth in white papers.
The number of bleached paper products on the market grew rapidly and the pulps used to
manufacture them became whiter. Coated papers, first introduced in the late 19th century,
became firmly established with demand from advertisers. Disposable products proliferated. And
Magee, 1997, p. 202.
2 For data on "strength" and "yield" columns see Smook (1982, p. 42); all other columns summarize material
presented in the text of this chapter.
the introduction of elemental chlorine gas as a bleaching agent in the 1920s and multistage
bleaching in the 1930s created whiter wood pulps.
Table 4.4. Bleached paper products, 1899
" book paper
- uncoated printing paper for use in
magazines
- fine writing paper (rag paper)
= drawing paper (rag paper)
" envelopes (rag paper)
" posters
- coated paper (introduced in 1880s)
= toilet paper (introduced in 1871)
Sources:
4.4.1 Advertisers Grow the Market for Coated Papers
Coated papers became a significant end use for bleached paper products. Coatedpaper is
a sheet of paper with a thin layer of clay and other pigments applied to the surface to fill voids
and cover fibers, "producing a surface more uniformly receptive to printing inks."' The
development of sophisticated printing presses, the printing of black and white then color
photography, and use of printed material for advertising increased demand for brighter, whiter
pulps to be used as the base for coated paper.
When papermakers developed coated papers in the late 19th century they created a new
grade of paper made from bleached wood pulps. Coated papers blossomed into one of the paper
industry's largest end uses for bleached pulp in the 20th century. 3 And it was advertisers,
through their demand for higher quality papers for ads, who spurred growth in coated paper
production. Key to the demand of advertisers for coated paper was their increasing use of color
in advertisements.
'For historical data on paper products see: Ibid.; McGaw, 1987; and Ohanian, 1993.
2Bureau, 1989.
3 Writing in the early 1950s, Casey noted that coated paper "has become one of the most important parts of the paper
industry, due to the demand for better printing surfaces ..." (p. 1007).
Coated paper emerged in the 1880s in conjunction with a new printing technology, the
halftone letterpress: "It is debatable which came first, the halftone printing process or coated
paper, but it is certain that neither one could have been fully developed without the other. ...
Coated paper ... made it possible to reproduce the finest halftone printings."' Superior optical
and printing properties make coated paper the best medium for displaying drawings,
photographs, and color images. 2
The optical properties of brightness, gloss,3 and opacity4 are important to coated papers,
which are primarily "printed or used for their decorative effect." 5 Brightness is a function of the
pulp used to make the paper and the pigments in the coating.6 In "most commercial papers, the
layer of coating is thin enough that the raw stock determines in part the brightness of the coated
paper. For this reason, it is desirable to use bright, clean [i.e., bleached] paper for coating raw
stock. If light coatings are applied, the body stock should have a brightness as close as possible
to that of the coating." 7 For much of the pre-World War II years, coated papers were made
primarily from mixtures of bleached sulfite and soda pulps (see Table 4.5).
The printing properties of coated papers, especially ink receptivity and smoothness, make
coated papers unique. The "greatest advantage of coated paper is that the coating layer furnishes
a printing surface which is far more uniform in density and oil absorption than any uncoated
' Ibid, p. 1007. Frederick Ives of Philadelphia and Georg Meisenbach of Munich independently, yet simultaneously,
developed the earliest halftone plates for letterpress printing in the late 1870s and early 1880s. Halftone printing
plates were developed to translate the tones of a photograph onto paper (Berry and Poole, 1966, pp. 253-254).
2 Casey, 1952, p. 1007.
3 High gloss creates one of the finest surfaces for printing. "Gloss is a measure of optical smoothness" (Ibid., p.
1117). The Champion paper mill in Hamilton, Ohio, first introduced high gloss, coated paper in the US in the late
1920s when "the mill developed the process known as cast coating which gives paper high gloss and smoothness
like that of a glossy photo. The plant's Kromekote brand introduced in 1929 continues to be the market leader"
(Boyer, 2001).
4 Opacity insures the inks do not show through the paper (Casey, 1952, pp. 1117-1118). Also see footnote 5.
s Ibid, p. 1007.
6 Clay and titanium dioxide were the most common pigments used to brighten coated paper throughout the 20th
century (Casey, 1952, pp. 1117-1123; and Smook, 1982, p. 265).
7 Casey, 1952, p. 1089.
paper surface."I Smoothness insures "better contact between the paper and the printing plate
than is possible with uncoated papers." 2










At first coated papers were manufactured on a machine separate from the papermaking
machine. This changed when Consolidated Papers introduced the first machine-coated,
doubled-sided paper in the US in 1934.4 "Machine-coated" means the paper is coated on the
papermaking machine. "Off-machine coated printing papers" are made on a separate machine,
usually at a different location.5 Machine-coated, double-sided paper filled "the need for cheap
mail-order catalogue paper which would reproduce illustrations better than standard uncoated
papers."6
The primary end uses for coated papers in the pre-World War II era were magazines and
printed advertising material,7 including posters, in-store displays, and mail order catalogues. The
demand for coated papers in magazines emerged primarily from advertisers who wanted to
display their illustrations, especially their color illustrations, on the best paper. Although
Ibid, p. 1160.
2 Ibid, p. 1114.
3 Ibid, p. 1087.
4 Graphic Arts Monthly, 1999, p. CP15.
5 Physically and functionally machine-coated papers are the same as off-machine-coated papers. "The only
distinction between the two is the type of manufacturer that does the coating, the primary producer or the
independent converter" (Noble, 1968, p. 69).
6 Casey, 1952, p. 1008.
'Guthrie, 1950, p. 52.
scientific publications and book publishing houses also benefited from the introduction of coated
paper, they lacked the economic clout of advertisers.
Advertisers influenced paper choices through payments for ad space. The development
of low cost, high volume magazines subsidized by advertising revenues emerged in the 1870s
and became firmly established by the turn of the century (see Table 4.6 for a list of prominent
mass circulation magazines). Advertising revenues kept "prices down so circulation could stay
up" and paid "the growing fees demanded by contributors."' "By 1904, magazines reaped $30
million in advertising revenues" 2 and thereafter mass circulation magazines "came to rely
heavily on advertising revenues to subsidize their production." 3 A price that magazine
publishers paid for advertising revenues was the use of higher cost coated paper for their ads.
Eventually magazine publishers followed the lead of Life magazine and printed the entire
magazine on coated paper. In 1937, Life became the first magazine to print its entire issue in
full-color on machine-coated, double-sided paper.4
Table 4.6. Introduction of popular magazines
Year Magazine
















4 Graphic Arts Monthly, 1999, p. CP15.
5 Waller-Zuckerman, 1989; Duke University (2000); and home pages for Time and Newsweek magazines.
Advertisers were quick to use the latest printing technologies and best papers to present
their ads, which increasingly used color.
In the absence of the sales talk that had traditionally accompanied the act of buying and
selling, commodities had to sell themselves. Print!advertising was reformed by
innovations such as enlarged size, catchwords, slogans, and even new printing
techniques. Early department stores were among the first to use photogravure and
chromolithography. Images transformed commodities into desirable items.'
And Procter & Gamble sent full color lithographic advertising prints of Ivory Soap directly from
specialty printers to magazines for binding in 1896.2
Color images were at the top of advertisers' list of preferred images because they
increased sales. Writing in 1913, Harry Hollingworth, a professor from Columbia, emphasized
the economic value of color, which "is illustrated by comparative tests carried on by mail-order
houses in Chicago. These tests show that a cut in color often sells as high as 15 times as much as
does a plain black and white cut of the same article." 3 And coated papers provided the best
reproduction of color images. By the 1940s offset printers using four-color printing presses
obtained "Brilliant effects ... on coated papers, since the coating tends to keep ink on the surface
of the paper where it has a greater brilliance."4
Innovations in color printing facilitated the introduction of color ads. Frederick E. Ives of
Philadelphia commercialized the three-color half-tone letterpress in 1890.6 Three separate
'This is a summary of Laermans, 1993 written by Goodwin, Ackerman, and Kiron, eds., 1997, p. 140.
2 Duke University, 2000.
3 Hollingworth, 1913, p. 102.
4 Ibid, p. 1182.
5 The half-tone process is "a photoengraving made from an image photographed through a screen having a lattice of
horizontal and vertical lines and then etched so that the details of the image are reproduced in fine dots with the
darker areas appearing as heavy and concentrated dots and the lighter areas as fine and diffused dots" (Merriam-
Webster, 1976).6 Berry and Poole, 1966, p. 257.
printers simultaneously commercialized rotogravure printing in the 1890s' and by the 1910s
rotogravure was "the process par excellence for illustrated magazines with big circulations."2 Ira
Rubel a printer in New Jersey developed offset lithography in 1904, this became the dominant
printing process in the US by the 1960s.3
4.4.2 Disposables: product innovation increases demand for white papers
In the first three decades of the 20th century, manufacturers seeded the US with a wide
range of disposable paper products made from bleached pulp, none of which were printing and
writing grades. Instead they were single-use products that displaced reusable products made
from different materials. Paper's competitive advantages were low cost and a material, cellulose,
with the capacity to be formed into different shapes.
First came the disposable paper cup in 1908. Introduced by Lawrence Luellen through
the American Water Supply Company of New England, the paper cup was designed to "dispense
a pure drink of water in a new, clean, and individual drinking cup." 4 Luellen introduced the
paper cup at a time when "Germ Theory, which became known to the public in the eighteen
nineties ... set off a wave of public anxiety about contagion. Any public place or object was
suspect."5
Then in rapid succession came a line of disposable sanitary and tissue products (see Table
4.7). Kimberly Clark introduced sanitary napkins under the brand name Kotex in 1920.6 These
' Rotogravure is a "photogravure process in which the impression is produced by a rotary press" (Merriam-Webster,
1976). The three printers were: Rembrandt Intaglio Printing Co. in the U.K., at C.W. Saalburg in the US, and at
Angerer & Goschl in Vienna, Austria (Berry and Poole, 1966, p. 254).
2 See Berry and Poole, 1966, p. 254; and Graphic Arts Monthly, 1999. Rotogravure was only "suitable for very long
runs owing to the cost of plate-making" (Berry and Poole, 1966, pp. 263-264).
3 Graphic Arts Monthly, 1999, p. CP28.
* Lafayette College Libraries, 1995.
5 Ehrenreich and English, 1978, p. 142.
6 Kimberly-Clark, 2002. Actually French nurses serving in World War I were the first to develop paper sanitary
napkins. They used the paper wadding from bandages for the napkins (Winegar, 1993).
napkins competed with reusable flannel napkins.' Kimberly Clark also introduced facial tissues
under the brand name Kleenex@ in 1924. Invented as a "sanitary way to remove cold cream,"
Kleenex soon spread to many other uses, 2 most prominently nose blowing. Tissues competed
with the traditional handkerchief.










1930s Ice cream cartons
1930s Napkins
1936 Milk cartons
Disposable tissue and sanitary products spread to other reusable product lines in the
1930s. Scott Paper3 introduced paper napkins in the 1930s and kitchen towels in 1931.4
Tampax introduced tampons in 1933.5 The last of the new disposable paper products introduced
in the pre-World War II era were the milk carton in 1936 and ice cream cartons in the 1930s.6
The sanitary and tissue segment of the paper industry grew the fastest of any paper segment
between 1899 and 1939, growing "at an average annual rate of almost 9 percent" 7 (see Figure
4.1). Tissue and sanitary paper products were manufactured from a mix of pulps that included:
Winegar, 1993.
2 Kimberly-Clark, 2002.
3 Kimberly-Clark acquired Scott Paper in 1995.
4 Kimberly-Clark, 2001.
5 Tambrands now owns Tampax Inc. (Houppert, 1995). On the year tampons were introduced, see Winegar (1993).
6 Ennen, 1999.
7 Ohanian, 1993, p. 15.
bleached and unbleached sulfite, groundwood pulp, and recycled papers., Helping to create
demand for these products were advertising campaigns that touted their convenience. For
example, Tampax touted tampons with the promise of "'No belts. No pins. No pads. No
chafing. No binding' 2 (also see Section 4.5.2 for further discussion of the role of advertising in
promoting disposable paper products).












1899 1909 1919 1929 1939
Year
Source: 3
The food containers -- milk and ice cream cartons -- were initially manufactured from
bleached sulfite lined manila (a type of paperboard), which entered the market in 1916.4 In
1939, International Paper "supplied the first bleached kraft paper grades that were suitable for
milk carton production." 5 The arrival of all of these products to the market increased demand for
bleached pulps and, while not the subject of this paper, increased garbage because they displaced
reusable products.
' Guthrie, 1950, pp. 27-29.
2 Houppert, 1995.
3 US Bureau of the Census data as cited in Ohanian, 1993, pp. 21-22.
4 Ennen, 1999.
5 International Paper, 1998.
4.4.3 Producing whiter paper with elemental chlorine and multistage bleaching
With advertisers searching for brighter, whiter papers for their ads and emerging markets
in sanitary products where whiteness could be associated with purity (see Section 4.5.2), pulp
producers responded by tinkering with processes and chemicals to create brighter pulp. At the
beginning of the 1920s, single stage hypochlorite bleaching produced sulfite pulp with 75-80
brightness and soda pulp with 78-80 brightness (see Table 4.8).
Multistage bleaching with hypochlorite was the first commercial breakthrough for
increasing the whiteness of wood pulp. It was first used on sulfite pulp in 1920,1 although paper
mills first used multistage bleaching with rag stock at the beginning of the 20th century:.
During this period of development, it was found that there were advantages in adding
only part of the bleaching chemical [i.e., hypochlorite] at the beginning of the operation
and the remainder later, perhaps in several portions. This led to the modem practice of
multistage bleaching with intermediate washes to get rid of the products of the bleaching
action. For many years this process was practiced only in the bleaching of rag pulps ... 2
Owners of kraft pulp mills had a particular incentive for experimenting with bleaching
processes. In the 1920s kraft pulp production burst upward with increasing demand for the
strong boxes made from kraft pulp and expanding production in the southeast (see Figure 4.2).
Southeastern pulp producers turned to kraft to pulp the resinous southern pines. Initially kraft
pulp mills were unable to compete in the markets for bleached papers because the preponderance
of complex cellulose-lignin bonds after pulping defied bleaching to a level acceptable for
printing and writing papers.4
The bleaching breakthrough for kraft mills was the simultaneous introduction of
elemental chlorine and multistage bleaching in 1930: that year kraft pulp was first bleached to a
1 Parsons, 1970, p. 266.
2 Libby, 1962, p. 17.
' Ohanian, 1993.
4 Casey, 1952, p. 288.
70 brightness, a level acceptable for medium grade printing and writing papers.' A few years
later multistage bleaching of kraft pulps achieved 80-82 brightness. While these levels did not
compare with the higher brightness achieved with sulfite pulp (see Table 4.8), the strength of
kraft and the abundant sources of pine in the southeast ensured growing demand for bleached
kraft pulps.
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Year
Source:2
The typical three-stage multistage bleaching process involved: chlorine (C) bleaching,
caustic soda extraction (E), and sodium hypochlorite (H) bleaching -- abbreviated CEH. The
chlorine bleaching stage dissolved and discolored the residual lignin, and whitened the fiber.
The caustic soda stage neutralized the pulp and enhanced the removal of dissolved lignin during
washing, which occurs between each stage. And the hypochlorite stage further dissolved and
'Parsons, 1970, p. 266.
2 Data 1899-1929 from US Bureau of the Census as cited in Ohanian (Ohanian, 1993, p. 21). Data 1939-1945 from
US Department of Commerce, 1947.
bleached the residual lignin. "Bleaching this way is more efficient because the solubilized
materials are removed before they can take up additional chlorine in side reactions."'
The three-stage bleaching process of CEH significantly increased the brightness of sulfite
pulps, from 75-80 to 85-87 brightness (see Table 4.8)1 The brightness of soda pulps inched
upward to 80 brightness with a two-stage process of CH. Kraft pulp gained the most from
multistage bleaching. The five-stage process of CEHEH increased kraft pulp levels to 80-82
brightness. Multistage bleaching "made it possible to produce strong white papers from sulfate
pulps which could not be bleached satisfactorily with straight hypochlorite." 2
Table 4.8 Brightness of different pulps
Brightness
Type of pulp .Single stage Multistage bleaching with
hypochlorite chlorine and hypochlorite
bleaching (1930s-1945)
(1920s)
Bleached sulfite 75-80 85-87 -- 3-stage (CEH) or
4-stage (CEHH)
Bleached soda (hardwood) 78 78-80 -- 2-stage (CH)
Bleached kraft 50 72-75 -- 3-stage (CEH)
(not used in printing 80-82 -- 5-stage (CEHEH)
and writing papers)
Brightness of unbleached pulps
Unbleached sulfite 50-65
(not used in printing and writing papers)
Unbleached kraft 25-45
(not used in printing and writing papers)
Unbleached mechanical 55-60
1 __ 1(used primarily in newsprint)
Sources: '
Soda pulp production in the US grew slowly but steadily before the introduction of
multistage bleaching: increasing from 0.2 million tons in 1899 to 0.5 million tons in 1929 (see
1 Casey, 1952, p. 279.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., pp. 278-294; Casey, 1952, p. 895; and Clayton, 1969, p. 352.
Figure 4.3). However, kraft pulping doomed soda pulping to obsolescence because it was vastly
superior: captured more pulp per pound of tree input and produced stronger pulp at a lower cost.
After the introduction of multistage bleaching, soda pulping growth stopped. In the first year
data are available for bleached kraft pulp production (1940), it already equaled soda production
(see Figure 4.3). Bleached sulfite pulp maintained its competitive advantage over bleached kraft
pulp until 1950, when another innovation in bleaching, the use of chlorine dioxide, propelled
bleached kraft pulp into the leadership position (see Section 4.5.1).
The pre-World War II era witnessed another bleaching innovation, the introduction of
hydrogen peroxide as a pulp bleaching agent. While hydrogen peroxide had the greatest
immediate impact upon mechanical (groundwood) pulps, it would become an important factor in
the bleaching of chemical pulps at the end of the 20th century. Discovered in 1818 by Louis
Thenard of France, hydrogen peroxide was first used as a bleaching agent by the textile industry
in 1878 to bleach silk. It was soon applied to other fabrics and by 1926 "hydrogen peroxide
became fully competitive in price to chlorine for bleaching cotton."2 Hydrogen peroxide grew to
become the dominant bleaching chemical for cotton, displacing chlorine: it accounted for 75% of
cotton bleaching in 1955 and accounted for "close to 100%" by the 1990s in the US3
Hydrogen peroxide was slower to take root in the paper industry. The St. Regis Paper
Co.'s Norfolk (Virginia) mill first used hydrogen peroxide to bleach groundwood pulp in the US
in 1941.4 Hydrogen peroxide is a more effective bleaching agent for groundwood pulps, which
contain much of the lignin in trees, because it bleaches by a different mechanism. Rather than
dissolving the cellulose-lignin bonds extractives it inactivates the color-producing groups (lignin
Casey, 1952, p. 133
2 Pratt, 1994, p. 24.
1 Ibid., p. 26.
4 O'Neil, Sarkanen, and Schuber, 1962, p. 357.
and extractives) attached to the cellulose. "For that reason" peroxide is "particularly suited for
bleaching" groundwood pulp, which it brightens "without material weight reduction" (i.e., loss
of pulp) and "without consuming much chemical."'
Figure 4.3. Bleached pulp production, US, 1899-1945
Source: 2
4.5 White papers proliferate with advertising, disposable products, and chlorine
dioxide, 1946-1969
The brightness level of bleached papers sprouted upward again in the early 1950s in the
US when mills started using chlorine dioxide as a bleaching agent. The increase in brightness
levels of paper occurred simultaneous with growing demand for bleached papers in general and
high brightness papers in particular. Advertisers again played a leading role in promoting white
papers, especially for white disposable paper products; many of which were bleached only for
marketing reasons.
Kraft, 1969.
2 Data for years 1899-1929 from US Bureau of the Census as cited in Ohanian (1993, p. 21). Data for years 1939-















4.5.1 Making even whiter paper with chlorine dioxide
Multistage bleaching positioned bleached kraft pulping to become the leading process in
the US and across the globe. At the close of World War II bleached sulfite pulp held two slim
advantages over bleached kraft pulp: it was bleached to higher brightness levels and yielded
more pulp per ton of fiber input in comparison to kraft pulping. Despite these advantages, US
mills continued to adopt kraft pulping because of its capacity to handle hard-to-pulp southern
softwoods, superior strength, and lower production costs. The result, bleached kraft production
quickly exceeded bleached sulfite production in the US During the 1940s bleached kraft
production outpaced, and by the 1950s surpassed, bleached sulfite production (see Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4. Bleached Kraft, Sulfite, and Soda Pulp Production, US, 1935-1970
Sources:
In 1946 a "revolution in bleaching took place with the installation
bleaching plants ... in three mills -- one in Canada and two in Sweden." 2
revolutionized bleaching because it significantly increased the brightness
1 US Department of Commerce, 1947; and American Paper Institute, 1981.
2 Clayton, 1969, pp. 352-353.
of chlorine dioxide
Chlorine dioxide















Rapson, a leading designer of chlorine dioxide bleaching systems in North America, recalled: "In
1947 I discovered that in the last stage [of the CEH process], chlorine dioxide followed without
washing by sodium hypochlorite [H] produced exceedingly white sulphite pulp. ... [The first test
run] produced the whitest pulp anyone had ever seen!"'
Chlorine dioxide use had been hindered by its toxicity and explosiveness: it is "exploded
by light, contact with mercury, contact with organic matter, or by electric spark."2 Rapson
experienced the combustibility of chlorine dioxide gas in 1946: "I stopped the air flow for one
minute, hoping to improve the distribution of the concentrated sodium chlorate solution in the
packing in the generating tower. When I restarted the air flow the plant exploded!" 3 Pulp mills
solved the combustibility problem by manufacturing it directly from sodium chlorate onsite, in a
closed system.4 When International Paper's Natchez, Mississippi mill used chlorine dioxide in
1951, it became the first US mill to use chlorine dioxide as a bleaching agent.5
Chlorine dioxide produces brighter pulp than hypochlorite because it is more selective to
lignin, i.e., it is more effective at removing the small amounts of lignin that remain after
chlorination (the first bleaching stage) without damaging the fibers. Chlorine dioxide was not
used in the first stage because it was (and still is) more expensive than chlorine (see Table 4.9).
In comparing costs of bleaching agents it is important to account for the fact that bleaching
power varies across chemicals, with chlorine dioxide and hydrogen peroxide being more
efficient bleaching chemicals per pound of chemical than chlorine and the hypochlorites. For
example, while chlorine dioxide is much more expensive than sodium hypochlorite per pound of
chemical, it is cost competitive in terms of the amount of pulp bleached per pound of chemical
1 Rapson, 1989, p. T244.
2 Casey, 1952, p. 304.
3 Rapson, 1989, p. T243.
4 Ibid.
s Ibid., p. T244.
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(see Table 4.9). Because chlorine dioxide is a more effective bleaching agent than chlorine,
Douglas Andrews and William Rapson separately proposed the partial substitution' of chlorine
dioxide for chlorine in the first bleaching stage in the 1960s. 2
The higher cost for hydrogen peroxide limited its use largely to mechanical
(groundwood) pulp mills. However, it developed a niche in the final stage of kraft bleaching
because the "degree of brightness permanence obtained when peroxide is used in the final stage
is better than that obtained when other bleaching agents are used in this stage." 3
Table 4.9. Cost comparison of different bleaching agents, 1969
Cost per pound Cost per pound of
at plant bleaching
Bleaching agent ($) equivalent at plant
($)
Chlorine 3.00 1.07
Sodium hypochlorite 6.10 - 6.40 2.28
Calcium hypochlorite 2.10 - 3.80 1.34
Chlorine dioxide 15.00 2.03 - 2.54
Hydrogen peroxide 46.00 7.82
Source:
In the paper industry's shorthand abbreviation of bleaching processes, "chlorine dioxide"
is "D". The dominant bleaching sequences to emerge from the introduction of chlorine dioxide
were CEHD in sulfite mills and CEDED in kraft mills. The CEDED process is:
1) chlorine bleaching (C)
2) alkali extraction with caustic soda (sodium hydroxide) (E)
3) chlorine dioxide bleaching (D)
4) alkali extraction with caustic soda (E)
Partial substitution means the first bleaching stage would consist of X% of chlorine and Y% of chlorine dioxide:
e.g., 95% chlorine and 5% chlorine dioxide.
2 Rapson, 1989, pp. T245-T246.
3 Casey, 1952, p. 302.
4Kraft, 1969.
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5) chlorine dioxide bleaching (D)
CEHD increased sulfite brightness to 90-92 and CEDED increased kraft brightness to 88-
92 (see Table 4.10). CEDED became the dominant bleaching sequence for bleached kraft pulp
mills in the US, Sweden, and across the globe by the 1960s.' After the rise of chlorine dioxide
bleaching, sulfite pulp retained only one advantage over kraft pulp, better pulp yield per ton of
fiber input.2
Table 4.10 Brightness of different pulps (US)
Brightness
Type of pulp Chlorine and Chlorine andhypochlorite chlorine dioxide
bleaching bleaching
(1930s - 1949) (1950-1969)
Bleached sulfite 85-87 -- CEH or 90-92 -- CEHD
CEHH
Bleached kraft 72-75 -- CEH 85-87 -- CED
80-82 -- CEHEH 86-87 -- CEHD
88-92 - CEDED
Sources:
Production of bleached chemical pulpse grew rapidly in the post World War II economic
boom: increasing from 3.1 million tons in 1946 to 14.6 million tons in 1969.5 Bleached kraft
pulp accounted for nearly the entire increase in chemical pulp production in the post World War
II period. It increased from 0.9 to 12.4 million tons, while sulfite remained nearly constant,
changing from 1.7 to 1.9 million tons, and soda pulp production declined from 0.5 to 0.2 million
tons (see Figure 4.4). Along with the growing economy, other factors that contributed to
bleached kraft pulp growth were: it displaced sulfite pulp, it continued to displace other materials
*In practice, bleached kraft pulp mills used many variations on this bleaching sequence, depending on the products
manufactured and the history of the mill.
2 Clayton, 1969, p. 431.
3 Ibid., p. 352; Casey, 1952, pp. 302-306; and Casey, 1952, p. 895.
4 The chemical pulps are kraft, sulfite, and soda pulps.
5 US Department of Commerce, 1947; and American Paper Institute, 1981.
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with the growth of white disposable products, and the rise of the photocopier contributed to
greater use of paper in business and government.
4.5.2 Marketing not function demands the whitest products
In the post-World War II era marketing departments and advertising agencies in the US
promoted disposable paper products by using white to symbolize purity and cleanliness. White
was part of the ads. White was the color of the products themselves. And white was the color
of the packaging used to contain and display the products. Producing bright, white sanitary
napkins, cups, milk cartons, plates, napkins, and facial tissues required the use of bleached pulp.
Yet the majority of this bleaching was unnecessary. The bleached white products resulted from
the selling of the products as pure and clean rather than because the bleaching imparted unique
functions to the products. Whiteness resulted from marketing not function.
The already existing association in western culture of white with cleanliness and purity'
fit the emphasis advertisers and marketers placed on sanitary living in the post World War II era.
Advertisers and marketers "hailed [women] as household engineers." 2 Product designers
modeled kitchens on science laboratories to fit the message of sanitary living.3 And
advertisements sought to change the purchasing choices of middle class women:
Consumer education had become consumer manipulation [by the 1950s]. Market
researchers had discovered that the most purchase-oriented shopper is socially isolated,
technologically uninformed, and insecure about her own domestic competence. It was
these traits the new consumer 'educators' -- the manufacturers and admen -- sought to
cultivate. The TV housewife is anxious about the brightness of her wash, the flavor of




4 Ehrenreich and English, 1978, p. 164.
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In this era of cleanliness and purity, white became a prominent element in
advertisements. Examples abound. Sweetheart advertised its Blu-Whitel Flakes detergent in a
daily newspaper (1953) as: "Dazzling White, Sparkling Bright!" (see Photograph 1.1).
Woodbury advertised its soap emphasizing the purity of those who use it in Life magazine
(1947): "'I see you in white satin [wedding dress] ... You'll be another Woodbury deb! "' (see
Photograph 1.2). Modess, owned by Johnson & Johnson, advertised its sanitary napkins in
Good Housekeeping (1947) with the headline: "Who would know better than the girls [nurses] in
white?" (see Photograph 1.3).
Consistent with the image of purity and cleanliness portrayed in ads was the use of bright,
white paper to manufacture and package disposable paper products. Manufacturers of disposable
paper products used bleached pulps (kraft and sulfite) to whiten their tissue and sanitary
products, cups, plates, and trays. Bleached kraft and sulfite were the primary pulps used in, tissue
and sanitary products -- toilet paper, sanitary'pads, tampons, 2 diapers, towels, napkins, facial
tissue -- in the 1960s, accounting for 65% of their pulp content: 36% bleached sulfite pulp and
29% bleached and semi-bleached kraft pulp. 3 Diapers were the only new tissue/sanitary paper
product introduced in the post World War II era.4 Bleached kraft pulp was also the principal
1 The bolding and underlining of "white" here and elsewhere in this paragraph is my emphasis.
2 "Although tampons have been marketed since the 1930s, the real gains in consumer acceptance occurred in the
1960s when many of the old prejudices against their use disappeared. they are now [early 1970s] enjoying
particularly rapid acceptance among younger women. ... [T]ampons share [of the feminine hygiene market] only
increased by 2.1 percentage points between 1955 and 1960 to 16.1%. By 1971, however, their share had more than
doubled to 37.3% (Noble, 1973, p. 96).
3 Waste paper accounted for the bulk (16%) of the remaining pulp (Noble, 1968, p. 67). "Wadding" is the absorbent
material in sanitary pads, tampons, and diapers.
4 The significant new product added to the tissue/sanitary paper product line that used bleached pulp was diapers.
Proctor & Gamble first introduced its disposable paper diapers, Pampers, in 1964 in St. Louis. It was not until 1969
that Pampers were available across the US (Richer, 2000). Sales of disposable began their rapid growth in the late
1960s: increasing from $50 million in 1966 to $351 million in 1971 (Noble, 1973, p. 97).
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Photograph 4.1. Blu-White Flakes Detergent: 'Dazzling White, Sparkling Bright!'
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Photograph 4.2. Woodbury Soap: 'I see you in white satin ..
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Photograph 4.3. Johnson & Johnson, Modess Sanitary Napkins: 'Who would know better than the
girls [nurses] in white?'
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input into the manufacture of cups, plates, and trays. These products are manufactured from
bleached paperboard,163 which by definition contains at least 80% virgin bleached kraft pulp.'6
Production of bleached disposable paper products totaled over four million tons in 1969
(see Table 4.11). With bleach pulp content totaling 65% for tissue and sanitary products and
85% for cups, plates, and trays, the use of bleached pulps in disposable white products equaled
almost three million tons (see Table 4.11). Thus disposable paper products, like the ads,
promoted purity and cleanliness through whiteness.
Table 4.11. Tissue papers and bleached paperboard: estimated
bleached che ical pulp consumption, 1969
Disposable Production, Estimated bleached Estimated
paper 1969 pulp in product bleached pulp
product (million tons) category consumption
category N_ (million tons)
Tissue and 3.61 65% 2.35
sanitary
papers
Cups, plates, 0.70 85% 0.60
and trays
Bleached
paperboard 2.869 85% 2.43
for packaging
Total 7.17 5.38
aBleached paperboard production minus cups, plates, and tray (which are also
manufactured from bleached paperboard).
Sources: 18
According to manufacturers of sanitary and tissue products the key properties of their
products are absorbency, softness, and brightness. 166 Yet the technical reality is, bleaching is
relevant to only one of these properties, brightness.
Take sanitary products like diapers, sanitary napkins, and tampons. During the 1960s the
absorbent material was made from bleached pulp, called wadding or fluff pulp. Could
manufacturers of sanitary products have produced an absorbent layer from unbleached pulp of
163 Bleached paperboard is also called solid bleached sulfate. "Sulfate" is another term for kraft pulp.
'"DeKing, 1995.
165 American Paper Institute, 1981; and US Department of Commerce, 1947.
166 Moore 1994.
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equal performance to bleached pulp? Since the principal roles of bleaching are to remove lignin
and whiten fiber, the key question is, does the presence of lignin in fluff pulp produce a less
absorbent product?
The answer is "no," as the emergence of bleached chemi-thermomechanical pulping
(BCTMP) indicates. In the late 1960s, a variation on groundwood (mechanical) pulping
emerged, called thermomechanical pulping (TMP).167 With the addition of a mild chemical pre-
treatment process and bleaching came bleached chemi-thermomechanical pulping (BCTMP). 6 1
BCTMP is significantly more material efficient than bleached kraft pulping: incorporating 85-
90% of a tree by weight into paper versus the 42-52% of a tree captured in bleached kraft
pulping.169
Two manufacturers of sanitary and tissue papers, Scott Paper and Procter & Gamble,
"were influential in developing grades of softwood BCTMP for absorbent products" because of
it's superior absorbency capacity.170 Since BCTMP includes most of the material in a tree
including lignin,171 lignin cannot be a barrier to absorbency. Or to state this in the negative, if
the presence of lignin impeded absorbency, then BCTMP, which contains most of the lignin in
the tree, would not have superior absorbency capacity.
The advantage of bleaching CTMP is it whitens the pulp. Unbleached softwood CTMP
has a low brightness of 60, approximately the whiteness of newsprint, whereas softwood
BCTMP has a medium brightness of 79.172 On all other properties relevant to sanitary paper
167 TMP "consists of preheating wood chips in a steaming vessel" to "soften'the wood's structure" (Bureau, 1989).168 TIid





products CTMP is competitive with BCTMP.173 Yet, CTMP use is largely restricted to non-
sanitary and tissue markets like newsprint and fiberboard. 7 4 because it lacks the brightness that
manufacturers of sanitary and tissue products value.
Since the key property imparted by bleaching is brightness, the bleaching of disposable
paper products serves the primary purpose of promoting sales through a false sense of
cleanliness: there is no evidence that bleached white paper is any more sanitary than unbleached
paper. Brown "sanitary" products would simply convey the wrong image: consumers would
associate them with dirt and being unsanitary. Take the case of Johnson & Johnson, which test
marketed a sanitary napkin that used peat moss as the absorbent material in the pad in the early
1990s (in Canada). "A manager at a company that makes private-label sanitary pads and napkins
said consumers may spurn the product because of the dark middle layer. 'I wouldn't buy a
brown sanitary napkin,' said Bonita Austin, a Wertheim Schroder & Co. analyst ... 'This is the
kind of product women just don't want to take a risk on. ' 175 Ms. Austin would not buy the
product because it was brown and assumed other women would not buy the brown pad because it
conveyed a higher risk. The implied risk is from the brown pad, which by virtue of the color
conveys images of dirt and germs. The product line, Sure & Natural Prima, is no longer on the
market and to this day mainstream feminine hygiene products and diapers in the US are white.' 76
Brightness is also a critical property in the market for home tissue products: toilet paper,
facial tissue, paper towels, and paper napkins. All of these products can be produced using
"7 For example, the "bulk" of softwood CTMP is competitive with both softwood BCTMP and softwood bleached
kraft pulp. Higher bulk "translates into lower fiber requirements for the same basis weight." Softwood CTMP has
better bulk properties than softwood bleached kraft: 2.5 cm3 for CTMP softwood versus 1.4 cm3 for bleached kraft
softwood. And softwood CTMP bulk competes with softwood BCTMP: 2.5 cm3 for CTMP versus 1.9-3.0 cm3 for
BCTMP (Cannell and Cockram, 2000).
174 Wenzel and Bradley, 1999, p. 226.1001P.
175 Goad, 1991.
176 The unbleached alternative for sanitary pads is reusable, unbleached cotton products. For example, a Swedish
manufacturer sells "unbleached, additive-free, all-cotton tampons" under the brand Terrafemme in North America
and Natracare in England (Winegar, 1993).
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unbleached papers, and the preferred unbleached paper alternative that emerged in the 1990s was
recycled paper:1 77
[In] the value segment of the consumer market [i.e., institutional purchasing], most tissue
companies use recycled fibre, many offering a 100% recycled fibre product. ... The so
called 'away from home' tissue market, which services offices and manufacturing sites,
governmental and healthcare facilities and food serving outlets, is primarily served by
products manufactured from recycled fibre.'7
Phil Fitzell, editor of New Jersey-based Private Label magazine, explained the reluctance of
brand name producers to opt for brown, recycled pulp:
makers of national brands have been reluctant to abandon their paper goods made with
virgin pulp -- items that for years have been touted for their softness, strength or
absorbency. Bringing out alternative lines could be perceived as an admission that the
public was cheated with the previous brand-name goods. 'It's hard for them to switch
gears,' Mr. Fitzell says.' 79
The result is the unnecessary, i.e., unnecessary from a functional standpoint, bleaching of tissue
products. Between sanitary and tissue products, production of unnecessarily bleached products
totaled 2.4 million tons in 1969 (see Table 4.11).
Manufacturers carried the purity-cleanliness-whiteness theme through to the packaging
itself by using bleached paperboard to contain their products. Bleached white paperboard
packages both conveyed a sense of purity and provided a bright, white background for displaying
color graphics. With the rise of bleached kraft pulp production in the 1930s manufacturers of
sanitary paper and other products increasingly used bleached paperboard to contain and display
their products.
Bleached folding cartons for food products became a fast-growth market in the 1950s,
especially for packaging milk, ice cream, and frozen foods. "In the fifties food cartons were
177 Reusable alternatives are also available for all tissue products excepting toilet paper: handkerchiefs, cloth towels




sharing in the supermarket boom and also capturing huge new markets such as milk cartons." 180
With its strength and high brightness, bleached and semi-bleached kraft became the dominant
source of pulp for food cartons. By 1967 bleached and semi-bleached kraft accounted for 85%
of the pulp consumed in the manufacture of bleached 'food cartons.181
Bleached paperboard, like bleached tissue papers and sanitary products, did not need to
be bleached to impart strength and impermeability to liquids, the key characteristics of bleached
foodboard. The strength of bleached paperboard is a function of the kraft pulping process. And
the impermeability is a function of the coatings applied to the paperboard. Thus packaging milk
and other food products in bleached paperboard conveyed an image of a sanitary, safe, and pure
product. Important characteristics for a product that paper manufacturers and large diaries hoped
would displace the clear, traditional, reusable glass milk bottle.
The strongest functional argument in favor of bleached paperboard is, it offers the best
display for color graphics. Bleached folding boxboard supplied marketers with a "superior
printing surface" that maximized the "visual effectiveness at the point of sale;" a property
"particularly important in supermarket merchandising," 82 where package design and shelf
placement affect sales. The result, as an industry analyst wrote in the late 1960s, was folding
boxboard producers increasingly upgraded "their product to whiter and brighter boards in order
to meet demands for improved printing surfaces and to compete with other materials."183
Consumers of bleached paperboard could have used unbleached kraft paper coated with
clay and a pigment such as titanium dioxide to provide a white background for printing. The
challenge is producing a surface of comparable brightness that will display bright colors. No
" Noble, 1968, p. 86.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid., p. 92.
183 Ibid., p. 86.
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manufacturers of diary products (milk cartons, ice cream, and butter) chose this route until Ben
& Jerry's began packaging its ice cream in unbleached kraft paperboard coated with clay in
1999. The clay-coated exterior provides a "smooth medium for high-resolution printing."184
The result: "The printing process for the new cartons is the same as with the old cartons and they
look identical."185
Even the paper bags used in retail stores like pharmacies and bakeries are often bleached.
By 1969 production of bleached wrapping, bag and sack, and shipping sack papers totaled 0.556
million tons.186 With plenty of functionally equivalent unbleached paper bags already on the
market, the need for bleaching paper bags is also functionally unnecessary. Again it is used for
symbolic reasons -- purity and cleanliness -- and displaying color graphics.
Similar to tissue and sanitary paper products, the bleaching of paperboard is not
necessary for the functioning of the product. By 1969 production of bleached paperboard totaled
3.56 million tons.187 With bleached paperboard containing 85% bleached/semi-bleached kraft,
consumers purchased 3.03 million tons of unnecessarily bleached paperboard in 1969. Therefore
between "bleached paperboard," "sanitary, tissue, and absorbent papers," and "packaging paper,"
6.413 million tons of unnecessary bleaching occurred in 1969 (Table 4.12).
A common trait among many of the bleached paperboard and bleached fluff products that
became firmly established in the 1950s was their disposability: they were designed as single-use,
throwaway products. Paper milk cartons displaced reusable glass bottles. Paper diapers
displaced reusable cotton diapers. Paper, as a low-cost, lightweight, and adaptable material,
complemented the culture of disposability that emerged in the 1950s. "Convenience in
14 Abrams, 1998.
"' Dairy Foods, 1999.
186 American Paper Institute, 1981, p. 7.8 7 Ibid., p. 14.
114
disposability is a major service function of paper products. In the postwar period sanitary paper
products have made major gains through increased use of such disposable products as towels,
tissues, plates, and cups."' 88
Table 4.12. Estimated bleached chemical pulp consumption by paper and paperboard
categories, 1969
Paper/Paperboard products Production Bleached Bleached
(that contain (million tons) chemical pulp chemical pulp
bleached chemical pulps) (%) (million tons)
Total Paper + Paperboard 25.356 13.463
Total Papers 21.796 10.433
Newsprint 3.362 16 0.538
Printing and Writing Papers 5.112 3.911
Uncoated book 2.499 81 2.024
Fine writing papers 2.307 72 1.661
Cover and text papers 0.200 72 0.140
Bleached kraft envelopes 0.106 81 0.086
Sanitary, tissue, and absorbent 3.611 65 2.347
papers
Bleached bristols (e.g., postcards) 1.124 72 0.809
Thin paper (e.g., cigarette papers) 0.289 72 0.208
Coated papers 3.349 56 1.340
Packaging paper (e.g., bags) 4.506 23 1.036
Special industrial papers 0.443 55 0.244
Total Bleached Paperboard 3.560 85 3.030
Milk Cartons 0.885
Bleached folding cartons 1.346
Bleached heavyweight cup 0.416
Bleached plate, dish, and tray stock 0.282
Bleached, other packaging uses 0.201
Bleached linerboard 0.114
Bleached paperboard, other uses 0.316
Sources: 9
The culture of disposability was neither inevitable nor a chance occurrence. Rather
manufacturers, marketing departments, and advertisers cultivated disposability to increase
consumption of low cost, mass-produced products. "The emerging philosophy [of a disposable
188 Noble, 1968, p. 11.
189 Production data: American Paper Institute, 1981. Bleached chemical pulp (%) data: Noble, 1968.
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society] was most fervently and bluntly stated" by Victor Lebow "in two long articles in The
Journal ofRetailing during the mid-fifties:"19 0
'Our enormously productive economy ... demands that we make consumption our way of
life, that we convert the buying and use of goods into rituals, that we seek our spiritual
satisfactions, our ego satisfactions, in consumption. ... We need things consumed,
burned up, worn out, replaced, and discarded at an ever increasing rate.''19
Not only were disposable tissue/sanitary products and paperboard packaging
unnecessarily bleached, many were unnecessary in the first place. Disposability and excessive
bleaching grew side-by-side and were enhanced by heavy doses of advertising. Some of the
products such as toilet paper are clearly necessary. The rest of the disposable paper products
offer some convenience while creating consistent demand for consumption.
4.5.3 Photocopiers and offset printing stimulate demand for printing and writing papers
Printing and writing papers remained the primary end use for bleached chemical pulps in
the post World War II era. By 1969, printing and writing papers consumed roughly 30% of all
bleached chemical pulps, the most of any product area (see Table 4.12). The 1950s and 1960s
brought a few changes that promoted increased rates of printing and writing paper consumption.
When Xerox introduced the first plain paper copier in 1959,192 it "quickly ushered in the era of
convenience copying and a tremendous demand for cut-size papers."1 93 Offset printing also
began its period of rapid growth in the 1960s,194 with production of uncoated offset papers
increasing from 0.55 million tons in 1959 to 1.36 million tons in 1969.'95 The increasing
demand for copier and printing papers gave the printing and writing paper segment "one of the
highest rates of growth in the entire paper industry [in the 1950s and 1960s]. The major impetus
1 Packard, 1960, p. 24.
191 Lebow as quoted by Packard, Ibid., p. 24.
192 Graphic Arts Monthly, 1999, p. CP19.
193 Bureau, 1990.
' Graphic Arts Monthly, 1999, p. CP20.
195 American Paper Institute, 1981, pp. 6-7. Uncoated offset papers are a subset of uncoated book papers.
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for this growth was the paper explosion occurring in business and industry. Office copying (15
copies or less) has grown to 60 billion copies a year and office duplicating (15 copies or more) is
also rising substantially."196
Some degree of bleaching is necessary for wo6d-based printing and writing papers that
have a use life of greater than a few days. An argument could be made that these papers are
excessively bright and that brightness levels of 80 are sufficient for most end uses. This paper,
for example, is bleached to a brightness level of 84, which is more than sufficient for its use. Yet
to argue whether 80 or 84 brightness is necessary is quibbling about the edges when compared to
the products that need no bleaching.
4.6 Early concerns over water use and pollution
From 1800 to 1969 the use of water in pulp and paper mills did not affect pulp bleaching.
While prima facie this may seem like an odd statement, why emphasize a non-issue, I highlight it
here because beginning in the 1970's water discharges did impact bleaching technology and
because mills had taken limited actions to address water pollution prior to the 1970s.
Pulp and paper mills have always been concerned with having stable sources of clean
water and, to a limited extent with water pollution. First, clean water is an essential resource for
pulp and paper mills.
Water is one of the most important raw materials for papermaking. It is used throughout
the papermaking process to suspend or carry the fibers and to dissolve added materials. It
is used as boiler feed water, for air conditioning, for cooling, for washing pulps, and for
drinking purposes ... The quality of the water is particularly important in pulp washing,
bleaching, sizing, and coloring of paper.'9 7
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'9Noble, 1973, p. 75.
197 Casey, 1952, p. 707.
Second, pulp and paper mills consume massive quantities of water. In 1959 US mills used an
average of 57,000 gallons of water per ton of product.' 98
Concerns over water pollution, however, were slow to develop. It was not until the post
World War II era, with government pressure, that mills became concerned with their pollution.
Prior to then, mills freely discharged all of their wastewater directly into water bodies without
any treatment. As the environmental historian, Richard Bartlett writes:
[Downstream] communities simply endured the pollution. Not until 1924 did articles
appear on the problem, 'and the evidence is that the industry at this stage spent almost all
of its time in defeating antipollution legislation, rather than attempting to control it
through research.' After World War II both state and federal antipollution legislation
began to be passed in spite of powerful industry opposition.199
The paper industry responded to growing concerns over water pollution by forming the
National Council for Air and Stream Improvement (NCASI) in 1943 and to regulation by
moving to reduce wastewater discharges. By the 1950s most paper mills practiced "some degree
of white water reuse" 200 and by the mid-1960s one-third of the industry's wastewater discharges
were treated by sedimentation, aeration ponds and lagoons, or coagulation. 20 1 By 1969 water use
had declined to 37,000 gallons per ton of product. 202
However, waterways were still adversely affected. As a report from the Tennessee
Valley Authority concluded on pollution from a North Carolina mill that flowed into Tennessee:
"'before the Champion plant put any water pollution abatement equipment into operation, circa
1962, the river was a 'dead river.' Until 1970, the year the secondary water treatment equipment
'
9 8 NCASI, 1991, p. 5.
199 Bartlett, 1995, p. 28.
200 Casey, 1952, p. 436. "White water" is the water remaining from the papermaking process.
201 Noble, 1968, p. 49.2 02 NCASI, 1991, p. 5.
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was placed into operation, there were periods when, because of very low dissolved oxygen and
large pH fluctuations, no life other than bacteria could have existed in the water."' 203
Water use, total suspended solids (TSS), and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) were
the widely acknowledged environmental problems posed by the pulp and paper industry by the
late 1960s and early 1970s. In its report on pollution in the pulp and paper industry in 1973, the
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) emphasized these three
areas of concern. Water use was of concern because the industry uses huge quantities of water.
The OECD estimated that Swedish and American mills used 300 m3/ton of paper (or 79,260
gallons/ton).204 Depending on the available water supply a mill can seriously impact the rivers or
groundwater it extracts water from. Mills located on low flow rivers have been among the first
to adopt advanced water conservation and treatment technologies. For example, it was 1955
when Westvaco installed the first secondary wastewater treatment plant in the US at its
Covington mill, located along the low flowing Jackson River in Virginia.205
TSS was of concern because "sedimented matter tends to change the nature of the bed of
the water course, disturbing the bottom vegetation and reproduction of animal life."206 Swedish
and American mills averaged 13 kg of TSS/ton of paper manufactured in 1970.
BOD refers to the discharge of substances that consume oxygen when they breakdown in
water. If oxygen consuming organic matter exceeds the natural purifying capacity of the water
fish and plant life can die. In 1970 it was common for "the dissolved oxygen in water many
miles down from a pulp or paper mill" to be "below the limits needed to maintain fish and
203 As cited in Bartlett, 1995, p. 70.
20 4 OECD, 1973.
205 Council on Economic Priorities, 1972, p. 27.
206OECD, 1973, p. 15.
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microscopic forms of life." 207 Laboratories calculate BOD levels based on how much oxygen
the wastewater consumes over a period of five (BOD5) to seven (BOD 7) days. BOD( 201 levels
for Swedish mills were 35 kg/ton of paper and for the US mills were 32 kg/ton in 1970.209
Another common water pollution problem from pulp mills is color. "Color" refers to the
discoloration of water caused by lignin and suspended solids.210 It is of "concern to both
industry and regulatory agencies because it is a visible indicator, to the layman, of pollution." 211
Color typically is not uniformly regulated in either Sweden or the US because, as the US EPA
states, it is "not of uniform national concern." 212
Swedish mills entered the late 1960s having installed primary wastewater treatment
systems to remove TSS. 213 A primary wastewater treatment system is any process, such as a
settling pond, that removes suspended solids.2 4 Since primary treatment systems reduce but do
not eliminate TSS, the industry remained a major source of suspended solids. In 1969 Swedish
mills discharged 210,000 tons of TSS, 215 as well as 630,000 metric tons of BOD 7.
Bleach plants, with their high water consumption and use of chlorine and chlorine
dioxide, were major contributors to water pollution from pulp and paper mills. As an industry
engineer concluded, "Bleach plant effluent frequently represents the biggest and most polluted
effluent from a modern sulfate [kraft] mill." 2 16 Bleaching is water intensive because chemical
pulps need to be thoroughly washed to remove the lignin and extractives. As early as the 1950s,
207 Ibid., p. 15.
208 The "5" represents the number of days the that analysts wait before testing a sample to determine the amount of
dissolved oxygen (Springer, 1986, p. 6).
20 9 OECD, 1973.
210 Springer, 1986, p.15.
211 OECD, 1973, p. 11.212 US EPA, 1993, p. 7-3.
21 Facht, 1976, p. 152.
214 Jones, 1973, p. 304.
2
" Facht, 1976, p. 135.
216 Edde, 1984, p. 23.
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industry technicians knew that chlorine bleaching created pollution. A former professor of pulp
and paper manufacturing observed in the 1950s that "Chlorine is extremely reactive and tends to
combine with organic matter to form addition and substitution compounds. This means that
chlorine is quickly dissipated by reaction with lignin and other materials in the paper mill
system." 2 17 Thus, when the pulp was washed with water, the water would wash away the
chlorinated lignins.
Water is central to bleaching because the pulp itself is moved through the bleaching
stages in a water slurry. The concentration of pulp in water is called the "consistency" of pulp.
In the chlorine bleaching stage ("C-stage") the pulp is at 3% consistency (3 parts pulp to 97 parts
water).2 18 The C-stage is a major source of water use because the pulp typically entered
chlorination at 10% consistency, left at 10% consistency, but was chlorinated at 3% consistency.
Thus "considerable process water must be both added and extracted during chlorination -- 21
m3/ton (5,600 gal./ton)."219 Additional uses of water during bleaching include: for washing the
pulp between bleaching steps; as a solution for the bleaching chemicals, which are applied in
water solutions; and for steam to heat the pulp. 220
With pressures to address wastewater discharges, engineers first became interested in
closing the water loop in bleach mills in the 1960s. With the goal of recycling bleach plant water
effluent, William Rapson developed and promoted the "closed-cycle pulp mill" concept in the
late 1960s and 1970s. In the closed-cycle concept Rapson sought to expand the closed water
loop of pulping to including bleaching.
217 Casey, 1952, p. 684.
21 Edde, 1984, p. 23.
219 Springer, 1986, p. 160.
220 See Edde, 1984 and Springer, 1986.
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In the pulping process water enters at the last stage: pulp washing (also called brownstock
washing). Pulp washing follows the "cooking" stage, where chemicals break wood apart into
pulp. The cooked pulp (brownstock) is washed with water to remove the cooking chemicals
(liquor) from the pulp. After washing the pulp continues on to the bleaching plant while the
effluent (which includes water and pulping chemicals) is recycled (called "recovery" in the
industry). Mills recover the spent liquor after pulp washing in a series of steps: 1) removing the
water through evaporation; 2) regenerating the spent liquor in a chemical recovery boiler; 3)
purifying what is now called "white liquor" in clarifiers and evaporators; and 4) returning the
chemicals back to the cooking process. 221
The evaporation of water from the spent liquor produces condensates, called "evaporator
condensate." The evaporator condensate can be reused in pulp washing but creates odor
problems from the smelly volatile compounds (such as mercaptans). The odor problems "can be
solved by stripping the condensate before reuse." 222 Thus kraft mills lowered operating costs by
conserving water and chemical use through recycling.
Chlorine and chlorine dioxide use, however, impeded the operation of a closed-cycle
bleached kraft pulp mill. Bleaching with chlorine and chlorine dioxide forms salts, chlorides,
which will damage equipment not designed to handle water flows with high salt content.223 A
particular concern with high chloride content is damage to the chemical recovery boiler, one of
the most expensive pieces of equipment in a pulp mill at approximately $105 million. In the
closed-cycle mill chlorides would mix with the spent liquor during pulp washing, they would not
be entirely removed during evaporation, and would then enter and damage the recovery boiler
221 For descriptions of chemical recovery in kraft mills in the 1980s see Springer, 1986 or Edde, 1984.
222 Springer, 1986, p. 124.
2 Edde, 1984, p. 28.
224 Albert, 1994, p. 88.
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with the spent liquor. The "Accumulation of chlorides in the recovery cycle remains a serious
concern because of their corrosive impact." 225
Rapson introduced the closed-cycle bleached kraft pulp mill concept at the International
Pulp Bleaching Conference in 1967. "The concept wis so radical that I ... labelled it The
feasibility of recovery of bleach plant effluent to eliminate water pollution by kraft pulp mills." 2 26
Rapson and Douglas Reeve tested the closed cycle process at the Great Lakes Forest Products
mill in Thunder Bay, Ontario in the 1970s. But that process quickly ended because of the
difficulty of recycling the chlorination (first stage) filtrate. 227 Chlorine and chlorine dioxide are
both corrosive gases. Their presence in the wastewater caused "severe corrosion" in the
"recovery boiler superheater" at the Thunder Bay mill, ending the closed cycle operation. 228 An
element of the closed-cycle mill did become common in the industry: "Complete countercurrent
washing from the paper machine through the five-stages of bleaching, using the effluent from
each stage as the wash water on the previous stage of the CEDED sequence" emerged in the
1960s. 2 2 9
4.7 Summary
The history of bleached paper products from 1800-1969 in the US is one of constant
demand for white paper. What separated the 19th and 20'h centuries in terms of white paper was
the 20th century demand for very white paper, as opposed to the mildly white paper used in the
19th century. The strong demand for bleaching chemicals in the pulp and paper industry began its
ascendancy with the transition to wood as the industry's primary fiber source in the second half
of the 19th century. The shift to wood transformed the role of hypochlorite bleaching in the
2 2 5 Mannisto, 1995, p. 70.2 26 Rapson, 1989, p. T245.
227Ibd
228 Reeve et al., 1983, p. 58.229 Rapson, 1989, p. T245.
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papermaking process from an add-on stage used to increase the fiber supply to an essential stage
in the manufacture of white printing and writing papers: bleaching became necessary for even
moderately white printing and writing papers.
With an abundance of readily available raw material, the use of printed material as an
advertising medium, and growing concerns over hygiene and the concomitant rise of disposable
paper products, demand for bleached paper products, especially tissue and sanitary paper
products, grew rapidly in the years between the world wars. As color became important for
advertising and as advertisers promoted paper products as clean, pure, and sanitary, demand for
very white paper products grew. In the years prior to and after World War 1Ithe brightness
levels of paper products jumped upwards on the backs of two new bleaching chemicals: chlorine
gas (elemental chlorine) and chlorine dioxide (manufactured at the mills from sodium chlorate).
The combination of expanding markets for bleached paper products and the manufacture of
increasingly brighter papers increased demand for bleaching chemicals.
By the 1960s bleached kraft pulp, whitened primarily with chlorine and chlorine dioxide,
was the most widely used bleached pulp. The dominance of chlorine as a bleaching agent,
however, would come to an end in the 1980s, when the combining of chlorine with lignin
compounds in the bleaching process would be revealed as a significant source of persistent,
bioaccumulative toxic chemicals. And with growing environmental concerns, the cultural
association of white with cleanliness and purity would be called into question.
124
5 An overview of the emergence and diffusion of cleaner bleaching technologies in the
Swedish and American paper industries (1970-1998)
With the emergence of national environmental regulatory programs in Sweden in the late
1960s and the US in the early 1970s came greater government scrutiny of pollution from pulp
and paper manufacturers and requirements to manage that pollution. Then in the 1980s and
1990s environmental organizations pressed for dramatic environmental improvements in the
manufacture of bleached paper products. This chapter begins by introducing the barriers to
technology innovation and diffusion in a mature industry sector stuck in the "specific phase" of
technology development. These barriers to technological change would complicate the efforts of
environmentalists to transform the environmental performance of bleached paper manufacturing.
Next the chapter assesses the similarities and differences between the Swedish and
American pulp and paper industries as they entered the mid-1980s; defining the technological
status of the industries prior to intensive pressure from environmentalists to adopt the cleanest
production technologies. Highlighted in this section are the potential implications of regulatory
decisions made in the 1970s for later technology diffusion.
The third section leaps forward a decade to present the spectrum of cleaner bleached kraft
production technologies that were available to manufacturers in the mid-1990s. It summarizes
the technological innovations and assesses the environmental performance of the different
bleaching options.
Finally the chapter closes with an assessment of the levels of cleaner production
technology diffusion achieved in both nations. Ultimately this chapter raises many questions
about why certain technologies diffused, others did not, as well as why the differences between
Sweden and the US. The answers to these questions will be address in later chapters.
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5.1 Barriers to the diffusion of innovations in bleached kraft pulp mills
When environmentalists tried to effect change in pulp bleaching in the 1980s they
confronted an industry with structural impediments to adopting technology innovations. High
capital costs, long amortization period for equipment, and massive production capacity militated
against the quick diffusion of new technologies in bleached kraft pulp production.
The pulp and paper industry is very capital-intensive.' For example, the construction of a
greenfield (new) bleached kraft pulp mill in Alabama cost $700 million in the early 1990s.2 The
high capital costs result from the economies of scale owners seek from their mills. Since unit
costs for both capital and operation decline with increased production (up to a certain point), the
largest mills -- with the capacity to produce over 1,000 metric tons of pulp per day offer -- the
best returns on investment: "The 'penalty' for smaller mills is severe, and given the importance
of investment return to a potential investor, the financial motivation for annual capacities in the
order of 400,000 plus tonnes per year is clear."3 The economies of paper production mean mills
are growing larger or closing down. For example, in Sweden the capacity of pulp mills increased
4.9% per year and paper mills increased 5.6% per year from 1960-1993.4
Since pulp is a commodity product, produced in large quantities with minimal
differentiation across manufacturers, and capital costs are high, the fast amortization of
equipment is economically infeasible.5 The result, mills use their equipment for as long as
possible, with a typical use-life of 20 to 25 years.6
IIED, 1996, p. 23.
2 Ferguson, 1992.
3 IIED, 1996, p. 23.
4 Ibid., p. 23.
5 Clayton, 1969.6 US EPA, 1993, p. 3-4.
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Large-scale production also impedes the development and adoption of technology
innovations because of the challenges of scaling up from laboratory testing to full-scale
production.
The scaling of laboratory or pilot-plant experimenth to full-size commercial equipment,
involving as it can a 'magnification factor' [because of the high throughput of materials in
a pulp mill] of anything up to 1,000 times, often runs into difficulties. New mills may
face a period of months or years during which many operating problems have to be
solved before pulp of the required quality is produced.'
As Ron Hise, technical director at Westvaco Corp.'s Covington, Virginia mill remarked, "No
one in the industry wants to be first to make process change." 2 Instead, most mills closely watch
the innovators and lead adopters, then decide whether to adopt a new technology.
The history of technology diffusion in the industry is replete with examples of long
periods of diffusion. Virgin wood fiber, first used in the mid-19th century, did not become the
dominant fiber source until the late 19th century. Kraft pulping, first introduced in Sweden in
1885, was not used in the US until 1909. It then took 40 years before kraft pulping became the
dominant pulping process. Chlorine dioxide, which spread quickly for a pulp and paper
innovation, was widely diffused in 15 years. First introduced in Sweden and Canada in 1946, it
was not until the early 1960s that it became a standard bleaching agent in pulp mills.
Gradual, incremental change, large-scale production, high capital costs, and commodity
product, are all characteristics of an industry in what the technology innovation researchers,
Abernathy and Utterback (1978), call the "specific phase" of technological development. For
firms in the specific phase, change is incremental because capital costs are high and an
"alteration in any one attribute or process has ramifications for many others." 3 Thus when
environmentalists demanded chlorine-free paper in the 1980s they confronted an industry with
1Clayton, 1969, p. 430.
2 Hise, 1995.
3 Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, p. 4 1.
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structural impediments to change. The high cost and slow rate of change in the industry would
require environmentalists to change their typical demand of immediate change from
manufacturers.
It is important to note, as emphasized by Abernathy and Utterback, that external factors
are often critical to change in firms in the specific phase of development: "New products which
require reorientation of corporate goals or production facilities tend to originate outside
organizations devoted to a 'specific' production system."' Locked into their modes of
production, external agitation becomes critical to innovation. Environmentalists would play this
role beginning in the 1980s.
5.2 Similar yet different: bleached kraft pulp mills in Sweden and the US, circa
1985
When environmentalists demanded that pulp and paper mills eliminate organochlorine
pollution in the 1980s they confronted similar, yet slightly different, mills. Similar because
Swedish and American mills had the same dominant pulping process -- kraft pulping -- and
bleaching chemicals -- chlorine and chlorine dioxide. Similar because bleached kraft pulp mills
in both nations were mammoth facilities, with high capital costs, whose owners were reluctant to
innovate. Different because a greater percentage of Swedish mills used an intermediary
technology between pulping and bleaching, called "delignification," to prevent water pollution,
reduce chemical use, and increase water efficiency. Different because a greater percentage of
American mills invested in secondary wastewater treatment systems to control water pollution.
Another important difference that would shape the pulp and paper campaigns was, Swedish mills
exported a far greater proportion of their production than American mills.
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' Ibid., p. 4 1.
5.2.1 Operating from the same technology base: kraft pulp bleached with chlorine and
chlorine dioxide
The Swedish and American pulp and paper industries entered the late 1980s with the
same dominant technology for manufacturing bleached pulp: kraft pulping with chlorine and
chlorine dioxide bleaching agents. In 1985 bleached kraft pulp was the most widely
manufactured pulp in Sweden, the U.S., as well as the world. At 50.2 million metric tons,
bleached kraft pulp represented 36% of global pulp production and was far greater than second
place mechanical pulping at 29.8 million tons (see Table 5.1). Bleached kraft pulp production
Table 5.1 Global pulp production, 1985 (million metric tons)
Bleached Kraft Unbleached Kraft & Sulfite, Percent of Total








not specified 0.725 0.5%




Other pulp 6.492 4.7%
Totals 139.761 55.914 34.916 5.787 100%a
*Total may not equal 100% because of rounding.
Source: PPI, 1992
represented 40% of pulp production in Sweden at 3.7 million metric tons (see Table 5.2) and
42% of pulp production in the US at 20.5 million metric tons (see Table 5.3). Together Sweden
and the US manufactured 48% of global bleached kraft pulp production, with the US first at 41%
of global production and Sweden fourth at 7% of global production (see Table 5.4). The
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dominance of bleached rather than unbleached pulp in world markets reflected the strong
demand for white paper products in developed nations.
Table 5.2 Swedish pulp production, 1985 (million metric tons)







Mechanical pulp 2.298 25.2%
Semi-chemical and chemi-
groundwood pulp 0.263 2.9%
Other pulp 0.044 0.5%
Totals 9.123 4.212 2.306 100%08
"Total may not equal 100% because of rounding.
Source: PPI, 1992
Table 5.3 American pulp production, 1985 (million metric tons)
Bleached Kraft Unbleached Kraft Percent of








Mechanical pulp 4.763 9.7%
Semi-chemical and chemi-
groundwood pulp 3.674 7.5%
Other pulp 1.065 2.2%
Totals 49.14 21.764 17.878 100%a
"Total may not equal 100% because of rounding.
Source: PPI, 1992
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Table 5.4 Top ten bleached chemical pulp producing nations, 1985 (million metric tons)
Total Chemical Bleached Kraft Pulp Bleached Sulfite PulpCountry Bleached Pulp (million tons) (million tons)(million tons)
United States 21.764 20.526 1.238
Canada 8.547 8.218 0.329
Japan 4.930 4.894 0.036
Sweden 4.212 3.674 0.538
Finland 3.484 3.381 0.103
USSR 2.530 1.476 -1.054
Brazil 2.260 2.243 0.017
Portugal 0.997 0.889 0.108
France 0.965 0.717 0.248
Spain 0.837 0.822 0.015
All Other Nations 5.388 3.369 2.019
Total 55.914 50.209 5.705
Source: PPI, 1992
To bleach kraft, as well as sulfite, pulp Swedish and American mills used chlorine and
chlorine dioxide. The most widely used bleaching sequence at Swedish and American bleached
kraft pulp mills beginning in the mid-1960s and extending to the 1980s was CEDED:1 with
chlorine ("C") and chlorine dioxide ("D") the bleaching chemicals ("E" is the extraction stage).
The American mills used 1.45 million metric tons of chlorine and 0.4 million metric tons of
sodium chlorate (the feedstock for onsite production of chlorine dioxide) in 1987. And Western
European mills used 0.57 million metric tons of chlorine and 0.3 million metric tons of sodium
chlorate in 1987 (see Table 5.5).2 Other bleaching chemicals used less frequently in bleached
Bonifant and Ratcliffe, 1994.
2 Since Sweden produced 33% of bleached chemical (i.e., kraft and sulfite) pulp in Western Europe in 1987, and
CEDED was the dominant bleaching sequence in Sweden, a rough estimate of Swedish chlorine and sodium
chlorate consumption for paper bleaching is 33% of the Western European total. Data for 1987: Swedish bleached
chemical pulp production was 4.345 million tons (kraft pulp - 3.778 million tons and sulfite pulp - 0.567 million
tons); and Western Europe bleached chemical pulp production was 13.328 million tons (kraft pulp - 11.085 million
tons and sulfite pulp -2.243 million tons) (PPI, 1992).
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kraft pulp mills included hypochlorite, oxygen, and hydrogen peroxide, with peroxide use
confined primarily to mechanical pulp. 2
Table 5.5 Chemicals consumed in pulp bleaching, Western Europe and the US (1987)
Chemical Western Europe US(1000 metric tons) (1000 metric tons)
Chlorine 566 1,449
Sodium chlorate"
3 0 2b 407
Hydrogen peroxide 114 33.6
aMills manufacture chlorine dioxide on-site from sodium chlorate
bAuthor's estimate: in 1987 W. European consumption (for all end uses) of
sodium chlorate was 360,000 metric tons. In 1990 (the latest year data are
available for), the pulp bleaching accounted for 84% of all peroxide
consumption in W. Europe. Thus a rough estimate of W. Europe pulp mill
peroxide consumption is 360,000 x 0.84. All data from Schumacher and
others, 1999.
Sources:
In the 1970s, Swedish and American bleached kraft pulp mills began to diverge slightly
in their technologies as they chose different paths for addressing wastewater pollution. In
Sweden the principal technology for addressing water pollution was oxygen delignification,
whereas in the US it was secondary wastewater treatment.
5.2.2 Introducing oxygen delignification: a pollution prevention technology
Oxygen delignification is both an extension of the pulping process and an addition to the
bleaching process. It is an extension of pulping because its wastewater is used in pulp washing.
It is an addition to bleaching because it removes lignin (hence "delignification") that would
otherwise be removed in the bleaching process. In oxygen delignification, the addition of
'Hypochlorite is manufactured from chlorine on-site (Smook, 1982, p. 156) and is included in chlorine
consumption.
2 Ibid., chapter 11, "bleaching".
3 Leder et al., 1994, pp. 733.1002U and 733.1005K (chlorine); Schumacher et al., 1999, pp. 732.1001K and
732.10021 (sodium chlorate); and Lacson, Leder, and Sasano, 2000, pp. 741.5000V and 741.5002G (hydrogen
peroxide).
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oxygen to the pulp causes lignin to separate from cellulose.' The lignin content of pulp is
measured on the basis of the pulp's "kappa number." For example, the kappa number for
brownstock (unbleached kraft) softwood pulp is 30-35.2 After oxygen delignification the kappa
number declines by roughly 50 percent, to 16-17.3
Since the role of chlorine in bleaching is to remove lignin (as well as to whiten wood
fibers), delignification reduces the amount of bleaching chemical needed in the first bleaching
stage. With oxygen costing less than chlorine and chlorine dioxide, oxygen delignification can
reduce operating costs.4 Swedish mills, for example, found operating costs to decline by "21 to
56 SEK [Swedish crowns] ($3.40 to $9.08) per ton, depending on the wood species (hardwood or
softwood) and consistency of the pulp." 5 In comparison to bleaching without oxygen
delignification, the annualized capital and operating costs ranged from a "decrease of 16 to 23
SEK ($2.59 to $3.73) per ton for MC [medium consistency oxygen delignification] softwood
pulping to an increase of 25 to 41 SEK ($4.05 to $6.65) per ton for HC [high consistency]
hardwood pulping."6 Savings are common with softwood pulp because softwoods contain more
lignin: bleaching a ton of softwood requires more chlorine and chlorine dioxide than bleaching a
ton of hardwood.
By using oxygen delignification mills are able to cycle the wastewater through the
pulping process; not containing corrosive chlorides, the wastewater from oxygen delignification




4 Ibid., p. 4-44.
' Ibid., p. 4-44.
6 Ibid., p. 4-44. "Consistency" refers to the ratio of pulp to water. Mills convey pulp as a liquid slurry. High
consistency pulp contains 25-28% pulp whereas medium consistency pulp has 10-12% pulp (US EPA, 1993, p. 4-
33).
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oxygen delignification use translates "directly into reduction in most pollutants of concern, i.e.,
BOD 5, color, and organochlorines."I
The first commercial use of oxygen delignification anywhere in the world was in 1970.
Developed as a joint venture between Kamyr AB (Swedish pulp equipment supplier),2 L'Air
Liquide (French manufacturer of oxygen), and SAPPI (South Africa Pulp and Paper Industry),
oxygen was first used at the SAPPI mill in Enstra, South Africa in 1970.3 Another team -- Sunds
Defibrator (Swedish pulp equipment supplier), MoDo (Swedish pulp and paper manufacturer),
and Canadian Industries Limited (oxygen supplier) -- developed a slightly different oxygen
delignification system. Their system was first installed at the Chesapeake mill in West Point,
Virginia in 1972 and the Munksj6 Aspa Bruk mill in Sweden in 1974.4
Today two delignification technologies are used in bleached kraft pulp mills: oxygen
delignification and extended delignification. Extended delignification, first commercialized in
1983, extends the cooking time of pulp, enabling further delignification prior to the bleaching
process. 5
5.2.3 Sweden opts for pollution prevention with oxygen delignification
In Sweden, the regulatory authorities and industry executives decided to address water
pollution from pulp and paper mills primarily through in-process changes (i.e., pollution
prevention) rather than end-of-pipe treatment.6 The Koncessionsnamnden fdr Milj6skydd
'US EPA, 1993, p. 4-47.
2 At the time Kamyr AB was headquartered in Sweden. The company split in 1989 to Kamyr AB (based in
Karlstad, Sweden) and Kamyr Inc., owned by the Finnish company Ahlstrom (Bonifant and Ratcliffe, 1994, p. 26).
3 Ibid., p. 70.
4 Ibid., p. 70. Bonifant and Ratcliffe stated that the Munksj6 mill installed the oxygen system in 1973. But Hans
Fasten, former manager of the Munksj6 mill, stated that the oxygen system came on line in 1974 (Fasten, 1993).
5 Kamyr, a Scandinavian pulp and paper supplier, developed the first extended delignification systems -- Modified
Continuous Cooking and Extended Modified Continuous Cooking -- in the mid-1980s. Kamyr's first installation
was a retrofit of a Finnish mill in 1983. Similar extended delignification systems are marketed by other pulp and
paper suppliers, principally Beloit and Sunds Difibrator. All extended delignification installations or retrofits, with
the exception the Finnish mill occurred in or after 1987 (US EPA, 1993).
6 Facht, 1976, p. 152.
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(Licensing or Franchise Board)' was responsible for issuing and reviewing operating permits for
major stationary sources of pollution, including pulp and paper mills.2 Although designed to
operate "like a court of law",3 the Licensing Board acted more like a mediator, hearing
arguments from the mill's management and consultants, and Statens NaturvArdsverket (Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency), then issuing a ruling in the form of a production permit.4 As
Nils Jirval, vice president of environmental policy at the Swedish Forest Industries Association
explained, "It is a game between acting parties. Industry wants to increase production and
authorities say fine, 'you need to reduce pollution.' Whatever technique reduced COD was
usually fine with the EPA. Although they preferred, and industry agreed, in-process changes
over treatment." 5
The pollutant of concern to Swedish regulatory authorities was chemical oxygen demand
(COD). COD is a measure of the presence of all organic substances in wastewater, the persistent
as well as the biological, thereby providing a better picture of pollution reduction in the mill as
compared to biochemical oxygen demand (BOD); which only measures the biologically
degradable organic substances in wastewater.6 Laboratories calculate COD differently than
BOD. They use chemical techniques to "measure the amount of oxidant consumed by a waste
sample using strong oxidizing agents such as potassium permanganate or dichromate."7 The
COD level for the same water sample is typically higher than the BOD level because more
compounds are oxidized chemically than biologically.8 COD "can be used to measure organic
'The Licensing Board was eliminated with the passage of the Swedish Environmental Code in 1999.
2 Swedish Ministry of the Environment, 1996.




7Springer, 1986, p. 9.
' Ibid., p. 9.
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matter in waste that is toxic to biological life,", whereas BOD only measures the oxygen-
depleting capacity of the wastewater. Swedish regulators could afford to be less concerned with
BOD because many of the mills discharged directly into the Baltic Sea. Sitting on the coast
meant that the mills could "solve" BOD problems through dilution; mixing polluted water with
clean sea water to increase the oxygen level in the water.
The focus on pollution prevention was not a strategy regulators applied to every industry.
For example, the petrochemical industry addressed its water pollution with end-of-pipe
treatment.2 The pollution management approach varied across industries depending on the
outcome of negotiations between regulators and industry executives.3 But, as Staffan Lagergren
of the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) recalled, paper industry executives
supported in-process change over secondary wastewater treatment because it was "most cost-
effective. They could get something back for their investment." 4
Typically permit renewal was a consensual process among regulatory authorities and mill
management. "We have a very friendly attitude with government," Nils Jirval emphasized.
"The authorities have not used the judges and courts to solve problems, instead we solve
problems through discussion."5 While the public hearing was an open process, Statens
NaturvArdsverket (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency) was often the only counterweight
to the mill perspective. NGOs, neighbors, and fisheries were seldom involved in pubic hearings








The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) gathered scientific and technical
data for, and made recommendations to, the Licensing Board. As Staffan Lagergren, Head of the
Heavy Industry Section at SEPA explained: the EPA "should know the technological solutions,
what is BAT [best available technology], and give advice in written statements to the Licensing
Board."' The Licensing Board then issued the legally binding mill permit, it did not set national
standards. While the discharge levels could vary across mills, reflecting local ecological
conditions and mill-specific economics, in practice they were quite similar.2
The most significant pollution prevention measure technology adopted by Swedish mills
was oxygen delignification. 3 By the end of 1986, 73% of Swedish bleached kraft pulp, mills (11
of 15 mills) had installed oxygen delignification systems.4 A smaller percentage, 40% (6 of 15),
invested in secondary wastewater treatment. 5 These mills were located inland or discharged to
shallow bays where water mixing was slower and BOD concerns were greater.6
The investments in oxygen would position the Swedish industry to address the future
concerns raised by environmentalists over organochlorine pollution from the mills. As the US
EPA wrote after dioxins were discovered in mill effluent: oxygen "puts the mill on the track
towards 'zero effluent pulping and chlorine-free bleaching. Should regulations or market forces
require further reductions or elimination of chlorine compounds, mills that have previously
installed oxygen delignification will be able to respond more rapidly." 7
Lagergren, 1998
2 Nystrum, 1998.
3 Other prevention measures included: dry rather than wet debarking and improvements in pulp washing through
better washing techniques and the installation of filter washers and washing presses (Facht, 1976, p. 153).
4 S~dergren, 1989, p. 11; and Lagergren, 1996.
5 Sdergren, 1989, p. 11.
6 Lagergren, 1998
7 US EPA, 1993, p. 4-47.
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5.2.4 The US opts for pollution control with secondary wastewater treatment
Under authority of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated guidelines for bleached kraft paper mills
in 1977.1 The US EPA writes "guidelines" because most states are responsible for implementing
the Water Pollution Control Act. In states that decide not to take responsibility, the US EPA
implements the law. The principal pollutants of concern in the 1977 regulations were the
conventional pollutants: BOD5 and TSS.2 The US EPA does not regulate COD. In establishing
effluent guidelines the US EPA does not mandate a technology. As the US EPA explains,
"effluent limitations guidelines are based upon the performance of specific technologies, but do
not require the use of any specific technology." 3 While mills can use whatever technology they
want to meet the guidelines, they typically use the technologies that were the basis for
developing the guidelines.
Reflecting the often adversarial nature of environmental regulations in the US, the pulp
and paper industry challenged the guidelines in court. "The industry's reaction to the guidelines
was adverse, and legal suits were brought against the EPA under the direction of the American
Paper Institute (API). All cases have been unsuccessful, and the guidelines stand as proposed."4
US mills responded to the regulations by investing in secondary wastewater treatment.
By the 1980s, the majority of bleached kraft mills, 76 of 88 mills (86%) had either invested in
secondary wastewater treatment or discharged directly to a municipal sewage treatment system.5
Yet it was clear to industry engineers in North America that in-process changes were the most
efficient means for reducing pollution, especially from bleaching operations. Writing in 1982,
'US EPA, 1993, pp. 2-6 and 7-3.
2 For example, see Ibid., pp. 5-4, 7-2 and 7-4.
3 Ibid., p. 9-2.
4 Springer, 1986, p. 47.
'US EPA, 1993, see pp. 6-46 and 8-73.
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Gary Smook, a pulp and paper engineer at the British Columbia Institute of Technology,
concluded in his Handbookfor Pulp and Paper Technologists (1982) that "The most effective
means of reducing and controlling mill discharges is better in-plant utilization of raw materials.
... Ultimately, the final word on abatement of bleaching effluents may be embodied in either
oxygen bleaching, the closed cycle system, or displacement bleaching."I
Oxygen delignification, however, diffused slowly into the US market. After the
Chesapeake mill first adopted oxygen delignification in 1972, only five other mills had adopted
the technology by the end of 1986: Champion International, Consolidated Papers, Union Camp
(2 mills), and Weyerhaeuser.2 The lack of American investments in oxygen meant
environmentalists would confront an industry unaccustomed to using pollution prevention
technologies.
5.2.5 Export markets in Sweden and the US
Export markets would play a critical role in how Swedish pulp mills responded to
demand for chlorine-free paper. With a small domestic economy, Swedish mills turned to
exports to expand their markets. In 1985 Sweden exported one-third of its pulp production and
three-quarters of its paper production (see Table 5.6).
Western European nations bought the majority, 76%, of Swedish exports in 1985.
Germany led all nations, importing one-fifth of Swedish pulp exports. Other major European
markets for Swedish pulp were Italy, France, the UK, and the Netherlands (see Table 5.7).
Demands for chlorine-free paper from German and English environmentalists and, more
importantly, consumers, would affect the investment decisions of Swedish mills in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
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1Smook, 1982, pp. 352-353.
2 US EPA, 1993, p. 4-4 1.
Table 5.6 Swedish and American population, consumption, and exports, 1985




Consumption rate, per capita 239 283
-(kg)
Pulp production 9.1 49.1
(million tons) _-_ ___- _
Pulp exports 3.0 3.4
(million tons) - _ 3.0_3.4
Pulp exports(% of total production)
Paper production 7.0 60.9
(million tons) 7.0 _60.9
Paper exports 53 3.2
(million tons) 5.3 _3.2
Paper exports
(% of total production) 75% 5%
Source: PPI, 1992
The US pulp and paper industry with its vast domestic market exports relatively little of
its production. With 239 million people consuming 283 kg of paper (1985), the US was (and
still is) the world's largest consumer of paper products. In 1985 the US exported 7% of its pulp
and 5% of its paper production (see Table 5.6). Because the US is by far the world's largest
producer of pulp and paper these small percentages represent large amounts: the US ranked #2 in
pulp exports (just in front of #3 Sweden) and #4 in paper exports in 1985 (just behind #3
Sweden).1 With its huge domestic market the US industry would prove invulnerable to foreign
demands for chlorine-free paper. For American environmentalists, this meant they were unable
to draw any leverage from foreign consumers.
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'PPI, 1992.
Table 5.7 Significant importers of Swedish pulp, 1985





United Kingdom 0.274 9%
Netherlands 0.199 7%




All other nations 0.607 20%
Total 3.007 100%
Totals may not add up due to rounding.
Source: PPI, 1992
5.2.6 Comparing Sweden and the US
When environmentalists in Sweden and the US demanded that mills manufacture
chlorine-free paper in the late 1980s they both confronted mill owners resistant to change
because of the high costs of capital and the challenges of making significant technological
changes in large-scale production facilities. Yet in Sweden there were a few factors that would
make bleached kraft pulp mills more receptive to demands for technological change: a regulatory
approach to pollution that emphasized prevention (in-process) over control, prior industry
investments in oxygen delignification, and an export-oriented industry. None of these factors
individually or combined, however, would prove sufficient to prompt bleached kraft pulp mills
in Sweden to manufacture chlorine-free, i.e., free of chlorine and chlorine dioxide, pulp. Other
factors, as discussed in the following chapters, would prove necessary to prompt mills to
manufacture chlorine-free pulp.
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Conversely in the US there were factors that supported the industry's resistance to
innovation, including a regulatory approach to pollution that emphasized control over
prevention, prior industry investments in secondary wastewater treatment systems, and a history
of adversarial relations between the paper industry and government regulators. These factors
would all reinforce the American industry's resistance to chlorine-free paper. But they, as
discussed in the following chapters, would not be the only reasons why the American industry
successfully resisted demands to manufacture chlorine-free paper.
Table 5.8 summarizes the key similarities and differences between the Swedish and
American pulp and paper industries that would be relevant to future demands for changes in
chemical bleached pulps and were present prior to 1986. The presence of the differences meant
that environmentalists in Sweden would begin their campaigns for changing pulp and paper
bleaching with historical advantages that were absent in the US.
5.3 Spectrum of cleaner production technologies in the manufacture of bleached
kraft paper circa 1995
By the mid-1990s a spectrum of cleaner bleaching technologies were in use at kraft pulp
mills in Sweden, the US, and elsewhere in the world. Between 1985 and 1995 the major
technological advancement in bleached kraft pulping was the development and use of ozone as a
bleaching technology. Incremental bleaching changes included the substitution of chlorine
dioxide for chlorine in the first bleaching stage and the use of hydrogen peroxide as an
alternative bleaching agent to chlorine dioxide. Another major development in the industry was
the first ever bleached kraft pulp lines that completely eliminated the use of chlorine and chlorine
dioxide, relying instead upon combinations of oxygen, ozone, and/or hydrogen peroxide. The
abbreviations used in the paper industry for these technologies are listed in Table 5.9. The
causes of these technology developments, which are detailed in Chapters 7-10, were demands on
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mills to reduce their use of water and discharge of chlorinated organic compounds (i.e.,
organochlorines). What follows below is a brief chronological introduction to the cleaner
bleached kraft pulping technologies as well as an assessment of their performance based on
environmental and cost parameters.
Table 5.8 Summary of technological, regulatory, and market similarities/differences between
Swedish and American pulp and paper industries circa 1985
Factors Sweden us
Capital intensity High
Dominant pulping technology Bleached kraft
Dominant bleaching chemicals Chlorine and chlorine dioxide
Pulp exports 33% 7%
Paper exports 75% 5%
Primary ecological concern Baltic Sea Low flow rivers
regarding industry wastewater
Primary regulated water pollutants TSS
COD BOD
Regulatory approach to pollution Pollution prevention Pollution control
Primary technological solution to Oxygen delignification: Secondary wastewater treatment:
pollution from bleached kraft pulp 73% of all mills 86% of all mills
mills
Secondary technological solution Secondary wastewater treatment: Oxygen delignification:
to pollution from bleached kraft pulp 40% of all mills 9% of all mills
mills
Industry-government relationship Cooperative Adversarial
The first major innovation to hit bleached kraft pulp mills after 1985 was the substantial
substitution of chlorine dioxide for chlorine in the first bleaching stage. This came to be known
as "partial substitution." A 50% substitution was written as: 50C/50D-E-D-E-D. Partial
substitution expanded rapidly in the industry after dioxins were publicly acknowledged to be in
mill effluent in 1987.1 In pulp bleaching operations, what the Swedes call "bleacheries,"
chlorine gas reacts with organic matter in trees to create a soup of chlorinated organic chemicals,
'US EPA, 1993, p. 5-11.
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many of which have never been identified. In fact, 80% of organically bound chlorine in mill
wastewater is "not amenable to compound specific analysis because of their relatively high
molecular mass and heterogeneous nature."' Dioxins were first discovered in the soup of
organochlorines discharged by mills in 1985 in the US, although this data did not become widely
known until 1987.2
Table 5.9 Common bleaching abbreviations
Next came the complete elimination of chlorine gas. Korsnis AB's mill in Gavle,
Sweden was the first to produce bleached kraft pulp without chlorine gas in December 1988.3
The mill completely substituted chlorine dioxide for chlorine in the first bleaching stage. At first
the mill produced limited quantities of what it called chlorine-free pulp. By 1990 the mill had
144
C = Chlorine gas (elemental chlorine)
D = Chlorine dioxide
E = Alkali extraction stage
Eo = Alkali extraction with oxygen
Ep = Alkali extraction with peroxide
Eop = Alkali extraction with oxygen and peroxide
0 = Oxygen
P = Hydrogen peroxide
Z = Ozone
'Berry et al., 1991, p. 45.
2 For details, see Chapter 9.
3 Svensk Papperstidning, 1989.
eliminated all use of chlorine gas.' The elimination of chlorine gas would be called elemental
chlorine-free (ECF) bleaching. A typical ECF bleaching sequence is: DEDED. In Sweden, the
bleaching combination of oxygen delignification and ECF was called ECF-lite: 2 An example of
an ECF-lite bleaching sequence is: ODEDED. I
The third innovation also emerged in Sweden. The Munksj8 Aspa Bruk AB mill in Aspa
Bruk, Sweden was the first to manufacture bleached kraft pulp without using chlorine and
chlorine dioxide. In 1990, Munksj6 began producing limited quantities of what would become
known as totally chlorine-free (TCF) pulp by using oxygen and hydrogen peroxide.3 The first,
and only, full-scale production of bleached kraft TCF pulp began in 1992 at the Louisiana-
Pacific mill in Samoa, California.4
The next major innovation was the introduction of a completely new bleaching chemical,
ozone. While ozone had been tested as a bleaching technology since the 1970s, it was not used
in full-scale production until 1992, when it was simultaneously introduced in Sweden and the
US. The two mills were Union Camp's Franklin, Virginia mill and Sbdra Cell's M6nsteres
Bruk.5 An advantage of an ozone-based TCF bleaching sequence over a non-ozone-based
sequence is that ozone is cheaper than peroxide. Peroxide is typically used in an ozone-based
TCF sequence (e.g., OZEP), but the amount of peroxide used is much lower than if no ozone is
used. The combination of ECF-lite with ozone resulted in dramatic pollutant reductions.
As manufacturers eliminated the use of both chlorine and chlorine dioxide, they increased
the capacity of the mills to reuse the water, coming closer to Rapson's ideal of the closed cycle





sUS EPA, 1993, pp. 4-57--4-58.
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the Metsa-Rauma mill in Finland opened in 1996 using a TCF process with the goal of becoming
the first TEF bleached kraft pulp mill.'
Table 5.10 lists the prominent bleaching sequences that emerged from the development
of these new technologies. Each of these technology developments produced major reductions in
pollutants from bleached kraft pulp mills, including BOD, COD, and color. When dioxins and
organochlorines became pollutants of concern from bleached kraft pulp mills in the 1980s, the
regulatory agencies in Sweden and the US developed a variety of techniques for measuring the
presence of organochlorines in wastewater. By 1990, a standard technique emerged for
measuring a class of chemicals broader than organochlorines, called adsorbable organohalogens
(AOX). 2 While the AOX technique measures more than just chlorinated substances,3
"essentially all of the halogenated organic substances measured as AOX are chlorinated
compounds." 4 The new bleaching technologies were also effective at reducing AOX.
'Grant, 1996.
2 AOX is the broadest measure of organohalogens -- i.e., it captures the highest percent of these substances -- and
became the standard measure for quantifying organochlorines and other halogens in Sweden in 1990 (Marine
Pollution '90, p. 30). Prior to 1990, the Swedish EPA used the "total organically bound chlorine" (TOCI) technique
to measure organochlorine pollution. Developed in 1981 at the Skogsindustrins Tekniska Forskningsinstitut
(Swedish Pulp and Paper Research Institute), the TOCI technique was "too time consuming and complex" for
routine effluent analysis (Odendahl, Weishar, and Reeve, 1990, p. 61). It was replaced by AOX, which is a simpler
and cheaper technique. Other advantages of AOX over TOCI include better reproducibility, lower detection limit,
and higher percentage recovery (Odendahl, Weishar, and Reeve, 1990).
3 AOX measures organic halogenated compounds that contain chlorine, bromine, and iodine (but not fluorine) in
wastewater effluent.
4US EPA, 1993, p. 7-11.
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Table 5.10 Bleaching kraft pulps: chemicals and bleaching sequences
Bleaching processes Bleaching sequences
Traditional chlorine bleaching C-E-D-E-D
Partial substitution 50C/50D-E-D-E-D
Elemental chlorine-free (ECF) bleaching D-Eop-D-E-D
ECF with oxygen delignification (ECF-lite) O-D-Eo-D-E-D
ECF-lite bleaching with ozone O-Z-Eo-D
TCF bleaching O-Z-Eop-P
A report written by the Paper Task Force in 1995 documented the environmental benefits
of the major new bleaching technologies and their associated bleaching sequences. The Paper
Task Force, as detailed in Chapter 10, was an initiative of the environmental organization,
Environmental Defense, and included the following members: Time Inc., McDonald's,
Prudential Insurance, Johnson & Johnson, and Duke University. Figure 5.1 summarizes the
environmental performance data compiled by the Paper Task Force for each of the different
bleaching sequences in comparison to partial substitution. The columns in Figure 5.1 represent
percent reductions in pollutants (AOX, BOD, COD, and color), water use, and energy use.
The dominant bleaching sequence that American pulp and paper manufacturers would
adopt, ECF, was the worst environmental performer of the cleaner production technology
options. It reduced AOX by 25% but increased energy use by 20% because of the greater
electricity demand for chlorine dioxide. ECF-lite (oxygen delignification and ECF), the
dominant technology adopted by Swedish mills, performed much better than ECF across all the
environmental indicators, including reducing water use by 46% and energy use by 21%. Overall,
TCF was the best environmental performer, although ECF-lite with ozone was a hair better than
TCF in reducing color and comparable to TCF in terms of reduced energy use. The Paper Task
Force concluded that "TCF processes may provide the most efficient route to minimum bleach
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plant effluent flow by avoiding the generation of chlorides [that impede water recycling]
throughout the bleaching process."' The data reveal a clear trajectory from dirtier to cleaner
technologies as pulp mills move away from chlorine and chlorine dioxide to greater reliance on
oxygen, ozone, and hydrogen peroxide.
Figure 5.1 Percent reduction of environmental indicators for four softwood bleached kraft pulp














Source: Paper Task Force, 19952
The Paper Task Force report also calculated the capital, operating, and total costs for each
of the major kraft bleaching technologies. The task force distinguished between softwood and
hardwood mills because hardwoods, which have less lignin, are easier to bleach than softwoods:
1 Paper Task Force, 1995, p. 206.
2 Summary of data presented on pages 194 and 195.
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they require fewer bleaching chemicals to reach the same level of brightness. The most
expensive technology option in terms of total costs (capital and operating costs) for softwoods
was ECF, although it was the least expensive for hardwoods (see Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2 Incremental costs for four bleaching technologies: annualized capital costs, operating
costs, and total year one costs (1995)
U Total Costs 1M Operating Costs o Capital Costs
Source: Paper Task Force, 19951
Even the cleanest bleached kraft pulping technologies, however, are dirtier than other
pulping technologies because of the bleaching process. Figure 5.3 illustrates the spectrum of
pulping technologies based on their releases of pollution to the environment and efficiency of
wood use. Figure 5.3 is based upon data from the Paper Task Force report, but the report did not
present the technologies in this form.
'Summary of data presented on page 210. It was assumed the hardwood mill would produce 500 air dried metric
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Source: Based on data from Paper Task Force, 1995.
The mechanical pulping and unbleached kraft pulping processes had the least
environmental impacts. Mechanical pulping had "lower releases to the environment" and used
"wood resources more efficiently" than the unbleached and bleached kraft pulping processes.
But mechanical pulping consumed more purchased electricity than unbleached or bleached kraft
pulping.1 Mechanical pulps are typically lightly bleached with hydrogen peroxide. Unbleached
kraft pulping had "lower energy consumption and environmental releases" than bleached kraft
pulps production, used "wood more efficiently than bleached kraft pulp," and produced a
stronger paper.2
Among the bleached pulping processes, a mechanical-chemical pulp hybrid technology
known as bleached chemi-thermomechanical pulp (BCTMP) had the best environmental profile.
Paper Task Force, 1995, p. 197.
2 Ibid., p. 197.
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BCTMP was followed by bleached kraft pulping, with sulfite pulping having the worst
environmental profile. BCTMP generated "low releases to the environment and use wood
resources efficiently compared to bleached kraft pulp." The price of BCTMP was also about
13% lower than that bleached hardwood. However, BCTMP processes consumed more
purchased energy.' "On average, sulfite pulp mills in the United States have higher air and water
emissions than bleached kraft pulp mills per ton of production." 2
5.4 Diffusion of cleaner bleached kraft pulp production technologies in Sweden
and the US, circa 1998
By the late 1990s the Swedish industry had traveled further down the path of cleaner
production technologies, with a far greater percentage of mills producing TCF pulp than in the
US. The influence of the environmental organizations in technology diffusion varied across the
two countries. In Sweden, the national environmental organizations were the principal catalysts
to technology diffusion, but not in the US.
To assess the level of diffusion achieved, I used Rogers' (1995) five-part classification of
innovation adopter categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and
laggards.3 From 1986 to 1998 the national environmental organizations in Sweden and the US
worked to develop and diffuse three different types of cleaner production technologies for
bleached pulp and paper products.
What follows in this section is the overall level of technology diffusion achieved in each
nation, divided by the goals of the national environmental organizations. This section does not
evaluate the role of environmental organizations in achieving the diffusion of the technologies;
nor does it detail the organizations and their campaigns. That data is in the chapters that follow.
Ibid., p. 198.
2 Ibid., p. 198.
3 See Chapter 3 for details on the levels.
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First, from 1986 to 1989 the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) promoted
"environmentally friendly chlorine-reduced" paper: paper made with pulp that released 1.0 kg
AOX or less per ton of pulp. Mills achieved the production of chlorine-reduced papers by
decreasing elemental chlorine use and increasing the use of chlorine dioxide, oxygen, and
hydrogen peroxide. By the end of 1992 the entire Swedish industry met this criterion, which was
more stringent than the national regulation of 1.5 kg AOX/ton of pulp. For a listing of the
innovators and early adopters see Table 5.11, column "SSNC: chlorine-reduced pulp and paper."
Driven by consumer demand, which was catalyzed by the SSNC, Greenpeace Sweden, and
Greenpeace Germany (Germany was the largest consumer of Swedish pulp outside of Sweden),
the entire industry advanced far beyond the regulatory requirements. Also by the end of 1992,
all Swedish mills had eliminated their use of chlorine gas. They were all ECF mills.
Second, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Environmental Defense
promoted ECF-lite technology. By the mid-I 990s a handful of American corporations had mills
with ECF-lite capacities, including Union Camp, Champion International, and Weyerhaeuser
(see Table 5.11, column "NRDC and Environmental Defense: ECF-lite"). Yet only
Consolidated Papers' decision to purchase ozone bleaching technology (the combination of ECF,
oxygen, and ozone was the most advanced ECF-lite technology) can be attributed to the work of
Environmental Defense and Greenpeace USA. The remaining corporations purchased oxygen
delignification for their mills because they saw the economic and environmental benefits of the
technology. All American mills became ECF in 2001, as required by the regulation.
Third, Greenpeace Sweden, Greenpeace USA, and later the SSNC promoted TCF pulp.
By 1997, 35% of Swedish bleached kraft pulp was TCF. Of the nine corporations manufacturing
bleached kraft pulp in Sweden, only two did not manufacture any TCF pulp: Iggesunds Bruk and
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Korsnas. Of the remaining seven corporations, most produced a combination of TCF and ECF
pulp (see Table 5.11, column "Greenpeace Sweden (and later SSNC): TCF pulp"). All ECF
production in Sweden was ECF-lite by 1992.
In the US, only Louisiana Pacific produced and marketed TCF bleached kraft pulp.
Louisiana Pacific made the transition to TCF as part of a consent decree with the Surfriders
Foundation.
Table 5.11 The diffusion of more environmentally friendly kraft pulp bleaching technologies in
Sweden and the US (1980-1998)
Technology goals of national environmental organizations
Sweden United States
Levels of SSNC Greenpeace Sweden Environmental Defense Greenpeace USA
technology (and later SSNC) and NRDC
diffusion Goal: Goal: Goal: Goal:
Chlorine-reduced TCF pulp ECF-lite pulp TCF pulp
pulp and paper (0.0 kg AOX/ton pulp) (-0.27 kg AOX/ton (0.0 kg AOX/ton(1.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp) pulp)
of pulp)
- Munkedals - Munksj6 Aspa - Union Camp (1992) - Louisiana
Innovators (1986) Bruk (1990) - Alabama Pine and Pacific (1992)
- Stora (1987) - Sbdra Cell (1991) Pulp (1992)
- MoDo (1988) - Vallvik (1991) - Pope and Talbot




aStora (1993) * Consolidated Papers
*SCA (1995) (1996)
- By 1992, entire * AssiDoman a Westvaco (1996)
Early industry averages (1995)
majority 1.0 kg AOX /ton
of pulp
__________a By 1997, 35% of
Swedish bleached
- All Swedish mills kraft pulp is TCF
Late are ECF-lite by




6 Roots of the pulp and paper campaigns: organochlorines in Sweden, dioxins in the
US (1970-1985)
The campaigns of the Swedish and American environmental groups to change pulp
bleaching in the second half of the 1980s had different roots. The Swedish campaigns of the late
1980s would grow from Garan Bryntse's campaign for unbleached paper at Milj6forbundet
(Environmental Federation). In the US they would grow from campaigns to eliminate dioxin
pollution, most notably from the work of Citizens Against Toxic Sprays to eliminate the spraying
of dioxin-contaminated herbicides in western Oregon and from a lawsuit by the Environmental
Defense Fund and National Wildlife Federation demanding that the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulate dioxins. The different roots of the bleaching campaigns
would later affect the target pollutants, solutions pursued, and tactics used by environmental
groups in each nation.
6.1 Swedish roots: campaigning for unbleached paper, Goran Bryntse and the
Environmental Federation (1980-1985)
Svenska Naturskyddsfdreningen (Swedish Society for Nature Conservation) and
Greenpeace Sweden both ran pulp and paper campaigns in Sweden between 1986 and 1998.
And both campaigns benefited from Goran Bryntse's early work at the Environmental Federation
on behalf of unbleached paper in the early 1980s. Bryntse would in fact start the Swedish
Society for Nature Conservation's (SSNC's) pulp and paper work when he moved to that
organization in 1986. The information collected, the arguments developed, as well as the tactical
approach employed by Bryntse at the Environmental Federation would be adopted in somewhat
different forms by Greenpeace Sweden. The significant elements of Bryntse's work at the
Environmental Federation were to: 1) identify water pollutants, including organochlorines, as the
principal problem posed by the Swedish pulp and paper industry; 2) identify pulp mills with
bleaching operations ("bleacheries") as the primary source of water pollutants in the industry; 3)
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define unbleached paper as the solution to water pollution from bleacheries; 4) see consumers, as
opposed to government regulators, as the primary agents that would move the industry to
change; and 5) develop brochures to educate consumers on the problems and solutions to
bleached paper.
6.1.1 Introducing Bryntse and the Environmental Federation
The seed for Miljaforbundet's (Environmental Federation's) 1 unbleached paper campaign
was planted in the late 1970s when environmentalists campaigned for the 1980 referendum
against nuclear power in Sweden. 2 In doing research on the paper industry's energy
consumption, Garan Bryntse, discovered that pulp mills with bleacheries were a major source of
water pollution.
In 1977, I was appointed to a governmental commission on energy savings, which was
related to the nuclear power industry in Sweden. We calculated energy use in the pulp
and paper industry. In doing the research, we noticed that the bleaching of pulp used
tremendous amounts of energy and had environmental problems. We presented our
findings to the government commission in 1977, but they did not like our findings. They
chose to consider the findings of two groups of professors who presented findings more
compatible to the perspectives of the commission. We were more of an alternative group
that was closer to the environmental community.3
Concerned with the wastewater pollution from the bleaching process and suspecting that
regulatory authorities and mills would do little to reduce this pollution, Bryntse approached the
Environmental Federation about starting a campaign for unbleached paper in 1980. Familiar
with Bryntse through his work opposing nuclear power, members of the Federation agreed to
Bryntse's idea. 1
Established in 1976, the Environmental Federation had its roots in organizing opposition
to nuclear power in the late 1970s. The Federation was established as a democratic alternative to
' Earlier translations refer to "Milj~forbundet" as the "Environmental Union" (see Jamison et al., 1990, p. 46), while
later translations refer to it as the "Environmental Federation" (see Lundqvist, 1997, p. 55).
2 The referendum did not pass.
3Bryntse, 1998.
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another union of local groups, called Miljdverdsgruppernas Riksforbund (the National
Organization of Environmental Groups). 2 At the height of its popularity in the late 1970s the
Environmental Federation represented 75 local groups, had 10,000 members, and was the second
largest environmental NGO in Sweden. 3 However, aber the defeat of the national nuclear
power referendum in 1980, environmental organizations in Sweden struggled to "recover the
vitality that they had displayed in the 1970s"4 and membership in the Environmental Federation
declined to a few thousand.5 By the mid-1980s, the Federation's main issue areas were the paper
industry, acid rain, toxic chemicals, and energy.6 The Federation advanced the agenda of its
member organizations through volunteers at the grassroots level, information dissemination, and
protest actions.7
Within the Environmental Federation, Bryntse formed Pappersgruppen (Paper Group)
with colleagues from Skogsindustrins Teknisksa Forskningsinstitut (STFI; translated as Swedish
Pulp and Paper Research Institute). 8 All of the members of the Paper Group, including Bryntse,
were volunteers. By affiliating with the Environmental Federation, Bryntse gained access to the
environmental movement through the Federation's local groups and an organizational home
through which he could solicit funding. And the Federation gained a campaign that required few
financial and staff resources.
' Bryntse et al., 1983.
2 The National Organization of Environmental Groups was run and dominated by Bj6rn Gillberg, which "his critics
would later refer to as Gillberg's 'empire' (Jamison et al., 1990, p. 28).
3 The largest environmental NGO in Sweden was the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation.
4 Jamison et al., 1990, p. 56.
5 Membership remained in the few thousands until the mid-1990s (Lundqvist, 1997, p. 55) when the Environmental
Federation merged with Friends of the Earth Sweden to become Milj6fbrbundet Jordens Vanner. The literal
translation of MiljUfbrbundet Jordens VAnner is Environmental Federation / Friends of the Earth. But the
organization translates it simply as Friends of the Earth Sweden (see www.mjv.se).
6 Bryntse, 1998.
7 Jamison et al., 1990, pp. 46-47; Lundqvist, 1997, pp. 54-56.
" Bryntse received his Ph.D. in paper engineering from STFI (Bryntse, 1998).
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The argument that bleaching operations were a major source of organochlorine pollution
was groundbreaking. No other environmental group in Sweden, or the world for that matter,
advocated for reducing organochlorine pollution from bleaching operations in the early 1980s.
At the time, only the pulp and paper industry, regulatory authorities, and a few research scientists
were aware of the organochlorines released by the industry.
Evidence began to emerge in the late 1970s that pulp and paper mills were a major source
of chlorinated organic pollutants. Questions of potential ecosystem damage from pulp and paper
wastewater discharges led both the industry and the Swedish EPA (SEPA) to launch research
projects. The research arm of the Swedish Forest Industries Association -- the Swedish Forest
Industry Water and Air Pollution Research Foundation (SSVL) -- funded two major studies on
organochlorine pollution in the late 1970s and early 1980s: SSVL-82 (1977-1981) and SSVL-85
(1980-1985).' The SSVL found that the least polluting bleaching sequence was oxygen
delignification followed by the partial substitution (15%) of chlorine dioxide for chorine in the
first bleaching stage, with secondary wastewater treatment using an aerated lagoon at the end-of-
the-pipe. 2 Yet the SSVL-82 report concluded that "spent bleaching liquors posed little danger to
marine life" and the SSVL-85 report supported that conclusion. 3
SEPA began its own five-year study in 1982, called the Environment/Cellulose project,
into potential environmental impacts from the pulp and paper industry.4 Environment/Cellulose
was the second of two precedent-setting projects where SEPA collected and analyzed data on
potential ecological damage from industrial pollution. The first, started in 1978, was the Fish
1 Reeve and Earl, 1989.2 Ibid., p. 66.
3 Auer, 1996, p. 98.
4 SWdergren, 1989.
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and Metal Pollution project on wastewater discharges from the iron and steel industry.' Prior to
these research projects the government relied on industry-funded data of potential harm from
pollution; research that seldom yielded adverse effects. As Bengt Erik Bengtsson, then staff
scientist for SEPA's Laboratory for Aquatic Toxicology, highlighted: "For many years, public
hearing after public hearing, industry had all the information. They had consultants that
provided them with the information. These consultants did not bite the hand that fed them" 2; i.e.,
they did not find evidence of adverse ecological impacts.
Along with organochlorines Bryntse highlighted other bleachery pollutants, including
BOD, color, and contributing to mercury pollution through the use of chlorine manufactured
using the mercury cell process.3 The problems Bryntse, et al., associated with organochlorines
were vaguely stated in the 1983 brochure: "They [organochlorines from pulp mills] do not form
naturally in the environment. Some of them can cause genetic damage. Bleacheries are the
source of most chlorine pollution in pulp and paper manufacturing." 4
Bryntse sought to bring about change through consumer demand rather than government
regulation because he distrusted politicians and regulatory authorities. Embarking on a
campaign to educate consumers, even in a small country like Sweden, is a monumental task.
Although there was a precedent for environmental consumerism:
[T]here was a particular technical focus in the environmental movement -- a focus on
chemical risks -- and thus an early interest, as well, in 'natural' products, such as 'health
food' or more natural kinds of food products. Indeed it seems fair to say that the
environmental movement in Sweden [during the 1970s], has been as much a consumers'
movement for more natural quality consumer products as a movement out to save the
environment.'
'Bengtsson, 1985; and Bengtsson, 1998.
2 Bengtsson, 1998.
3 Bryntse et al., 1983.
4 Ibid., p. 15.
5 Jamison et al., 1990, p. 37.
159
Targeting consumers had two significant implications for the campaign: they needed to
organize consumers to change their buying habits based on environmental concerns and to
identify unbleached paper products for consumers to purchase. To organize consumers they
developed educational materials (brochures) and persuaded municipalities to incorporate
environmental criteria into their paper purchasing decisions.
6.1.2 Bryntse's brochures: information dissemination
Educational materials were Bryntse's campaigning trademark and fit nicely with the
Environmental Federation's focus on local action. In 1980, the Paper Group wrote its first
brochure, Oblekt Papper for Miljons Skull! (Unbleached Paper for the Environment's Sake).'
"That brochure," Bryntse recalled, "was spread within the environmental movement and we
succeeded in raising awareness to the issue within the environmental movement." In 1981, we
started to make our argument more extensive and expanded the four-page report of 1980 to eight
pages in 1981 .,,2 In 1983 the Paper Group again expanded the brochure, this time to 16 pages.
Our first big break came in 1983 when the state decided that it was the Year of the Forest
Industry. The state and industry spread information about the industry throughout
schools in Sweden. We argued that if the state supported spreading information
developed by the forestry industry about itself, then a balanced perspective was needed
and that we should have money to spread our perspective of the industry. The
Department of Agriculture gave 25,000 crowns to the environmental movement to
distribute its view of the industry. We doubled the size of the brochure to 16 pages and
distributed 10,000 copies to an audience much broader than just the environmental
movement.
We spread it among friends and most importantly to local politicians in Swedish
communities. Within many communities, we found friends who proposed to the local
government that they use environmentally friendly paper. The issue was not one of any
particular political party; we contacted people across the political spectrum, basically





By 1988 the original four-page brochure distributed by the Environmental Federation had
become a 50-page booklet produced by the SSNC (Swedish Society for Nature Conservation,
where Bryntse moved in 1986). The 1988 booklet would also serve as the foundation for
Greenpeace International's, The Greenpeace Guide to Paper in 1990.1 Between 1980 and 1988
three other versions of the brochure were printed (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1. Pulp and paper brochures and booklets produced by Bryntse, et al.
Year Title Number Pages Publisher Authors
I Printed
1980 Unbleached for the not available 4 G6ran Bryntse.
Environment's Sake Birgitta Johansson,
1981 Unbleached for the not available 8 Environmental Gunilla Ladberg, and
Environment's Sake Federation Astrid S6derbergh
1983 Unbleached for the 10,000a 16 Widding1
____Environment's Sake ________________________
1986 Unbleached for the not available 30 Swedish Society for G6ran Bryntse,
____ Environment's Sake --__ --. __u_ -- Nature Conservation Birgitta Johansson,
1988 1Paper and the Environment 55,00 b 50 (SSNC) and Gunilla Ladberg
aSource. Bryntse, 1998.
b SourAr: ESderstrdm, 1998
'The authors were the same for these three publications and listed in the same order.
2The authors were the same for these two publications and listed in the same order.
In the brochures Bryntse, et al., sought to create a preference for brown rather than white
paper by emphasizing how pollution results from bleaching paper and most unbleached products
on the market perform just as well as bleached products. Promoting unbleached paper products
meant confronting the (mis)perception that brown paper is dirty and ugly and white paper is
clean and beautiful. They sought to turn the "white is better" notion on its head, explaining that
the environmental reality was just the opposite, brown paper was "cleaner" than white paper.
Along with information on pollutants from bleacheries the brochure included illustrations such as
Figure 6.1, where the brown paper says to the white paper, "Now then, enough of your
superiority! You will not live any longer than I."
' See the forward of The Greenpeace Guide: "Greenpeace gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Dr.
Goeran Bryntse of Falun, Sweden. ... this booklet would not have been possible without his immense knowledge of
the subject."
161
Figure 6.1 Cartoon from Unbleached Paper for the Environment's Sake
Translation: "Now then, enough of your superiority! You will not live any longer than I"
Source: Bryntse and others, 1983, p. 10
In raising the question of, "Why do we need white paper products?" the Environmental
Federation challenged the right of paper manufacturers to unilaterally define the criteria for
better products and challenged consumers to be more thoughtful in purchasing products. This
suggested that production decisions are public rather than private decisions because they affect a
public good, in this case, water quality.
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6.1.3 Defining the solution: unbleached paper
The solution of Bryntse, et al., to water pollution from bleaching was simple: eliminate
the bleaching step altogether and buy unbleached paper. From an environmental perspective, the
logic was sound:' prevent water pollution from bleaching by eliminating the bleaching process
altogether; thereby making paper production a two-step process -- pulping and papermaking. As
a pulp and paper engineer, eliminating bleaching made sense to Bryntse because he knew that
many paper products were or could be produced without bleaching and without compromising
product quality. Unbleached paper towels, napkins, diapers, newsprint, toilet paper, and
cardboard boxes are among the products that can perform as well as their bleached counterparts.
The brochures promoted the purchase of unbleached and low bleached paper products by
listing companies manufacturing such products. For some products, including toilet paper and
photocopier paper it was difficult to find 100% unbleached products. For their 1983 brochure
they only identified one brand of 100% unbleached toilet paper: "MoDo's 'Spare' made with
recycled paper." Whereas "'Edet Krapp' [was] made with 60% recycled paper and 40% mixture
of [virgin] sulfate and sulfite pulp, both bleached and unbleached" and KF's LENI toilet paper
was "made with 80% recycled paper and 20% bleached sulfite pulp."2
And copy paper was the most difficult paper to find an unbleached alternative for because
bleaching plays a critical role in its manufacture. Most manufacturers produced copy paper from
bleached kraft pulp paper because it produced the strongest paper. Unbleached kraft paper, the
color of a brown grocery sack or cardboard box, is too dark for copy paper. The combination of
And from a history of technology innovation perspective, eliminating steps in the production process is the route to
dramatic efficiency gains. For example, "Each of the several production methods for making plate glass, from those
of the seventeenth-century workshops at Versailles to those of the latest float glass factory, involved a combination
or elimination of earlier steps, each resulting in dramatic productivity gains and lower unit costs" (Utterback, 1994,
p. 116). However, as Utterback (1994) cautions, such changes do not come easily: "these giant leaps in productivity
... involve tremendous investments in research and new plant and equipment" (p. 118).
2 Bryntse et al., 1983, p. 7.
163
strength and whiteness made copy paper difficult to replace with an unbleached product. In the
1983 brochure, Bryntse, et al., did their best to locate a paper that could be used in copiers, but
they encountered problems:
Designed for offset printing, Holmen Econo Book and Holmen Blade Matt can also be
used for copying. However, they can cause problems in copy machines where paper
heats up to a high temperature. Then the surface of coated paper changes so that print
quality becomes worse. For that reason, test it before using for copying.'
6.1.4 Moving the market: trying to capture the purchasing power of municipalities
Bryntse's first major initiative to move the market was, asking politicians at the local
level to purchase unbleached paper products. 2 While some municipalities asked their suppliers
for unbleached paper, they confronted two major barriers: 1) individually their purchasing power
was weak; and 2) there was no alternative for the paper products they purchased the most of:
copy and writing papers.
To address the first barrier Bryntse changed his request to municipalities, asking them to
write a statement to their national association -- Kommunforbundet (Swedish Association of
Local Authorities) -- rather than suppliers to identify and promote the manufacture of
environmentally friendly paper.
By 1984, we had statements from 40 communities [to Kommunfdrbundet] asking for
environmentally friendly paper. In the summer of 1985, Kommunf6rbundet formed an
action group for communities with statements to purchase environmentally friendly
paper.
Kommunfdrbundet hired one-person full time to search for environmentally safe paper
products for the communities. This work started in 1985 and we developed criteria [in
1986] for purchasing environmentally safe products. We called it miljovanligt, which
translates as environmentally friendly.'
Having municipalities sign a statement to the Association of Local Authorities was a
clever move. It made municipalities unofficial members of the unbleached paper campaign,
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' Ibid., p. 10.
2 Bryntse, 1998.
provided the campaign with its second source of legitimacy (the first was funding from the
Department of Agriculture for printing brochures 2), increased the purchasing power of
municipalities, and generated a staff position dedicated to the project. Representing 289
municipalities,' the Swedish Association of Local Authorities commanded much greater
purchasing power than any one municipality.
The second barrier created a critical choice for the Federation and Bryntse: whether to
continue advocating for unbleached paper for all products (despite the difficulty of finding
alternatives for copy paper) or to accept bleached products that met certain environmental
criteria (accepting the demand for strong, white paper). Environmental advocates frequently
confront this type of decision: how high should they set the bar for environmental performance?
If Bryntse continued to advocate for only unbleached paper it would limit the campaign's
acceptance among consumers because it meant purchasing lower quality paper in the short-term
(with no viable technological solution in sight in the long-term), but would maintain the
environmentally superior position of promoting brown (and less polluting) paper over white
paper. Bryntse opted to abandon the position of unbleached paper products for copy and writing
papers (maintaining it for most other paper products) and began working on a definition of
environmentally friendly paper with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities.
That decision complicated the campaign's message and its work. It changed the message
from the simple "buy unbleached paper" to the vaguer, "buy environmentally friendly paper,"
which in turn had to be defined. It also required more detailed data on different bleaching
processes, including the technologies and chemicals used, and their wastewater discharges. And
it required making a decision typically associated with governmental regulatory agencies:
'Ibid.
2 See section 6.1.2 above.
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deciding how to define environmentally preferable. Is environmentally friendly to be based on
the technology used (such as oxygen delignification), the level of pollutants released per ton of
product (e.g., 25 kg COD/ton of pulp), or is it a combination of the two?
Bryntse would address these issues after he moved to the SSNC in 1986. With Bryntse's
departure the Environmental Federation lost its technical expertise and connections because the
other members of the Paper Group left with him. While the Environmental Federation remained
connected to the paper campaign after Bryntse's departure, it had no significant role:
"Miljdforbundet," Bryntse recalled, "was still part of the campaign [in 1986], but was no longer
important." 2
6.2 American roots: grassroots and nationals groups target dioxin (1975-1985)
In the early 1970s a small environmental and consumer research group, the Council on
Economic Priorities (CEP), 3 released a report that condemned the paper industry for its pollution:
Paper profits: pollution in the pulp and paper industry (1972).4 The research of CEP prompted
one industry analyst to conclude that, "In the realm of pollution control, one of the prime targets
-- perhaps the No. 1 target -- is the paper industry." 5 CEP's spotlight on the industry faded with
the passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments in 1972 and the mills
installing secondary wastewater treatment systems.
Thereafter, from the mid-1970s to 1986, no national environmental group ran a
prominent campaign against pulp and paper pollution. Thus the pulp and paper initiatives of
American environmental groups that emerged in the late 1980s would not have their roots in a
'For more on the Association see its webpage: http://www.svekom.se/skvad/indexeng.htm.
2 Bryntse, 1998.
3 Formed in 1969, the Council on Economic Priorities is a small "nonprofit public service research organization
dedicated to accurate and impartial analysis of the social and environmental records of corporations" (Institute for
Policy Studies, 2002).
4 Council on Economic Priorities, 1972.
5 Jones, 1973, p. 1.
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sectoral campaign targeted at the pulp and paper industry. Instead the American initiatives
sprouted from chemical campaigns against dioxin pollution. The Greenpeace USA and
Environmental Defense initiatives both started when they learned of dioxin pollution from pulp
and paper mills in 1987. These two environmental groups would run the most prominent
national campaigns targeting water pollution from American pulp and paper mills between 1987
and 1998. Two other national environmental groups -- the National Wildlife Federation (NWF)
and Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) -- as well as a handful of state and local groups
were also active in trying to effect change in the industry.
The catalyst to all the initiatives was the same: dioxins. While dioxins were common to
all the initiatives, there were differences in campaigning philosophy, tactics, and goals among the
organizations. Greenpeace USA would have a closer affinity to the grassroots groups
campaigning against toxic pollution at the local level. Carol Van Strum, the lead author of the
report that would launch Greenpeace's pulp and paper campaign (both internationally and in the
US), founded a grassroots anti-toxics group in western Oregon in the 1970s. Environmental
Defense, NWF, and later NRDC all entered the arena of pulp and paper pollution through legal
actions against the US EPA. Their focus, at least initially, would be on attempting to reduce
industry pollution through regulatory change. Environmental Defense would alter its strategic
approach in the 1990s when it attempted to effect change through collaboration with major
purchasers of paper products.
6.2.1 Citizens Against Toxics Sprays (CATS) launch grassroots campaign against dioxin-
contaminated herbicides (1975-1981)
Carol Van Strum started the first American environmental campaign against dioxin
pollution in the mid- 1 970s. In her words, this is how the campaign began:
We moved here [Five Rivers, Oregon] in 1974. In the spring of 1975 the county sprayed
the roadside with 2,4,5-T [2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid]. My kids were fishing
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when two guys drove by, sprayed the roadside, and doused the river and my kids as well
with 2,4,5-T. My kids got really sick. I called the road department. They said, 'the
chemical is perfectly safe, safe as table salt. The kids must have got the flu.' I went back
to the river and saw dead fish, ducklings, and crayfish. That's when I realized I was
being lied to. Then the Forest Service helicopters started spraying the ridge above our
home with 2,4,5-T. That summer there were a rash of birth defects among our geese and
chicken, including crossed beaks and stumpy wings.
In the fall of 1975 an article appeared in the local newspaper. The reporter, who was also
a professor at Oregon State University, thought 2,4,5-T was most wonderful and praised
it to no end. I got mad and wrote a letter to the editor describing how my kids got sick,
the birth defects among the poultry, and the death along the river. We had just moved
here and I knew only a few people. Suddenly, my phone was ringing non-stop from
people with similar stories.
We had a community meeting. People wrote down what happened. We presented the
information to the Forest Service and asked them to stop spraying within a mile of our
homes. They responded with the same story as the county: 'it is safe as table salt.' We
had several meetings with the Forest Service. But they had no plans of stopping the use
of 2,4,5-T.
We formed Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, CATS, and decided to hire a lawyer. We
raised money through bakesales and concerts. People in Eugene [Oregon] jumped on the
issue and helped us to raise money. We found a lawyer and filed a lawsuit against forest
service. In the lawsuit we asked that the Forest Service not spray within a mile of where
people lived. We won a lawsuit against the Forest Service in 1977 [Citizens Against
Toxic Sprays v. Bergland], which resulted in a ban on the use of 2,4,5-T in the Siuslaw
[National Forest]. Two years later, the EPA issued an emergency suspension of the
registrations of 2,4,5-T for forestry and rights-of-way uses.'
CATS challenged the US Forest Service's spraying of 2,4,5-T under authority of the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of 1970. NEPA requires federal agencies to
"include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official on -- (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii)
alternatives to the proposed action ..."2 For the US Forest Service this would include logging
and the spraying of herbicides. Citizen groups can only contest the EIS process not decisions
' Van Strum, 2001. For a published account see C. Van Strum, A Bitter Fog, 1983.
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Public Law 91-190 91 " Congress, S.1075, January 1, 1970.
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made based on the EIS.1 Therefore CATS argued that the Forest Service failed to complete a
proper EIS, which must include an analysis of alternatives to the spraying of herbicides. In
CATS v Bergland the federal judge, Otto Skopil, ruled that the Forest Service's EIS was
insufficient because it did not adequately present information on the health effects of herbicides
or discuss alternatives. 2 Judge Skopil concluded that:
The 1976-77 E.I.S. fails to acknowledge the extreme toxicity of TCDD [shorthand for
2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-p-dibenzodioxin] or the opinions of scientists about its hazards, to
discuss E.P.A. administrative proceedings against 2,4,5-T or the ongoing TCDD residue
monitoring program being conducted by E.P.A., to report on TCDD levels found in
animal specimens taken from the Siuslaw National Forest, or to mention the controversy
over the effects of Agent Orange in Vietnam. These are the major, but by no means the
only, shortcomings of the E.I.S. in its discussion of the potential effects of phenoxy
herbicides upon human and animal health.3
Scientists discovered the TCDD-2,4,5-T connection in the late 1960s and early 1970s
when they assessed the toxicological effects of Agent Orange. A defoliant used in the Vietnam
War, Agent Orange was a 50-50 mixture of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D). 4
Laboratory studies started in the late 1960s and published in 1971 found extremely low levels of
2,3,7,8-TCDD to be the primary cause of birth defects in the offspring of mice and rats exposed
to 2,4,5-T.5
When the unpublished laboratory results were leaked to the press in 1969 they created a
wave of protest against the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, including Congressional hearings in
61970. The combination of Congressional hearings, press coverage, and scientific evidence of
potential harm prompted the Department of Defense's (DOD) to stop using Agent Orange in
'Caldwell, 1998, p. 49.
2 Van Strum, 1983, p. 104.
3 Ibid., p. 101.
4 Ibid., p. 12.
5 Courtney, 1971; and Sparschu, 1971.
6 Moore, Kimbrough, and Gough, 1993.
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1970.1 Soldiers exposed to Agent Orange later (1978) filed class action lawsuits against the US
Government and the manufacturers of Agent Orange, which included Dow Chemical.2
"TCDD" is the most toxic member of a family of 75 compounds with similar molecular
structure known as dioxins. Dioxins are never produced intentionally. They are an unintentional
byproduct of production or incineration processes that include chlorine, carbon (organic matter),
and heat. TCDD was unintentionally formed in the manufacture of the chlorinated herbicide
2,4,5-T and remained in the final product.
Further evidence of the toxicity of dioxins emerged in 1975 when Carter, et al., published
a study that documented adverse health effects to horses exposed to TCDD-contaminated waste
oil.3 The horses were exposed when the town of Times Beach (Missouri) spread waste oil on
arenas and roads to keep dust down. The US Government would later (in 1983) order the.
evacuation of Times Beach because of dioxin contamination. Despite the emerging science on
the toxicity of dioxin, its contamination of 2,4,5-T, and the decision of the DOD to halt the use of
Agent Orange in Vietnam, the US Forest Service opted to use the Agent Orange ingredients.--
2,4,5-T and 2,4-D -- as herbicides in the 1970s.
When Judge Skopil ruled in CATS favor in 1977, his ruling was limited by the authority
of NEPA. He could only prohibit the spraying of herbicides until the Siuslaw National Forest
finalized its EIS for the use of herbicides. After Judge Skopil declared the Forest Service's EIS
legally acceptable in April 1978 the Forest Service resumed spraying 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D.4
The Forest Service's decision to resume spraying came at a time when research studies
provided further evidence of TCDD being extremely toxic at very low doses. In 1978 and 1979
' Ibid., p. 235; and Schuck, 1986, pp. 16-23.
2 Schuck, 1986.
3 Carter et al., 1975.
4 Van Strum, 1983, p. 104.
170
two landmark studies were published on the toxicity of TCDD. Kociba, et al. (1978) found
TCDD to be a carcinogen in ratsi and Murray, et al. (1979) found multi-generational
reproductive effects at chronic doses of a single part per trillion in the diet per day.2 The US
EPA added to the growing concerns surrounding dioxin when it found a correlation between the
spraying of 2,4,5-T in the national forests of western Oregon and human miscarriages in 1979.3
Known as the Alsea Study, it was "widely reported on television" and "brought the issue of
aerial spraying 'home' in that it was U.S. forests that were sprayed, domestic watersheds that
were possibly contaminated with TCDD, and American women who feared that their
miscarriages resulted from the spraying."4
Based "on the laboratory data as well as new epidemiology data that purported to
correlate herbicide use in Oregon with a seasonal increase of human miscarriages," the US EPA
suspended, on an emergency basis, "essentially all remaining uses of 2,4,5-T and related
herbicides" in the spring of 1979.5 The EPA's emergency suspension of 2,4,5-T use ended the
debate over 2,4,5-T use by the Forest Service. However, the Forest Service merely substituted
2,4-D for 2,4,5-T. The Forest Service continued to use 2,4-D until 1984, when a federal judge in
the Ninth US Circuit Court of Appeals (northwestern US) "banned federal use of all herbicides
in the Alsea Study area until they are adequately tested for human health effects." 6
1Kociba et al., 1978.
2 Murray et al., 1979.
3 Smith, 1979. The Alsea study was not released publicly due to a combination of politics and questions of
methodological errors (Van Strum and Merrell, 1987; and Moore, Kimbrough, and Gough, 1993).
4 Moore, Kimbrough, and Gough, 1993, p. 234.
5 Ibid., p. 231.
6 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. IV-23.
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Heavily in debt and exhausted from its court battle, CATS handed off its scientific,
medical, and legal work to the Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (Eugene,
Oregon; established in 1978). With debts unpaid, CATS "quietly dissolved" in 1981.1
6.2.2 The CATS' legacy
The CATS' campaign against 2,4,5-T/dioxin would have important implications for
future dioxin-related campaigns. First, it represented the emergence of grassroots groups as an
important force in shaping (anti-)toxics environmental initiatives, a force that would challenge
the hegemony of national environmental groups to define the environmental movement's toxics
agenda. Greenpeace USA would be a notable exception among national environmental groups
with multi-million dollar budgets in deciding to align itself closely with the grassroots groups.
As Robert Gottlieb writes in his history of the American environmental movement, "As a staff-
based organization, Greenpeace [USA] lacked the rootedness of the community-based
movements, although its decision to elevate the toxics issue as a primary focal point for action
often placed it in alliance with community organizations."2
Greenpeace USA became active on dioxin-related issues in 1985, opposing the burning
of toxic waste in the Gulf of Mexico3 and demanding the clean-up of dioxin-contaminated waste
sites.4 Reinforcing Greenpeace USA's connection to the grassroots groups, Carol Van Strum
would be the lead author of the report that launched Greenpeace's pulp and paper campaign.
The willingness of the grassroots anti-toxics groups to fight aggressively for their goals
created friction between themselves and the national environmental groups. Mark Dowie in his
book on the environmental movement emphasized that "Grassroots organizations and the
'Van Strum, 1983, p. 110.
2 Gottlieb, 1993, p. 195.
3 Reinhold, 1985.
4 For example, in Chicago Heights, Illinois (Shipp, 1985).
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nationals remain at odds ... over what Gibbs and others perceive as the nationals' excessive
accommodations with industry ... "1 This source of friction between the nationals and grassroots
groups/Greenpeace USA would emerge among the organizations that would try to reduce
pollution from the pulp and paper industry in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Second, CATS revealed the power of dioxin to capture the attention of decision makers
and the media. The scientific research showing TCDD to be very toxic at extremely low levels
provided environmentalists with persuasive evidence of the need for action. TCDD's toxicity led
Judge Skopil to rule that the Siuslaw Forest Service's EIS was inadequate in 1977. It also, in
combination with the 2,4,5-T-associated miscarriages in Alsea, led the US EPA to issue its
emergency suspension of the use of 2,4,5-T.2 Suddenly environmentalists had a powerful
problem to require action on.
Judge Skopil in his approval of the Forest Service's EIS in 1978 went as far to state,
while acknowledging it was outside the legal authority of NEPA, that:
The E.I.S. discloses that there are unanswered questions about the potential harm from a
chemical that is acknowledged to be one of the most toxic substances known to mankind.
If I were the person responsible for making the decision of whether herbicides containing
this substance should be broadcast sprayed from helicopters over our national forests, I
would be extremely reluctant to allow it. There are simply too many unanswered
questions, and too few benefits compared to other methods of vegetation management, to
justify the unknown risk. .... I am sincerely concerned about the effect of the use of
herbicides upon the health of human beings and our environment.'
The 2,4,5-T-dioxin association of the mid-1970s also caught the national media's
attention, especially when the US EPA began to consider an emergency suspension of 2,4,5-T.
In November 1977, Steve Kanigher of the Wall Street Journal wrote that "Environmentalists cite
mounting evidence that phenoxy herbicides [e.g., 2,4,5-T] used by Forest Service and forest
1 Dowie, 1995, pp. 13 6-137. While Dowie was writing specifically about the friction over Clean Air Act
negotiations and the Delaney Clause, he was highlighting a more general problem.
2 McFadden, 1979.
3 As cited in Van Strum, 1983, pp. 105-106.
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product cos [companies] to defoliate unwanted vegetation are highly toxic to human and animal
life and may cause cancer and birth defects."' By 1979 the dioxin-herbicide connection had
become a national story with 16 articles published on the topic in major American newspapers
(see Figure 6.2). This represented the most intensive coverage on dioxin to date, with previous
Figure 6.2 Newsprint articles with "dioxin," "dioxin" and "herbicide," or "dioxin" and
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newsprint coverage peaking in 1974 (when the US EPA opted against issuing an emergency ban
on 2,4,5-T) and 1976 (when the explosion of Hoffman-LaRoche's trichlorophenol plant in
Seveso, Italy dusted the surrounding communities with dioxin). Dioxin became a household
1 Kanigher, 1977, as cited from Lexis-Nexis abstracts.
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Source:
word in 1983 when the US Government evacuated Times Beach, Missouri because of
contamination with TCDD: 175 articles in major US newspapers contained "dioxin," with 112 of
them including Missouri, in 1983 (see Figure 6.3). Other significant sources of dioxin coverage
from 1977 to 1985 were the lawsuits of Vietnam veterans concerning adverse health effects from
Agent Orange exposure and Love Canal (which was evacuated because of chemical
contamination from hazardous waste sites that included dioxin).
Third, the CATS' campaign prompted regulatory action, which in turn provoked a
corporate backlash from Dow Chemical. Dow worked hard to revoke the suspension. Over the
next four years Dow spent millions trying to overturn the suspension. "Dow said it had spent
more than $10 million to defend the product in hearings before the environmental agency and in
discussions with officials."2 To try to overturn the emergency ban Dow lobbied the Reagan
administration and US EPA officials and supported research that would exonerate 2,4,5-T.
Dow developed cordial relations with political appointees in the US EPA, Washington,
DC office after Ronald Reagan who campaigned against environmental regulation became
president in 1980.3 For example, when a draft US EPA report on dioxin pollution from Dow's
Search of Lexis-Nexis database (July 2002) under: "academic universe," "general news," with international
newspapers excluded.
2 Holusha, 1983.
3 To fulfill his anti-environmental agenda President Reagan appointed high-profile environmental opponents,
including Anne Gorsuch as Administrator of the US EPA and James Watt as Secretary of Interior. As an editorial in
the normally staid New York Times remarked after a few years into the tenure of these Reagan officials: "Mr. Watt
and Mrs. Gorsuch are zealots, bent on hacking down environmental laws that seem to infringe on industrial activity"
(New York Times, 1983). Gorsuch and her team of political appointees did their best to make the EPA an
ineffective agency: "The administration made deep cuts in the agency budget in fiscal years 1982 and 1983.
Gorsuch declared that regulatory rule making must wait for adequate scientific research; at the same time, the EPA
cut back its research effort. Enforcement was decentralized to the various states; at the same time, the EPA
decreased the grants that supported state enforcement activities" (Szasz, 1994, p. 121). The degree to which Reagan
appointees went to support industrial interests was simply scandalous. Rita Lavelle, chief of the toxic waste
programs, was sentenced to six months in prison and fined $10,000 in 1984 for lying to Congress (Shabecoff, 1984).
Anne Gorsuch became the highest-ranking federal official cited for contempt of Congress when she refused to turn
over documents sought by two House panels (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1982). Amid the scandals Anne
Burford (Anne Gorsuch, before marrying in 1983) was forced to resign in March 1983 (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, 1983).
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Midland (Michigan) plant included information that Dow objected to, they "were deleted from
the EPA final draft report, as were references linking dioxin with cancer, reduced fertility, and
birth defects, and information on animal studies linking dioxin with such health effects."I This
Figure 6.3 Newsprint articles with "dioxin," "dioxin" and "herbicide," "dioxin" and "Seveso," or
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action led Congressional Representative Scheur (Democrat from New York) to remark that
"'Corporate polluters ... know they can expect friendly treatment from the loyal soldiers at the
Environmental Protection Agency and they have acted on it, even to the point where strong
'Bureau of National Affairs, 1983, p. 2078.
2 Search of Lexis-Nexis database (July 2002) under: "academic universe," "general news," with international
newspapers excluded. Note: some articles may have both "herbicide" and "Missouri" in them, therefore the
subcategories -- e.g., "'dioxin' +'herbicide"' and "'dioxin' + 'Missouri"' will overlap to some extent.
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scientific evidence developed by regional officials showing serious environmental contamination
can be routinely expurgated in Washington."
On the scientific front Dow sought to remove the spotlight on 2,4,5-T as a major source
of dioxins. One Dow-funded report concluded that fires (i.e., natural sources) were the dominant
source of dioxin emissions.2 While the argument that fires are the dominant source of dioxins
would be proven false, 3 Dow helped to establish that "TCDD pollution was a far broader and
more serious problem than previously believed." 4 Dow dropped its initiative to reverse the
2,4,5-T ban in 1983.5 That decision occurred amid the release of data by the US EPA that
documented high levels of TCDD in drinking water in Alsea, Oregon. Research by the US EPA
found TCDD in drinking water in Alsea at levels as high as 5800 parts-per-trillion. 6
Fourth, the CATS campaign highlighted the strengths and challenges of a dioxin
campaign. The strengths -- mobilizing citizens to oppose pollution and capturing the attention of
decision makers and the media -- have already been highlighted above. The challenges include
mobilizing the general public in the face of complex scientific information (a corollary of
mobilizing the lay public is developing and maintaining a clear message in the face of
counterattacks from vested economic interests), countering the backlash of well-funded and
highly motivated vested economic interests, changing the underlying behavior that caused the
pollution in the first place, and maintaining momentum after victories.
Engaging regulators, judges, and manufacturers on the causes and effects of toxic
chemicals on humans and the environment leads to complex and subtle arguments that can easily
'Ibid., p. 2078.
2 Bumb and al, 1980; Rawls, 1979.
' For example, see US EPA, 2000 for the dominant sources of dioxins.
4 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. 111-15.
5 Holusha, 1983.
6 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, pp. IV-20-IV-2 1; and Appendix 1, which includes a photocopy of the EPA lab
results, titled: "Analysis of TCDD in biological and environmental samples ('Alsea, Oregon Phase 11 Project')."
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lose the attention of the press and the lay public. The need for simple messages in any
environmental campaign meant to capture widespread public attention is important. In the case
of 2,4,5-T the message was: 2,4,5-T is contaminated with dioxin. Dioxin is one of the most
substances known to humans. Therefore we must stop using 2,4,5-T.
To oppose toxic campaigns, manufacturers try to undermine the environmental message
by highlighting uncertainties in the data and emphasizing factors that obscure the role of their
product in causing harm. For example, Dow argued that forest fires, not 2,4,5-T, were the
primary source of dioxins.
Dow seems to have been caught off-guard by how quickly demands for action on 2,4,5-T
emerged and the US EPA acted. The element of surprise and quick action usually works in favor
of environmentalists. Surprise is a factor that would differentiate the pulp and paper campaigns
of Greenpeace Sweden and Greenpeace USA.
The emergency suspension put Dow in the much harder position of overturning an
existing decision. An effort that was doomed to fail once Dow itself was ensnared in a fight
between the Democratic-controlled Congress and the Republican-led Reagan Administration
over environmental policy. While environmentalists were able to maintain a clear message in
the face of Dow's opposition, we will see in the pulp and paper case to follow that the US
industry was very effective in undermining the message of environmentalists.
The capacity of environmentalists to use dioxin to create a crisis for government officials
and industry executives has a serious downside: it can obscure the broader goals of
environmentalists. For example, the members of CATS focused on 2,4,5-T because of 2,4,5-T's
known contamination with TCDD, despite their goal of stopping the spraying of both 2,4,5-T
and 2,4-D. This approach meant forgoing the historical precedent of lumping 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D
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together, as the US DOD did when it stopped spraying Agent Orange, which contained both
2,4,5-T and 2,4-D. The short-term result was the US Forest Service simply replaced 2,4,5-T
with 2,4-D. The emergency suspension of 2,4,5-T did not change how the Forest Service viewed
its use of herbicides. Thus the Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides and other
environmental groups worked to have the US EPA ban 2,4-D, which occurred in 1984.
On the positive side a dioxin campaign served as a stepping stone to other chemicals. On
the negative side, it may have proven difficult to move to other chemicals as regulators and
reporters come to think the most serious problem -- dioxin pollution -- has already been
addressed. As the political scientist, John Kingdon emphasized, once a policy window closes it
is difficult to re-open it.' This would happen in the US on pulp bleaching where
environmentalists would succeed in dramatically reducing dioxin emissions but could not expand
the campaign beyond dioxins to all organochlorines.
6.2.3 Environmental Defense and NWF file dioxin lawsuit against the US EPA
In 1985 Environmental Defense and NWF filed a lawsuit against the US EPA that would
become the basis for a consent decree between the plaintiffs and the Agency on dioxin pollution
from the pulp and paper industry. Yet, when the lawsuit was filed, Environmental Defense and
NWF did not know nor suspect that it would lead them to the pulp and paper industry. At the
time the known sources of dioxin were chlorinated pesticides and pesticide production,
incineration, pentachlorophenol and tetrachlorophenol (used as a wood preservative).2




Commoner at the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems recommending shutting down waste
incinerators as "soon as possible."I
Environmental Defense and NWF planted the seed for the lawsuit in 1984 when they
filed a petition under the Toxics Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1977 with the US EPA. The
broad purpose of the petition was "to force EPA to control all sources of highly toxic dioxins in
the environment." 2 Specifically, the petition demanded that the agency, under authority of
TSCA, limit the concentration of dioxins and furans to 0.1 parts per billion in products, require
labeling of all products contaminated with dioxins and furans, ban land and ocean disposal and
underground injection of isomer-containing wastes, and issue water effluent prohibitions for the
chemicals. 3 A year later the US EPA rejected "the petition's request for immediate regulatory
action under Section 6, saying there is insufficient information at this time on which to base such
an action." 4 Environmental Defense and NWF responded by suing the agency, demanding that it
regulate dioxins and furans.5 The lawsuit would become the entry point for Environmental
Defense's and NWF's future work on the pulp and paper industry.
Using lawsuits to prompt government action was the principal tactic used by
Environmental Defense from its inception in 1967 to the mid-1980s. Established by scientists
and lawyers in 1967 to oppose DDT spraying on Long Island (New York), Environmental
Defense "was the first group organized solely for the purpose of bringing environmental
lawsuits." 6 In its early years Environmental Defense relied upon scientists to identify problems
Bureau of National Affairs, 1985.
2 EDF, 1984.
3 See: Bureau of National Affairs, 1984, p. 1064; and Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 657 F. Supp. 302 (DC DC, No. 85-0973, 1987).
4 Bureau of National Affairs, 1985, p. 1862.
5 Bureau of National Affairs, 1988.
6 Carter, 1979.
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and lawyers to negotiate legal solutions.' By the mid-1970s Environmental Defense had "a
strong reputation as an independent, adversarial organization, particularly in such areas as toxics
policy, where regulatory activities provided a continuous arena for challenge and litigation." 2
Writing in 1977, then executive director Arlie Schadt emphasized that "EDF's basic strategy
remains unchanged: the intense pursuit of a limited number of carefully selected cases, aiming to
set national precedents in environmental law while solving specific environmental problems." 3
Over the years Environmental Defense would grow into one of the nation's largest
environmental groups. By the 1980s Environmental Defense was a multi-million dollar
organization with offices in New York City (headquarters), Washington, D.C., and California. It
had revenues of $3.4 million in 1985, with 60% of revenues ($2.035 million) from memberships,
contributions, and bequests and 31% of revenues ($1.065 million) from foundations.4 As
Environmental Defense grew and evolved, it retained a concern for addressing problems caused
by toxic chemicals. As highlighted in the 1984 Annual Report: "Ever since EDF's birth in the
ultimately successful battle to ban DDT, EDF has been in the forefront of efforts to reduce
human and environmental exposure to toxic chemicals. EDF has repeatedly shown that effective
regulation is both technically and economically feasible."
In the mid-1980s Environmental Defense began an evolution from an adversarial,
litigation-focused organization to a more collaborative, market-focused organization under the
guidance of its new executive director, Fred Krupp. Krupp defined this as the "third stage" of
environmentalism. According to Krupp, the first stage was the conservation movement that
'EDF, 1987.
2 Gottlieb, 1993, p. 139. Along with toxic chemicals, the other principal program areas over the first two decades
were energy, wildlife, and water resources. See Environmental Defense annual reports 1971-1987, available at
www.edf.org.
3 EDF, 1977.
4 The remaining nine percent ($0.307 million) was from government grants, investment income, awarded attorneys'
fees, and miscellaneous revenue (EDF, 1985).
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began at the beginning of the 2 0 * century with the formation of the Sierra Club. The second
stage began with Rachel Carson's Silent Spring and tried to "halt abusive pollution." The third
stage is about solutions. It moves "beyond reactive opposition" and "demands a high level of
economic and scientific expertise";2 skills possessed by Environmental Defense.3
When third-stage environmentalists worry about a proposed dam, for example, they don't
only document the damage it will cause. They also search for other ways to address the
need for new water or power supplies that the dam is supposed to address. Growth, jobs,
taxpayer and stockholder interests, agricultural productivity, adequate water and power
for industry and consumers -- all these are part of the third-stage agenda.
While this strategic shift did not end Environmental Defense's use of lawsuits, it did
result in a shift away from lawsuits to collaborative efforts with business as the primary tactic for
leveraging change. "This focus on a potential economic common ground between industry and
environmentalists, encouraged by the growing numbers of staff economists within the
organization, evolved during the Reagan and Bush years into an overarching Environmental
Defense strategy to promote market incentives, replacing regulation as a primary tool for
reshaping environmental policy." 5 For Krupp and Environmental Defense the vision was that
"EDF solves environmental problems. These four words capture for me EDF's special role in
the environmental community."-
Environmental Defense's initiatives to reduce water pollution from the pulp and paper
industry would mirror this transformation. While Environmental Defense originally engaged the
pulp and paper industry through its lawsuit with NWF, it would later cede the litigation work to




3 Loy and Krupp, 1986.
4Krupp, 1986.
s Gottlieb, 1993, p. 140.
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The NWF would play a much more limited role than Environmental Defense in trying to
reduce pulp and paper water pollution, working solely on the lawsuit. Established in 1936 to
conserve land and wildlife for hunting, NWF emerged to become the nation's largest
environmental group in both members and revenues.2 For example, by 1990 it had 5.8 million
members,3 over twice as many as the next largest group, Greenpeace USA (2.3 million
members) 4 and a budget of $87 million.5
NWF's primary focus was, and remains, education: "We educate America's lawmakers,
political leaders, business leaders and grass-roots activists about environmental problems and
wok with them to find effective, common-sense solutions." 6 Formed to protect the environment
for hunting it has always been one of the more conservative environmental organizations. "More
than other mainstream [national environmental] groups, the NWF actively solicited relations
with industry interests while decrying the 'extremists and kooks' and 'screamers and yellers'
within the environmental movement." 7 The NWF took a leadership position in developing
collaborative relations with the. business community when it formed the Corporate Conservation
Council in 1982. The "council consists of 20 senior executives who consult with each other and
the NWF on matters of mutual interest concerning the use of natural resources."' Yet, NWF also
hired lawyers beginning in the 1970s to initiate lawsuits in a select number of cases.9 To pool
limited resources environmental groups often joined in litigation,'0 as was the case with NWF
'Krupp, 1986.
2 Mitchell Mertig, and Dunlap, 1992, pp. 13-15.
3 Bosso, 1994, p. 36.
4 Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap, 1992, p. 18.
5Ibid., p. 13.
6 NWF, 1996.
7 Gottlieb, 1993, p. 158.
8 Thomas, 1992.
9 Hays, 1987, p. 480.
'
0 Ibid., pp. 480-481.
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and Environmental Defense. While NWF is known as a conservation, non-confrontational
environmental group, its role in pulp and paper was more adversarial.
6.3 Implications for the pulp and paper campaigns
The pulp and paper campaigns that would emerge in Sweden and the US in the second
half of the 1980s had their roots in very different environmental initiatives. The Swedish
campaigns were rooted in Bryntse's/Environmental Federation's pulp and paper sector work,
whereas the US campaigns were rooted in dioxin. The differences in goals, pollutants of
concern, solutions, and tactics, which are summarized in Table 6.2, would have three important
implications for the future bleaching campaigns.
Table 6.2 Comparing roots of the Swedish and American bleaching campaigns
(1970-1985)
Key Factors Sweden USA
Leading organization(s) Environmental Federation Grassroots groups
Environmental Defense
NWF
Goals Reduce pulp and paper Eliminate all sources of dioxin
pollution, especially and furan pollution
organochlorines
Focus Industry sector: pulp and paper Chemicals: dioxins and furans
industry
Pollutants of concern Organochlorines as a class of Dioxins and furans
chemicals and other water
pollutants




Tactics Educational materials Lawsuits
Market campaign Protest actions
First, Swedish environmentalists would start by defining the problem as organochlorines
whereas the Americans would define it as dioxins. Organochlorines represent a broad class of
chemicals, of which dioxins are a part. To eliminate organochlorine pollution bleached kraft
pulp mills would need to make more significant changes in technology and chemistry than if
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they just eliminated dioxins. The decision of a bleached kraft pulp mill choosing to eliminate all
organochlorines or just dioxins would be similar to the US Forest Service deciding whether to
switch from 2,4,5-T to 2,4-D or developing another approach for managing weeds.
Second, by 1985 Giran Bryntse had already spent five years cultivating a market for
unbleached paper products in Sweden, whereas in the US the dioxin tactics had centered on
regulatory change and lawsuits. Even CATS relied on a lawsuit to halt 2,4,5-T spraying. Thus
the campaign tactic that would prove most effective in moving the pulp and paper industry to the
cleanest production technologies, using a market campaign, was undeveloped in the US. Finally,
Bryntse understood the technological capacity of the industry, whereas such knowledge was
completely absent in the US environmental movement in 1985.
In a manner similar to the decision of Swedish mills and regulators to invest in oxygen
delignification, the Bryntse/Environmental Federation unbleached paper campaign made the
Swedish environmental groups better prepared to promote a more ambitious environmental
agenda in the pulp and paper industry than in the US. The focus on an industry sector provided
them with a much better understanding of the industry and its markets. The focus on a class of
chemicals made the campaign broader than just dioxins. The focus on consumers gave them a
route to changing the industry outside of the government. Each of these factors, knowledge of
the industry, organochlorines as a class, and consumer action, would become critical to moving
the industry. All of these factors were absent in the US.
In the US, environmentalists entered the pulp and paper campaigns focused on
eliminating dioxin. They had no knowledge of the pulp and paper pollution, markets,
technologies, or environmentally preferable papers already on the market. A result was that
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market campaigns were slower to develop in the US and the problem definition centered on
dioxins rather than organochlorines.
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7 Creating markets and flamboyant actions: the SSNC and Greenpeace Sweden
(1986-1988)
In 1986, consumers in Sweden could not purchase environmentally friendly copy and
writing papers because no manufacturer produced or marketed such a product. However, by the
end of 1988 the three largest Swedish paper companies produced and marketed environmentally
friendly copy and writing papers. The reason for these new products: the market campaign of
the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC). By the end of 1988 there were many
other environmentally friendly paper products on the Swedish market as well, including
unbleached coffee filters and tissues, and chlorine-reduced diapers. The emergence of these
products resulted from the SSNC's market campaign, media coverage of the ecological disasters
of 1988, government research, and Greenpeace Sweden's pulp and paper campaign.
From 1986-1988, the SSNC and Greenpeace Sweden worked to green Swedish pulp and
paper manufacturing. While a short period, these three years heralded the beginning of major
shifts in how Swedish manufacturers bleached pulp and the forces that caused them to make
environmental investments, as well as how environmentalists succeeded in diffusing the cleanest
production technologies. The first part of this chapter examines how the SSNC created a market
for environmentally preferable paper. The second part examines how Greenpeace Sweden
attempted to create change through direct action and lobbying.
7.1 The SSNC: greening the Swedish paper market by connecting consumers and
manufacturers
The SSNC is Sweden's oldest and largest environmental group. An "elite group"
concerned with "the increasing degradation of Sweden's nature and wildlife due to rapid
industrialisation" formed the SSNC in 1909 to promote the protection of wildlife and
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wilderness.' Since its founding, the "main task of the SSNC has been nature protection,
including protecting endangered species, such as the white-tailed eagle and the peregrine, rivers
from dams, and threatened forests.2
To disseminate the message of nature conservation in the early decades, the conservation
society relied on education, through conferences, meetings, and publications. A chapter
organization similar to the Sierra Club of the US, it has over 270 local chapters spread
throughout the country.3 Representatives from the local chapters meet biannually to elect a
governing board and set the major elements of the organization's agenda.4
In the 1960s the SSNC's focus expanded from nature conservation to broader ecological
concerns after Rachel Carson published Silent Spring (1962). "[T]ranslated into Swedish almost
immediately," Silent Spring spawned the modern environmental movement in Sweden.' The
SSNC responded by hosting conferences on pesticides in 1963 and air pollution in 1964. Rising
Swedish interest in the environment caused membership to blossom, increasing from 5,000 in
1955 to 55,000 in 1970.6 With the additional financial resources from the growing membership,
the SSNC invested in professional staff to lobby government officials in Stockholm for policy
change.7 The SSNC entered the 1970s with an expanded agenda, professional staff, and
headquarters in Stockholm.
By 1987, its membership had reached 150,000 members. The majority of the members,





5 Jamison et al., 1990, p. 20.
Ibid., pp. 20-2 1.
7Ibid.
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participate in the work of the organization.' The principal sources of income for the SSNC, from
highest to lowest percentage, have been: membership fees, government grants, funding drive,
and book sales.2
Prior to G(ran Bryntse's arrival, the SSNC had not run a market campaign. It lobbied for
more effective legislation, argued for more research, and generally directed its activity towards
political decision-makers in Stockholm. 3 When Bryntse arrived from the Environmental
Federation he brought to the SSNC a market campaign for environmentally friendly paper. The
primary focus of this campaign was: reduce organochlorine pollution from pulp mill bleacheries.
At first, the key strategic elements of the campaign were, to organize environmentally sensitive
municipalities to use their collective demand for paper (see previous chapter) to bring about
change in the manufacture of paper. Later the SSNC expanded the program to directly target
household consumers through an ecolabeling program.
Unlike the organization he worked for, Bryntse did not engage in lobbying for regulating
the pulp and paper industry because he thought this was a futile exercise. As he recalled,
"Naturverdsverket [SEPA] and the politicians were slow to address the issue, and when they did,
they favored industry."4 Bryntse's skepticism towards the regulatory authorities was not without
merit. It was commonly acknowledged within industry and among regulatory authorities that
they had a close relationship. In a strikingly candid comment, Erik Nystr6m of SEPA
acknowledged that his close relationship with industry could result in agency capture:
Is there a downside to our working closely with industry? It might be that we are not as
strict as we should be. Maybe industry would be doing more if we did not have a close
relationship. Three weeks ago someone from industry asked me to attend a hearing
because without the agency there, no one would counter the perspective of environmental
Lundquist, 1996, p. 55.
2 SSNC, 2000, p. 50.
3 Jamison et al., 1990, p. 31.
4 Bryntse, 1998.
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groups. I know people in all the mills and I work closely with them. It could color my
thinking in ways that I am not aware of.1
Thus the SSNC turned to the market to try to affect change in pulp and production.
7.1.1 Defining environmentally friendly paper: the SSNC and Swedish Association of
Local Authorities
The SSNC catalyzed change in the course of paper production in Sweden by defining
criteria for environmentally friendly paper and persuading key actors in the paper supply chain to
use its criteria in their purchasing and production decisions. Central to the SSNC's success was
the working relationship Bryntse had developed with the Association of Local Authorities while
at the Environmental Federation. In 1986 no manufacturer produced copy and writing papers
that met the SSNC's criteria for environmentally friendly chlorine-reduced paper. Three years
later all the major manufacturers had paper products on the market that met the SSNC's criteria.
While at the Environmental Federation, Bryntse promoted unbleached paper products as
the solution to organochlorine pollution. But unbleached paper was not an option for copy and
writing papers. To use mechanical pulp for printing and writing papers would result in weak
paper, unsuitable for printing presses and photocopiers, that would yellow over time. For
printing and writing papers the SSNC and the Association of Local Authorities decided that,
since organochlorine pollution was the primary pollution problem from the industry,
organochlorine pollution -- AOX -- would be the criterion for defining environmentally
preferable paper. They defined environmentallyfriendly chlorine-reduced paper as paper made
with pulp that resulted in 75% less AOX pollution than normally discharged.2 But, since Bryntse
considered the average discharge to be 4.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp, in practice the performance
1Nystrum, 1998.
2 Bryntse, Johansson, and Ladberg, 1988, p. 49.
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standard was 1.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp.' And they defined environmentallyfriendly chlorine-free
paper as paper made with pulp that released 0.2 kg AOX or less per ton of pulp. 2
The decision to define two types of environmentally friendly paper enabled the SSNC
and Association for Local Authorities to define short- and long-term goals for the industry.
Defining chlorine-free as a long-term goal sent a signal to the industry on future environmental
performance expectations. A signal important in an industry where capital investments are high
and production equipment has a life of 20-30 years.
At the time, even the goal of 1.0 kg AOX/ton of bleached kraft pulp was ambitious. To
put these discharge levels in perspective, the average discharges hovered around 4.0 kg AOX/ton
of bleached kraft pulp, 3 with some Swedish bleached kraft pulp mills discharging up to 7-8 kg
AOX/ton of pulp. For example, the Korsnds mill released 7.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp in 1988.4
And two years later, the Swedish Parliament later passed a bill limiting organochlorine
discharges to 1.5 AOX per ton of pulp.5 No bleached kraft pulp mill in the world discharged 1.0
kg AOX or less/ton of pulp in 1986.
Defining criteria for environmentally friendly paper was a unique aspect of the campaign.
As Per Baumann, environmental director of KF (second largest supermarket chain in Sweden)
recalled,6 the booklet "had a tremendous impact" because it "was the first time" anyone had
suggested "criteria for deciding whether a [paper] product was more environmentally adopted
[i.e., friendly] than other products." 7 In defining criteria for environmental performance the
1 Bryntse, 1998.
2 Bryntse, Johansson, and Ladberg, 1988, p. 49.
' In 1988, Bryntse, et al. (Ibid.) estimated discharges at 4.0 kg AOX per ton of pulp and SEPA estimated average
discharge levels of AOX at 3.5 kg/ton of pulp in 1988 (SEPA, 1990).
4 Granvik, 1991, p. 17.
5 Lagergren, 1996, p. 673.
6 Sweden's second largest grocery retail chain at the time.
7 Baumann, 1998.
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SSNC moved to use the market as the regulator of industry discharges rather than the
government.
Bryntse tried to persuade in 1986, to no avail, the major paper manufacturers, including
Stora, MoDo, and SCA, that they should produce chlorine-reduced paper.' These manufacturers
were not swayed by the purchasing power of the Association of Local Authorities. Nor were
they swayed by studies from their own research institute, the SSVL, that documented substantial
reductions in organochlorines through the combination of oxygen delignification followed by the
partial substitution of chlorine dioxide in the first bleaching stage. 2 A challenge the SSNC
confronted in catalyzing change in production was persuading a technologically conservative
industry that it should innovate for environmental reasons. As Per Bauman, who worked on
environmentally friendly purchasing at the grocery retailer KF observed, "How could the paper
industry know that the customers really wanted to have this [environmentally friendly] product?
How could they know they [customers] were interested [in the long-term]?" 3 Environmental
demand from the market was a new and unknown phenomenon for manufacturers.
Yet one manufacturer would decide to break with industry opposition to chlorine-
reducedpaper in 1986. That manufacturer made the move to environmentally friendly paper
before dioxins were discovered in Swedish mill effluent, before findings SEPA released the
major findings from its Environment/Cellulose research project, and before the ecological crises
of 1988.
Bryntse, 1998.
2 Reeve and Earl, 1989, p. 66. Also see Chapter 6, section 1.1.
3 Baumann, 1998.
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7.1.2 Munkedals AB joins the environmentally friendly paper campaign
Sensing an opportunity to differentiate itself from other papermakers, Munkedals AB
agreed in late 1986 to manufacture chlorine-reduced copy paper under one condition: the
Association of Local Authorities agrees to carry some of the project's risks by purchasing at least
3,000 metric tons of paper. Reflecting the purchasing power of its members, the Association of
Local Authorities agreed.'
An unintegrated paper mill,2 Munkedals was in a better position to meet the requirements
for chlorine-reduced paper than an integrated pulp and paper mill. Without a pulp mill, it did not
have to invest in costly equipment to reduce effluent and could purchase pulp from anywhere. 3
Munkedals met the 75% reduction in AOX by using 75% mechanical pulp bleached with
hydrogen peroxide (which resulted in zero AOX discharge) and 25% chlorine bleached kraft
pulp. 4 Copy paper is usually manufactured with bleached kraft pulp because mechanical pulp
produces a weak, off-white paper that yellows over time. Newspapers, for example, are made
from mechanical pulp. Since Munkedals' paper only contained 25% bleached kraft pulp, the
SSNC and Association of Local Authorities assumed that it resulted in 75% less AOX discharges
than typical copy paper.
A small, independently owned mill5 Munkedals used the environment to create market
differentiation and capture a price premium. As Porter and van der Linde (1995 write, first
movers -- "the companies that can see the opportunity first and embrace innovation-based
'Bryntse, 1998.
2 An "integrated" mill manufactures both pulp and paper. An "unintegrated" mill manufactures only pulp or paper.
' Bryntse, 1998.
4 Ibid.
5 Munkedals only manufactured a couple hundred tons of paper/day, whereas the largest mills manufactured over
1,000 tons/day. For example, in 1996, Munkedals manufactured 387 tons of paper/day, whereas the largest paper
mill, KorsnAs, manufactured 1,468 tons of paper/day (Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1996).
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solutions -- will reap major competitive benefits."' Creating a niche market for a small mill like
Munkedals was important to its survival. As a report on the Swedish industry in Pulp and Paper
concluded, the survival of smaller companies "will depend on finding niche markets" because
they "do not have the same advantages of economy of scale" of the largest manufacturers like
Korsnis, Stora, MoDo, and SCA.2
To differentiate its new environmentally friendly paper Munkedals searched for a
symbol, finally buying the right to use the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) panda.3 Displaying the
WWF panda, by Munkedals (or any other company) on a product does not mean the product
meets higher standards for environmental performance. When a company buys the right to use
the panda it means the company supports the work of the WWF, but the panda symbol "says
nothing at all about the product's environmental characteristics." 4
Munkedals decision to produce chlorine-reduced paper was an important turning point
for the SSNC's environmentally friendly paper campaign: it connected environmentally
conscious consumers with a manufacturer, sent a signal to pulp producers of emerging demand
for AOX-reduced pulp, and created a crack in industry solidarity against environmentally
motivated investments. As Eva Eiderstr6m, department head of ecolabeling for the SSNC
explained, "Munkedals broke from the informal paper industry 'federation"' when it "decided to
produce paper according to our standard." 5 Eiderstr6m defined "federation" as an informal
association among pulp and paper manufacturers against environmental change:
The informal association in the industry exists because it limits what they as a whole
must do. Each company is better off doing as all are doing, because it slows the pace of
change and removes any competition on environmental issues. It is an informal
'Porter and Linde, 1995, p. 130.
2 Wold, 1990.
3 Bryntse, 1998.
4 SSNC, 1998, p. 8.
' Eiderstram, 1998.
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agreement. If someone goes further, then they all must go further, and they resist this
approach. Their goal is to minimize their environmental competence.
Stora publicly opposed the production of environmentally friendly paper, 2 publishing a
counter brochure to Bryntse et al.'s, titled, All Paper is Environmentally-Friendly, which
emphasized the industry is environmentally because it is based upon renewable resources.3 And
the corporations berated the municipalities. The political backlash for the local authorities was
intense and caught them by surprise. As Eva Eiderstr6m of the SSNC observed: "The
municipalities were way out in front on this [the paper] issue. I think it will be the last time.
Some of the municipalities had paper mills and the mills said, 'what are you doing? We will lose
jobs if we have to make these investments.'" 4 Additionally the Stora-owned distributor,
Pappersgruppen,5 which distributed Munkedals' paper, refused to advertise Munkedals' paper as
environmentally friendly.6
Finally they attacked the quality of Munkedals paper. It was, said Nils Jirval, "a very
lousy copy paper." 7 While Bryntse defended the paper then, he later conceded that "Munkedals
produced poor quality paper: it jammed in the copiers and created all kinds of dust."8 Despite
the reaction of the industry mainstream, Munkedals continued to produce environmentally
friendly paper and the local authorities continued to purchase it. Capturing a price premium,
Munkedals had an economic incentive to continue on the environmental path. The local
'Ibid.
2 For example, see Schr6der, 1987.
3Auer, 1996.
4 Eiderstr~m, 1998.
s Now called Papyrus (see: www.papyrus.com).




authorities, committed to making an environmental difference through purchasing, continued to
buy the paper.'
7.1.3 The scientific evidence begins to weigh heavily in favor of environmentalists
The scientific weight-of-evidence shifted strongly in favor of the SSNC almost
simultaneous with Munkedals decision to manufacture chlorine-reduced paper. Organochlorines,
which Bryntse had emphasized as a problem since 1980, and dioxins became pollutants of
concern in the late 1980s.
By the mid-1980s dioxin pollution unrelated to pulp and paper mills was a prominent
public issue in Sweden. Swedish reporters began focusing on dioxins in 1985 and 1986 when
Sweden emerged as a global leader in addressing dioxin pollution.2 "In 1984, Sweden was the
first country in the world to report the general background of PCDDs [dioxins] and PCDFs
[furans] in the human population. The same year background levels of PCDDs and PCDFs were
reported in human milk in Sweden." 3 And in 1985 Sweden temporarily closed its municipal solid
waste incinerators so they could be retrofitted to drastically reduce dioxin emissions. 4
Dioxins first became associated with pulp and paper mills in 1986 when they were found
by researchers in crabs downstream of the wastewater discharge from S3dra Cell's, V6r mill, on
the west coast of Sweden.5 Shortly after the crab finding, SEPA released a study in 1987 that
revealed levels of 2,3,7,8-TCDD (the most potent member of the dioxin family) as high as 100
picograms per gram (pg/g) in lobster and 20 pg/g in finfish downstream from mill discharges.6
'Baumann, 1998.
2 A search of ArtikelS6k for "dioxin*" identified 11 articles: six articles in 1985 and five articles in 1986.
3 Integrated Waste Management, 1988, p. 7.
4 Ibid., p. 7.
5 Nystr~m, 1998.
6 From Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA, 1988, p. 190), as cited in Auer (1996, p. 93).
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And SEPA identified the pulp and paper industry as the third largest source of dioxins (after
waste incinerators and iron and steel works) in 1987.1
After the dioxin discovery, the Swedish National Chemicals Inspectorate (KemI) 2
examined the use of chlorine in the manufacture of diapers and recommended banning chlorine
use because it pollutes the environment and contaminates diapers with dioxins. "Some studies,
the inspectorate says, reveal that dioxins can be found in disposable diaper fluff. The
inspectorate says that the consumers -- babies -- do not care whether the diaper is white or grey,
and that this makes the product suitable for a ban. The inspectorate adds that it could later
consider recommending the ban to include household paper, toilet tissue and packaging paper."3
While KemI's recommendation was never implemented, it created, with the help of Greenpeace
Sweden, concern over dioxins in paper products (see section 7.2.1).
In 1987 and 1988 research findings poured out from SEPA's Environment/Cellulose I4
project: 43 papers were presented at conferences or published in journals in these two years (see
Figure 7.1).5 Scientists involved with Environment/Cellulose documented a host of problems
associated with water pollution from both unbleached and bleached pulp mill, including impaired
fish reproduction, liver damage, abnormal metabolism rates, malformed fish eggs, and skeletal
deformities.6 Most dramatic, the Environment/Cellulose researchers documented skeletal
deformities to fish: including the "pug-headed" pike with upturned rather than straight head (see
SEPA, 1990, p. 45.
2 "KemI's task is to ensure that manufacturers and importers fulfil [sic] their obligations, but also to monitor
developments in the chemicals field, increase knowledge and, where necessary, to issue regulations" (KemI,
undated, p. 2).
3 Chemical Week, 1987, p. 28; and Chemical Week, 1988.
4 As noted in Chapter 6, Environment/Cellulose I was a research project by SEPA into potential ecological damage
from pulp and paper mills.
5 See bibliography in S6dergren (SWdergren, 1989).6TIid
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Figure 7.2) and the sculpin with vertebrate damage (see the wavy, rather than straight spinal
column in Figure 7.3).
Figure 7.1 Environment/Cellulose I Research: Number of Conference
Papers Presented and Journal Articles Published by Year (1982-1988)
Source:1
These fish became symbols of the damage caused by pulp mill effluent. They became the
poster fish for the SSNC, Greenpeace Sweden,2 and the media of the harm caused by pulp and
paper mill pollution.3 The pike was prominently featured in a color photograph on the back
cover of the SSNC's 1988 booklet, Paper and the Environment, under the title, "Bleached Paper
-- At What Price?" (see Figure 7.2). Below the photograph the text read:
' Ibid.
2 See The Greenpeace Guide to Paper (Greenpeace International, 1990) pages 12 and 13.
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Here is the pike caught outside the Norrsundets mill that manufactures chlorine bleached
sulfate pulp. It has a starkly deformed jaw, a so-called "pug-head," and fin rot. Also
other species caught where chlorine bleacheries discharge have fin deformation, skeletal
damage, and impaired reproduction. It is becoming increasingly obvious that pulp mills
with chlorine bleacheries harm fish. In fact, the whole Baltic Sea ecosystem is
disturbed.'
The images of deformed fish became media sensations in 1988 when the seas
surrounding Sweden were beset with ecological crises in 1988 (discussed in section 7.1.5). As
Dr. Bengt-Erik Bengtsson, a scientist on the Environment/Cellulose project recalled: "My
results with sculpins were shown on TV. Any person on the streets could understand and say
this is not right."2
The deformities in the fish were never directly correlated with organochlorine pollution
from bleaching operations. For the pug-headed pike it was "not established whether or not the
cause could be looked for in the discharge which solely originates from the bleaching
processes." 3 This was also the case with the damaged spine of the sculpins: "It has also been
shown that the effects are not related only to chlorinated organic material but also that
unbleached pulp effluents cause measurable changes." 4
Yet Environment/Cellulose I and its follow-up project, Environment/Cellulose II,5 did
associate organochlorine pollution with adverse ecological impacts. As Environment/Cellulose
II concluded:
The less pronounced biochemical/physiological responses in fish exposed to effluents
from unbleached processes in the laboratory supported results from the field, where a
reduction of discharged chlorinated material from a bleached pulp mill also reduced the
impact on the fish population. Thus, reductions in the amount of chlorinated organic
material will obviously result in improved conditions for the fish populations and
presumably also for the plant and animal communities as a whole.
1Bryntse, Johansson, and Ladberg, 1988.
2 Bengtsson, 1998.
3 SWdergren, 1989, p. 81.
4 Ibid., p. 103.
' Environment / Cellulose 11 (1988-1991) evaluated the environmental impact of bleached pulp mill effluents from
mills located along the coast of the Baltic Sea and in Lake Vattem (Sbdergren, ed., 1993, p. 9).
6 Ibid., p. 101.
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Den har gaddan 5r fbngad utanf6r Norrsundets pap-
persmassefabrik som tillverkar klorblekt sulfatmassa.
Den har starkt deformerade kakar, s k mopsskalle, och
fenorna ir f6rkrympta. OcksA hos andra arter, som
fbngats i narheten av klorblekeriernas utslapp, har
man konstaterat fendeformationer, skelettskador och
st6rd fortplantning. Att massafabrikernas klorblekeri-
utslapp skadar fisken blir alltmer uppenbart. Ph sikt
kan hela Ostersj6ns ekosystem rubbas.
Klorblekning av pappersmassa medf6r bWde giftut-
slapp och ett stort sl6seri med ved och energi. Nu
finns det i minga fall bra alternativ till klorblekt pap-
per och tekniken utvecklas hela tiden. Papperet och
miljon beskriver olika metoder f6r papperstillverkning
och blekning och deras konsekvenser f6r milj6n. Har
for du ocksA hjalp med att hitta milivanligare alterna-
tiv i pappersdjungeln.
F6r texten svarar Goran Bryntse, tekn dr i pappers-
teknik, Birgitta Johansson, tekn lic i cellulosateknik
och Gunilla Ladberg, f6rfattare och fil dr i pedagogik.
Utgiven av Naturskyddsforeningen i samarbete med
Miljoforbundet.










In addition to the deformed fish, Environment/Cellulose estimated the paper industry
discharged 15,000 tons of organochlorines into the water every year and that organochlorines
were detected as far as 1,400 kilometers downstream. The Environment/Cellulose scientists
concluded that "the results thus show that discharges from mills producing bleached kraft pulp
may be of regional extent as regards biological effects; nonetheless, the chemical monitoring
suggests that there is a problem of large-scale character" because pollutants from pulp mills are
dispersed throughout the Baltic Sea.'
Media coverage of dioxins in pulp mill effluent (1986-1988), SEPA's findings of
ecological degradation from pulp mill effluent (1987 and 1988), and the ecological disasters of
1988 (discussed below), all legitimized the SSNC's problem definition. All the major daily
newspapers, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet, Aftonbladet, and Expressen,2 as well as the
smaller regional newspapers, published articles between 1986 and 1988 confirming the SSNC's
argument that pulp mills were a major source of pollution. Titles from the major dailies
included: "Dioxin in Wastewater Discharges Is a Serious Problem" 3 and "EPA Sounds Alarm:
High Levels of Dioxin in Fish"4 (Dagens Nyheter); "Injured Fish Intensifies Demand: Bet for the
Environment?" (Svenska Dagbladet);5 "The Great Paper War" (Aftonbladet);6 and "Death by
Bleaching: We Sacrifice Forests and Fish for White Paper" (Expressen).i Articles from smaller
1S dergren, 1989, p. 109.
2 The two major quality newspapers were the morning papers: the more liberal Dagens Nyheter and the more







regional papers included: "White Paper -- At What Price?" (Vestmanlands Ldns Tidning)1 and
"Pick the Right Paper for the Ocean's Sake" (Helsingborgs Dagblad).2
Industry responded to dioxins in paper products by arguing they posed no risk to humans.
Nils Jirval of the Swedish Forest Industries Federation claimed that "'Swedish paper products,
which contained dioxins in a few parts per trillion were safe.' 3 Given that any adverse effect
from low levels of dioxin exposure will be seen years (possibly decades) after exposure or in the
next generation -- and most adverse effects would be obscured in a sea of confounding factors --
it was easy for industry to claim its products were safe because environmentalists lacked
evidence of adverse effects.
After the dioxin discovery Swedish pulp and paper manufacturers took organochlorine
pollution seriously. When dioxins were discovered in mill effluent, all companies with
bleacheries quickly began mill trials of chlorine dioxide substitution, experimenting with
different levels of substitution to ascertain how much substitution was necessary to eliminate
dioxin formation.4 They responded by identifying the sources of dioxin formation and methods
for reducing organochlorine discharges. "When the dioxin issue came out we immediately
started research projects at SSVL. We found the reasons why dioxins and furans were formed in
chlorine bleaching process and learned how to reduce them." 5
Industry responded to the deformed fish by focusing on scientific uncertainty. As Peter
Axegfrd of the Swedish Pulp and Paper Research Institute recalled, the deformed pike found








Concerned with its rapidly declining public image, Lennart Ahlgren from the Korsnas pulp and
paper company published an article in the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet -- "The Swedish Forest
Industry Solves Its Environmental Problems" in May 1988. Ahlgren explained the measures
taken by the industry to address pollution: identifying the sources of dioxins in pulp and paper
mills and reducing dioxin discharges by reducing chlorine use through partial substitution.' Yet
with massive seal deaths on the horizon (see below), industry had little opportunity to claim
innocence in the fish deformities.
7.1.4 Stora breaks with the industry "federation" and shifts an entire market
The industry's campaign against chlorine-reduced paper collapsed in late 1987 when
Stora broke from the industry "federation" ranks and began marketing chlorine-reduced copy
paper.2 Then the largest pulp and paper manufacturer in Europe,3 Stora's decision to manufacture
chlorine reduced paper, together with the press coverage of the seal deaths in the summer of
1988, shifted the entire Swedish paper market. Here is how Nils Jirval of the Swedish Forest
Industries Association summarized the events:
A company [Munkedals] jumped on the wagon that was not an integrated paper mill and
it produced a very lousy copy paper; its paper had some special sign on it [panda]. Then
another company [Stora] joined in this business, and suddenly environmentally friendly
paper became a safe issue. That's how the NGOs and customers came in as a pressure
group for the development of a new [production] technique.4
Stora made its decision to produce chlorine-reduced paper amid the revelations of dioxins
in paper mill effluent and the release of SEPA results, showing high quantities of organochlorine
discharges from the industry and adverse ecological effects. Bryntse claims that personal
connections were instrumental in persuading the plant manager at Stora's Nym5lla mill to invest
in chlorine-reduced bleaching:
1Ahlgren, 1988.
2 Auer, 1996; Bryntse, 1998; and Jirval, 1998.
3 Globe and Mail, 1987.
4 Jirval, 1998.
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Because my wife and I had worked at STFI [Swedish Pulp and Paper Research Institute]
we have many contacts in the paper industry. That is where we met, while working at
STFI. Some of our friends were working at the Nym6lla mill, and they were instrumental
in convincing the plant manager to invest two million crowns [-$300,000] to reduce
AOX levels below 1 kg per ton of pulp.
Since the Nymalla mill was a bleached sulfite pulp mill, it was easier in comparison to a
kraft mill to reduce AOX discharges. Sulfite pulping produces brighter unbleached pulp, which
requires less bleaching chemicals to reach medium brightness levels.2 With the use of hydrogen
peroxide and no chlorine or chlorine dioxide, a sulfite mill can achieve ISO 85-87 brightness. 3
To provide a sense of paper brightness levels, you are reading from paper that is ISO 84
brightness. The brightest papers are ISO 88 or greater. Most paper mills, however, manufacture
copy and writing papers from kraft rather than sulfite pulp because of its superior strength and
brightness. For these mills the costs of reducing AOX discharges would be much higher than
sulfite mills. Sulfite mills also represented only 12% of bleached chemical pulp in Sweden in the
mid-1980s.4
Because Stora manufactured a quality environmentally friendly paper, its decision
deflated the industry's arguments that you could not have high quality, chlorine-reduced paper.
That Stora recognized AOX pollution as an opportunity rather than a problem illustrates the
power of market campaigns to create competition among firms on environmental performance;
contrasting sharply with government regulation that creates cooperation among firms to resist
increasing environmental performance.
When the largest pulp and paper company in Europe added chlorine-reduced paper to its
product portfolio it put tremendous pressure on the rest of the industry to follow, lest they lose
market share. MoDo began marketing chlorine-reduced paper in 1988 and SCA followed
1Bryntse, 1998.
2 See Chapter 4.
3 Pulp and Paper, 1991, p. 33.
4 See Chapter 5.
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quickly thereafter.' The bleached kraft pulp mills reduced their AOX levels to 1.0 kg or less per
ton of pulp "by adapting existing technology", including oxygen delignification, extended
delignification, and chlorine dioxide substitution. 2 By 1991 nearly all grades of printing and
writing papers sold in Sweden were chlorine-reduced as defined by the SSNC. 3 Nationwide
AOX discharges averaged 1.7 kg/ton of pulp in 1990 and first averaged less than 1.0 kg/ton of
pulp in 1992 (0.6 kg/ton).4 Chlorine use ended in Sweden in 1992, making all the mills ECF.
And by the end of 1993 all Swedish bleached kraft pulp mills were ECF-lite, because all had
installed oxygen delignification systems.5
Mills that manufactured chlorine-reduced paper were certified by the SSNC and placed in
its book on environmentally friendly paper products. Verification was made through telephone
calls and occasional mill visits.6 A task that became quite burdensome in 1989 when the number
of paper manufacturers increased and included Finnish as well as Swedish companies. "SNF
[SSNC] could not certify every mill as being environmentally friendly," Bryntse explained. "We
did not have the resources. It was my job and I could not certify every mill. For example, one
paper mill alone had 40 suppliers of pulp. How could I guarantee each of these companies
supplied environmentally friendly pulp?"7 The need for SSNC verification declined dramatically
when the Nordic Swan -- an ecolabeling system established by the Nordic countries in 1989 --
became the dominant environmentally friendly paper certification program in Sweden in the
early 1990s. The emergence of the Nordic Swan and its competition with the SSNC is discussed
in the next chapter.
Bryntse, 1998; Jirval, 1998.
2 Jirval, 1998.






Because the mills continued to bleach and to use chlorine in the late 1980s, the industry's
trade association continued to defend the status quo. Bo Wergens, then director general of the
Swedish Forest Industries Federation, argued that bleaching:
gives a bright paper which is not easily discoloured during storage, and does not yellow
when exposed to sunlight; a white but strong paper; improved absorbtion capacity;
elimination of bark and wood residues from the pulp; and elimination of fatty acids and
other substances which can give rise to an unpleasant or disagreeable smell. As yet
chlorine is usually needed in order to get the bleaching process to function effectively.'
It remains true to this day that bleached kraft pulp mills produce the strongest and
brightest paper. But the other arguments for chlorine being unique -- improved absorbtion
capacity, elimination of bark and wood residues from the pulp, and elimination of fatty acids and
other substances -- were later proven false. For example, G6ran Eriksson, production manager
of Korsnis admitted in 1991 that "'Chlorine gas isn't needed to get rid of impurities.' 2
Eriksson's admission reflects a common attribute of environmental technology change: industry
arguments opposing change on technological grounds prove false (and are forgotten) as the new
technologies become widely diffused and performance attains the same level as previous
technologies.
7.1.5 The ecological catastrophes of '88
Two ecological catastrophes struck the west coast of Sweden in the summer of 1988 and
cemented the legitimacy of the SSNC's problem definition in the public's eyes. First, toxic algal
blooms erupted on the west coast of Sweden in May and June of 1988. "The algal toxin had
drastic effects on the marine ecosystem, killing large numbers of macroalgae, invertebrates, and
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'Rusbridger, 1988.
2 Granvik, 1991, p. 17.
fish."I The primary cause of the algal bloom, eutrophication, was fueled by higher than normal
nutrient loadings from land runoff.2
Second, massive deaths of harbor seals, also off the west coast of Sweden,3 followed
quickly thereafter. By the end of 1988, an estimated 60% of the population of harbor seals in
Western Europe had died.4 The outcome from these two events, as a reporter for The Guardian
(London) on assignment in Stockholm described, was catastrophic:
Some of the beaches along the Swedish riviera have been littered, not only with dead
seals, but with dead dolphins, dead and deformed fish, gulls and ducklings; with eels
covered in mouth ulcers and seals covered in boils and lesions. Beneath the surface there
drift entire shoals of lifeless mussels and starfish. In some places the seabed is carpeted in
dead worms.5
The seal deaths disturbed the Swedes and received intensive media coverage. Titles such
as these burst up from the pages of newspapers: "People are at Fault for Fish and Seal Deaths;"6
"Seal Deaths Challenge our Lifestyle;"7 "Seal Deaths are the Tip of the Iceberg."8 Figure 7.4
illustrates the incredible spike in articles printed on seal deaths, algal bloom, and dioxins in 1988.
Over 60 articles were written on these topics9 in 1988, many published in the month of August.
The profusion of articles reflects the degree of public attention placed on pollution during this
period. The result, "'It has scared everyone in Sweden,"' stated Arno Rosemarin, then editor of
Ambio (the journal of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences).' 0
1Rosenberg, Lindahl, and Blanck, 1988, p. 289.
2 Ibid.
3 As well as along the Atlantic coast of many European nations.





9 As identified using ArtikelSbk.
10 Rusbridger, 1988.
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At first, when scientists did not know the cause of the seal deaths, Swedes focused on
pollution from the paper industry and their lifestyle as the causes of the seal and fish deaths. The
media coverage of seal and fish deaths, and associations with dioxin made Swedes keenly aware
of the pollution from the pulp and paper industry. "Every time you watched television or opened
the newspaper you saw small seals dying or dead on the coasts. That made a tremendous impact
on people as a whole and business." 2
With the press and scientists connecting lifestyle with pollution, household consumers
questioned the purchasing of bleached paper products, and quickly turned to the unbleached
paper products listed in the SSNC's brochure, Paper and the Environment (1988). "Many
communities and local authorities they started using this booklet and said, 'we want




environmentally adopted [friendly] paper when we are buying paper products for our
community."'" The SSNC's booklet, with its lists of environmentally friendly producers by
paper product category, perfectly complemented this desire for action. It became a bestseller in a
rapidly expanding environmental movement: "We initially printed 15,000 copies of Paper and
the Environment," recalled Eiderstr6m. "These quickly sold-out and we printed 40,000 more
copies."2 The booklet and the market campaign fit with the SSNC's organizational structure.
With local chapters spread throughout the country, members used the booklet to promote
environmentally friendly purchasing among individuals and local authorities. "The demand for
environmentally friendly products came from the bottom of the organization [SSNC]. Our local
groups picked up the issue and members campaigned on their own. People wanted to do
something about the polluted seas." 3
Citizens acted by purchasing unbleached (rather than bleached) consumer goods --
including coffee filters, bathroom tissue, paper towels, and tampons -- and chlorine-reduced
bleached products like copy paper and diapers.4 For example, after the summer of 1988 the sale
of unbleached coffee filters went from 17% of the Swedish market to 90% by 1990; and for the
leading manufacturer of bleached paper bags, Swedish orders dropped from 90% of the market
to 10% within a few months in 1988.5 These significant and quick shifts in product market
illustrate the combined power of media coverage, consumer action, and the SSNC providing
information on alternative products. The media united diverse consumers across the nation and





5 Holm and Lothigius, 1991, p. 19.
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Substitution came quickly for many household paper products because manufacturing
them without bleaching had no effect on product performance, despite the protestations of a few
manufacturers. For example, Melitta "had put a lot of time and effort into proving the technical
impossibility of producing an unbleached product [coffee filter]." However, after Melitta began
to lose market share to the Swedish manufacturer Finess, whose market share jumped from 17 to
35 percent in 1988, it was forced "to do an about-turn" and produce unbleached coffee filters.'
Industry executives thought they were unjustly attacked. As Nils Jirval, director of
environmental policy at the Swedish Forest Industries Association, explained the industry
position:
Seals died in large numbers on the west coast and washed up onshore, and there were
huge fish kills. All of that was blamed on the pulp and paper industry. We were really
the scapegoats at the time ...
There was no connection between the seal deaths and the paper industry. The truth came
out a half-year later, and then it was too late. In the public eye the damage was already
done.
We defended ourselves as much as possible, but we did not know what was causing the
seal deaths. Eventually it was identified as a virus that killed the seals, which came from
the far north. We could not be absolutely sure that the resistance to that virus was not
affected by our discharge. To defend ourselves we must be 100% sure. When NGOs
make a claim they do not need any proof: saying 'we fear that is the case' is enough. We
cannot say 'we fear that is not the case.' We are playing in different leagues.
It is an upper and underdog situation. We can never win a debate in the public's eyes
unless they environmentalists are really foolish; they always have the sympathy of the
public. All the media jumped on to this issue and wrote stupid things. They blew up all
the threats and disasters on page one.
By mid-August a distemper virus was identified as the direct cause of the deaths.3 Even
after a distemper virus was identified as the cause, Swedish scientists and reporters remained
convinced that pollution, especially the widespread diffusion of persistent and bioaccumulative





Some scientists, especially those outside of Sweden, doubted this connection. Scientists "like
British Environment Secretary Nicholas Ridley, [have] been cautious about linking the virus
with the polluted state of the seas that the animals inhabit."' Swedish scientists, however,
vigorously disagreed:
Olof Linden, associate professor at the University of Stockholm, is scornful of such an
attitude: 'I find it rather stupid and strange. We know that these seals are absolutely
loaded with persistent and poisonous substances which human society produces. ... The
virus may be natural, but it is working on an eco-system in stress. It's odd that anyone
should dispute the connection.' 2
Furthermore Swedish scientists viewed the seal deaths as an indicator of potential harm
to humans. "'When you see dead seals it is an indicator that we have got all the way up to the
top of the food chain. That means we're next. That means dioxins turning up in human breast
milk. It's a time bomb that we've got here,"' explained Arno Rosemarin (editor of Ambio).3
7.1.6 Institutionalizing retail demand for environmentally friendly paper: the SSNC-ICA
alliance
Helping to expand the SSNC's presence into retail purchasing was an informal alliance
with Sweden's largest supermarket chain, ICA. Amidst the seal deaths in 1988, the SSNC
worked with ICA, helping the supermarket retailer develop its own criteria for environmentally
friendly paper.4 The result, not surprisingly, was criteria almost identical to that developed by
the SSNC:
Grade A: chlorine free (0.1 kg AOX/ton)
Grade B: low AOX (less than or equal to 1 kg AOX/ton)





4 Bryntse, 1998; Eiderstr6m, 1998.
5 Bryntse, 1998.
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The only difference between the two sets of criteria was ICA's chlorine-free criterion
(Grade A) was somewhat more stringent: 0.1 kg AOX/ton of pulp for ICA vs. 0.2 kg AOX/ton of
pulp for SSNC. ICA implemented its grading scheme by asking manufacturers for data on AOX
discharges and placing labels on its store shelves with: the grade level.' KF, the second largest
supermarket chain, quickly followed ICA in instituting its own shelf-based ecolabeling scheme
based on similar criteria.
ICA's decision to grade the environmental performance of paper products coupled with
the seal deaths and KemI's recommendation to ban chlorine use in the manufacture of diapers
changed the diaper market. M61nlycke, a Swedish diaper brand name owned by SCA introduced
chlorine-reduced diapers in 1988, gaining a Grade B classification from ICA, and quickly
increased market share on its main competitor, Procter and Gamble (P&G). Bryntse, who
worked as consultant for P&G in the late 1990s, recalled that P&G "was furious when ICA said
that it would classify its diapers as Grade C. Since the Swedish diaper company M61nlycke had
changed to Grade B, P&G knew to sell in Sweden it would need to get at least a Grade B rating."
P&G immediately began working with its pulp supplier, Stora's Sk6ghall mill to produce Grade
B pulp." 3 This marked the beginning of a war across western European between SCA and P&G
over the environmental performance of their diapers:
A marketing battle has been raging between Europe's two leading diaper producers,
Peaudouce, headquartered in France but Swedish owned, and Procter & Gamble, over
claims that their products are made from non-chlorine pulp. Peaudouce uses pulp made
from a peroxide-bleached chemi-thermomechanical pulp (CTMP) plant at Ostrand,
owned by its parent company Svenska Cellulose Aktiebolaget (SCA), while P&G's main
supplier of non-chlorine pulp is Stora of Sweden.4





The diaper battle is illustrative of how Sweden was at the forefront of the struggles to
address pulp and paper pollution. The whole issue of dioxins in consumer products, for example,
did not become a major issue in Great Britain until 1989.1 In February 1989, The Guardian
reported that researchers "found traces of the highly toxic chemical" dioxin in bleached white
milk cartons and "sanitary products such as tampons and disposable nappies [diapers]. Other
disposable goods like tissues, tea bags and coffee filters which had been bleached white were
found to contain dioxin."2 That dioxins became an issue in England and elsewhere in Europe
mattered for Swedish manufacturers because it created pressure to change for the export market
as well. As in Sweden, environmentalists were critical in bringing attention to pollution from the
industry. In Great Britain it was the Women's Environmental Network and in Austria and the
Germany it was Greenpeace. 3
The demand for environmentally friendly products grew in Sweden and western Europe
beyond paper to include detergents, organic food, and other retail products. By 1989, the
Associated Press reported that European "Consumers increasingly are demanding products that
don't 'cost the earth,' and companies are seizing the new opportunity." 4
By 1990, the Swedish pulp and paper industry began using its environmental investments
to its advantage. It took public credit for the investments in environmentally friendly paper
products and as being the most green of the industry. As reported in the Financial Times
(London), Bengt Lof, president and chief executive of MoDo (then Sweden's third biggest pulp
and paper company), stated: "It is natural for us to seek to further improve the production
' A search of Lexis-Nexis for articles in London newspapers on dioxin in the pulp and paper industry only revealed






process from an environmental point of view since this will give us competitive advantages in
the future.'"
7.2 Greenpeace Sweden: trying to create momentum for change through direct action
The origins of Greenpeace date back to the early 1970s when Canadians in Vancouver
formed the organization in 1971 to protest nuclear testing. At first they tried to halt nuclear tests
by sailing ships into nuclear test zones. Ben Metcalfe of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
reported the formation of Greenpeace while aboard the Phyllis Cormack: "'We Canadians started
the Greenpeacing of America last night, represented by 12 men in an 80-foot halibut boat on our
way to the United States nuclear test island of Amchitka in the far Aleutians. Our goal is a very
simple, clear, and direct one -- to bring about a confrontation between the people of death and
the people of life.' 2 The presence of the media aboard the Phyllis Cormack shaped the future of
the organization. In the words of Robert Hunter, first president of Greenpeace: "Mass media is a
way of making millions bear witness at a time."3
In its early years Greenpeace was a loose-knit organization opposed to whaling, sealing,
as well as nuclear testing, with offices in Canada, North America, and Europe: "by 1976 many of
the 'offices' were simply an interested individual who lent a telephone and a room for occasional
meetings. In reality, Greenpeace was still a fledgling organization, with only 30 workers at its
core."4 Yet the character of the organization was already set: international in scope and tactically
oriented to using direct action to capture media attention. Direct actions, as Paul Watson (an
early member of Greenpeace) explained, go "'through the camera and into the minds of people.
'Burton, 1990, p. 6.
2 Brown and May, 1991, p. 12.
3 Hunter, 1979, p. 252.
4 Brown and May, 1991, p. 40.
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The things that were previously out of sight and out of mind now become commonplace.
Therefore you use the media as a weapon."'"
Zodiac boats confronting whaling ships. Climbers hanging banners from smokestacks.
Divers plugging discharge pipes. The effect, political scientist Paul Wapner writes, is that by
presenting alternative images of the environment, bearing witness, criticizing
predominant modes of conduct, and exposing ecological atrocities, Greenpeace tries to
express itself through communication technologies to joggle the minds of the world. It
literally speaks through the air waves spanning the globe. Satellite dishes, fax machines,
video cameras, and electronic mail services are the tools of Greenpeace's political action.
And these are, essentially, entry ways into the world media network.2
In 1977 the US, Canadian, and European Greenpeace groups formed an international
umbrella organization, Greenpeace International and registered it as a charity in the Netherlands.
"Under the new plan, each national group would maintain its autonomy to a large extent and
devise its own local campaigns. An overseeing council with representatives from each of the
member countries3 would meet to make the major decisions. ... Eventually, each voting country
would contribute about a quarter of its income to Greenpeace International." 4
By 1986 Greenpeace International ran three campaigns: toxics, nuclear, and wildlife and
ocean ecology.5 Each campaign had: an international coordinator, a national coordinator in each
country with an office, international project directors, and national campaigners.6 The pulp and
paper campaign was a project of the toxics campaign.
'As quoted in Wapner (1996, pp. 53-54).
2 Ibid., pp. 156-157.
3 The member countries in 1977 were: Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, and the United States, with nine regional offices (Brown and May, 1991, p. 68).
4 Ibid., p. 68.
s Dykstra, 1986, p. 45.
6 Wapner, 1996, p. 49.
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The guiding ideas of the toxics campaign in the 1980s were the precautionary principle'
and pollution prevention.2 Greenpeace interpreted the precautionary principle to require "that all
waste generators apply the most advanced techniques, even if dangers or disturbances in the
environment have not yet been demonstrated."3 And halogenated hydrocarbons, with chlorine
being the most prominent halogen, were the target toxics. "Most halogenated hydrocarbons
exhibit one or more of the properties of persistence, bioaccumulation, carcinogenicity,
mutagenicity, teratogenicity or acute toxicity."4 The toxics campaign sought to challenge the
existence of halogenated hydrocarbons "from three different angles: the product, the
manufacturing process and the waste disposal process method." 5
During the late 1980s, Greenpeace International grew rapidly, with worldwide revenues
increasing from $63 million in 1987 to $167 million in 1990.6 The constant need for Greenpeace
to raise money and to capture media attention has brought about critics. Paul Watson, who broke
from the group in 1977 to found the more radical Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, views
Greenpeace as a "corporation bent on growth and profit. He likens it to Starbucks and Barnes &
Noble, saying Greenpeace takes money and publicity away from smaller grassroots groups and
inadvertently discourages activism." 7 Greenpeace members are "checkbook" members,
providing financial support to the organization but not engaged in activism through the
organization.
Germany, which was a leader in developing the principle of precaution, called Vorsorgeprinzip, defined it as
policy that is "preventive instead of reactive, employing avoidance and reduction of emissions technology at their
source. The essence of Vorsorgeprinzip is that "environmental dangers [harm to the environment] and damages
shall be avoided as far as is possible' (Cameron and Abouchar, 1991, pp. 6-7).
2 Bellion and Bunin, 1988, p. 7; and Dykstra, 1986.
3 Bellion and Bunin, 1988, p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 8.
' Ibid., p. 9.6 Peerla 1997, p. 20.
7 Kerlin, 2001.
8 Jamison et al., 1990.
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The pulp and paper campaign exemplified, wrote Uta Bellion and Lisa Bunin of
Greenpeace International, "Greenpeace's efforts to eliminate the generation of halogenated
hydrocarbon byproducts [like organochlorines] at the manufacturing process level."' The
Greenpeace strategy on pulp and paper was consumer education and public pressure.
Consumer education is aimed at forcing selective buying habits i.e., choosing unbleached
or recycled paper versus bleached paper products. Public pressure, supported by
scientific arguments, will undoubtly [sic] lead to new legislative and enforcement
initiatives and ultimately to better environmental performance.2
While Greenpeace International officially launched the pulp and paper campaign in 1987,
pulp and paper mills had been targets of national toxics campaigners prior to that year. Major
sources of water pollution, pulp and paper mills made an easy target for Greenpeace. The first
direct action of Greenpeace Sweden, for example, was at a pulp and paper mill in 1986.3
Greenpeace International launched the pulp and paper campaign in 19874 with the release
of the report, No Margin of Safety,5 by Greenpeace USA and Greenpeace Canada. The report,
which is discussed in Chapter 9, focused on dioxin pollution from the pulp and paper industry.
By 1989 Greenpeace International's pulp and paper campaign encompassed 17 countries across
the globe, with a concentration of activities in Europe (including Austria, Finland, Germany,
Norway, and Sweden), North America (Canada and the US), New Zealand, and Australia.6
The international campaign funded the gathering, publication, and dissemination of
technical information, such as The Greenpeace Guide to Paper7 and the translation of a
Greenpeace Germany report on the paper industry.8 The most powerful aspect of the
'Bellion and Bunin, 1988, p. 10.
2 Ibid., p. 11.
3 Brown and May, 1991, p. 132.
4 lbid., p. 142.
s Van Strum and Merrell, 1987.
6 Kroesa, 1999; Brown and May, 1991, p. 177.
7 Greenpeace International, 1990.
8 Greenpeace International, 1990.
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international campaign in Europe was it enabled Greenpeace to link actions targeting the major
producers (Finland and Sweden) and consumers (Germany, Great Britain, and The Netherlands)
of paper products. Thus Greenpeace could create consumer demand in Germany for
environmentally friendly pulp produced in Sweden.
In addition to the work of the national offices, regional Greenpeace campaigns lobbied
for more stringent regulation of AOX discharges from the pulp and paper industry through the
regional commissions with authority over pollution in the Baltic Sea and North Atlantic,
including: the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), with responsibility for pollution into the Baltic
Sea and the Paris Commission (PARCOM), with responsibility for the North Atlantic.'
In the early years, from 1986-1988, Greenpeace Sweden proved to be quite effective at
moving its problem definition onto the public agenda by capturing media attention through
cleverly designed direct actions. In particular, Greenpeace brought to media attention the issue
of dioxin pollution from pulp mills. While Greenpeace also presented scientific arguments at
public hearings on pulp mill environmental permits, it made little progress in its goal of
eliminating chlorine discharges through the regulatory process.
7.2.1 Creating the problem: dioxins or AOX?
The Greenpeace pulp and paper campaign in Sweden (as well as internationally) had a
love-hate relationship with dioxin. As organizers Greenpeace staff worldwide embraced dioxin
because the media interpreted it as an extremely toxic substance that people should not be
exposed to. As agents of change in pulp and paper production, however, Greenpeace
'While both commissions established recommended AOX effluent standards, they were irrelevant because Swedish
mills were below the standards. In 1990 HELCOM established a discharge level of 1.4 kg AOX/ton of pulp to be
achieved by 1995 (Auer, 1997, p. 359). And two years PARCOM established a much more stringent discharge level
of 1.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp to be achieved by 1993 (PARCOM, 1992).
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campaigners despised dioxin because it distracted from the broader goal of eliminating all
organochlorine (AOX) discharges.
Swedish Greenpeace tends to show signs of irritation at the mention of dioxins. 'Dioxins
are very fashionable,' says Margaret Rainey [pulp and paper campaigner for Greenpeace
Sweden], 'but they're only one of thousands of really nasty [chlorinated] substances
floating around, many of which could be worse but which aren't necessarily known to us
yet.'1
While Greenpeace wanted to focus on chlorinated organics as a class of chemicals, it
focused on dioxins because that was the interest of the media. The media can shape the message
of environmental groups, as the sociologist William Gamson (1993) finds, by "deciding which
frame sponsors [spokespeople] will be granted standing and selecting what to quote or
emphasize" (p. 119). In the case of dioxin versus AOX, this is what happened according to
former Greenpeace Sweden campaigner, Rune Leithe-Ericksen:
Greenpeace in Sweden focused on all chlorinated compounds as measured by AOX. We
recognized the need to address compounds as a group rather than compound by
compound. And the authorities now see that as the case ... The EPA followed AOX, but
the media liked dioxins. 'Dioxin' sounds toxic and is toxic.
The media wants simple messages. Today it is difficult to communicate environmental
issues because of their complexity. AOX is more complicated than dioxin and no one
wants to read about it. The public wants something easy and the media wants something
to focus on.2
Swedish reporters were receptive to covering the dioxin in paper pollution story in 1987 because
they had covered other dioxin stories, including dioxin in breast milk, in 1985 and 1986.
Greenpeace willingly accepted the dioxin channel to the media. In fact, Greenpeace
promoted the whole issue of dioxin content in products. Shortly after the release of No Margin
ofSafety in August 1987, documents were leaked to the Greenpeace USA revealing that "dioxin




facial tissue, toilet paper, kitchen towels, copying paper, and coffee filters."' Through its
internal electronic mail system, the news of dioxins in paper products quickly spread among
toxics campaigners working on pulp and paper. Greenpeace Sweden quickly disseminated that
news in Sweden. As Bryntse recalled:
Greenpeace made that argument, that coffee filters were unsafe. In 1987 some person in
the US discovered dioxins in diapers. That was big news and Greenpeace distributed that
news in Sweden. And some German compared unbleached and bleached coffee filters
and found that the bleached coffee filters leached dioxins. That was big news too.
Within half a year all you could find on store shelves were unbleached filters.
Despite the lament of Greenpeace Sweden campaigners that the media was only
interested in dioxin, over time Swedish reporters did write stories related to the problems of
chlorine. Figure 7.5 illustrates the degree of general newspaper coverage of dioxin versus
chlorine-related stories between 1986 and 1997. "General coverage" means any story where
dioxin or a chlorine-related issue is a central feature (i.e., listed as keyword) of the article.
"Chlorine-related issues" covers chlorine compounds, chlorine discharges, and chlorine
bleaching. Figure 7.5 highlights two important findings.2 First, and not surprising, dioxin
received much more press than chlorine-related issues from 1986-1988: 22 articles on dioxin
versus 5 articles on chlorine issues. Second, and this is the interesting part, chlorine issues
became somewhat more popular between 1989 and 1997: 14 articles on chlorine versus 10
articles on dioxin. Environmental issues addressed under "chlorine," along with pulp and paper,
were the chlorinated plastic, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and ozone depleting chemicals.
1Greenpeace International, 1990, p. 17.
2 This was a general search, not just for dioxin or chlorine issues related to the pulp and paper industry, in order to
understand general media coverage of these chemicals.
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Figure 7.6 illustrates similar coverage related to the pulp and paper industry. From 1986-
1988 dioxin articles dominated: 10 dioxin versus 5 chlorine-related articles. Thereafter, 1989-
1997, only two articles addressed dioxin versus eight articles that addressed chlorine-related
issues.2 The sharp decline in both dioxin and chlorine articles after 1989 reflects the view of
reporters that the story was no longer worthy of attention. The decline in dioxin articles also
reflects the shifting of Greenpeace Sweden's focus to organochlorines. The shift of media
attention from dioxin to chlorine does indicate the capacity of environmental NGOs to alter the
media discourse over time
1 ArtikelSak database, search for "dioxin*" and "chlorine*" performed in 1998.
2 Two articles overlapped, one in 1988 (Bendroth, 1988) and another in 1993 (Hardell, 1993).
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7.2.2 Focusing government and public attention: direct actions at Sodra Cell's, Vairo
Bruk Mill (1986 and 1987)
Greenpeace Sweden's pulp and paper campaign began in typical Greenpeace fashion,
with direct action. The scene was the gate to the Vard Bruk bleached kraft pulp mill owned by
S6dra Cell. Located on the west coast of Sweden, the Var6 mill was convenient to Greenpeace's
main office, which at the time was located in the west coast city of Gtteborg. Heken Nordin, the
Greenpeace toxics campaigner at the time, described the event:
On the 15th of May 1986 our first action in Sweden, received national attention. We
dumped a half of ton of rotten fish at the front of the mill's gate. This created a huge
backup of logging trucks in front of the mill and created a great, visible image. Trucks
were backed up for kilometers from the entrance to the mill and the media were there
reporting the whole event. It was a great action.2
ArtikelSk database, search for "dioxin*" and "chlorine*" performed in 1998.
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The dumping of dead fish was a clever visual image because it surfaced the underwater
harm that was caused, according to Greenpeace, by the mill's water pollution. The Vard mill
action, Greenpeace Sweden's first, illustrated the capacity of Greenpeace as an organization to
bring attention to itself and environmental issues through cleverly designed direct actions.
Nearly a year later, Greenpeace returned in March 1987 for another action at the Var5 Bruk mill.
The stage this time was a public hearing.
To expand production, Swedish pulp and paper mills renewed their operating permit
through the Koncessionsnamnden for Milj6skydd (translated as the Licensing or Franchise
Board).'
Mill's have production permits that are valid for eternity. But the Licensing Board has
the authority to review permits every 10 years. Since few mills have standstill
conditions, most have their permits reviewed more frequently. Any time a mill
undergoes an expansion in production it needs a new permit. At this time the EPA
increases their [environmental] demand. It is almost a prerequisite that a mill reduces
overall pollution even as it increases production.
The Licensing Board is an open procedure. The mill submits an application and then the
Licensing Board gets opinions from the EPA, county administration, local administration,
fisheries, neighbors, NGOs, whoever has an interest. Then a public hearing is held to
discuss the permit.2
In theory the public hearings were an opportunity for input from citizens and NGOs into the
activities of pulp and paper mills. In practice, however, Swedish NGOs and citizens seldom
participated in the hearings. The result, permit renewal was a consensual process among
government authorities and mill management. 3
In 1986 S6dra Cell decided to expand production at its Var6 mill. In preparing data for
its application to the Licensing Board, S6dra Cell discovered dioxin in crabs downstream from
' The Licensing Board was eliminated with the passage of the Swedish Environmental Code in 1999.
2 Jirval, 1998.
3 See Chapter 5 for further details.
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the mill in late 1986.1 The presence of dioxins in crabs downstream from the mill set the stage
for Greenpeace Sweden to change the dynamic of Licensing Board public hearings.
For the public hearing in March 1987, Greenpeace Sweden organized local citizens to
attend the hearing and advocate for more stringent regulations on organochlorine discharge from
the mill. It also developed yet another clever hook to capture media attention and broaden public
awareness of the problems posed by industry pollution. In the words of Heken Nordin:
We raised local opinions on pollution from the mill and many people attended the
meeting. TV stations were there, we dressed up as waiters, and served a crab salad
sandwich to management on TV. It was a win-win situation for us. If he did not eat the
sandwich we would say, 'see, dioxins are bad for you.' If he ate the sandwich we would
say, 'look he's exposing himself and the rest of us to dioxins.' He ate the sandwich.
That was awfully good coverage. 2
The actions on the Var6 mill certainly made an impression on Sadra Cell staff, as Roland
L6vblad (environmental manager), candidly admitted years later when the company had
committed to chlorine-free bleaching:
In 1986 we also got the first "Dioxin-alarm' connected with pulp production in Sweden,
when results were published regarding the analysis of dioxins in crabs caught outside our
Var6 mill. The reaction from the environmental authorities, the newspapers and the
environmentalists was immediate: The Vard mill was polluting crabs -- an important
foodstuff -- with the deadly poisonous dioxins, and chlorine bleaching was to blame!'
Greenpeace Sweden demanded the Licensing Board restrict discharges to less than 1 kg
AOX per ton of pulp,4 the same discharge level recommended by the SSNC in its criteria for
chlorine-reduced environmentally friendly paper. In its final decision, the Licensing Board
required the Var6 mill to reduce discharges from 5.0 to 1.5 kg AOX per/ton of pulp: less than
what Sdra Cell wanted, more than what Greenpeace advocated for.5 It is impossible to
L6vblad, 1998. Christoph Rappe did the analysis that identified the dioxin contamination in the crabs and became





5 Auer, 1996, p. 148.
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ascertain the extent to which the Licensing Board's final decision was more restrictive because
of Greenpeace Sweden's action and organization. But the presence of Greenpeace Sweden at the
public hearings created a political counterweight to industry and created a middle ground for the
Licensing Board to operate in.
The action revealed the potential for environmentalists to change the dynamic of public
hearings, raised the issue of exposure to seafood contaminated with dioxin through the media,
and challenged the Licensing Board and Swedish EPA to be more aggressive in their demands
upon industry. "In the months to follow, Greenpeace Sweden attended permitting hearings of
other sulfate pulp mills, gaining similar results."I
While direct action helped to capture media attention, Greenpeace Sweden used scientific
evidence to capture the Licensing Board's attention. To support demands for change, Heken
Nordin met with scientists working on Environment/Cellulose I to both gather information and
recruit them to support the position of Greenpeace Sweden:
The scientists I worked with included Professor Anders S~dergren at Lund; he=s an
ecologist. I had good meetings with Ake Larson and Bengt Erik Bengtsson at the
Brackish Water Institute, which is south of Stockholm. The brackish water lab was very
important to my work. I met with Staffan Lagergren at the Swedish EPA. They were
cooperative and gave me a lot of information. I came in as a polite and interested
individual in their work: 'can you help and train me?' They helped me a lot. I also
remember meeting with Peter Axegird to get an industry perspective. I got information
from the experts and personally met with all of them.2
Anders S5dergren, Bengt Erik Bengtsson and Staffan Lagergren were researchers on the
Environment/Cellulose I project.3
Nordin translated the technical data into information to mobilize politicians and
regulatory authorities to action:4
' Ibid., p. 148.
2 Nordin, 1998.
3 See Sodergren (1989).
4 See Hays, Chapter 14, The Politics of Legislation, Administration, and Litigation.
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Then we [Greenpeace Sweden] packaged the information in a different way to get
publicity and to get action. I could go further and say more than they [scientists] could.
... The data were widespread [on the hazards associated with chlorinated organics from
pulp mills], including the skeletal deformations of fish. Bengt Erik Bengtsson did those
studies and the scientists were quite worried, but they could not do anything. Suddenly
Greenpeace became a way for them to get the information out. They had a lot of
information and we put it out.'
Greenpeace Sweden went further than the scientists by arguing that AOX discharges
from the mills were the cause of skeletal deformities in fish and that dioxin-contaminated
seafood posed serious hazards to human health. The difference between the positions of
Greenpeace Sweden and the Environment/Cellulose scientists on AOX discharges was slight: the
scientists acknowledged an association between AOX discharges and adverse ecological effects,
but not a direct correlation, as argued by Greenpeace Sweden.
On dioxin exposure from seafood, Greenpeace Sweden took a more precautionary
approach than SEPA. SEPA'S position on dioxin exposure from seafood, while ambiguous,
tilted to qualifying existing exposure levels as safe. In 1988 SEPA assured consumers of seafood
that occasionally exceeding the weekly dioxin exposure limit of 35 pg/kg would not pose
significant health risks, despite warning that exposure levels higher than this level over an
extended period was undesirable. 2 Greenpeace Sweden, however, argued that exposure to dioxin
in general was a problem and that exposure from seafood, especially in combination with other
sources of exposure, was unacceptable. Dioxin exposure is a serious public health threat because
"2,3,7,8-TCDD is the most hazardous chemical toxin known," "it is carcinogenic," and worst of
all, causes "genetic and reproductive damage." In particular, "The consumption of 30 grammes
of Baltic salmon a day (the average amount for Scandinavia) may result in an ingestion of
dioxins", making seafood consumption the largest nutritional source of dioxin exposure: "10 to
1 Nordin, 1998.
2 From Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA, 1988, pp. 190-192), as cited in Auer (Auer, 1996, pp. 92-
93).
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60 times greater than that via dairy fats (average daily consumption around 100 grammes), the
second largest nutritional source of dioxins."I
On both dioxins and AOX discharges the position of Greenpeace Sweden was aligned
with prevailing science, but Greenpeace Sweden was willing to make definitive statements of
causal relationships that scientific evidence could not support. A scientific challenge
environmentalists confront is overcoming the difficulty of proving correlation between pollution
and specific adverse human or ecological effects. As Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1996) conclude:
With most environmental problems, the analysis is considerably more difficult [than with
smoking tobacco]. Neat experiments and simple statistical tests usually are not adequate
or feasible and attempts to find statistical correlations (as in the case of smoking and
health) between possible causes and effects seldom yield clear-cut results (pp. 28-29).
Given the frequent lack of statistically significant correlations between pollution and
adverse effects, i.e., scientific uncertainty, a question environmentalists confront is how far to
push available data. A prudent course of action for environmentalists is to both acknowledge the
uncertainty and to argue for action in the face of uncertainty rather than make unsubstantiated
claims of damage that can weaken their credibility while strengthening the credibility of
opponents. As the American anti-toxics activist and executive director of the Center for Health,
Environment and Justice, Lois Gibbs writes in a chapter on organizing, "Never lie" and "Never
tell half-truths." 2
Taking action in the face of scientific uncertainty is an element of the precautionary
principle, the premise of which Sweden adopted in its Environment Protection Act of 1969 and
re-affirmed when it signed the Second North Sea Conference Ministerial Declaration (London
Declaration) of 1987. Precaution is a guiding principle of Swedish environmental law, as stated
in the Environment Protection Act:
'Greenpeace International, 1990, pp. 14-15.
2 Gibbs, 1995, p. 186.
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Anyone performing or intending to perform environmentally hazardous activity shall take
such protective action, tolerate such restriction of the activity and take such other
precautionary measures as may reasonably be demanded for preventing or remedying
detriment. ... [emphasis added]'
And the London Declaration of 1987 reaffirmed the need for precautionary action:
[I]n order to protect the North Sea from possible damaging effects of the most
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to
control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by
absolutely clear scientific evidence. 2
Yet the Swedish government and environmentalists still have the burden of proof of
showing harm. As Greenpeace International stated in its paper guide, the paper "industry makes
assurances that it will eliminate organochlorine discharges if these are ever proven to cause
environmental destruction. This means that before any negotiations over a clean-up can begin,
irreversible damage to the environment must first be scientifically documented." 3 That industry
demands a high level of proof of harm for action is not surprising. As Nils Jirval, environmental
director of the Swedish Forest Industries Association explained:
The main focus for my job and colleagues is to keep an eye on politicians. Sometimes
politicians make stupid decisions that are not based on science. They would drive us
crazy if we had to meet all the proposed regulations. We respond because we can't invest
all kinds of money just to satisfy politicians. Regulations must be based on
environmental fact.4
7.2.3 Touring the Munksjo Aspa Bruk mill: Greenpeace Sweden brings in the media and
government (1987)
A few months later, Greenpeace Sweden again was on the direct action trail, this time
using the Greenpeace International ship, the Beluga. The toxics campaigners launched a 45-day
tour from May to June 1987 along the southern Swedish coast and into the great lakes (Lakes
Vattern and Vdnern) to "highlight the problems caused by the untreated discharge of synthetic
'Swedish Ministry of the Environment, 1996, Section 5.
2 As quoted in Cameron and Abouchar (1991, p. 5).
3 Greenpeace International, 1990, p. 19.
4 Jirval, 1998.
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chemicals."' The main targets of the tour "were chemical industries, municipal sewage
treatment plants, and pulp and paper factories." 2 The pulp and paper highlight of this trip was a
stop at the Munksj6 mill in Aspa Bruk on Lake Vattern, where Nordin led a tour of
environmentalists, journalists, and government officials through the mill.
Yes, that was a nice action. We sent mail to the local and national government, to
management, and journalists that we tour the Aspa Bruk mill. We ended up having an
open day at the mill. We took the Beluga up to the mill=s dock -- we had
environmentalists, journalists, and staff from the environmental department and the
ministry of environment onboard-- and I led this group on a tour of the mill: >1 am going
to show you the industry.' Greenpeace had high status then and very few people dared to
stop us from doing anything.'
Greenpeace Sweden coordinated this event with the local environmental group, Save Vattern
Committee (Radda Vattern Kommitt6n), which turned out a fleet of 200 small boats to protest
pollution from the mill.4
The Munksj6 mill in Aspa Bruk was a good target for Greenpeace Sweden because of its
location and pending permit renewal. Located on Lake Vattern, the Aspa Bruk mill discharges
into a lake "highly valued for recreation, fisheries, and as a drinking water reservoir." 5 Because
of its location, the mill has always been under tight regulatory scrutiny for wastewater
discharges. For example, in 1974 it the first mill to install oxygen delignification in Sweden.
In 1985 the mill applied to the Licensing Board for a new permit to expand production. 6
At the time the mill discharged 5 kg AOX/ton of pulp and was the principal source of
organochlorine pollution into the lake, including dioxins.7 Analyses performed as part of the
permitting process discovered dioxins in Aspa Bruk's effluent and elevated dioxin levels in fish
'Brown and May, 1991, pp. 138-139.
2 Ibid., pp. 138-139.
3 Nordin, 1998.
4 Fasten, 1998.
' Persson et al., 1989, p. 208.
6 O'Brian, 1996, p. 19.
7 Fasten, 1993.
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downstream of the mill. "In L. Vattern, sediment contamination by chlorinated organic
compounds shows a distinct gradient from the main point source [the Aspa Bruk mill]" and
"fairly high concentrations of dioxins were detected in some arctic chars from the lake." The
mean total concentration of dioxins in eight arctic char was 45 or 60 pg dioxin equivalents/g
whole weight of the fish:' "which is about three to four times as high as in salmon from nearby
L. Vanern or from the Baltic."2
Despite the high dioxin levels in fish, the Licensing Board issued a permit in late 1987
that required the mill to reduce AOX discharges to 3 kg/ton of pulp by installing secondary
(biological) wastewater treatment.3 This was much more lenient than the 1.5 kg AOX/ton of
pulp required of the Var6 mill. Concerned the permit was too lenient, that wastewater treatment
would not reduce discharges of persistent pollutants, SEPA appealed the Licensing Board's
decision to the Ministry of Environment. "We appealed most decisions at that time if they were
not 1.5 [kg AOX/ton of pulp] or equal because we wanted to set a precedent" and ensure that
mills introduced in-process changes, like chlorine dioxide substitution, that prevented the
formation of persistent pollutants, recalled Erik Nystr5m of SEPA.4
To what extent Greenpeace Sweden's action at the mill influenced SEPA's decision to
appeal the 1987 permit was impossible to ascertain. According to SEPA staff, it was scientific
evidence not Greenpeace Sweden's action that prompted the appeal.5 At a minimum,
Greenpeace Sweden illuminated for the SEPA that the Aspa Bruk mill should be of particular
concern given its central role as a source of pollution into the beautiful and popular Lake
VAttem.
' The mean had two values, 45 or 60 picograms, depending on the measurement technique.





In 1988, the Ministry of Environment ruled in SEPA's favor and required the Licensing
Board to develop more stringent regulations. 1 When the Licensing Board re-negotiated the
permit in the midst of seal deaths and a national election that turned into a referendum on the
environment, the permit became a centerpiece in the political debate, with the Minister of
Environment, Birgitta Dahl announcing the new permit at the mill during the election campaign. 2
The state of political affairs was, recalled Hans Fasten, mill manager of Aspa Bruk, "where
environmental questions were first and economic issues like employment were lower." 3
According to Fasten, the result was "hard demands to reduce AOX, instead of the 3-5 kg
AOX per ton originally promised, it was lowered to 1.5."4 But the mill did not have to meet the
1.5 kg AOX/ton of pulp until 1992. The final permit allowed the mill to discharge 3 kg AOX/ton
of pulp from 1988 to 1991, with a reduction to 1.5 kg AOX/ton of pulp from 1992 to 1994, and
finally achieving 0.5 kg AOX/ton of pulp beginning in 1995.5 The mill actually met these
targets years ahead of the regulatory requirements because of market demand (see next chapter).
For example, by 1992 mill discharge was 0.4 kg AOX/ton of pulp, well below the 1.5 kg AOX
required by the Licensing Board.6
For Greenpeace Sweden, the Beluga tour was a media success. It included a well
publicized meeting with the Minister of Environment, Birgitta Dahl, aboard the Beluga to
discuss water pollution.7 And during the tour months of May and June, "Greenpeace" was a








8 Search of ArtikelS6k database in 1998.
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reporter even wrote a column, subtitled "Diary from Beluga."' In fact the entire year of 1987
was a huge media success for Greenpeace Sweden in general and its toxics campaign in
particular. "Greenpeace" was identified as a central feature in 15 articles, 13 of which were
related to toxics issues,2 including two related to pollution from the Aspa Bruk mill.3
Increasing Swedish interest in environmental issues and media coverage promoted rapid
growth in Greenpeace Sweden. The title of one article aptly reflected Greenpeace Sweden's
growth: "Sweden Crosses Over to Greenpeace." 4 And Sweden did crossover to Greenpeace,
joining the organization in droves:
We hit our peak in Sweden in 1987 and 1988, and were able to do almost as we wished.
We grew exponentially in the 1980s: from 3,000 in 1985, to 30,000 in 1986, to 90,000 in.
1987, to 160,000 1988. With such a large membership and working in such a small
country, of only 8 million people, it was quite easy to get national coverage when we did
an action.5
The rapid growth in Greenpeace Sweden increased the resources available to the pulp and paper
campaign.
7.2.4 Pressuring the Riksdag: the Vallviks action (1988)
In 1988, in the midst of a national election that witnessed Green Party politicians
becoming members of the Riksdag for the first time, Greenpeace Sweden directed its attention to
parliament. To influence government policy Greenpeace Sweden held a direct action at a plant
partially owned by the Swedish government and lobbied the Ministry of Environment.
In the spring of 1988 Greenpeace Sweden held an action at the Vallviks Bruk mill6 in
conjunction with the Nordic Council Meeting of environmental ministers in Stockholm. Because
1 Hagelin, 1987; Hagelin, 1987.
2 Search of ArtikelS6k database in 1998.
3 See Danielzon, 1987; Granehed, 1987.
4Hultman, 1987.
5 Nordin, 1998. Also see Brown and May (1991, p. 131) for a published account of the rise in Greenpeace
membership.
6 The mill is located in Vallvik, approximately 250 kilometers north of Stockholm
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the government was a partial owner of the mill, Greenpeace Sweden wanted to hold it
responsible and expose it as a direct contributor to pollution in the Baltic Sea.
The most substantial effort by Greenpeace to push parliament was the action at the
Vallviks mill. We saw a direct link to the state at the mill because the state had an
ownership stake in the mill. We said, 'this is a mill the state can do something about
because it owns part of it.' We plugged the pipe at Valviks and would not leave until the
mill promised to do something. But nothing ever came of this action.'
In addition Greenpeace Sweden campaigners "met with the environmental minister at the time,
Birgitta Dahl, wrote a paper to her, and held a press release and some activities." 2
More in response to the ecological crisis of seal deaths and algae blooms confronting the
nation and the rising influence of the Green Party than in response to Greenpeace Sweden the
Riksdag passed a bill in the summer of 1988 recommending that mills limit their discharge to 1.5
kg AOX/ton of pulp. While the industry lobbied members of parliament to keep the discharge
levels as high as possible,3 the industry was willing to accept limits on AOX discharges despite
the lack of a direct correlation between AOX discharges and adverse environmental impacts.
This is because the industry and government had a history of developing regulations based on
general parameters of pollution rather than specific environmental endpoints. Nils Jirval of the
Swedish Forest Industries Association explained the industry-government position:
We never regulate any specific chemical. We have overall compounds that we measure:
COD, AOX, and BOD, which are indicators of pollution. In the dioxin debate we
discussed technologies that could reduce dioxin. We knew if we avoided chlorine in
bleaching the formation of polychlorinated compounds would be almost zero. Instead the
discharge only included monochlorinated compounds and no chlorinated phenols,
dioxins, and furans. That was enough for the authorities: they accepted this and







Thus regulating AOX was not contested and the level of 1.5 kg AOX/ton of pulp was accepted as
a reasonable level for the industry to attain.
For Greenpeace Sweden and the SSNC the bill was unacceptable. "The parliament was
quite weak on TCF," remarked Nordin. "The bill froM 1988 set a floor to stand on. It pointed to
zero AOX and set a progressive timetable, but it was way behind the technology."' Mills were
already producing pulp that met the SSNC's criteria for chlorine-reduced paper of less than or
equal to 1.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp. Although the Riksdag was behind the technology it was ahead
of other governments. Sweden was the first nation to set a national standard for organochlorine
pollution. It would be a decade later before the United States set a national standard for
organochlorine pollution.
It was at this point, when Swedish consumers moved en masse to unbleached and
chlorine-reduced papers, that Greenpeace Sweden followed in the footsteps of the SSNC and
turned to the market.
Then Hiken started a consumer campaign. This was a big success. Consumers started to
demand unbleached coffee filters, copy paper, and diapers. The consumer campaign
gave people a way to act on their concerns. They read about and saw the degradation of
the oceans, now they could act. In the Greenpeace Sweden magazine we identified
unbleached consumer products and advocated for people to buy them. We tried to find
TCF paper at the time, but found none.2
7.3 Conclusion
By the end of 1988, the market for paper products in Sweden had changed significantly
from 1986. The major producers of printing and writing papers sold chlorine-reduced products.
M51nlycke sold chlorine-reduced diapers. Proctor & Gamble would offer chlorine-reduced
diapers in 1989. And many manufacturers of household products -- coffee filters, tissues, toilet




At the center of these changes was the SSNC. Between 1986 and 1988 the SSNC
produced the widely disseminated booklet, Paper and the Environment, developed criteria that
became the dominant definition of environmentally friendly paper products, and persuaded major
manufacturers to produce paper to its specifications. Media coverage of the ecological disasters
of 1988 brought the SSNC's market campaign to the retail level, to household consumers.
Scientific research by SEPA legitimized the causal stories of the SSNC and Greenpeace Sweden.
And Greenpeace Sweden helped to diffuse the science and bring media attention to the industry's
pollution.
The SSNC achieved its successes by effectively wielding technical information,
establishing credibility and legitimacy among both individual and institutional consumers,
catalyzing the development of other change agents, and increasing resources available to the
campaign. Indicators of the effective use of technical information include people request your
materials and services, and act upon the recommendations included in your materials and advice.
Central to the effective use of technical information is the development of materials and content
that people use for education and guidance. Paper and the Environment, the SSNC's booklet,
with its problem definition, criteria for environmentally friendly paper products, and listing of
environmentally friendly products and producers was a resource guide to all environmentalists
and consumer activists. Members of the SSNC used the booklet to organize at the local level.
Greenpeace International translated it into English, using it as the foundation for its paper guide.
Members and citizens demanded it. Important to the success of the booklet and the entire
campaign was its focus on solutions. The SSNC with its criteria and list of alternative products
was the first to define environmentally appropriate solutions, and because it created a market for
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chlorine-reduced paper, its criteria became the dominant definition of environmentally preferable
copy papers until 1990.
In market campaigns credibility with consumers is important to success. Consumers,
many who have never been involved in a political campaign (i.e., filled with conflict), must trust
environmentalists before they act upon their advice, and G6ran Bryntse, a paper engineer by
training, became a trusted advisor. That ICA, the nation's largest grocery retailer, approached
the SSNC and Bryntse for guidance in developing its paper grading scheme illustrates the level
of credibility they had achieved by 1988.
To succeed in market campaigns environmental organizations must catalyze other
individuals and organizations to adopt and advocate for their goals. Change agents, as Rogers
1995) defined them, diffuse innovations to other individuals and organizations. The SSNC
catalyzed the development of change agents up and down the paper supply chain: from
individual consumers to manufacturers of paper products. The Association of Local Authorities
helped define the criteria and negotiated with manufacturers to produce the paper. Munkedals
publicly promoted environmentally friendly paper by using the WWF panda and requested
AOX-reduced pulp from its suppliers; which in turn prompted Stora then MoDo and SCA to
offer chlorine-reduced papers. Reporters focused the entire nation on the plight of the seals and
seas, and the plausible role of paper industry pollution in their demise. ICA tried to influence
consumer decisions at the retail level by grading household paper products on their
environmental performance through a shelf-labeling scheme. Individual members of the SSNC
worked at the local level to persuade friends and local authorities to change their purchasing
habits. When a campaign has many different voices advocating for change, the odds for success
rise dramatically.
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In conjunction with the media coverage of the seal deaths, the paper campaign helped to
increase dues paying members within the SSNC, making the printing of 55,000 copies of a 50
page booklet with color photographs front and back a possibility. Campaigns need financial and
human resources to operate and grow, and these were available.
The SSNC did not develop a tight coalition to advance environmentally friendly paper
with the other environmental NGO active on pulp and paper between 1986 and 1988,
Greenpeace Sweden. As discussed in the following chapter, an intense rivalry and competition
over ownership of the paper campaign emerged between Bryntse and Greenpeace Sweden.
Despite the inability of Greenpeace Sweden and the SSNC to coordinate their actions, they
accidentally worked in a complementary fashion. Greenpeace Sweden took the lead in
promoting the problem and capturing media attention, and the SSNC took the lead in promoting
the solution.
Finally, the campaign had more good fortune: the course of events completely
overwhelmed industry opposition to change. Plagued by an onslaught of successive problems --
dioxins in wastewater, seafood, and paper products; deformed fish; massive seal and fish deaths;
and national media attention to all of these problems -- the industry was on constant defense
between 1986 and 1988. Compounding the difficulty of defending its operations over pollution,
Stora broke the informal agreement among major manufacturers to not produce chlorine-reduced
paper. Manufacturers attempting to maintain the pre-1986 status quo had no time to develop a
coherent and organized defense. They were constantly fighting new crises. The result was
disequilibria in the industry as their common ground on limiting environmental competence
fractured. Thus the SSNC's campaign moved forward against a disoriented opposition.
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The SSNC's environmentally friendly paper campaign is one of those rare campaigns
where problems are few and successes are contagious. But, as we shall see in the next chapter,
the success was short-lived.
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8 Wholesale and retail campaigns to shift the Swedish market: Greenpeace Sweden,
Greenpeace Germany, and the SSNC (1989-1998)
Trying to effect change through product innovation and business collaboration were not
strategies used by Greenpeace organizations prior to the pulp and paper campaign. Yet these
were the strategies Greenpeace offices in Sweden and Germany used to create a market for
totally chlorine-free (TCF) pulp and paper products. When Greenpeace International launched
the pulp and paper campaign in 1987 no bleached kraft pulp mill in the world made pulp without
using chlorine and chlorine dioxide. By the time Greenpeace International ended the pulp and
paper campaign in 1992, however, a TCF market flourished in northern Europe. Greenpeace
was the primary cause of this change.
This chapter is divided into five primary sections. The first section examines the
evolution of Greenpeace International's technology goal for the pulp and paper industry. The
second section describes how Greenpeace's competition with the SSNC temporarily undermined
the diffusion of TCF technologies. The third section explores the successful Greenpeace
campaigns to persuade major consumers of bleached kraft paper in Sweden and Germany to buy
TCF paper. The fourth section details the major arguments of the ECF-TCF debate, which
would prove relevant for the US as well. Finally the chapter briefly touches upon the SSNC's
initiative to resurrect its paper campaign in the late 1990s.
8.1 The Greenpeace solution evolves: from 1.0 kg AOX to chlorine-free to TCF to TEF
The initial environmental goal of Greenpeace Sweden in the permit hearings at Var6
Bruk and Munksj6 Aspa Bruk was 1.0 kg AOX per ton of pulp. With the discovery of dioxins in
mill effluent it was immediately apparent to toxics campaigners within Greenpeace that the use
of chlorine gas in bleaching operations was the principal source of dioxin in mills and had to be
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eliminated. Carol Van Strum and Paul Merrell (1987), co-authors of the report (No Margin of
Safety) that launched Greenpeace International's pulp and paper campaign, conjectured in that
report that: "The bleaching stage is the probable source of most pulp and paper mill dioxins. The
first-stage bleaching, to remove most residual lignin, is commonly performed with chlorine gas.
It is at this stage that dioxin precursors are mostly likely to form."' Van Strum and Merrell's
educated guess, that use of chlorine gas in the first bleaching stage was the primary source of
dioxin, was later confirmed by reams of analysis in Sweden, the US, Canada, and elsewhere.2
They concluded that, "To reduce dioxin pollution from the pulp and paper industry, the major
goal should be the greatest possible elimination of chlorine and [sic] from all paper production
cycles, from the forest to the finished product."3
In 1988 Greenpeace International, in consultation with the national organizations,
decided that Greenpeace should advocate for chlorine-free paper under the slogan, "chlorine-free
by '93."4 However, Greenpeace campaigners had not settled upon their definition of "chlorine-
free." When Greenpeace campaigners said "chlorine-free" in 1988, some meant only the
elimination of chlorine gas while others meant the elimination of all chlorine-containing
chemicals. How Greenpeace would define "chlorine-free" was a significant campaign decision.
It would affect the degree of change campaigners would try to impose upon industry, their ability
to claim success, and the perception among staffers of Greenpeace as a radical environmental
organization. Greenpeace campaigners were aware of these issues in 1987. An issue they did
not foresee was how their decision to focus on campaign chlorine-free paper would be turned
against them.
1 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. VIII-6.
2 For example, see US EPA, 1993.
3 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. IX-1.
4 Kroesa, 1999; Nordin, 1998.
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Some in Greenpeace argued the term was perfectly clear: chlorine-free means no use of a
chlorine-containing chemical.' Others were less certain. "Renate [Kroesa]," the international
coordinator of the pulp and paper campaign, "was ambiguous at first concerning [the elimination
of] chlorine dioxide," recalled Jack Weinberg, former Great Lakes campaigner for Greenpeace
International.2 This debate reflected a broader internal debate within Greenpeace about how far
to push industry.
There are fundamentalist and pragmatist streaks in Greenpeace. The fundamentalists
view clean production as a sliding scale, where there is always another level of
improvement. They don't believe in proposing solutions and accepting technologies.
The pragmatists, and they dominated the pulp and paper campaign, promote
technological solutions.3
If Greenpeace had defined chlorine-free as only the elimination of chlorine gas, it would
have achieved a quick and relatively easy victory because the primary substitute chemical,
chlorine dioxide was already in use at mills. As Van Strum and Merrell predicted, mills would
rapidly move to chlorine dioxide.4 Chlorine dioxide in fact became the dominant substitute for
chlorine in Sweden, the US, and the world.5
For Greenpeace there were a handful of compelling reasons to define chlorine-free as the
absence of any chlorinated substance. First, the continued use of chlorinated substances in
bleaching would create organochlorine pollution, including dioxins. Heken Nordin recognized
that mills "could reduce organochlorines by 80 percent with chlorine dioxide," but he saw




4 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. IX-8).
5 Rooks, 2001.
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with chlorine dioxide."' Among the organochlorines would be, argued Van Strum and Merrell,
dioxin:
In both hypochlorite and chlorine dioxide oxidation, chlorine atoms are freed, however,
and both processes involve some degree of chlorination of residual lignins; any
subsequent hot caustic extractions should result in further dioxin formation, although far
lower amounts would be involved than in the chlorination [i.e., chlorine gas] phase. 2
Van Strum and Merrill foresaw two other problems with chlorine dioxide. First, because
capital investments in the industry are long-term, expensive cosmetic solutions such as
substituting chlorine dioxide for chlorine should be avoided. 3 As Jack Weinberg explained:
The debate on chlorine dioxide came down to, where will industry put its investment
money and what technology will it lock itself into for the next investment cycle. We
recognized that industry operates with a long-term [20-30 year] investment cycle. We
were willing to contemplate a longer time frame for industry to move away from chlorine
dioxide.4
Second, the recycling of chlorine dioxide effluents into the recovery boiler could "end up
generating as much or more dioxin through combustion in the recovery furnace." 5 This did not
become an issue because of the problems caused by sending chlorine dioxide effluents into the
recovery boiler.
Another compelling reason to oppose chlorine dioxide substitution was it supported the
self-perception of Greenpeace campaigners as radicals. "This was in late 1986, when I started
asking, 'Is chlorine-free bleaching possible?"', recalled Nordin. "The most radical answer was 7
years and the most conservative was 15 years. If the most radical person from industry could say
7 years, then Greenpeace could say five years. Our slogan became, 'chlorine-free by '93.'"6
'Nordin, 1998.
2 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, pp. VIII-6--VIII-7.
3 Ibid., p. IX-7.
4 Weinberg, 1999..
5 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. IX-9.
6 Nordin, 1998.
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While all these factors inclined Greenpeace to oppose chlorine dioxide substitution, it
was the rapidly changing market in Europe that prompted Greenpeace to define chlorine-free
broadly -- absence of any chlorinated substance -- rather than narrowly -- absence of chlorine
gas.
On the technology side three important changes occurred in the industry between by
1990. First, bleached kraft pulp mills began to run individual bleaching lines without the use of
chlorine gas.' Second, in 1989 a few sulfite pulp mills in Austria and Germany ended their use
of all chlorinated bleaching agents. And by "August 1990 there were already a dozen factories
in Sweden, Norway, (west) Germany, Portugal and Austria which were bleaching either all or
some of their output with hydrogen peroxide -- alone or combined with oxygen -- instead of
chlorinated chemicals." 2 Suddenly Greenpeace had an example of the best prevention
technology on the market, mills that eliminated the use of chlorine gas and chorine dioxide.
Third, some paper products, such as coffee filters, once made with bleached paper were now
made with unbleached paper, thereby eliminating the use of all bleaching chemicals.
Following the changes in production, marketing managers in Europe began touting their
products as chlorine-free, with chlorine-free encompassing any of the technologies noted above:
kraft pulp bleached without chlorine gas but with chlorine dioxide; completely chlorine-free (no
chlorine gas nor chlorine dioxide) bleached sulfite pulp; and unbleached pulp. For example, The
Times of London reported in 1989 that "Manufacturers are now promising to produce a much
wider range of products with chlorine-free pulp, including sanitary towels and nappies [diapers].
'For example, seeSvensk Papperstidning, 1989; and Swan, 1989.
2 Greenpeace International, 1990, p. 17.
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Sainsbury is considering other paper products, such as toilet paper, tea bags and coffee filters, as
a longer term goal."'
The rapid ascent of the paper industry's interest in chlorine-free bleaching is illustrated in
Figure 8.1, which depicts the number of articles with "chlorine-free" (as a keyword) in the trade
press from 1977-1997. The promotion of paper products containing chlorine dioxide-bleached
pulp as chlorine-free, as well as the SSNC's definition of chlorine-free (which allowed some
AOX discharge), offended Greenpeace campaigners. 2 Mills that eliminate the use of all chlorine
containing bleaching agents have virtually zero AOX discharge. They still have a small fraction
of AOX because organohalogens in the trees.
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3 Search of Paperbase database for "chlorine-free" in 1998.
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By 1990 the Greenpeace campaigners had aligned themselves behind the broader
definition of chlorine-free: i.e., no use of any chlorine-containing bleaching agent, namely
chlorine gas and chlorine dioxide. In its paper guide, Greenpeace International defined the
solution of the pulp and paper campaign as: "the elimination of all organochlorine discharges by
putting an end to chlorine-based bleaching."I
Given the controversy that erupted over the definition of chlorine-free, I was surprised to
learn that the technical literature in the trade journals supported Greenpeace's broad definition of
chlorine-free. A search for the term "chlorine-free" in the Paperbase database (which includes
journal articles and conference proceedings worldwide) from 1970-1997 uncovered the first
reference related to chlorine-free bleaching in 1978.2 From 1978 to 1986, eleven
articles/conference papers were published in the trade literature on chlorine-free bleaching (see
and almost two-thirds (seven) of the articles raised the environmental benefits of chlorine-free
bleaching. None of the articles defined chlorine-free as only the elimination of chlorine gas; or
to frame it in the positive, all the articles defined chlorine-free as the absence of any chlorinated
bleaching agent, including chlorine dioxide and hypochlorite. For example, the conference paper
by Chen, et al. (1982) examined the "Economic and environmental reasons for the interest in ...
the use of the chlorine-free bleaching agents, hydrogen peroxide and sodium hydrosulphite ..."
Another paper defined a "chlorine-free bleaching process" as involving four stages -- oxygen,
ozone, extraction, and hydrogen peroxide -- again, no use of any chlorine-containing chemical.3
Thus historically, industry defined chlorine-free as no chlorine-containing bleaching agents.
Even after the chlorine-free definition became politicized, some in industry still supported the
broader definition:
' Greenpeace International, 1990, p. 19.
2 The first reference in 1976 addressed chlorine-free pigments.
3 Schleinkofer, 1981.
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Several Swedish pulp and paper manufacturers claim to produce chlorine-free products
while bleaching with chlorine dioxide. This is dishonest and should not continue since it
misleads the public who wish to purchase chlorine-free products. Chlorine dioxide,
hypochlorate, and other chlorine containing agents may produce chlorine organic
compounds.
When paper companies began promoting chlorine dioxide-bleached paper as chlorine-
free, there was a struggle to define these papers. Greenpeace vigorously defended chlorine-free
as meaning no chlorine-containing compounds and the many companies using only chlorine
dioxide countered their product was chlorine-free as well. The whole issue was further
complicated by the SSNC's definition of chlorine-free (see next section), which had become the
"Euronorm" by the late 1980s. 2 Out of this struggle emerged two terms: elemental chlorine-free
and totally chlorine-free. Elemental chlorine-free or ECF means the bleaching process uses no
chlorine gas (elemental chlorine), but uses chlorine dioxide. Totally chlorine-free or TCF means
the bleaching process uses no chlorine gas and no chlorine-containing chemicals such as chlorine
dioxide and hypochlorite.
A search of Paperbase for "ECF" and "TCF" indicates that these terms first emerged in
the early 1990s. Articles using the terms trickled out in 1990 (one TCF article) and 1991 (three
TCF and four ECF articles), but began to pour out in 1992 (see Figure 8.2). By 1993 the two
terms were firmly embedded in the industry. The advocates for TCF paper were environmental
NGOs, with Greenpeace the most prominent, and a few producers of TCF pulp and paper
products. The advocates for ECF were most pulp and paper manufacturers, their trade
associations, and producers of sodium chlorate (the feedstock for manufacturing chlorine
dioxide).
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'Krantz, 1991, p. 11.
2 SWdra Cell, 1992.
Figure 8.2. TCF and ECF in the trade literature (1987-1997)
source:
The ECF-TCF distinction worked to the disadvantage of environmentalists. As Mark
Floegel of Greenpeace USA recalled, "ECF versus TCF put us in the position of being the hair
splitter. You never want to be in the position of the hair splitter."2 Because, as Christoph Thies
of Greenpeace Germany explained, "The need to completely eliminate all chlorine compounds
and the slight distinctions between ECF and TCF was far more than Joe Average could
understand. This was a very clever move on the part of industry: 'elemental chlorine-free'
sounds very much like 'chlorine-free.' 3 It may be that industry coined the term ECF, but the
debate over how to define chlorine-free was fought fiercely between Greenpeace Sweden and the
SSNC (see next section).
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By the 1990s Greenpeace was advocating for TCF as a means to achieving the totally
effluent-free (TEF) mill.' Reflecting industry resistance to moving beyond ECF and
Greenpeace's limited ability to create demand for TEF, "effluent-free" never achieved the
prominence these terms and the relevant technologies never received the same attention as
chlorine-free. For example, there were far more papers on "chlorine-free" than "effluent-free" 2
in the worldwide trade literature for every year beginning in 1988 (see Figure 8.3). Figure 8.3
Figure 8.3. Chlorine-free and Effluent-free in the Trade Literature (1975-1997)
Source: a
1Floegel, 1999.
2 Between 1975 and 1997 there were far more papers on "effluent-free" (273 articles) than "zero discharge" (50
articles).
3 Search of Paperbase database for "chlorine-free" in 1998.
250
indicates that Greenpeace's campaigning for effluent-free processes may indeed have had an
effect on the industry. Articles on effluent-free technologies started a sustained ascent in 1992,
the first year that the ECF/TCF distinction had taken hold in the industry.
8.2 Fighting over the technology goal: Greenpeace Sweden and the SSNC
The decision of Greenpeace International to define chlorine-free as no chlorine-
containing compounds, i.e., zero AOX, put it in conflict with Goran Bryntse and the SSNC. By
the end of 1988 the SSNC's criteria for chlorine-reduced paper was the standard for acceptable
environmental performance among concerned Swedish consumers, in both institutions and
households. As the demand for environmentally friendly papers spread to other western
European nations, the SSNC's criteria became informally known as the "Euronorm."' And
G6ran Bryntse, who had created, nurtured, and cultivated the campaign for environmentally
friendly paper and was the first environmentalist to raise the problem of organochlorine pollution
from pulp and paper mills, had developed a sense of ownership over the issue.2
Despite his successes, Bryntse harbored resentment towards Greenpeace Sweden: "Media
hungry Greenpeace entered into this campaign and then dominated the media."3 This bitterness
erupted into a major dispute with Greenpeace Sweden on the question of how to define chlorine-
free paper.
In the late 1980s Greenpeace Sweden tried to persuade Bryntse to change the SSNC's
definition of chlorine-free to 0.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp. 4 Bryntse refused. He even refused to
have his name listed as a co-author on The Greenpeace Guide to Paper (The Greenpeace Guide
1Sbdra Cell, 1993, p. 2.
2 Bryntse had even received an award from a Swedish television network for outstanding environmental work in





to Paper, 1990), which was based on a translation of the booklet (Paper and the Environment)'
he co-authored, because he disagreed with Greenpeace's position on chlorine-free paper.2
Bryntse made his disagreement clear when the SSNC (i.e., Bryntse) revised the criteria
for environmentally friendly paper in 1990. Environmentally friendly chlorine-reduced paper
was tightened from 1.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp to less than or equal to 0.5 kg AOX/ton of pulp. But
most importantly, environmentallyfriendly chlorine-free paper was reduced from less than or
equal to 0.2 kg AOX/ton of pulp to less than or equal to 0.125 kg AOX/ton of pulp. 3 Bryntse
explained the disagreement in these terms: "I disagreed with Greenpeace's decision to focus
solely on TCF [i.e., zero AOX]. I have never found any environmental arguments against ECF
paper. 'Chlorine-free' paper for me means, no negative environmental impacts. No one can
show any environmental difference between ECF and TCF wastewater discharge."4 In addition,
Bryntse opposed TCF because he thought, "it was an oversimplification of the issue. No pulp
will ever be TCF because of contaminants in the wood."5 While the scientific evidence of harm
between ECF and TCF was a matter of debate (see section 8.4 below), the fight between G6ran
Bryntse and Greenpeace was really over control rather than science.
Reflecting a longstanding unwritten agreement among environmentalists, the fight
between the SSNC and Greenpeace Sweden was kept out of the media. "Environmental groups
never fight publicly," stated Per Rosander, Greenpeace Sweden toxics campaigner. "We don't
'Bryntse, Johansson, and Ladberg, 1988.
2 Bryntse's name is prominently feature in the foreward of The Greenpeace Guide to Paper: "Greenpeace gratefully
acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Dr. Goeran Bryntse of Falun, Sweden. Dr. Bryntse is an expert in paper






want to show our disagreements to the public. It is bad for environmental change and confuses
the public."i
In 1992 Bryntse's refusal to adopt zero AOX discharge as the definition of chlorine-free
created a public relations disaster for the SSNC. Sweden's largest manufacturer of bleached
kraft pulp, S6dra Cell publicly attacked the SSNC for being weak on the environment. Svenska
Dagbladet, Sweden's second largest daily morning newspaper, published an opinion editorial
("op ed") article by Roland L6vblad (environmental director of Sddra Cell) titled: "SSNC
Misleads Consumers: S6dra's Environmental Director Criticizes the Society's Definition of
Chlorine-free Paper." 2 L6vblad publicly stated what Greenpeace would only say in private when
he questioned the SSNC's definition of chlorine-free.
While Sedra Cell had resisted demands for dramatic change from Greenpeace Sweden, in
1992 it changed direction (see section 8.3.3 below). L6vblad's attack on the SSNC was, in the
words of Per Rosander, "an amazing sight; seeing a corporation ahead of an environmental group
on an environmental issue."3 For Stdra Cell, which was producing and marketing TCF pulp, the
definition of chlorine-free mattered. It wanted chlorine-free defined to be 0.0 kg AOX/ton of
pulp. "Many leading paper producers even within Europe took the 0.1 norm of the Society for
the Conservation of Nature [SSNC] as a seal of approval to use chlorine chemical bleached pulp
in their paper products. In this way paper based on chlorine chemical bleached pulp could be
called 'chlorine-free' with reference to SNF [i.e., SSNC]." 4 A Sddra Cell publication explained




4 SWdra Cell, 1993, p. 2.
5 Sbdra Cell, 1996, p. 66.
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While this dispute was not the sole cause of the distinction -- paper companies claimed their
chlorine gas-free products as chlorine-free in the early stages of the SSNC-Greenpeace Sweden
dispute -- it did contribute to confusion in Sweden as evidenced by L6vblad's article and it did
support a goal of technology laggards to delay change through confusion.
While no one at the SSNC would state it, S6dra Cell's blast was the likely reason for the
SSNC to change its chlorine-free definition in 1993 to 0.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp.' That decision
caused Bryntse to leave the organization. His departure was, as Eva Eiderstr6m remembered,
painful:
There was quite a bit of debate within the organization about how far we should go.
G6ran is a strong person in himself and had quite a bit of ownership with the criteria.
G6ran left kicking and screaming. Our decision to adopt TCF as a criterion for our
products was delayed because of Gbran. ... In 1993, we decided we want zero chlorine
and chlorine dioxide. In the process of redeveloping the criteria he left.2
When the SSNC adopted zero AOX discharge for its definition of chlorine-free paper in 1993,
Bryntse felt betrayed:
I have found no reasons for more stringent regulation, labeling beyond ECF. This led to
a falling out between me and SNF. In 1993, Greenpeace had influenced SNF to adopt
TCF as the labeling criterion for paper products. I was on the board at the time and
vehemently disagreed with this decision. After the decision I could not justify continued
work with SNF, and resigned from the board. If you play like children I do not want to
be a part of your work.?
The SSNC's competition with Greenpeace and Bryntse's strong ego, combined with
competition from the Nordic Swan, ended the SSNC's efforts to change bleaching technology.
While it is easy to understand how Bryntse would resent Greenpeace -- for years he toils at the
campaign, grows it from the grassroots, and when it becomes attractive, Greenpeace jumps in
and steals the spotlight -- he allowed his ego to block change, and thereby opportunities for





longer at the cutting edge of change and would focus its resources on institutionalizing
incremental change and promoting technologies that were slightly behind best practices.
However, the Nordic Swan, with a much more business friendly approach to ecolabeling, moved
quickly to control the position of institutionalizing incremental change. When the SSNC finally
decided to promote the cutting edge of bleaching technology in 1993, it found this position
dominated by Greenpeace. And the cost to the SSNC of moving to zero AOX discharge was the
loss of its pulp and paper expert.
8.3 Innovations in campaigning: Greenpeace Sweden and Greenpeace Germany
move the market
From 1989-1992 Greenpeace offices in Sweden and Germany catalyzed sweeping
technological change in the bleaching of pulp. The strong green consumer movement in western
Europe and its international presence facilitated Greenpeace's promotion and diffusion of TCF
pulp. To catalyze change through the market Greenpeace relied on product innovation, business
collaboration, and direct action. The four keys for opening the market to TCF were Das Plagiat,
Munksj6 Aspa Bruk, IKEA, and S6dra Cell.
8.3.1 Product Innovation by Greenpeace Germany: Das Plagiat
By the late 1980s Germany and Sweden were the European nations with the most
environmentally conscious consumers. According to a US. News and World Report article on
Europe, the "socially responsible Swedes" were running "a close second to Germany" in terms
of green purchasing.' Their citizens were leading a European "green consumer" movement that
had gained momentum in the late 1980s.2 West Germany had a head start on the rest of Europe
with the establishment of a national ecolabeling program, the Blue Angel, in 1977.3 By 1990 its
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1 Knight and Dimmier, 1989.
2 Timberlake, 1989.
3 Rosen and Sloane, 1995.
consumers were the most environmentally aware among western European nations. A survey at
the time of consumers from a handful of western European nations found 82 percent of West
Germans claimed to incorporate environmental concerns into their shopping decisions, as
compared to 67 percent in the Netherlands and 50 percent in France and the UK.' West
Germany was also one of the first European nations to have members of parliament from the
Green Party.
Greenpeace benefited from the widespread concern for the environment in Germany,
helping to make it a powerful force within the country as well as within Greenpeace
internationally. Its solid membership base, financial resources, and scientific expertise made
Greenpeace a credible environmental NGO in Germany.2 As a briefing note to a forests minister
from Canada noted, "'Greenpeace Germany is a very credible organization and buyers have
indicated that if forest managment [sic] practices become an issue they will simply not buy our
products.'" 3
In 1989 Greenpeace Germany established its pulp and paper campaign. A leading
producer and consumer of paper products, Germany purchases its virgin pulp from other nations.
For example, in 1989 (West) Germany produced 10.6 million tons of paper and paperboard
products, making it the European Community's biggest paper producer.4 But it produced only
10% of Europe's pulp, importing pulp from Scandinavia -- which produced 60 percent of
Europe's pulp and from Canada.5
Among the German pulp mills were a few bleached sulfite mills, but no bleached kraft
pulp mills. Producing a weaker paper than kraft mills, sulfite mills had been losing market share
' Ibid.
2 Hamilton, 1994; Peerla, 1997.
3 Hamilton, 1994.
4 Sutton, Pearson, and O'Brian, 1989.
5 Roberts, 1993.
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to bleached kraft pulp mills for years. The sulfite mills in Europe moved quickly to TCF
bleaching to gain a market advantage: "European suppliers have already found that end products
incorporating this [chlorine-free sulfite] pulp have a selling edge among environmentally
conscious consumers."' For Greenpeace Germany, the lack of any bleached kraft pulp producers
was an incredible opportunity because it meant the absence of any organized opposition to TCF
pulp. As Jack Weinberg of Greenpeace International explained: "Germany and Austria had no
bleached kraft pulp mills; they just had sulfite mills, which are easier to make TCF. TCF
demand created economic benefits in Germany, so there was no strong, well-financed opposition
to TCF. The German mills were not threatened by TCF."2
With German sulfite mills switching to TCF bleaching, Greenpeace Germany moved to
pressure paper mills to demand TCF bleached kraft pulp from their suppliers in other nations.
Christoph Thies, former Greenpeace Germany pulp and paper campaigner tried to persuade
paper mills to change their operation: "When I started as a paper campaigner I traveled around
the country, visited paper factories, and raised the problems of health and ecological dangers
associated with chlorine bleaching." The paper industry made it clear to Thies that they would
change not "unless threatened by customers or required by law." 3 While West Germany began
taxing AOX discharges from pulp mills in 1989,4 the tax had no effect on the unintegrated paper
mills that purchased their pulp from overseas because they had no bleaching operations. Thies
concluded that "The main threat, the main reason to change, had to come through their
customers: publishers, advertising designers, advertising agencies, and mail order catalogues." 5
'Pulp and Paper, 1991, p. 33.
2 Weinberg, 1999.
3 Thies, 1999.
4 Milmo, 1989, p. 12.
5 Thies, 1999.
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A challenge Thies confronted was convincing customers of paper mills to request a
product not on the market: TCF bleached kraft pulp. The lack of TCF bleached kraft pulp
prompted campaigners to search for a mill producing it. Finally campaigners in Germany and
Sweden found one such company: "In 1990, we found a company that could make TCF kraft
pulp with only a little loss in brightness."'
The mill manufacturing TCF pulp just happened to be the very mill Greenpeace Sweden
held an action at in 1987: Munksj6 Aspa Bruk. While assessing methods for reducing AOX
discharges, Munksj6 ran a small batch of TCF pulp. Marketing director, Sam Wiklund saw an
opportunity:
The issue for the Ehrenreich and English, tea bag company was not the question of
different levels of AOX, it just wanted zero; to say, we have no chlorine. They were
using unbleached and chlorine free sulfite pulps, but couldn't get the right qualities. The
company was willing to pay more for less bright TCF pulp, we couldn't believe it!"2
This led Munksj6 Aspa to rethink its marketing strategy. "Instead of going for high
brightness, low AOX grades, it decided to see what market opportunities existed for lower
brightness, zero AOX grades." 3 The mill ran its first TCF pulp trials in 1989, achieving 70% ISO
brightness that retained the necessary strength properties. 4 A year later it began commercial
production of 70% ISO brightness TCF pulp,5 making it the first bleached kraft pulp mill to
commercially manufacture TCF pulp.6 The market environmentalists had catalyzed for less




3 O'Brian, 1996, p. 19.
4 Ibid.
5 Fasten, 1993.
6 O'Brian, 1996, p. 19.
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Munksj6 Aspa Bruk is a small mill by industry standards. Among the bleached kraft pulp
mills in Sweden, it was the smallest in terms of annual production capacity, with roughly three
percent of the nation's bleached kraft pulp mills.' Its bleaching capacity of 140,000 tons per year
was significantly smaller than, for example, S6dra Cell's largest mill (M6nsteris mill) with its
capacity of 395,000 tons per year.2 In 1990, Aspa Bruk produced 9,600 tons of TCF pulp,
expanding to 54,000 tons in 1991 and 79,000 tons in 1992.3 A niche player in a huge market,
Aspa Bruk's production of TCF pulp would have had minimal impact on the market, if no other
bleached kraft pulp mill changed production processes.
Thies tried to convince paper manufacturers and publishers in Germany to demand TCF
paper, but to no avail. The reply from paper manufacturers was, "there is no demand for less
bright, TCF paper."4 Then "We told publishers, 'the demand for TCF paper must come from
you.' 5 But "They blamed advertisers and marketing departments, 'they demand very bright
paper. We cannot change without losing advertisers;"' which represented roughly 70% of the
budget for newsweekly Der Spiegel.6 According to Rune Leithe-Ericksen of Greenpeace
Sweden, Der Spiegel claimed it would have used TCF paper "'if quality TCF paper was
available. But it is not. We cannot print a quality magazine on the available TCF paper. The
colors and ink don't appear the way our consumers want it. We would be unable to sell it." 7
"Everyone in the product chain had an excuse for why they were not responsible for changing."8
In the end, "There was no pressure on them to change."9
SEPA, 1998, pp. 17-18.








Frustrated by their inability to persuade any part of the product chain in Germany to
demand TCF pulp, Thies and Greenpeace Germany decided to produce magazine-grade paper: if
"the industry will not voluntarily push for and develop TCF magazine paper, we must make it
ourselves."' Greenpeace Germany set out to prove that the industry was wrong by producing a
quality magazine-grade paper made with TCF pulp.
We estimated the loss in brightness in final product would be small, less than 2%. But
nobody knew exactly how much loss in brightness would occur. Magazine paper in
Germany traditionally contains only 20% chemical pulp, mainly kraft pulp bleached with
chlorine compounds. The mechanical pulp was never bleached with chlorine. The
magazine paper also included coatings and fillers. Only 20% of the final paper product
would suffer from a moderate loss in brightness. And I knew that kraft pulp is not at the
surface of the paper; it is in the middle of the paper to give it strength. The surface of the
paper is a fine mineral coating and mechanical pulp. ... The theory we operated from
was that kraft pulp only imparted roughly 10% of the brightness to the final paper. If the
brightness of the kraft pulp itself only declined by 10%, then we estimated overall
brightness for magazine paper would decline by 1 to 2%. We knew customers would not
recognize such a marginal drop in brightness. 2
Greenpeace purchased the bleached kraft pulp from Munksj6 Aspa Bruk, hired Haindl (a
German paper manufacturer) to produce the paper, hired designers to professionally lay-out the
36-page magazine, and printed 200,000 copies of a mock version of Der Spiegel (the number one
selling newsweekly magazine in Germany), called Das Plagiat (The Plagiarizer).3 Das Plagiat
was complete with articles detailing environmental damage caused by bleached kraft pulp mills,
logging damage in British Columbia, and a four-page spread on the TCF pulp manufactured at
Munksj6 Aspa Bruk.4 Included in Das Plagiat was a postcard to mail to Der Spiegel's parent




4 Greenpeace Germany, 1991.
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"The campaign is reported to have resulted in mailbags full of reply coupons on the desk of Der
Spiegel's editor."'
The production of Das Plagiat was a gold-plated environmental initiative that only a
resource-rich organization like Greenpeace Germany could afford.
Its total cost was in excess of $175,000 dollars (US). ... The Plagiat created a sensation
among the Greenpeace pulp and paper campaigners. Who could imagine risking
$175,000 on one action? In campaign mythology, the Plagiat became the million-dollar
2
action.
Greenpeace released Das Plagiat in January 1991 at an action at the headquarters of Axel
Springer Verlag. As Thies recalled, "we dumped a reel of two tons of paper at the entrance,
handed out copies of Das Plagiat, and spoke to the local press. We forced management into
interviews and received quite good local news and TV coverage." 3 But Greenpeace shied away
from an aggressive media event for fear of backlash from a media giant like Axel Springer
Verlag:
We could have created a brilliant story on the national TV, but we were a bit afraid of
taking on the media. Most Greenpeace actions rely on media coverage. We were
insecure in attacking the media because we depend on the media. In March 1991, a few
months later, we received the strongest attack on Greenpeace in Der Spiegel, accusing
Greenpeace of being nothing but a money making machine: this was a revenge for our
earlier action against Der Spiegel.4
The impact of Das Plagiat was not on the citizens of Germany, but on the pulp and paper
industry. It soundly refuted the position that a quality product could not be produced with TCF
pulp. An editorial by the publishers of Pulp and Paper International attested to the quality and
effect of Das Plagiat:
[The] publication by Greenpeace of Das Plagiat, a plagiarized version of the major
German magazine Der Spiegel, printed on a specially-commissioned chlorine-free
lightweight-coated [LWC] paper, has had a profound effect on Germany's publishers. ...
Sdra Cell, 1996.




For those of you have not seen the end result, we can tell you that the paper was not as
bright as regular LWC, but perfectly acceptable to magazine readers. In fact, we would
doubt that many buyers of the magazine even noticed the lower brightness. Its
publication made it clear that lower brightness could be acceptable to readers, while the
loss of strength resulting from the elimination of chlorine need not necessarily cause too
many technical problems during printing.'
Stung by Das Plagiat, publishing houses and paper producers in Germany agreed to
purchase TCF pulp. At first the market moved immediately away from pulp bleached with
chlorine gas. For example, Haindl, the paper manufacturer used by Greenpeace, stopped
purchasing pulp bleached with chlorine gas. 2 The movement was so rapid away from chlorine
gas bleaching that prices for market pulp in Germany, "which had been bleached by processes
using elemental chlorine, were being penalized for that reason. According to one source, there
were sales where the price was reduced by around $20/ton solely because of this." 3
Axel Springer Verlag began purchasing TCF pulp in the autumn of 1992. When Axel
Springer Verlag decided it wanted TCF paper, the mills in Sweden, Finland, and Canada
complied. For example, the SCA Graphic, Sundsvall mill, switched to TCF pulp production
processes to keep its business with Axel Springer Verlag. 4 The "great majority of other German
periodicals followed suit.5 Following the German lead, demand for TCF rose quickly in northern
Europe. "Austria, Switzerland and the Netherlands, as well as the Nordic countries are all now
leading consumers of TCF pulp, helping TCF's share of Europe's graphic papers market to more
than double from seven per cent to 15 per cent in the past year." 6
Christopher Brown-Humes writing in the Financial Times of London remarked that Das
Plagiat "must rank as one of German Greenpeace's most successful campaigns:"




5 S6dra Cell, 1996, p. 6.6 Brown-Humes, 1993.
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By common consent, the environmental organisation did much to create the consumer
pressure which has forced many German publishers, paper manufacturers and merchants
to go 'totally chlorine-free' in the last two years. This in turn has forced a number of pulp
mills which supply the German market to find substitute bleaching agents for the chlorine
compounds they use. 'German Greenpeace took the initiative against chlorine and it has
succeeded,' says Pertti Laine, director of the Finnish Forest Industries Federation's
industrial and environmental unit. 'We have had to invest billions of markka to change
our bleaching methods.' The latest in a long line of'such investments will come on stream
next month when Metsa-Botnia's Kaskinen mill in western Finland inaugurates a new
ozone bleaching plant as part of its commitment to TCF production.'
The cost to Axel Springer Verlag was a higher price for paper because TCF pulp sold at a
price premium. For Munksj6 Aspa Bruk, SLdra Cell, and a few other non-Swedish mills,2 the
price premium was an incredible benefit, coming in the midst of a downturn in pulp and paper
production. Prices for market pulp plummeted from $830/ton in October 1990 to $500/ton by
November 1991. In 1991 the TCF mills received a price premium of $65/metric ton for their
pulp and ECF pulp had a price premium of $20/metric ton.3 The price premium per ton of pulp
lasted until 1995.'
8.3.2 IKEA - A Whole New Campaign: Greenpeace Discovers Collaboration
In 1991 the international furniture products store, IKEA, agreed to use TCF pulp in its
product catalogues. The reason was Greenpeace Sweden. Hans Hildorsson, Catalog Group
Head at InterIKEA, was quite clear about the cause of IKEA's decision: "The initiative for TCF
came from Greenpeace. We would not have gone TCF without Greenpeace."5 Greenpeace
succeeded by targeting a company sensitive to its environmental image and developing the trust
and confidence of the company's staff.
'Ibid.
2 The other mills were Empresa Nacional de Celulosas (Portugal), Metsti-Botnia (Finland), and Howe Sound Pulp
and Paper (Canada).




An international corporation that uses large quantities of paper for its catalogues, IKEA
was a good target for Greenpeace. In 1992, for example, IKEA produced 100 million catalogues
that consumed 45,000 tons of paper.' This was part of an image problem IKEA had in northern
Europe: it was perceived as a large, wasteful corporation. "IKEA is a high profile company,"
explained Margaret Rainey, pulp and paper campaigner for Greenpeace Sweden.2
"Environmentalists often target IKEA because of its reputation as a cheap store that uses
resources inefficiently and requires a car to reach. IKEA is also big, profitable corporation,
making it a target for showing environmental results." 3
Hans Hildorsson of IKEA corroborated the image problem:
In the late 1980s, IKEA became a prominent public company and the economic press
started to write about us. We had two environmental issues that received a lot of negative
press: formaldehyde and PVC plastic. A company in the public eye, we were selected by
the green movement as a target. It didn't matter if we were generally doing a lot of good
work. We have a hot name and are selected as a target because we are vulnerable.4
Consumer campaigns and negative press hit IKEA in the pocketbook. For example,
when formaldehyde was found in IKEA particleboard bookshelves (on the lacquer) in the early
1990s, after IKEA had stated it would use no more formaldehyde, sales of the bookshelves
declined temporarily by roughly 25 % in northern Europe.5
Greenpeace Sweden and IKEA started their collaborative project in 1991. "In the early
1990s," according Hans Hildorsson, "it was very clear that Greenpeace knew much more about
paper and pollution than we did. Also, Margaret was a results-oriented, rather than a







facts to a great extent in making our decisions."' That Greenpeace produced Das Plagiat also
gave it legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of IKEA staff. "We had Das Plagiat and this
helped: having Das Plagiat in my hand, showing the technical feasibility of that TCF magazine
paper was very powerful. 2
In the mid-1980s managers in IKEA's catalogue division decided they wanted more
control over the production side of their catalogues to lower costs. Their first step was to
purchase their own paper: "The benefits are you buy directly from the source, get better prices
because you assume a lot of risks, and open up a lot of knowledge." 3 When IKEA went to its
suppliers, the paper manufacturers, requesting TCF paper they were treated like foolish children:
"We were subjected to intense criticism from some parts of the pulp and paper industry and from
some companies selling chlorine bleaching chemicals. We were told that we did not know what
we were doing. Some even refused to meet our demand for TCF paper." 4 Margaret Rainey
recalled the interactions between IKEA and its customers a bit more bluntly:
The paper manufacturers would tell customers that they didn't know what they were
talking about. Customers would say, 'we want chlorine-free paper.' The suppliers would
treat them without respect and say, 'chlorine-free paper is not technically feasible.' Then
when it became possible, they would say, 'chlorine-free paper is of inferior quality.' The
catalogue staff at IKEA said, 'we want chlorine-free paper. If you won't sell it, we will
buy from another company.' IKEA dropped one of its suppliers because it refused to
supply chlorine free paper. The supplier had made a pact with other mills and clients not
to produce TCF paper.5
That suppliers treated IKEA's request for TCF with such disdain played to Greenpeace's
advantage, it enhanced the credibility of the Greenpeace campaigners because they treated IKEA
staff with respect. That any paper manufacturer was willing to lose a contract with an







manufacturers and their view of customers. IKEA's efforts to purchase TCF paper revealed the
myth of producers' mantra that "the consumer always knows best."
IKEA staff were so frustrated by the paper industry's arrogance, that they lashed backed.
For example, at a paper conference in May 1993, Hans Hildorsson scolded the industry:
This is what I see when I look at the paper industry: a conservative industry dominated by
technicians who can see no other product benefit than the ones that could be meassured
[sic] by your instruments. I have a sneaking suspicion that all of you represent nothing
but different profit centers in the same company. A company that you have chosen to
give the generic name THE INDUSTRY."'
Furthermore Hildorsson stressed that the industry was willing to meet the properties
desired by art directors, advertisers, and printers of "runability," "printability," and "whiteness,"
but not the desire of IKEA and the general public for environmental properties. 2 IKEA chose
TCF because "From a consumer and a communication point of view it was very hard to
communicate that you are almost chlorine free. It is a degree and numbers game that we wanted
to avoid. We wanted to be clearly without chlorine." 3
The notion of working closely with industry to achieve its goal was a questioned tactic
within Greenpeace Sweden. While Greenpeace Sweden may agree with a company on one issue,
it is likely to disagree on others. Greenpeace thrives on eco-crises and media generating actions.
Collaboration operates behind closed doors and out of the limelight. For example, when IKEA
refused to hold a press conference announcing its decision to buy TCF pulp, it posed problems
for Greenpeace's efforts to promote TCF:
Unfortunately for us, IKEA never wanted publicity when they made the transition to
TCF. They never made it public. IKEA merely added, 'paper published on TCF paper'
in small letters at the back of the catalogue. We wanted them to publicize their decision,
but they refused. We ended up doing the publicity for them. IKEA has a policy of never






The IKEA campaign conflicted with Greenpeace's need for publicity and its in-your-face
approach to industry. Margaret Rainey felt ostracized by members of Greenpeace Sweden
because she collaborated with IKEA. "I met with resistance within Greenpeace in Sweden, but I
had support within Greenpeace International. The International executive director said, 'sure, try
and make it happen.' I was not willing to start a project without International behind me." ...
Greenpeace staff always wanted to confront industry and was unwilling to think about how we
could work industry. I wanted to meet with industry, retailers, and talk with them. Others just
wanted to do an action."
8.3.3 Sbdra Cell: The Rise of a Pro-Environment Corporate Change Agent
To move TCF pulp from the fringe to the mainstream of the industry Greenpeace needed
more defectors, more producers of TCF pulp, than little Munksj6 Aspa Bruk. IKEA, and paper
manufacturers and publishers in Germany could request TCF pulp, but until producers
manufactured it, there would be no TCF paper products. A major breakthrough for the campaign
occurred when SSdra Cell, Sweden's largest producer of bleached kraft market.pulp decided to
invest in TCF pulp. Stdra Cell's three bleached kraft pulp mills (M6nsterhs Bruk, M6rrums
Bruk, and Vdr Bruk) manufactured 995,000 tons of pulp in 1996, accounting for 20% of
Swedish bleached kraft pulp production.'
In 1991, Greenpeace Sweden again SSdra Cell, this time it was the M6nsteris mill in
southeastern Sweden. Again the unintended invitation was S6dra Cell's request for a new permit
to expand production. Concerned that S5dra Cell planned to expand without investing in TCF




In 1989, S~dra proposed to increase production at its M6nsteris mill from 335,000 to
800,000 tons per year.' As part of the permitting process, the Swedish EPA requested a
complete environmental study of the mill's receiving water: the Kalmar Straight in the Baltic
Sea. When the results were released to the public Greenpeace Sweden released them in Swedish
and translated them into English. Greenpeace concluded, "This study proves once again that
there is no such thing as dilution for persistent toxic substances, and that the only way to be rid
of them is end to their production." 2
Greenpeace grabbed the public process associated with permit renewal to literally
spotlight pollution from the M6nsteras mill. To visualize the impossible to see pollution from
the M6nsteres mill, the discharge pipe is under the sea, Greenpeace divers piped the discharge to
the surface, creating a huge pollution fountain (see Photograph 8.1).
While Greenpeace pressured S6dra Cell for TCF pulp at its M6nsterAs mill, Sidra Cell
researchers quietly experimented with TCF bleaching. The company first experimented with
TCF bleaching at its Var6 mill in the spring of 1990. But it was not until "A year later, in April
1991, we succeeded, after further trials and tribulations, in producing hardwood pulp entirely
without the use of chlorine-based chemicals at our Mnsteris mill. The brightness of this pulp
was 80 per cent."3 When the full-scale trial production was in progress, "our technicians were
conducting secret tests in our research laboratory" on the use of ozone as a bleaching agent.4 By
the end of 1991 SO-dra Cell was, unknown to Greenpeace, producing TCF pulp.
Pulp and Paper Europe, 1996.
2 Rainey and Kroesa, 1991, p. 5.
3 Sodra Cell, 1996, p. 44.
4 Ibid., p. 45.
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Photograph 8.1 Greenpeace Makes Fountain of Monsterbs Mill's Water Effluent (1991)
Greenpeace protesterar mot ubyggnaden av Monsteris bruk, som tillverkar pappersmassa. Utslappen dirifrin gir rakt ut iett omride med ett rikt figeliv. Dr hAckar higer, skarv och havs5rn, som alla lever pA fisk. Omrddet norr om avloppet, vidblands norra udde, Ar dessutomav dksintresse for yrkesfisket. FOTO: MATS SAMUELSSON/GREENPEACE
"Monsteres Future Dreams"
SOdra Cell began its research into TCF bleaching, as Roland L6vblad (environmental
manager) recalled, due to "a combination of reasons: NGOs, regulations, and markets." An
experience of its president, Helge Eklund, was especially critical to approving investments in
TCF pulp. Initially reluctant, Eklund became a TCF convert in 1991 when, "In discussions with
customers over TCF pulp," he "sold [TCF] pulp before it was even produced."'
Suddenly the head of research and development, Steve Moldenius, had the president's
support and Sddra Cell embarked upon developing a process to commercialize ozone bleaching,
1 Lvblad, 1998.
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something no mill had done to that date.' The result, in September 1992 S6dra Cell became the
first company in the world to manufacture commercially ozone bleached pulp (beating out Union
Camp in the US mill by one week). 2
What Eklund and others at S6dra Cell saw in TCF pulp was a means to differentiate their
product. S6dra Cell only manufactures pulp. It is not an integrated company, meaning it does
not manufacture both pulp and paper. Economically pulp is a commodity product. Hence it is
hard to create a brand name and market differentiation around the product. By moving to TCF
S6dra Cell created an opportunity to distinguish its product in the market. As L6vblad would
later say, "We have a niche product, where there are few competitors." 3
Like the Munksj6 Aspa Bruk mill, S6dra Cell received a price premium for its TCF
product. Hans Burmeister, marketing director of S6dra Cell, said in October 1993 his company
received a price premium of $58-$87/ton for TCF pulp.4 "'Thanks to TCF we have higher
utilization rates,"' said Hans Ola Wallnaes, purchasing manager at Sidra Cell: "Last year the
group averaged 93%, while the industry average was below 87%."5 Stdra Cell staff argued the
price premium was justified because TCF kraft pulp "is more expensive to produce than ECF
kraft." 6
S6dra Cell never acknowledged that it changed because of Greenpeace. Although it did
acknowledge that Das Plagiat catalyzed the market for TCF paper: "there is no denying that few
environmental campaigns have achieved an impact to compare with that of Das Plagiat. When
the definitive history of TCF comes to be written, this single-issue magazine will without any
1 Ibid.






doubt be seen as a milestone."' But the decision to manufacture TCF was its decision: "In 1991
we decided to choose a new strategy: Instead of opposing the signals from society and the
market, we started to listen to them. Our first mission was to develop the technology necessary
to stop the discharges of the controversial organochlorines, i.e. the development of Totally
Chlorine Free bleaching." 2 When S~dra Cell decided to go TCF, Steve Moldenius met with
Greenpeace, "but," as Margaret Rainey recalled, "it was not the same as with IKEA where we
had a project together. When they decided to turn to TCF they were good about it. They
presented their TCF strategy to us and welcomed own opinions." 3
Simultaneous with its technological development, S6dra Cell developed an aggressive
marketing campaign for its TCF pulp, which it called "Z pulp": "Z as in Zero, or 0% chlorine
chemicals." 4 The marketing campaign included advertisements, staff advocating for TCF paper
products, and supporting publications. "What was incredible," Per Rosander recalled, "about
S6dra was once it started down the TCF path it acted like an NGO. It launched a campaign for
TCF paper and developed aggressive materials in favor of TCF. Sdra saw a business
opportunity and thought international markets were changing: they saw the environment as the
wave of future commerce." 5 The advertising campaign first featured a print ad titled, "Are your
hands full of chlorine?", which was "published in leading newspapers throughout Europe in the
late spring of 1992."6 A continuous stream of advertising in specialist journals, trade magazines
and daily newspapers followed the first ad. Then came a direct mail advertisement to 7,000
people -- including paper manufacturers and merchants, printers, major users and environmental
'SWdra Cell, 1996, p. 7.
2 Lvblad, 1996.
3 Rainey, 1999.
4 Scdra Cell, 1996, p. 1.
5 Rosander, 1998.
6 Sodra Cell, 1996, pp. 82-83.
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officers -- that included an alarm clock and a message "Wake up!"' S~dra Cell wanted to create
the "Z brand name" for its pulp. "We had a unique product and we wanted to tell the market
about it, and not just our traditional customers, the paper manufacturers. We also wanted to
reach their customers -- the merchants, printers, publishers, large buyers of paper and so on." 2
Sudra Cell's marketing of TCF left few stones unturned. Among the more notable
moments included Roland L6vblad's op ed in the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet critiquing the
SSNC's definition of chlorine-free and Helge Eklund lecturing the US paper industry to see the
light on the environment at the 1995 Non-Chlorine Bleaching Conference held in the U.S.
Many of you in the audience will hope that ECF bleaching is enough. It's not. My
conviction is that ECF is not enough as long as competitors are prepared to further and as
long as chloro-organics leave the mills with the effluent. Then you will argue that there
will be ways of closing the loop also using chlorine chemicals for bleaching. Not so. Let
me ask you one question. How will you avoid creating dioxin when burning the chloro-
organics in the recovery boiler or the incinerator. You won't.3
S6dra Cell also launched its own environmental magazine, Responze, that included an article title
"Killing 4 Myths about TCF."4 A few years later it printed a booklet, The Book A bout Z, on the
history of its TCF development.5
Along with trying to create a brand name, S~dra Cell wanted to increase general (i.e.,
beyond itself) demand for and production of TCF pulp. Having multiple producers of TCF had a
few advantages for the company. First, large consumers of pulp and paper want multiple
suppliers in different countries to insure a steady supply of product. They want to avoid being
stuck without paper because its sole supplier is on strike or a natural disaster disrupts production
and delivery.6 Second, Sadra Cell also wanted to level the playing field to its advantage by
Ibid., pp. 82-83.
2 Ibid., p. 81.
' Eklund, 1995, p. 87.
4 SWdra Cell, 1995.
' Sodra Cell, 1996.
'Refkin, 1997.
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having all mills invest in ozone. If all Swedish mills adopted ozone bleaching, S~dra Cell would
have had a first mover advantage in terms of experience working with the technology.
Attracted by the price premium for TCF, a few mills followed S6dra Cell to TCF.
Swedish mills that joined S6dra Cell in producing TCF pulp were SCA Graphic (Sundsvall mill),
MoDo Paper AB (Husum mill), Stora (Skutskar and Norrsundet mills), and Vallviks. By 1996,
34% of bleached kraft pulp production in Sweden was TCF.1 The TCF innovations of S6dra
Cell and Munksj6 Aspa Bruk also catalyzed interest in effluent-free pulp mills.
Beginning in 1992, industry consultants and researchers, and a few pulp mills began
aggressively seeking reductions in all their wastewater discharges, not just AOX.
The environmental improvements have brought closer the day of the effluent-free mill --
one in which internal water systems are enclosed and liquid discharge is virtually non-
existent. Eliminating chlorine is an important part of this process because it is so
corrosive. A pulp mill being built at Rauma in western Finland will be virtually closed
while MoDo and Sodra Cell are among the Swedish companies working to close water
systems at some of their mills. 2
S6dra Cell's aggressive campaign tactics won it many enemies in the industry. Pulp and
Paper Europe captured this displeasure in a muted form when it wrote: "The company attracts
considerable attention through its innovative promotional campaign aimed at paper users as well
as producers." 3 Sdra Cell's response to critics within the industry was blunt and included a
tripartite division: reactionaries, the shortsighted, and the skeptics. The reactionaries "have old
production facilities which have not been modernised in step with technological developments."
The shortsighted have "rather modern production facilities but who in the present recession
simply do not consider that they can afford to make the investments which TCF demands." The
skeptics "live in the hope that TCF will not be successful. They simply let others work with
technical development and wait to see if all the problems that crop up along the way are
'SEPA, 1998, pp. 17-18.
2 Brown-Humes, 1995, p. IV.
3 Pulp and Paper Europe, 1996.
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solved."' Sdra Cell's decision to manufacture TCF pulp broke the industry's informal pact to
produce only ECF pulp. It was significant because S6dra Cell is a major producer of pulp in
Sweden. Without SSdra Cell the TCF market would have died.
8.3.4 Ending the Pulp and Paper Campaign Prematurely (1992)
Greenpeace International ended the pulp and paper campaign in December 1992 because
staff in powerful Greenpeace Germany had won, or at least thought they had won, the battle over
TCF paper. With International folding the pulp and paper campaign into a broader chlorine
campaign, Margaret Rainey decided it was time to leave Greenpeace Sweden. Her position was
never filled, ending Greenpeace's work on pulp pollution in Sweden.2
When Greenpeace International made the decision to end the pulp and paper campaign,
on the surface it seemed like the right decision. By the end of 1992 there were many indicators
pointing to TCF becoming the industry standard in Europe. With demand outpacing supply in
northern Europe, TCF pulp received a price premium and mills were converting to TCF. In 1993
a vice president of the chemical manufacturer Kemira predicted that "'within three to four years
all the pulp in Scandinavia will be TCF.'" 3 By 1994 over 50 chemical (kraft and sulfite) pulp
mills worldwide were producing TCF pulp, with 55% (28 mills) of them in Scandinavia and
nearly 75% (37 mills) of them in the Germanic speaking countries (Austria, Germany, and
Switzerland) and Scandinavia. There was only one TCF mill in the U.S., the world's leading
producer of paper, and seven in Canada (see Table 8.1).
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'Eklund, 1994, pp. 1-2.
2 Rainey, 1999.
3 Roberts, 1993.
Table 8.1. Mills manufacturing TCF pulp by nation (1994)
Number of TCF Mills
Country I CONTINENT Kraft (sulfate) Sulfite CTMP










EUROPE 22 18 2
USA I
Canada 4 2 1
NORTH AMERICA 5 2 1
Brazil / SOUTH AMERICA 1
TOTAL 28 20 3
Source: Albert, 1994
Yet if Greenpeace had looked below the surface it would have seen many other indicators
that suggested the international battle for TCF was not won, even within Europe. Of the 42 mills
producing TCF pulp in Europe, almost 90% of them were in Scandinavia and the Germanic-
speaking countries. This meant that France and southern Europe were well behind the Northern
European countries in the transition to TCF pulp. Furthermore the US, the world's leading paper
producer, lagged far behind the Northern Europeans and Canada.
Greenpeace International ended the pulp and paper campaign because it was no longer a
campaign issue in Germany and because Greenpeace was caught in a financial crisis. After Das
Plagiat, demand for TCF pulp in German paper manufacturers, publishing houses, and paper
distributors skyrocketed. For example, TCF paper represented 35-40% of photocopying paper in
Germany in 1992.2 Christoph Thies proclaimed the campaign a success by 1993. Thies, reporter
Brown-Humes wrote, "is confident the trend towards TCF is irreversible." Thies gave two
' Three of the Swedish mills Albert lists as having TCF capacity -- Assi Doman (Karlsborg), Korsnas, and Stora Cell
(Skoghall) -- did not produce TCF pulp in 1996 (SEPA, 1998, pp. 17-18).
2 SWdra Cell, 1992, p. 3.
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reasons for his view. "First, increased recycling will create pressure for cleaner input of raw
material. Second, he says that chlorine has to be eliminated if pulp mills are to achieve their
wider ambition of totally enclosing their water systems so that they discharge no liquid effluent
at all. 'TCF is only a step on the way to an effluent-free mill,' he states."' Thus Greenpeace
Germany was moving onto other campaign issues, including fiber supply and logging of old
growth forests. As Christoph Thies and Martin Kaiser of Greenpeace wrote, in 1993
"Greenpeace saluted the victory and turned its attention to the world's last remaining ancient and
old growth forests, which are mostly threatened by logging." 2
It was also during this time that national Greenpeace offices were rapidly losing
members, which in turn meant less money for both national offices and the international office.
Membership in Greenpeace Sweden, for example, which had peaked at 162,000 members in
1988,3 had declined by one-third to 110,000 members in 1994.4 And internationally,
membership and revenues were declining as well. For the 1990-1994 period, income for
Greenpeace International peaked at $179 million in 1991. It then declined rapidly dropping 27%
to $131 million by 1994 (see Table 8.2).
National offices interested in campaigning on chlorine-free paper were allowed to as part
of the broader chlorine campaign (part of the toxics campaign), but far fewer resources were
available to national campaigners. The implications of folding the international pulp and paper
campaign were significant for Greenpeace USA (see next chapter) and for campaigns in southern
Europe. As Per Rosander, who was working for Greenpeace International at the time, recalled,
"To get change in southern Europe meant changing France, but the campaign never got off the
Brown-Humes, 1993.
2 Thies and Kaiser, 2000, p. 3.
3 Brown and May, 1991, p. 131.
4 Lundqvist, 1997, p. 55.
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ground. Our campaigner for southern Europe never made much happen and the public was less
receptive to environmental issues in general and environmental purchasing in particular."' In
Germany, the work started on forestry issues and recycled paper became part of a new forests
campaign, which was established in 1993.2
Table 8.2. Greenpeace Across the Globe: Members and Income
Year Members Income
(millions) (million US dollars)









The organizational division of materials -- trees and recycled paper -- in the forests
campaign and chemicals in the toxics campaign reflects a failure of Greenpeace to integrally link
forests and paper products into one campaign. Yes in their vision statements of the industry
Greenpeace did link fiber sources and production. For example, in an op ed article in Pulp and
Paper International Kroesa, et al.,3 argued that the pulp and paper industry had to address four
key environmental issues: paper consumption, forestry practices, pollution from pulp production,
and recycled content. Yet organizationally Greenpeace divided the work into two campaigns
rather than establishing one campaign on forests and paper. Had Greenpeace created a forests
and paper campaign it could have simultaneously supported both work on pulp mills and forests.
Since Greenpeace was contracting in the early 1990s, the trade-off would have been the end of
some other campaign that others within Greenpeace thought was critical.
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Rosander, 1998.
2 Peerla, 1997, pp. 242-244.
3 Kroesa, Floegel, and Thies, 1991.
In retrospect, Christoph Thies lamented the decision to end the TCF campaign:
It was a strategic mistake was to stop a winning campaign. While PVC, chlorinated
solvents, and forestry practices were important issues to pursue in northern Europe after
we created demand for TCF paper, we should have continued funding for international
work on TCF paper: we could have sped up this process.
Ironically, the withdrawal of Greenpeace from the TCF meant that the leading organization
campaigning for TCF pulp in Europe became the pulp manufacturer, S6dra Cell. In Sweden, the
SSNC tried to revive interest in TCF paper in 1996 to little avail.
8.4 Opposing forces: ECF v. TCF
Just as Greenpeace folded up its pulp and paper campaign, claiming victory and moving
on, much of the pulp and paper industry and its chemical suppliers began to re-group around
chlorine dioxide and ECF bleaching. For example, the manufacturers of sodium chlorate and
pulp and paper formed the North American-based Alliance for Environmental Technology
(AET) in 1993 to promote chlorine dioxide bleaching.2 In Europe, the chemical manufacturer
Eka Nobel, producer of both sodium chlorate and hydrogen peroxide,3 became a major supporter
of chlorine dioxide production.4
Eka Nobel's interest in promoting ECF stemmed from its position as Europe's leading
manufacturer of sodium chlorate with 37 percent (224,000 metric tons) of production capacity in
1994.5 Eka was also the leading sodium chlorate manufacturer in North America, with 30
percent (477,000 metric tons) of production capacity in 1994.6 It had smaller investment in
'iThies, 1999.
2 Pryke, 2001.
3 Eka Nobel merged with Akzo in 1994 to become Akzo Nobel.
4 Roberts, 1993.
5 The next largest producer was Finnish ChemicalsOy with 33 percent of sodium chlorate capacity (SRI
International, 1995, p. 732.1001Z).
6 Ibid., p. 732.1000T.
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hydrogen peroxide production, with 13 percent (98,000 metric tons) of European production
capacity.'
Eka's The White Book on White Paper (1993) presented six principal arguments in favor
of ECF bleaching. First, "Neither ECF nor TCF produce the kind of chlor-organics which are
harmful to the environment." 2 As mills ended their use of chlorine gas, use of chlorine gas
ended in Swedish mills in 1993, the generation of persistent and bioaccumulative toxics like
dioxins and furans dropped dramatically, often to non-detect levels. Eka concluded that "Toxic,
highly chlorinated compounds are not present in the effluent stream if the AOX value is lower
that 1 kg ptp [per ton of pulp]." 3
Environmentalists contend that chlorine dioxide use still results in the formation of
detectable levels of dioxins and furans. Studies "suggest that formation of bioaccumulative
dioxins and furans, while indeed greatly reduced in mills using ECF processes, continues to
occur."4 This is especially true of furans. For example, Stinchfield and Woods found detectable
(as well as non-detectable) levels of furans in effluent from an ECF mill.5 Dioxins and furans
can form in ECF mills because "Gaseous chlorine is inevitably evolved either in the production
of chlorine dioxide or in the pulp mixture to which it is applied."6 While environmentalists make
much of these findings, regulatory agencies in Sweden and the U.S. have brushed them off. Erik
Nystr6m of the Swedish EPA quickly explained away this problem: if furans are found "it might
be because some chlorine dioxide generators still produce chlorine, and these could react with
the organics to produce furans. This is why washing the pulp well is important."7
' SRI International, 1996.
2 Eka Nobel, 1993, p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 52.
4 Ritchlin and Johnston, 1998, p. 11.
5 Stinchfield and Woods, 1995, p. 120.
6 Johnston et al., 1996, p. 21.
7 Nystram, 1998.
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Chlorate is another environmental problem associated only with ECF bleaching.
Chlorate, "a potent herbicide to which marine brown algae are particularly sensitive,"' forms
when bleaching with chlorine dioxide. This "problem appears to have largely been solved
through modified effluent treatment," Greenpeace scientists acknowledged, although "the
situation outside of Scandinavia is unclear." 2
The most compelling scientific argument environmentalists had in favor of TCF over
ECF related to problems common to both bleaching processes as well as unbleached kraft pulp
mills: sub-lethal toxic effects on fish. Sub-lethal toxic effects alter the normal physiology of fish
but do not result in immediate death. Sub-lethal toxic effects from both unbleached and bleached
kraft mill effluents include endocrine disruption, activation of enzymes associated with exposure
to toxic compounds, gill and liver abnormalities, impaired reproduction and genotoxicity. The
causes are largely attributed to chemicals present in the wood itself.3
The toxicity of any mill effluent has led environmentalists and a small segment of
industry researchers and producers to favor technologies that move mills to closing the water
loop in bleach plants. Greenpeace, and others within industry agree, that mill closure is easier to
achieve with TCF technology because it generates far fewer chlorides. "Conventional bleaching
with 100% C10 2 [chlorine dioxide] substitution (ECF) will result in unacceptably high chloride
levels" for mills trying to close the water loop, concluded researchers with the pulp and paper
consulting firm EKONO, Inc. 4 Chlorides, which damage the recovery boiler, must be removed
prior to entering the recovery boiler.
Johnston et al., 1996, p. 18.
2 Ibid., p. 18.
' Ibid., p. 24.
4 Mannisto, 1995, p. 70.
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A much less compelling science-based argument, though frequently invoked by
environmentalists, was TCF "is a true application of the precautionary principle: to avoid harm
from the beginning. It is near impossible to investigate what happens with the discharge under
real conditions and in different environments."' Precaution is invoked here because ECF
bleaching results in discharges of AOX, 2 the effects of which we do not know. And since TCF
bleaching results in zero AOX discharge, precautionary action directs us away from ECF to TCF.
The problem with this approach was, as acknowledged by Greenpeace scientists, "There appears
to be no correlation between AOX discharge levels and environmental impact." 3
Second, and the next strongest argument against TCF was its cost: "TCF costs up to US
$100 more per tonne than ECF."4 Furthermore, as Lennart Ahlgren of Korsnds AB argued, "'It's
questionable whether we should continue to focus on reducing AOX levels"' below 0.5 kg/ton
pulp because it "'would mean heavy capital investments and high operating costs -- and the
additional environmental benefits are uncertain.' 5 In the Paper Task Force cost estimates, the
greatest difference between ECF and TCF was $12, not $100 (see Chapter 5).
Third, Eka supported the goal of minimal effluent but saw no advantage with TCF: "The
best solution is closing the wash-water loop in the bleach plant. A development which is making
good progress, with both the ECF and TCF bleaching methods."6 While Eka and Greenpeace
' Thies, 1999.
2 ECF mills still produce AOX discharges, though at significantly lower levels than mills using chlorine gas. The
level of AOX discharge depends on the kappa number of the pulp prior to bleaching. The kappa number refers to
the level of lignin in the pulp. Mills using oxygen delignification and extended cooking, which reduce the kappa
number of the pulp, can reach AOX levels of 0.1 kg/ton of pulp, whereas mills not using these technologies can
produce 1.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp (Johnston et al., 1996, pp. 16-17). As Johnston, et al., in their report for
Greenpeace conclude, "The term ECF can embrace a wide range of process technologies. ... Hence, the term ECF is
often applied both to pulp with a high kappa number likely to generate large quantities of AOX and that produced
with a low kappa number, implying that much less AOX would be formed" (Johnston et al., 1996, p. 16).
' Johnston et al., 1996, p. 22.
4 Eka Nobel, 1993.
5 Granvik, 1991, p. 18.
6 Eka Nobel, 1993.
281
agreed upon the goal of closing the water loop in mills, the evidence as presented above indicates
that closing the loop will be easier with TCF technology.
The remaining three arguments Eka presented were much less compelling and seem
directed at its supporters in industry rather than being effective in swaying any agnostics on the
ECF v. TCF question. Fourth, "TCF bleaching, for full brightness, is based on a new
technology", ozone, for which "there is limited experience."' This argument implies that ozone
bleaching cannot produce full brightness (89% ISO or greater) pulps. It is true that when S6dra
Cell first introduced TCF pulp in 1991, it was only at 75% ISO brightness for softwood and 80%
ISO for hardwood; levels well-below full brightness (equal to or greater than 89% ISO
brightness). However, S~dra Cell achieved 89% ISO brightness for hardwood in 1992 and for
softwood in 1994.2 For manufacturers of bleached kraft pulp the most compelling argument not
to invest in TCF was the added cost of using ozone bleaching.
Fifth, the "Judgement [sic] of modem bleaching must be done on a scientific basis, rather
than an emotional basis." 3 Eka Nobel echoed a common theme of manufacturers that
environmentalists do not play by the same rules as industry. For example, the chief of research
at SCA, in an op ed in the business newspaper, Dagens Industri, attacked Greenpeace in 1991:
"Greenpeace will never say anything truthful or objective. ... Chlorine-free is merely a media
idea with no factual basis in the forest industry."4 De Ruvo's comment is particularly ironic,
since a few years later SCA was the second largest (after S6dra Cell) producer of TCF pulp
(320,000 metric tons in 1996) in Sweden.5
'Ibid.
2 Sodra Cell, 1995, p. 6.
3 Eka Nobel, 1993, p. 7.
4 de Ruvo, 1991, p. 6.
5 SEPA, 1998, pp. 17-18.
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Finally, no pulp is totally chlorine-free because chlorinated organics "occur naturally in
wood and are produced by living organisms in the oceans, soil and ordinary water. Chlorine and
chlorine compounds, like salt in the oceans, are as essential in the biosphere as oxygen is in the
air."' Here Eka attempts to undermine the term TCF by stating it is scientifically invalid: all
pulp contains organochlorines therefore TCF cannot exist. It is effective for ECF advocates to
the extent it moves the discussion away from human-made organochlorines to natural
organochlorines and to a discussion of when is TCF "TCF." In both cases it helps to obscure the
goal of Greenpeace: eliminating discharges of human-made organochlorines.
The entire set of arguments for ECF proved to be effective in the US. They raised
questions for institutional consumers like Time Inc. And the scientific arguments proved
effective with US EPA. ECF moved environmentalists into a murky scientific position with no
clear toxic villains such as dioxins. Without government requirements for TCF and with the
absence of Greenpeace market pressure, the result was ECF dominance of the market. By 2000,
ECF bleached pulp production worldwide was 53.1 million metric tons as compared to a mere
5.2 million metric tons for TCF.2 The strength of the industry backlash on chlorine dioxide
revealed a weakness in the market campaign:
The market is especially important when there is inaction at the legal and political levels:
then we can try to bring about change through a voluntary approach. Eventually results
must be secured by political and legal action. With the market we can get quick results.
But the market strategy is volatile, and if the work stops it can rollback.3
8.5 Retail campaigning: the SSNC
Simultaneous with establishing its ecolabeling program, Good Environmental Choice, the
SSNC's monopoly over defining environmentally friendly paper came to an end. The Nordic
283
1Eka Nobel, 1993, p. 10.
2 Rooks, 2001, p. 44.
3 Thies, 1999.
governments established an ecolabel, the Nordic Swan, which defined a performance standard
weaker than the SSNC and Greenpeace Sweden pressed for criteria more stringent than the
SSNC. Squeezed between the Nordic Swan and Greenpeace Sweden, the SSNC became a
peripheral player in shaping the market for environmentally friendly paper from 1993-1996.
G6ran Bryntse's fight with Greenpeace was a primary cause of the SSNC's movement to the
periphery. Lacking an agenda that distinguished itself from the Swan and coping with an
internal battle over its criteria for environmentally friendly paper the SSNC lost its leadership
position. It was not until 1997, with the SSNC recovered from Bryntse's departure, when the
SSNC tried again to influence the market for environmentally friendly paper products.
8.5.1 Bra Milj6val (Good Environmental Choice)
In 1990, the SSNC and the supermarket chains created Good Environmental Choice, an
ecolabeling program that provides consumers with environmental information at the point of
purchase.' The principal product areas targeted by these initiatives were batteries and laundry
detergents, as well as paper products. 2 The SSNC could undertake such expansive actions
because it was in the midst of rapid growth. The combination of the ecological disaster of 1988
and the SSNC's visibility at the grassroots resulted in a massive increase in the SSNC's
membership, doubling from 100,000 in 1985 to 200,000 in 1991.3
The strategy behind Good Environmental Choice was to leverage the purchasing power
of retailers to promote the production of environmentally friendly products by manufacturers and
'The SSNC translates Bra Milj6val as either "Good Environmental Choice" (SSNC, 1998) or "Good Green Buy"
(Eiderstrum, 1998). Good Environmental Choice is used here because it is the term commonly used in translations.





to foster demand among individual consumers by offering the products for sale and labeling
them as environmentally preferable.
Retailers play an important part in promoting labeled products through their suppliers.
Retailers are the real consumers in the market: what they choose is what their customers
can choose from. At the same time, retailers have the best contacts with consumers and
know first-hand what their preferences are. When they chose to forward these
environmental demands to their suppliers it resulted in labelled products on the shop
shelves.
The SSNC defined the criteria for each product and identified products that met the criteria and
retailers "identified the approved products by placing a yellow label and the text Good
Environmental Choice on the shelves in their stores." 2
The SSNC persuaded Sweden's three largest grocery retailers, with roughly 75 percent of
total grocery sales, 3 to participate in Good Environmental Choice: ICA (#1), KF (#2), and Dagab
(#2, tied with KF).4 The retailers participated in Good Environmental Choice because it
removed the burdens of developing an in-house program and provided a means for addressing
individual consumer demand for environmentally preferable products. As Per Baumann of KF
recalled, "It was a very clever [idea] from the SNF [SSNC]. Everybody [in KF] thought it was a
very good idea."5
The capacity of Good Environmental Choice (as designed in 1990) to effect bleached
pulp production was limited because many of the products made from bleached pulp, especially
fine printing papers, were not sold in grocery stores. From 1990-1991 Good Environmental
Choice promoted the purchasing of chlorine-reduced paper products commonly found in grocery
stores, such as diapers.
' Eiderstrum, 1998, pp. 20-21.
2 SSNC, 1998, p. 2.
3 OECD, 1997, p. 17.
4 According to Per Baumann of KF (1998), ICA had 33%, KF 20%, and Dagab 20% of the grocery sales market.
'Ibid.
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Good Environmental Choice greatly expanded its labeling opportunities when it unveiled
the Falcon ecolabel in 1992. Then any manufacturer that applied for and received certification
could display the Falcon on its product, wherever the product was sold. For example, the paper
manufacturer Munkedals AB could and did put the Falcon on packaging boxes that contain
Environmental Choice certified copy paper. To display the Falcon on its product, manufacturers
submit an application that certifies its product meets the SSNC's criteria and pay an application
fee. The SSNC verifies compliance by carrying out "inspections by random sampling" or when
it suspects non-compliance.' Yet just when (1992) the SSNC was positioned to institutionalize its
stamp of approval for environmentally friendly bleached paper products through Good
Environmental Choice, its criteria were no longer relevant to effecting change in bleached pulp
production.
The guiding philosophy at the SSNC is to promote the most environmentally advanced
products feasible with existing technology,2 recognizing that at least one manufacturer must have
the capacity and willingness to meet the criteria. "As an NGO," Eva Eiderstr6m explained, "we
cannot have a consensus process because there is no way industry [as a whole] will agree to the
criteria we develop [because they are too stringent]. Industry gives comments, yes, and
theoretically they have a strong position because if we develop criteria they can't meet, then we
won't have any participants. But, we don't want to give up the market to industry." 3
SSNC, 1998, p. 4.
2 Although Bryntse challenged this philosophy when he refused to make zero AOX discharge a criterion for
environmentally friendly bleached paper (see next section for details).
3 Eiderstr6m, 1998.
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8.5.2 Swan v. Falcon: The SSNC Loses Ground to the Nordic Ecolabel
In 1989 the Nordic Council of Ministers (Ministers of Consumer Affairs) introduced a
common Nordic -- Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden' -- environmental labeling program,
called the Nordic Swan.2 In its first few years the Nordic Swan struggled to gain acceptance in
the Swedish market. Ironically the SSNC helped the Nordic Swan's ascendancy in setting the
Swedish standard for ecolabels. According to Magnus Hedenmark of SIS Ecolabeling (the
organization responsible for implementing the Nordic Swan in Sweden),3 "The SNF [SSNC]
started ecolabeling in Sweden. Without them we would not have grown as fast as we did."4 The
two major events that promoted the Swan in Sweden were paper campaign and the VIA boycott.
In 1991 the SSNC launched a boycott against VIA laundry detergent, a product of
Unilever. The SSNC initiated the boycott after failing to persuade Unilever to introduce an
environmentally friendly detergent. Unilever, in Eva Eiderstr6m's (1998) words, "replied that
there was no consumer demand for other types of detergents than the ones they already supplied,
and that they were extremely hard to manufacture without sacrificing product performance" (p.
18). "The SNF [SSNC] boycott was so successful," Magnus Hedenmark recalled, "that Lever
lost roughly 15 to 20 percent of its market share in Sweden."6 When Unilever decided to
reformulate in 1992, it refused to use the SSNC's ecolabel, opting instead for the Nordic Swan.7
' Denmark joined the Nordic Swan in 1997 (US EPA, 1998, p. B-24).
2 SIS Miljomarkning, 1998, p. 1.
' The Swedish name of the organization is Standardiseringen I Sverige (SIS) Milj6markning; which literally
translates as the Swedish Standards Institution Ecolabeling. However, the common translation is SIS Ecolabelling, a




7 Eiderstram, 1998; Hedenmark, 1998.
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After Unilever received the Nordic Swan ecolabel, "the other multinationals, Colgate-Palmolive
and Proctor and Gamble, soon followed suit."'
The SSNC's boycott of Unilever's detergent and Unilever's choice of the Swan as its
ecolabel was illustrative of the dynamic between manufacturers, Nordic Swan, and the SSNC.
The majority of corporations, according to Hedenmark, "choose the Nordic Swan rather than the
SNF [SSNC] because they understand you get more influence here" at the Swan. "If they don't
join us, then there is SNF who doesn't listen to business. If you don't have Nordic Swan than
NGOs take over [ecolabeling in Sweden]." 2 For bleached paper products in particular and
ecolabeled products in general the result is Nordic Swan dominance over the Falcon.
Businesses have greater influence over criteria development at the Nordic Swan than at
Good Environmental Choice because they participate in writing the ecolabeling criteria at the
Swan,3 the consensus process of the Swan's Ecolabelling Board tends to the lowest common
denominator when conflicts arise among the participating nations,4 licensee fees pay a greater
proportion of the Swan's operating budget,5 and the Swan lacks the SSNC's commitment to
promoting the most environmentally advanced products feasible with existing technology.6
1Eiderstrm, 1998, p. 19.
2 Hedenmark, 1998.
3 The expert panels that develop draft criteria for products tends to favor business interests because, as Magnus
Hedenmark (1998) of SIS Ecolabelling explained, environmentalists often lack the resources to participate" "NGOs
are not always willing to be on the expert panel." But "Companies are interested in being involved. The result,
expert panels are seldom balanced," he concluded.
4 The need for all of the Ecolabelling Board's decisions to be unanimous creates a tendency to move to the lowest
common denominator when disagreements arise over criteria. For example, in developing criteria for fine paper
products Finnish companies wanted less stringent AOX levels than Swedish companies because the Finnish
companies were not prepared to meet the same AOX discharge levels. The resulting compromise was weaker on
AOX discharges than was acceptable to environmental NGOs and even many Swedish companies (Eiderstrom,
1998).
s The Nordic Swan's receives half of its funding from license fees and the other half from participating governments
(US EPA, 1998, p. B-25). The Good Environmental Choice program receives one-fifth of its funding from
licensees, with the remaining four-fifths of funding from retailers (30%) and the SSNC (50%) (Eiderstr6m, 1998).
6 Eiderstr6m, 1998.
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For printing and writing papers the Swan had become the de facto regulatory standard
because the majority of consumers will not buy paper without the Swan label in Sweden. As
Anne Marie Vass of SIS Ecolabeling said, "The Swan does not have 100 percent market share
[in Sweden], but it is hard to sell paper products without the Swan. Companies selling paper feel
the impact. 'If we have the Nordic Swan,' they tell us, 'it's easier to sell."" While this statement
could be dismissed as propaganda on the part of the Swan, Eva Eiderstr6m confirmed it:
In 1992 the Nordic Swan released their criteria. The difference between theirs and ours is
that the Nordic Swan still accepts ECF [elemental chlorine-free] and we do not. The
paper industry then chose the Nordic Swan for most of its paper products and this has
made it difficult for us to eco-label fine paper products. 2
For fine paper products over the period 1992-1995 the primary difference between the
criteria of the Swan and Good Environmental Choice was their allowable AOX discharge. The
Swan allowed 0.5 kg AOX/ton of pulp,3 whereas Good Environmental Choice required zero
AOX/ton of pulp (beginning in 1993).
The Swan became the dominant ecolabel for printing papers because with its less
stringent criteria for AOX most paper manufacturers, like laundry detergent manufacturers
before them, adopted the Swan. Thus ending sometime between 1992 and 1993 the SSNC's
dominance over criteria setting, which it had held since 1986. In a nation where almost all
printing papers carry the Swan ecolabel and since the Swan's criteria for paper products are more
stringent than Swedish regulations, it, in effect, sets the baseline for technology laggards selling
paper products in Sweden. While conceivable that Swedish mills could release more AOX for
export products, demand for low AOX pollution from Western European consumers prevented




3 SIS Milj~markning, 1996.
to include a zero AOX discharge criterion the Swan provided no impetus to the further diffusion
of TCF bleaching (which is necessary to reach zero AOX) in Sweden in particular and
Scandinavia in general.
8.5.3 Falcon as phoenix: the SSNC resurrects its work on bleached paper products (1997-
1998)
From 1993 to 1996 the SSNC's efforts to promote environmentally friendly paper
languished while the organization recovered from the stress of Bryntse's departure. In 1997 the
SSNC revitalized its work on environmentally friendly paper by expanding its criteria beyond
AOX discharges and positioning itself as taking the environmental highground in contrast to the
Nordic Swan. To revitalize work on paper products the SSNC developed new criteria for paper
products in 1997 that included criteria for forest management practices and energy use (see Table
8.3). For example, to receive the Good Environmental Choice Rank B classification total fiber
content must include 30 percent Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certified fiber and/or post-
consumer recycled fiber. FSC is an international "labeling scheme for forest products, which
provides a credible guarantee that the product comes from a well-managed forest."' Another
requirement of Rank B classification is 30 percent of supplied electrical energy must carry the
Environmental Choice ecolabel. Requirements for receiving the Environmental Choice ecolabel





Table 8.3. Summary of Good Environmental Choice criteria for printing paper (1997)
Requirements Rank A Rank B
Raw materials




= Total gross supply of 0.2 MWh/ton of pulp 0.6 MWh/ton of pulp
fossil fuel to pulp mill






- Substances not allowed Chlorinated bleaching chemicals Chlorinated bleaching chemicals
to be added during (including chlorine and chlorine (including chlorine and chlorine
manufacture of pulp or dioxide) and 11 other chemicals dioxide) and 7 other chemicals
paper
Water Pollutants (bleached kraft
pulp; kg/ton of pulp)
- Chemical Oxygen 18.0 35.0
Demand (COD) 0.04 0.06
Phosphorous
Air Pollutants (bleached kraft
pulp; kg/ton of pulp)
= Sulphur 0.4 0.7
- Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) 1.5 2.0
Source: SSNC, 1997
The SSNC needed to expand the scope of its criteria beyond AOX to address the absence
of public interest in bleachery pollution and growing interest in forestry practices and energy use.
By 1997 bleachery pollution was no longer of interest to consumers:
If I am a consumer, I believe the pulp and paper companies took care of the bleaching
problem in the early 1990s. Then if informed that everything is back where it was, I
would become frustrated and confused, and would lose interest. I would not have the
stamina to check every five years to see what is happening. It is hard to get people
interested and involved with an issue that should be resolved. They can say, 'look what
happened the last time. We took care of the problem, now it is back again. When are
these issues finished?"
The SSNC revitalized consumer interest in the paper industry by focusing on forestry
practices and energy use: "Forestry and energy are part of our strategy of going further. Forestry
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'Ibid.
is helped by our strategy of certifying 100% of the forests.' Thus the SSNC's criteria for
environmentally friendly paper in 1997 were much broader than in 1993.
8.6 Analysis
By defining criteria for chlorine reduced paper and producing a consumer guide of paper
products the SSNC played a significant role in promoting the elimination of chlorine gas from
Swedish bleacheries. That the SSNC's criteria for environmentally friendly paper were eclipsed
by the business friendly Nordic Swan ecolabel was not a surprising outcome. The surprising
outcome was how Bryntse's stubborn desire to maintain a course of action independent of
Greenpeace Sweden resulted in an extremely embarrassing public event for the SSNC: accused
of being environmentally inadequate by a pulp corporation in a major newspaper. Equally
surprising was how Bryntse's decisions to promote incremental rather than bold change quickly
choked off opportunities for growing the SSNC's work on paper products. A year after the
attack by S6dra Cell the SSNC's capacity to promote change in bleachery pollution had been
destroyed. It was not until four years later that the SSNC tried to revitalize its work on bleachery
pollution by incorporating it into a broader agenda for sustainable forestry practices and energy
use.
While evaluating the effectiveness and effects of the SSNC's broader environmentally friendly
paper work is beyond the scope and period of my research, it seems like a strategy that will
create opportunities for growth. It creates many different angles to organize on, rather than
closing them off as Bryntse did in 1990. It also creates opportunities to organize different
constituencies of people to become involved based on their interests, from water pollution to
energy to forestry practices. The challenge remains persuading manufacturers it is in their
interest to be an environmental leader beyond the Swan.
Ibid.
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It was the Greenpeace organizations that were effective at market change in the early
1990s. Greenpeace campaigners in Sweden and Germany affected change in pulp bleaching
through direct action and collaboration with business. Das Plagiat was by far the most
successful, creative, and costly direct action of the pulp and paper campaign, in Europe or North
America. Through Das Plagiat Greenpeace usurped the power of production from industry, the
power to decide what is and what is not technologically viable. Environmentalists often lack the
capacity to prove that their technological optimism is pragmatic rather than utopian. In
environmental conflicts manufacturers hold the power to say what is and what is not
technologically viable. It is easy for manufacturers to say, "No we cannot produce a quality TCF
paper." While environmentalists can reply, "Yes it is possible to produce quality TCF paper,"
their statement usually has no credibility. Das Plagiat created credibility for Greenpeace to state
that TCF paper is technologically viable. The power of manufacturers to determine what is (and
is not) technologically viable seems to breed arrogance among manufacturers towards consumers
requesting environmental changes in production and products.
The "silent collaboration" with IKEA created a paradox for media obsessed Greenpeace.
The collaboration created an incredible success story -- a leading consumer of paper products
chose TCF paper and had to dump one of its previous suppliers to get the paper -- yet IKEA
refused to do any publicity around its decision. From the perspective of the pulp and paper
campaign the collaboration with IKEA made perfect sense: it clearly moved the TCF agenda
forward. From the perspective of Greenpeace as an organization whose growth depends upon
successful media images, the collaboration with IKEA was a waste of time and resources.
Because market campaigns aim to transform industrial practices they will invariably involve
"inside-outside" strategies for environmentalists. An inside strategy is when environmentalists
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collaborate with business or government. An outside strategy is when environmentalists use
pressure tactics like direct actions.
An inside strategy is necessary because change requires technical knowledge, purchasing
power, and corporate action. Developing relationships based on trust was an important factor in
the success of Greenpeace's market campaign. Staff at Munksj6 Aspa Bruk' and IKEA worked
closely with Greenpeace to help advance the TCF agenda. The market campaign facilitated the
development of trust between likely and -- in the case of Munksj6 and S3dra Cell -- once
adversaries because it created economic incentives for the mills: price premium and higher than
average utilization of production capacity during a recession. For IKEA the economic incentive
was to avoid lost sales because of a negative environmental image.
Important to the successes of Greenpeace in Europe were general consumer demand for
green products, running an international campaign, and the transformation of S6dra Cell. By the
early 1990s Germany and Sweden were the two European countries with the most
environmentally conscious consumers. This meant making the pollution connection between
paper consumption and production much easier. Public awareness of the connection between
products and the environment is something that environmentalists along with the media, at least
in Sweden, played central roles in creating.
Jack Weinberg (1999; formerly of Greenpeace) argues that Swedish mills were more
receptive to TCF because they had already invested in pollution prevention technologies, mainly
oxygen delignification. While the oxygen delignification investments made the transition to
TCF easier from a financial perspective, the awareness of the market opportunity is what
captured the interest of Aspa Bruk and Sadra Cell. Some mills with oxygen did not opt for TCF.
1 Aspa Bruk supplied Greenpeace with the TCF pulp for Das Plagiat.
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The capacity of Greenpeace to simultaneously pressure German paper manufacturers and
publishing houses and Swedish pulp producers created organizing opportunities unavailable to
the SSNC. Being international enabled Greenpeace to search out susceptible links in the paper
supply chain outside of Sweden. And the Swedish industry with its dependence on exports, in
particular to Germany, was vulnerable to demands from German consumers.
Critical to the diffusion of TCF technology was S6dra Cell. Prior to its announcement to
produce TCF pulp, there was only one small company producing TCF bleached kraft pulp: Aspa
Bruk. Alone Aspa Bruk did not have the production capacity to move the market. Had it been
the only TCF bleached kraft pulp producer the TCF market would have quickly died. When
Sdra Cell jumped into the TCF market it made a huge splash because it is one of the leading
suppliers of market pulp in Europe. Surprisingly Sddra Cell itself became a change agent,
launching a major marketing initiative to create a brand name for a commodity product.
The actions of Greenpeace and the cultivation of a green market helped to surface
individuals within the paper supply chain interested in technology innovation and environmental
issues. Suppressed by a technologically conservative industry, Greenpeace provided cover for
these innovators to experiment and speak out. For example, S3dra Cell and its equipment
suppliers developed and installed a technology -- ozone bleaching -- used nowhere else at the
time commercially.
The speed and extent of change Greenpeace leveraged through the market was incredible,
especially when compared to the sliver of change it leveraged through the regulatory process.
While the regulatory arena created a forum for bringing publicity to the problem of pulp
pollution and having government scientists and reports confirm these problems, it failed because
the regulatory process favors industry's proclivity to incremental rather than radical change, fails
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to create incentives for change, and curbs creativity. The regulatory process favors business at a
variety of levels. The burden of proof rests with environmentalists who must prove harm rather
than industry proving safety.' The inclination of government is to promote economic
development over environmental protection. 2 Regulators as Erik Nystr6m of the Swedish EPA
noted, tend over time to view the world like those they regulate. Manufacturers have the right to
pollute as defined in their permits and changing this right is an arduous task. All of these factors
make regulatory change difficult and likely to be incremental rather than radical, and radical is
too strong of a descriptor for what is often best practice in the industry. Regulations have
become static mechanisms for trying to effect change in production. And they have been
ineffective, especially in comparison to the market, in creating incentives for change.
Greenpeace thought it had achieved critical mass in Europe by the end of 1992. That it
had not highlights a problem with market campaigns as compared to creating change through law
and regulation: the vulnerability to roll back is greater. In reality Greenpeace had picked the low
hanging fruit in Europe. To institutionalize TCF in Europe, Greenpeace needed to move beyond
northern Europe and to adjust its campaign to the backlash of industry against TCF. A broader
coalition of organizations and an assertive effort to connect fiber supply (recycling and logging
of old growth forests) with pulp bleaching would have created greater opportunities for alliances
with other organizations, building a broader-based movement for more environmentally friendly
practices across the entire lifecycle chain.
'For example, see Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1996.
2 For example, see Lindblom, 1977.
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9 Moving dioxin pollution from pulp mills onto the national agenda: Greenpeace USA
and Environmental Defense (1986-1989)
This chapter introduces the initiatives of Greenpeace USA and Environmental Defense to
move dioxin pollution from pulp and paper pollution onto the national agenda of regulators and
the general public. Taking different tactical approaches and targeting different institutions, both
organizations helped to place dioxin pollution from the paper industry high on the agenda of the
press, the US EPA, pulp and paper corporations, a handful of politicians, and concerned citizens.
The story begins in the mid- 1 980s when evidence of dioxins in pulp mill effluent trickled into
offices of state and federal environmental protection agencies. Dioxin pollution from pulp mills
grew into a national issue when Greenpeace USA released the report, No Margin ofSafety, in
1987. The issue blossomed a few weeks later when the improbable happened: someone from the
paper industry's trade association leaked hundreds of pages of internal documents to Greenpeace
USA. For the next two years Greenpeace USA and Environmental Defense staff tried to create
the pressure necessary to catalyze change in an industry known for slow, plodding technological
transformations. Table 9.1 provides a chronology of significant events in the early years of
dioxin pollution from American pulp and paper mills.
9.1 Dioxin pollution from pulp mills leaks into the public domain in Maine and the
Great Lakes region (1985-1987)
From 1985 to 1987 evidence of the dioxin-paper industry connection trickled into the
public domain as officials in Maine and Minnesota grappled with emerging evidence of dioxin
pollution from pulp and paper mills. When collecting data for its National Dioxin Study, the US
EPA discovered dioxins in fish downstream of pulp and paper mills and in paper mill sludge.
The EPA began the National Dioxin Study on command from the US Congress. Frustrated by
the Reagan Administration's lack of progress in regulating dioxins, the Democrat-controlled
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Table 9.1 Chronology of significant events in the early years of dioxin pollution from
American ulp and paper mills (1983-1989)
Year Event
1983 US EPA begins National Dioxin Study
1984 US EPA sets water quality level for TCDD at 0.013 ppq
October: EDF and NWF file petition with US EPA to regulate dioxins under the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA)
1985 March: EDF and NWF file lawsuit with US EPA to regulate dioxins under TSCA
July: Maine issues fish advisory downstream from pulp mill due to dioxin
contamination
September: Dioxins found in sludge at Maine pulp mill, chlorine the suspected cause
October: Minnesota issues fish advisory downstream from pulp mill due to dioxin
contamination downstream
1986 Chlorine consumption per ton of product peaks in the US
March: Dioxins found in sludge at Minnesota pulp mill
June: The Five-Mill Study begins: cooperative study between US EPA and pulp and
paper industry
1987 August: Greenpeace USA releases No Margin of Safety
September: Greenpeace USA releases Deep Pulp papers
September: New York Times puts dioxins in paper products on front page
September: US EPA admits that paper products contain dioxins
October: US EPA releases results from preliminary risk assessment on dioxins in
paper products
December: US EPA study recommends downgrading its cancer-risk for dioxin
1988 May-November: Greenpeace, North American Inland Waters Expedition
July: EDF and NWF sign consent decree with US EPA on dioxin pollution from pulp
and paper mills
July: US Congress holds hearing on water pollution from Champion International's
mill in Canton, NC
1989 February: Greenpeace USA petitions USDA to use milk cartons with no dioxins
March: findings from EPA studies released in New York Times show excessive levels
of dioxins in fish downstream from pulp mills and in pulp mill effluent
July: Melitta North America introduces unbleached coffee filters
September: US FDA finds low levels of dioxins in paper products do not pose a threat
to human health
Congress insisted that the US EPA undertake a National Dioxin Study to determine the sources
of dioxin exposure and background levels of dioxin in the environment.' Congress appropriated
$4 million in 1983 for the US EPA to complete the research.'
As part of the National Dioxin Study, US EPA scientists analyzed dioxin contamination
in soil and fish in pristine areas of the country to identify background levels of dioxin in the
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'US EPA, 1987.
environment. In what US EPA scientists thought were pristine rivers, researchers found
surprisingly high levels of dioxin in fish. When they looked upstream for potential sources of
dioxin, they found massive pulp and paper mills. In 1985 samples of pulp mill sludge were
tested for dioxins: "The data revealed that, within the paper industry, bleached kraft pulp mills
contained the highest levels of dioxin."2
The first press account3 of the dioxin-paper industry connection came in September 1985
when the Associated Press reported a press conference held by Governor Joseph Brennan of
Maine. The governor announced that: "Low levels of the toxic chemical dioxin that were found
in fish taken from the Androscoggin River have been tentatively matched to sludge from kraft
paper mills in Maine." 4 The Commissioner of the Maine Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP) explained that "the dioxin in the sludge may be a byproduct of a chemical
reaction in the kraft bleaching process, in which chlorine is used [emphasis added]." 5 A few
months earlier the DEP had issued a fish advisory for the Androscoggin River because of dioxin
contamination, recommending that no more than two to three fish be eaten per month.6
A month later the Minnesota Health Department issued a fish advisory recommending
"against eating any fish" from the 40 mile portion of the Rainy River7 downstream of the Boise
Cascade pulp and paper mill in International Falls because of high dioxin levels, which were
thought to be from the mill.' Then in March 1986 the Star-Tribune newspaper of the Twin Cities
(Minneapolis and St. Paul) reported that "traces of the toxic substance dioxin" have been found
by state and federal regulators "in waste sludge produced by the Boise Cascade Corp. paper mill
'Van Strum and Merrell, 1987.
2 US EPA, 1993, p. 66092.
3 Based on a search of the Lexis-Nexis and Dow Jones Interactive databases.
4 Associated Press, 1985.
' Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 The Rainy River runs along the US-Canadian border in northern Minnesota.
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in International Falls."2 Howard Zar of the US EPA sought to allay public concerns by
emphasizing the level of contamination: "'The level of dioxin (in the sludge) [414 parts per
trillion] is less than half' of the EPA's level of concern (1,000 parts per trillion). Therefore he
concluded, "it's not a worrisome number." 3
Dioxin-contaminated fish became a regional issue in May 1986 when the US EPA
Region V office (Great Lakes region) issued the report, Dioxin in Great Lakes Fish. The
Associated Press, Chicago Sun-Times, and Star-Tribune (of the Twin Cities), as well as the
environmental newsweekly, Environment Reporter, all covered the story, highlighting that
"Great Lakes fish contain potentially dangerous levels of the suspected carcinogen dioxin."4
Again the US EPA, this time Peter Wise, director of the Great Lakes National Program, sought
to allay public concerns: "consumers still can safely eat fish from the Great Lakes." But he
qualified the term "safely:" "'If you consume great amounts of fish (from the lakes) over a
period of time, then it would be of great concern.' 5
Paper mills were listed among the potential sources of dioxin: "Researchers presume the
dioxin in Great Lakes fish originated at nearby pesticide manufacturing plants, paper mills and
incinerators."6 And Dean Rebuffoni of the Star-Tribune emphasized the potential dioxin-paper
mill connection:
In several cases outside the Great Lakes Basin, elevated levels of dioxin in fish appear to
be associated with certain discharges from paper mills. The EPA, several states and the
wood-products industry are analyzing additional samples of fish from waters below paper
mills and from the mills themselves. The EPA said those studies "will enable controls to








Two weeks later Rebuffoni reported that "Low levels of the toxic substance dioxin have been
found in sludge generated by Duluth's sewage-treatment plant and by the Potlatch Corp. paper
mill in nearby Cloquet, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) said Wednesday."'
He explained that "The dioxin tests reported by the MPCA stem from analyses of sludge samples
done at the Duluth laboratory of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and are part
of the EPA's national study of dioxin contamination."2
In August 1986 the Environment Reporter published the most detailed public account of
the status of the dioxin-paper industry research:
The EPA draft [National Dioxin] study found dioxin in fish and river sediments
downstream from a number of pulp and paper mills located in various parts of the
country, prompting the agency to initiate a 'follow-on' study of dioxin generation at these
facilities, according to Cummings [research analyst on the EPA's Dioxin Management
Task Force].
He said that there is evidence that dioxin is present in sewage sludge from pulp and paper
mills and that EPA, states, and the paper industry are attempting cooperatively to
discover at which stages in the milling processes the pollutant is generated.?
This article represented a very quiet announcement of the "The Five-Mill Study:" a cooperative
study between the US EPA, American Paper Institute (API was the paper industry's trade
association), and National Council for Air and Stream Improvement (the paper industry's
technical research arm).
9.2 Greenpeace USA creates a national environmental problem
An unmarked envelope brought the pulp and paper industry to the attention of
Greenpeace USA. In December 1986 the Chicago office of Greenpeace received an envelope: it
"contained leaked EPA documents, revealing that a major secret research program on pulp and
paper mill dioxin sources was underway ... This envelope marked the beginning of
'Rebuffoni, 1986.
2 Ibid.
3 Bureau of National Affairs, 1986.
4 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. VI-1.
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Greenpeace International's "pulp and paper campaign."
Using direct action as its primary strategy, setting ambitious environmental goals, and
allying with grassroots groups set Greenpeace USA apart from the other national environmental
groups with their strategy on lobbying and litigating.' For example, Greenpeace USA's
alignment with grassroots, anti-toxics groups led its executive director to decline an invitation to
participate in the Group of Ten -- an effort of the national environmental groups to coordinate at
the executive director level actions to oppose the Reagan Administration's attack on
environmental regulation. Invited to participate, then executive director Peter Bahouth
provisionally agreed: if Lois Gibbs, director of Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste was
invited to participate, then he would participate. Gibbs was not invited, so Bahouth declined.2
The distance of Greenpeace USA from other national environmental groups and its proximity to
grassroots groups created tensions between Greenpeace and Environmental Defense, and to a
lesser extent NRDC, in their future work against pulp and paper pollution.
Like the other national environmental groups Greenpeace invested significant resources
into fundraising, especially direct mail solicitation.3 In the late 1 980s Greenpeace USA spent
$0.23 of every dollar it raised on direct mail fundraising and canvassing.4 A problem that
emerged in the process of trying to transform US bleached kraft pulp mills was the need to stamp
an organizational identity on reducing water pollution from pulp mills, in particular for raising
money, rather than creating and coordinating a movement that opposed (together) water
pollution from pulp and paper mills. And this was a problem shared by both Greenpeace USA
and Environmental Defense.
'Mitchell, Mertig, and Dunlap, 1992, p. 17. For a description of Greenpeace International see Chapter 7.
2 Dowie, 1995, p. 74.
3 Gottlieb, 1993, p. 194.
* Shaiko, 1993, p. 96.
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9.2.1 No Margin ofSafety: a preliminary report on dioxin pollution and the need for
emergency action in the pulp and paper industry
On 21 August 1987 Greenpeace USA released No Margin ofSafety. At 10 chapters and
130 pages, No Margin of Safety is a detailed report. It covers: the toxicity and regulatory history
of dioxin; EPA's complicity with herbicide manufacturers during the Reagan administration to
minimize dioxin-related regulation; results from the National Dioxin Study; EPA's collaboration
with the paper industry; pulp and paper manufacturing processes; dioxin formation during pulp
manufacturing; and recommendations for dioxin-free paper production. At the core of No
Margin ofSafety were three messages: 1) pulp and paper mills poison the environment with
dioxins, 2) chlorine and chlorinated bleaching chemicals are the primary source of dioxins in
paper mills; and 3) the US EPA colluded with the paper industry to keep information of dioxin
pollution from the public.
Leaked documents from the EPA were the genesis of No Margin of Safety. As Carol Van
Strum' recalled:
Greenpeace's Chicago office received leaked documents [in 1986] from EPA suggesting
the EPA and the pulp and paper industry were involved in negotiations over the National
Dioxin Study and involved in a joint study. Greenpeace asked us [Paul Merrell and I] to
write the report.
The National Dioxin Study was not published by 1986 because of pulp and paper
corporations, they were a major source of dioxins. We filed a FOIA [Freedom of
Information Act] request to EPA for all documents related to the National Dioxin Study
and the pulp and paper industry.
What happened was a scandal. The EPA agreed with industry how to respond to my
FOIA request and what they will give us and not give us. I had data from the EPA that
showed dioxin in paper products, but I could not use it in No Margin ofSafety because
the EPA said they were preliminary, not final results.
Dioxins, Van Strum and Merrell explained, were of particular concern because "Every
dose tested in laboratory animals has resulted in increased levels of cancer, birth defects and
other reproductive problems, and in damage to the body's immune system." They labeled
1 See Chapter 6 for a description of Carol Van Strum's anti-toxics work.
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2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (2,3,7,8-TCDD or "TCDD" for short) the "most toxic ...
molecule made by humans" 2 because it is very toxic at very small doses. The positions
articulated by Van Strum and Merrell would later be affirmed by numerous scientific studies.
Today the US National Toxicology Program lists TCDD as a known human carcinogen in its
Report on Carcinogens.3 TCDD is carcinogenic in rodents at the nanogram per kilogram level (a
nanogram is one billionth of a gram) and daily human exposures are measured in picograms (a
picogram is one trillionth of a gram).4 Because of its toxicity at very low doses Van Strum and
Merrell took the position, as did Greenpeace, that "There are no 'safe' levels of TCDD."5 Quite
worrisome to Van Strum and Merrell were dioxins from pulp mills: "The levels of dioxin being
found near pulp mills suggest a public health emergency in North America." 6
Van Strum and Merrell forecasted, correctly, that the US EPA "would merely suggest
'levels of concern' as advisories to individual states, relieving EPA from responsibility for dioxin
regulation and enforcement." 7 The US EPA, they emphasized, chose to:
forego regulatory action to investigate, control, or eliminate dioxin emissions from pulp
and paper mills. Instead, EPA would do nothing pending further study and also gave
industry control over study design, sampling plans, and pace of the study. Without public
participation or oversight, EPA signed an agreement with an industry trade association
[American Paper Institute] substituting secret studies for regulatory action,
notwithstanding that the agency already had sufficient information to take strong
regulatory action as well as a string of precedents to support such action."'
The US EPA signed an agreement in June 1986 with the API and National Council on Air and
Stream Improvement to study sources of dioxin and dioxin in water effluent at five pulp mills:
International Paper, Jay, Maine; Champion International, Lufkin, Texas; Mead Paper,
Van Strum, 2001.
2 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. II-1.
3 National Toxicology Program, 2002.
4 For example, see Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, 1998.
5 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. I-1.
6 Ibid., p. 1-1.
7Ibid., p. IV-3.
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Chillicothe, Ohio; Boise Cascade, International Falls, Minnesota; and James River, Wauna,
Oregon. Formally called the "US EPA/Paper Industry Cooperative Dioxin Screening Study,"
this later became known as "The Five-Mill Study."2
Reflecting their distrust of the US EPA, Van Strum and Merrell's policy
recommendations were weak on government action and strong on mobilizing the public. First:
The most important first step toward a dioxin-free pulp and paper industry in North
America is to force full disclosure of dioxin studies from industry and government. A
fully informed public will be the most effective instrument for necessary political and
economic changes in this vital industry.?
Second:
Consumer education to encourage acceptance of less-bleached materials is a particularly
attractive option for some products [such as unbleached tissue papers] that could open
new market opportunities. ... Indeed, it seems likely that many consumers would respond
to a 'chlorine and dioxin free paper' marketing appeal with the same fervor now
bestowed on recycled papers.4
No Margin ofSafety was a seminal report for Greenpeace USA. It helped Greenpeace
USA staff move dioxin pollution into the national spotlight and created the context for a press
conference that caught national press attention and prompted an industry insider to leak
documents to Greenpeace, which in turn generated further press attention.
9.2.2 No Margin ofSafety spotlights dioxin pollution from pulp and paper mills
Greenpeace USA and Greenpeace Canada simultaneously released No Margin ofSafety
on 21 August in Chicago and Toronto. Two newspapers,5 the Star-Tribune in the Twin Cities
and The Globe and Mail in Toronto,6 picked up the story, publishing short articles in the middle
Ibid., p. VI-2.
2 US EPA, 1988.
3 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. IX-13.
4 Ibid., p. IX-5.
5 According to searches of Lexis-Nexis and Dow Jones Interactive.
6 See Associated Press, 1987; and Downey, 1987. The Star-Tribune picked the story up from the Associated Press
wire service.
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of their papers.' The Star-Tribune emphasized the US EPA's collusion with the paper industry
with a quote from report co-author Paul Merrell: "'The records show the pulp and paper mill
industry got them (Environmental Protection Agency) to suppress it [the National Dioxin Study]
because of the levels of dioxin.' 2 Countering Merrell was an EPA spokesperson who denied
any malfeasance: "'Most of the data in the report has already been released,' said David Ryan, an
EPA spokesman in Washington, D.C."3
Ryan's portrayal of the dioxin data as old news was the same spin Carol Raulston, vice
president government affairs, API, advocated for in a memo to John Thorner, director,
communications and staff counsel, API: let's make "the paper industry findings appear as 'old
news.' Specifically, we should note that the study has been out in draft form for over a year; that
we (as well as everyone else) have been aware of the paper industry findings ..."4
The first significant media breakthrough for Greenpeace USA came on 1 September
when Laurent Belsie of The Christian Science Monitor wrote an 1138-word, page one story --
"EPA links dioxins to paper mills" -- with a map locating the five paper mills under investigation
for dioxin emissions.5 Belsie highlighted Greenpeace USA's contention of industry collusion.
And this time the US EPA, through Alexander McBride, chief of water quality analysis,
conceded that the industry's involvement was unusual: "'Obviously, it's not the usual EPA
process,' McBride says. But 'in terms of having the data collected ... I think it was an enormous
plus to have the industry involved. It did enable us to move a lot farther a lot faster.' 6
McBride's interpretation of the benefits of cooperation contrasted sharply with the view
'Star-Tribune, page A13; Globe and Mail, page A14.
2 Associated Press, 1987.
3 Ibid.
4 Raulston, 1987.
5 Belsie, 1987, p. 1.6 Ibid.
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held by Red Cavaney, president, API, who explained the benefits of cooperation in a memo to
his Executive Committee on 30 December 1986:
A year ago, we received reports that, as part of its National Dioxin Study, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had found trace levels of dioxin in sludges from
some pulp and paper mills. Although this created some activity at the state regulatory
level, the industry was able to forestall major regulatory and public relations
difficulties by, among other things, agreeing to cooperate in a joint study with EPA
to determine the source of dioxin if, in fact, it proved to be present [emphasis added].'
Using research to stall regulation is an effective strategy industry often employs under the guise
of making decisions on the basis of sound science.
9.2.3 The "Deep Pulp" papers
A huge breakthrough for Greenpeace USA came when it received yet another set of
leaked documents, this time from an anonymous source -- dubbed "Deep Pulp" by Greenpeace
staffe -- within the paper industry's trade association, the American Paper Institute (API). Deep
Pulp sent hundreds of pages of API memos and reports to Greenpeace USA.3 The papers
included: evidence of dioxins in paper products and industry effluent, industry-EPA
communications, industry strategy to delay/stop regulatory action on dioxin emissions, and
industry public opinion polling data.
Important to Greenpeace USA's goal of capturing press attention, the Deep Pulp papers
included information on dioxins in paper products. The paper industry knew by at least February
1987 that its products contained dioxins. As Robert Hayes (director of corporate
communication, Boise Cascade Corp.) and Carol Raulston (API) stated in a memo to Michael
Farrar (vice president, environmental and health program, API) and Ely Gonick (senior vice
president, technology, International Paper): "The [Five Mill] study results do indicate that we
'Cavaney, 1986.
2 Floegel, 1999.
3 Author's note: Carol Van Strum provided me with a complete set of the Deep Pulp papers.
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have dioxin in our products in untested, but presumed, trace amounts in the parts per trillion
range."I
The Deep Pulp papers also revealed the initial strategic thinking and actions of what
became a very successful campaign by the US paper industry, led by API, to delay and impede
initiatives to reduce the industry's water pollution in general and dioxins in particular. Key
ingredients in the API's strategy were: bend the US EPA to its will, work to keep the agency and
paper industry members on message, undermine the science supporting stringent dioxin
regulation, and mobilize resources.
From the early findings of dioxin in paper products to the final water pollution
regulations promulgated in 1998, the actions and decisions of the US EPA were largely
consistent with the objectives of API. In the early years the API used joint research projects to
help bend the US EPA to its will. The API's Dioxin Public Affairs Plan of 1987 framed its
regulatory/legislative strategy in these simple terms:
Who (1) Work through EPA as lead federal agency
-- EPA makes initial contacts with FDA/CPSC/OSHA
-- Message: Avoid undue concern/alarm on the part of the public as
well as state and local jurisdictions
How (2) Cooperate on joint activities
-- Provide information they need and/or ask for
-- Share industry data/studies if:
(a) public health concern is raised
(b) serves objectives of getting appropriate regulations'
The first joint research project, the Five-Mill Study, helped API to delay regulations and to gain
access to and cooperation from agency staff as well as.
The US EPA also agreed with the industry's position that evidence of dioxin
contamination of paper products should be withheld from the public. John Festa (director,
chemical control program, API) highlighted this agreement in his memo to Patricia Hill (director,
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1Hayes and Raulston, 1987.
water quality program, API) after meeting with the US EPA in May 1987: "A.D. Little
[consulting company] is doing product risk assessment -- hypothesizing contamination [of paper
products] at 10 ppt. Work to be completed by end of July. No formal document to be prepared.
Information for internal use [at the EPA]." 2
By July 1987 the API had access to the highest level of the agency, US EPA
Administrator Lee Thomas. Red Cavaney gave this favorable report back to API member
companies in July 1987:
In response to an industry request, EPA Administrator Lee Thomas and members of his
staff met with Dioxin Task Group Chairman and Glatfelter Company CEO Tom Norris
and API staff on July 31. The industry asked for the meeting to discuss how the Agency
might characterize to the public the significance of the levels of dioxin thus far detected,
to share the industry's views on future activities and to emphasize the importance of
EPA's ongoing re-evaluation of its views of the potency of dioxins.
Administrator Thomas indicated a willingness to cooperate with the industry to ensure
that the public not be unduly alarmed about this issue. He felt the cooperative efforts
should continue and gave no indication that the Agency felt that the current situation
was a crisis warranting immediate regulations [emphasis added].4
After leaving the US EPA in 1988, Lee Thomas joined Georgia-Pacific Corp.-- the second
largest manufacturer of bleached pulp and paper products in the US -- as director of its
environmental department.
API staff knew they had a difficult task of selling Americans that a little dioxin was okay.
First, polling data revealed that over 50% of Americans would avoid paper products if they
learned the products contained dioxins.' Second, Americans were be skeptical of industry
spokespeople on dioxin contamination. Polling data indicated that paper industry staff had the
least credibility on the dioxin issue: only 10% of those polled viewed a paper company scientist
as "very believable" on dioxin and less than that, 7%, viewed a paper company president as very





believable.2 Therefore having a US EPA official -- with 31% polled viewing someone from the
agency as "very believable" -- state the industry's message was clearly preferred.
Reflecting a combination of high level access and arrogance, API staff defined the
message they wanted US EPA officials to present to the media:
Get EPA to approach the significance of exposure to trace levels of dioxin in a balanced
manner.
-- not 'seek' publicity
-- remain low key
-- characterize as 'not a real threat to environment or public health' if possible3
As revealed below, US EPA officials generally spoke in terms consistent with API's message.
The message the paper industry defined for the US EPA mirrored its own message, which
Cavaney defined in his memo to API members in August 1987:
-- The dioxin detected at some pulp and paper mills is in extremely low quantities --
levels not even measurable as recently as two years ago.
-- All evidence to date suggests no real hazard is associated with these levels.
-- To resolve any possible uncertainties about the significance of these detections,
the industry is moving quickly to complete a joint study with the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.4
The slight difference was the paper industry hid behind its cooperation with the EPA to gain
credibility with the general public. To help spokespeople for member companies stay on
message and hone their media skills, API organized with the help of the public relations firm
Burson-Marsteller, a three-day training in April 1987.1
Another objective of API was to have the US EPA re-evaluate the toxicity of dioxin.
"Get EPA to 'rethink' dioxin risk assessment" was an objective listed in the API's Dioxin Public
Affairs Plan.2 The benefits of a lowered risk assessment for dioxin were clear to the industry, as
the API's Dioxin Coordinating Committee recognized in its summary paper from meetings held
* Cambridge Reports Inc., 1987.
2 Ibid.
3 American Paper Institute, 1987.
4 Cavaney, 1987.
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in June 1987: "If the [dioxin risk] assessment were to be changed, the basis for questioning the
industry's dioxin levels, could cease to exist."3 The paper industry, with the help of the chemical
industry, later succeeded in persuading the US EPA to review its dioxin risk assessment.
Recognizing the importance of having "independent" scientists supporting the industry's
position of, no action on dioxins, the Deep Pulp papers revealed the early initiatives of API staff
to mobilize scientists sympathetic to their position. John Festa of API began exploring the
formation of an external Independent Science Advisory Board and an internal in-house advisory
panel in May 1987 to achieve the following actions:
We must aggressively advance the legitimate views held by many experts within the
scientific community that the U.S. government takes an unduly conservative view with
respect to the health effects of dioxin.
Our objectives in involving these two groups would be to: a) possibly delay any 'rush to
judgment' on the part of federal or state agencies and, in turn the consuming public,
based upon health impact assumptions that may be scientifically questionable; to b)
possibly change the assumptions on which current federal government policies are based;
and c) provide the industry with the best available advice and expertise."
The anticipated cost for an "independent" Science Advisory Panel: $150,000.5 API later decided
to fund an "$8 million research project by the Chemical Industry Institute of Technology to
determine how dioxin causes cancer and whether it causes cancer in humans." 6
Despite Deep Pulp revealing API's political strategy, the US paper industry's campaign
against regulation and market change proved very effective. It delayed federal regulations for 13
years. It limited the standards set in the final federal regulations to levels consistent with the
industry's objectives. It prompted a dioxin reassessment by the US EPA in 1991. It blocked the
formation of a market for totally chlorine-free (TCF) paper in the US.
1Raulston, 1987.
2 American Paper Institute, 1987.





9.2.4 The Deep Pulp papers capture national press attention
When Greenpeace USA released the Deep Pulp papers at a press conference in Green
Bay on Wednesday, 23 September, the Associated Press picked up two stories from Joyce
McLean, director, Great Lakes campaign, Greenpeace International: 1) dioxin contaminates
paper products "ranging from facial tissue to disposable diapers and office copying paper," and
2) "government and industry officials have conspired to conceal a risk of toxic dioxin in paper
products." Dioxin in paper products was a story likely to attract media attention because of the
widespread use of bleached paper products. However, by emphasizing dioxin in paper products
it placed Greenpeace USA in the impossible position of showing any harm from the products.
The day after Greenpeace USA released the Deep Pulp papers, dioxin in paper products
was front page news in The New York Times: "Traces of dioxin found in range of paper goods."
Two days later, the story had spread across the country: "Dioxin found in some paper products:
concentrations reported in EPA study seen as no threat to health" (The Washington Post, page
A4);' "EPA says many paper products contain dioxin" (Los Angeles Times, page 4);2
"Contaminant traces: sizing up the risk of dioxin in paper" (Christian Science Monitor, front
page);3 and "Paper industry moves to back its claims that dioxin-tainted goods pose no risk" (The
Wall Street Journal, page 5).
A month after releasing No Margin ofSafety Greenpeace USA had created, with the help
of an anonymous person inside the API, a national story. Yet the messages and actions from US
EPA officials continued to support the objectives of the paper industry as defined by API. Over
the last four months of 1987 officials of the US EPA: stated that dioxins in paper products are
' Weisskopf, 1987.
2 Associated Press, 1987.
3 Belsie, 1987.
4 Taylor, Freedman, and Koenig, 1987.
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not of concern, despite indications from US EPA data that dioxins could be of concern; delayed
decision-making until completing further studies; and recommended downgrading the cancer-
risk level for dioxins.
When reporters asked, do the "traces" of dioxin found in paper products pose a threat to
human health, US EPA and industry representatives replied, there is little to worry about. And
that was the leading sentence in David Weisskopf's article in The Washington Post: "Some
everyday paper products are contaminated by tiny amounts of the cancer-causing chemical
dioxin, but concentrations of the pollutant are too low to warrant public health concern,
government and industry officials said yesterday."
Dr. John A. Moore, assistant administrator; US EPA, concluded that "'There's no basis to
be concerned at this time that any of these products are unsafe.'" The risks posed by such low
levels, Moore added, "'get down to negligible.' 2 In reaching these conclusions Moore seemed
to go out of his way to declare paper products safe. Especially since preliminary data from the
US EPA indicated excess cancer risks from dioxin in coffee filters were 1 in 1,000 to 1 in
100,00, 3 levels that usually prompt regulatory action. Excess cancers of 1 in 100,000 to 1 in
1,000,000 are acceptable to the EPA, not 1 in 1,000 or 1 in 10,000.
The US EPA's response to dioxins in paper products and dioxins in pulp mill effluent
was further research. Moore explained that "the E.P.A. will now look at some 90 paper mills
around the country to determine to what extent each mill's paper [and water effluent] is
contaminated by dioxin and to 'find out how we can reduce the levels"' of dioxin from paper







In early October the US EPA publicly released its preliminary report on risks from dioxin
exposure in paper products. Bill Waugh, Office of Toxic Substances, US EPA, concluded that
the finding "'does not warrant any immediate action,"" despite the data showing that "five of
seven items sampled pose a slightly higher risk of cancer than the Environmental Protection
Agency considers acceptable." 2 For coffee filters, "the increased risk of cancer would be one
additional case for every 10,000 people ... At risk levels this high, the Government frequently
takes regulatory action to protect the public." 3 Bill Waugh was unconcerned because
conservative assumptions "may have overstated the extent of exposure to the toxic chemical."4
The US EPA, along with the other regulatory agencies responsible for the safety of paper
products -- Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Consumer Product Safety Commission --
responded to the data on dioxins in paper products by committing to perform further research on
the problem: "Answers may start emerging some 18 months from now." 5
The US EPA further enhanced the paper industry's efforts to avoid dioxin regulation
when an internal committee recommended in December 1987 that the agency reduce its estimate
of the cancer-causing potential of dioxin from 0.006 to 0.1 picogram per kilogram body weight
per day.6 The 0.1 picogram/kilogram level is the amount of dioxin needed to cause a 1 in
1,000,000 risk of cancer from dioxin.7 While the US EPA never implemented this
recommendation, it signaled to sources of dioxin emissions that the agency was open to









wanted the agency to downgrade its dioxin risk assessment.
While no evidence ever emerged of US EPA officials making policy decisions in
collusion with paper industry officials, US EPA communications and decisions in 1987 remained
consistent with the objectives of API: see Table 9.2 for a side-by-side comparison. As Michael
Weisskopf reported in The Washington Post in October, when he wrote an in-depth article on the
Deep Pulp papers, "The EPA generally appeared to fall in line with industry objectives, although
its spokesman, Dave Cohen, insisted that the agency 'was on its own track. If they [paper
industry officials] were attempting to be manipulative, it never entered our thinking." If API
officials never coordinated with EPA officials on how to reply to questions on dioxins in the
paper industry, then agency officials simply had the same thoughts as paper industry officials.
Journalists also framed their initial stories in terms that favored the objectives of industry.
The articles immediately after the release of the Deep Pulp papers emphasized the levels of
dioxins in paper products and downplayed the issue of whether any dioxin should be in a paper
product or effluent from a paper mill. The de facto assumption was a little dioxin is okay. David
Weisskopf's article in The Washington Post is illustrative of how American reporters portrayed
dioxin. Weisskopf implied that dioxin is only slightly toxic when he wrote: "TCDD is classified
by the EPA as a probable human carcinogen, although its only proven danger to humans is a
disfiguring skin disease called chloracne." 2 Weisskopf wrote this despite extensive evidence at
the time that TCDD was the most potent human-created carcinogen, was a reproductive toxicant
in animal studies relevant to humans, and is a persistent and bioaccumulative chemical.
To present the position critical of industry and government, journalists turned primarily




Table 9.2 Comparison of US EPA communications and decisions in 1987 to API
objectives
US EPA -- Statements and Decisions API -- Statements and Objectives
David Ryan, spokesman, US EPA,
22 August 1987
- "Most of the data in the report has already
been released"
David Cohen, spokesman, US EPA, 23
September 1987
- "new techniques only recently have been
developed enabling researchers to
measure the much smaller
concentrations found in the pulp mills"
- "there is no evidence to suggest that
such minute quantities pose a health
hazard."'
Dr. John A. Moore, assistant administrator, US
EPA, 24 September 1987
- the E.P.A. will now look at some 90
paper mills around the country to
determine to what extent each mill's paper
[and water effluent] is contaminated by
dioxin2
Dr. John A. Moore, assistant administrator, US
EPA, 25 September 1987
- "'There's no basis to be concerned at this
time that any of these products are
unsafe,' he said, adding that the risks
posed by such low levels 'get down to
negligible." 3
US EPA, Internal study recommends lowering
cancer risk from dioxin, 8 December 1987
- the US EPA "in a new draft study ... has
sharply reduced its estimate of the
cancer-causing potential of dioxin"4
Carol Raulston, vice president government
affairs, API, 31 August 1987
- let's make "the paper industry findings
appear as 'old news.' ... we should note that
the study has been out in draft form for over
a year..."
API - Dioxin Public Affairs Plan, March 1987
- "The dioxin detected at some pulp and paper
mills is in extremely low quantities'-- levels
not even measurable as recently as two
years ago."
- "All evidence to date suggests no real
hazard is associated with these levels."
Red Cavaney, president, API,
30 December 1986
"forestall major regulatory ... difficulties
by, among other things, agreeing to
cooperate in a joint study with EPA"5
API - Dioxin Public Affairs Plan, March 1987
- Get EPA to "characterize as 'not a real
threat to environment or public health'"
- "All evidence to date suggests no real
hazard is associated with these levels."
API, Dioxin Coordinating Committee,
16-17 June 1987
- "If the [dioxin risk] assessment were to be
changed, the basis for questioning the
industry's dioxin levels, could cease to
exist."A
quoted Silbergeld emphasizing that "despite the low levels of TCDD, the industry findings 'can't






6 American Paper Institute, 1987.
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periods. ... [Therefore] she called on the EPA to ban the bleaching process at paper mills to
eliminate the risk."' But Silbergeld was framed as a lone voice in a sea of unanimity.
Over the following months The New York Times, in particular, emphasized opportunities
for downplaying the risks from dioxin exposure. Most striking was the title to Shabecoff's
article on the preliminary risk assessment results on dioxins in paper products, released by the
US EPA in October: "Risks from dioxin called fairly low." This was the title to an article that
stated: "At risk levels this high [for exposure to dioxins from coffee filters], the Government
frequently takes regulatory- action to protect the public."2 The title for The Washington Post's
article on the same topic was quite different: "Dioxin in paper products raises concerns at EPA:
levels of cancer-causing agent slightly higher than agency consider acceptable." And when an
internal study within the US EPA recommended that the agency reduce its estimate of dioxin's
carcinogenicity in December 1987, The New York Times placed it on the front page: "Estimate of
risk of dioxin is cut in cancer study." Yet when the US EPA's science advisory board concluded
a year later that there was no scientific basis for changing the cancer risk dose for dioxin, The
New York Times did not report that decision. In the upcoming years The*New York Times
continued to play a leadership role in featuring articles that downplayed the risks associated with
dioxin.'
Reporters also devoted little space to assessing how people could avoid exposure to
dioxins in paper products or how mills could reduce dioxin formation. And when they delved
into the solution side, they accepted industry claims that there were no known solutions for
reducing dioxins. For example, Philip Shabecoff of The New York Times quoted Red Cavaney of




dioxin produced in the papermaking process. But he added, 'there is no readily apparent solution
to the problem.' 2 That statement is an outright lie.
First, industry officials knew by that time that chlorine was the primary source of dioxins.
In the same article Shabecoff quotes Michael Farrar of API stating that "dioxin contamination
occurs when paper is bleached with chlorinated compounds." 3 Second, it was widely known
within the industry that mills: reduced chlorine use with oxygen delignification, reduced
organochlorine pollution by using oxygen and/or chlorine dioxide,4 and could partially substitute
5chlorine dioxide for chlorine in the first bleaching stage.
Another solution known at the time was to avoid bleached paper products in the first
place. In an article run by the Associated Press about a man who ate toilet paper, the man wrote
the US EPA asking if he was at risk. David Cohen, US EPA spokesman, replied: "'it might be
advisable if you avoided eating paper products from bleached kraft pulp."'6 This was one of the
rare moments in 1987 when the American press and the US EPA implied that buying unbleached
products was a method for reducing dioxin exposure. Certainly Greenpeace USA staff deserve
part of the blame for the poor reporting on solutions: they had little knowledge of the solutions
available on the market in the US.
From the perspective of Greenpeace USA's nascent efforts to change pulp bleaching
processes, the reporting on dioxin in paper products was mixed. At one level the attention made
' For example, see Schneider, 1991.
2 Shabecoff, 1987.
3 Ibid.
4 For example, pulp and paper researchers in Canada reported in 1987: "Oxygen delignification of unbleached pulp
has been shown to be a cost effective method of reducing pollution. It reduces the lignin content of unbleached pulp
by about 50%, resulting in corresponding reductions in chlorine use and dissolved chlorinated organics [which
include dioxins] in the bleach plant effluent" (Galloway, Schmid, and Lebidoff, 1987, p. 27).
s For example, Chemical Week reported on 7 October 1987 that sodium chlorate (the feedstock for making chlorine
dioxide) "is replacing chlorine in producing bright pulp" and in Europe "there are environmental reasons behind the
growth as pulp mills require more chlorate" (Rivoire, 1987, p. 26).
6 Darst, 1987.
318
dioxins in the paper industry a national issue: thirty two articles on "dioxin" and "paper" and
"mills" appeared in the US press between September and December.' The content of the
articles, however, largely favored the positions of the US EPA and API.2 The American press
was unwilling to raise the problems of very low level exposures to dioxin, as Jock Ferguson did
in The Globe and Mail of Toronto: "There are no immediate identifiable health effects from low
levels [of dioxin exposure], but no safe level of the substance has ever been determined." 3
The paper industry, led by the American Paper Institute staff, did an incredible job of
damage control in the midst of a serious crisis. When reporters framed the story as "trace" levels
of dioxins in paper products and EPA officials said the levels are safe, they scored a victory.
When The New York Times began to take a skeptical position on the toxicity of dioxin, they
scored a victory. And for its part, the staff of the American Paper Institute kept on message as
did most. of the spokespeople for individual companies. In a rare candid statement from the
industry, William Trice, executive vice president, research and development, at Union Camp
Corp. 4 admitted that: "'The (paper industry) has to be justifiably concerned"' with the detection
of cancer-causing dioxin in paper products.5 Over the next few years the paper industry
continued to be on the defensive. The question was, how many dollars would be invested in less
polluting bleaching technologies to satisfy regulators and consumers and by when?
9.3 Greenpeace USA: the early years of the pulp and paper campaign
The US pulp and paper campaign "grew organically," as pulp and paper campaigner
Mark Floegel described it: "it was not thought out, it grew out of action."6 Eventually the
Based on a search using Dow Jones Interactive.
2 Weisskopf did write an extensive article on the Deep Pulp papers a month after their release in October 1987
(Weisskopf, 1987).
3 Ferguson, 1987.
4 Union Camp Corp. is now owned by International Paper.
s Taylor, Freedman, and Koenig, 1987.
6 Floegel, 1999.
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campaign grew into a "multi-front campaign that included public education, media attention,
regulators, local campaigns like the one against the Pigeon River mill [owned by Champion
International], and Congress."' From 1987-1989 the organic approach worked. Greenpeace
USA staff followed their intuition, pursued approaches that seemed promising, and kept pressure
on the industry to eliminate dioxins.
9.3.1 North American Inlands Water Expedition
The North American Inland Waters Expedition was the first major follow-up to No
Margin of Safety. Using Greenpeace International's 78-foot river boat Beluga, Greenpeace
USA, Greenpeace Canada, and the Greenpeace Great Lakes campaign (which International
funded) launched a six-month toxics tour in 1988. Starting in Montreal in May the Beluga
traveled up the St. Lawrence River, through the Great Lakes, and down the Mississippi River,
ending in New Orleans in November. 2 The purpose of the tour, said Joyce McLean, Great Lakes
campaign director, was to "raise public awareness of pollution around the Great Lakes [and
along the Mississippi River] and try to increase public pressure for cleanup." 3
From the perspective of the pulp and paper campaign, the North American Inland Waters
Expedition raised local awareness of dioxins from pulp and paper mills when newspapers
reported Greenpeace actions.4 Newspapers in Canada covered actions at two Canadian mills,
when Greenpeace climbers tagged the banner, "Dioxin Kills" to the Domtar Fine Paper Mill in
Cornwall, Ontario5 and Canadian Pacific Forest Products Ltd. mill in Thunder Bay, Ontario. 6 A




4 A search of Dow Jones Interactive for "Greenpeace" and "Beluga" and "paper" in 1988 revealed seven articles
covering pulp and paper mills: four in Canadian and three in American newspapers.
5 Toronto Star, 1988
6 Canadian Press, 1988.
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Natchez, Mississippi, when climbers tagged that mill's water tower with the banner, "Take the
poison out of the pulp."'
9.3.2 The International Joint Commission (IJC)
The first segment of the Inland Waters Expedition was part of a broader campaign -- the
Great Lakes campaign -- to reduce toxics pollution in the region. Started in 1983, the Great
Lakes campaign was one of a handful of regional ecosystem campaigns funded by Greenpeace
International to improve the health of large water ecosystems. 2 Within the Great Lakes
campaign, the International Joint Commission (IJC) became a focal point for action.
Established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between Canada and the United
States, the role of the IJC is to help manage and protect the waters of the Great Lakes. Much of
the IJC's current work involves helping governments clean up the Great Lakes and prevent
further pollution. 3 Canada and the United States agreed to control water pollution and to clean
up waste waters from industries and communities when they signed the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement of 1972. When the two nations signed a new Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement in 1978, they committed to trying to prevent persistent toxic substances from entering
the Great Lakes.4 The 1978 agreement includes Annex 12 - Persistent Toxics Substances, which
commits the nations to developing:
"Regulatory strategies for controlling or preventing the input of persistent toxic
substances to the Great Lakes System ... :
(i) The intent of programs specified in this Annex is to virtually eliminate the
input of persistent toxic substances ...
(ii) The philosophy adopted for control of inputs of persistent toxic substances shall
be zero discharge ... [emphasis added]'
Associated Press, 1988.
2 Other ecosystem campaigns were: the Baltic Sea, North Sea, and Mediterranean campaigns (Peerla, 1997, p. 154).
3 See the IJC's webpage at: www.ijc.org.
4 See the IJC's webpage at: www.ijc.org.
5 International Joint Commission, 1987.
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The 1989 biennial meeting of the UC marked the beginning of chlorine becoming a major
issue for the UC. 1 In the late 1980s Greenpeace International and some of its national members
began campaigning against chlorine because "chlorine poses a severe threat to the ecosystem and
must be phased out." 2 The argument for targeting chlorine was, it is the chemical common to a
range of persistent, toxic, and/or bioaccumulative chemicals: notably DDT, PCBs, CFCs, and
dioxins. Joe Thornton defined Greenpeace USA's argument against chlorine and
organochlorines in the report, The product is the poison: the case for a chlorine phase-out:
Enough is known about the persistence and toxicity of organochlorines as a class to
justify an outright ban. Only a tiny portion of the many organochlorines in commerce
have been subjected to even preliminary hazard assessments, and many more
organochlorine by-products and breakdown products remain unidentified and thus
unassessed. Regulating organochlorines one-by-one is doomed to failure. A shift of
regulatory focus from individual chemicals to the class of organochlorines is necessary.
The banning of individual organochlorines over the last two decades has resulted in
drastic reductions in inputs of these chemicals to the environment. Now, that strategy
must be applied to the entire class of organochlorines. To prevent further cont9inually
increasing levels of organochlorine contamination, the manufacture and use of all
organochlorines must be phased out. Because all uses of chlorine also produce
organochlorines, all uses of chlorine must be phased out as well.3
In 1991, after lobbying by Greenpeace and other environmental organizations, the UC called for
the virtual elimination of chlorine in the Great Lakes region (see Chapter 10 for details).
9.3.3 Working at the grassroots: Pigeon River mill in North Carolina
Fights by local citizens to cleanup water pollution from mills were a driving force for
innovation at the old Champion International mill in Canton, North Carolina and the Louisiana
Pacific mill in Samoa, California.' Despite Greenpeace only being involved in the Canton mill
fight, these cases illustrate the important and sometimes effective environmental work that
happens at the grassroots.
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1Botts and Muldoon, 1996.
2 Thornton, 1991, p. 1.
I bid., p. 4.
Two citizen groups began prodding Champion International2 to cleanup water pollution
from its Canton mill in North Carolina in the early 1980s: the Dead Pigeon River Council of
Tennessee and Pigeon River Action Group of North Carolina. The Canton mill discharged its
wastewater effluent into the Pigeon River, which flows west from the mill into Tennessee.
Upstream from the Canton mill, the Pigeon was a pristine mountain river supporting sport fish
like trout. Downstream from the mill, residents in neighboring Tennessee received a river that
included no viable populations of sport fish, fish contaminated with high levels of dioxin, highly
discolored water, and water unacceptable for drinking. 3 The local activists eventually forced a
substantial modernization of the Canton mill in the 1990s that included oxygen delignification
and a new technology developed by Champion called "bleached filtrate recycling," which
enabled the mill to recycle its chlorine dioxide wastewater, after filtering chlorides out, through
the recovery boiler.4 Greenpeace USA and Environmental Defense provided technical support
and Greenpeace USA performed an action near the mill.5
9.3.4 Reaching consumers through milk
Greenpeace USA entered consumer campaigning with milk cartons. Renate Kroesa, pulp
and paper coordinator, Greenpeace International, catalyzed the milk carton controversy.
Attending an international dioxin conference in Umea, Sweden in the summer of 1988 she heard
John Ryan from Health and Welfare Canada present finding dioxins in milk packaged in paper
products, but not in milk packaged in containers made from plastic or glass.6 Kroesa alerted
1At the Louisiana Pacific mill it was a lawsuit by the Surfriders Foundation that catalyzed the development and
adoption of innovative bleaching technology. The innovations at these mills will be discussed in Chapter 10.




6 Kroesa, 1999 and Turner, 1988.
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reporters in Canada on the research.' Janice Turner picked up the story in August and reported
in The Toronto Star that a "federal scientist had found traces of dioxin and related toxic
compounds in milk products sold in plasticized containers." 2
A few months later the story crossed the border. In November The Seattle Times ran the
first story on dioxins from milk cartons 3 when Bill Dietrich reported that the US FDA "is
beginning similar checks" as completed in Canada on dioxin in milk from bleached cardboard
milk cartons.4 The story attained a slightly higher level of prominence in the press when the US
Congress, House Energy and Commerce Committee, subcommittee on Health and Environment,
heard testimony on dioxins in paper products on 8 December. Officials from the regulatory
agencies -- EPA, FDA and Consumer Products Safety Commission -- responsible for assessing
the risks of dioxins in paper products reported that they could not answer questions on the risks
posed by dioxin in bleached paper products until they gathered more information.5 Yet, Richard
Ronk, acting director of FDA's Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition reported: "'Based
on the information available, we do not believe that the very low levels of dioxins and furans that
have been reported in paper products represents a significant health risk. ' 6 Janet Hieber of
Greenpeace USA and Ellen Silbergeld of Environmental Defense testified at the hearing in
support of eliminating dioxin pollution from paper mills.7 With Representative Henry Waxman
of Los Angeles chairing the subcommittee hearing, the Los Angeles Times picked up the story,
titling it: "Milk cartons to be studied for any dioxin traces."8
1 Kroesa, 1999.
2 Turner, 1988.
' Based on search for "dioxin" and "milk" in Dow Jones Interactive.
4 Dietrich, 1988.




Despite what seemed to be a major story, dioxins in milk from paper products and
Congressional hearings, the story received little additional press. Then Greenpeace USA
captured regional press attention in February 1989 when it petitioned the US Department of
Agriculture (USDA), which subsidizes the national School Lunch Program, "to ensure that milk
provided to children is not contaminated with dioxin that migrated out of the milk carton"' by
requiring the use of containers that do not leach dioxin. With three wire services -- The
Associated Press,2 State News Service,3 and Reuters News Service4 -- picking up the story, it
spread across the country. The Los Angeles Times, Houston Chronicle, The Evening News
Harrisburg, St. Petersburg Times, and Tulsa World all carried the story.5
A challenge Greenpeace USA faced was the lack of unbleached milk cartons on the
market in the US. Janet Hieber conceded at Greenpeace's press conference that "The products
[unbleached milk cartons] are not on the marketplace today," although they are available in
Sweden.6 When reporters asked, how should consumers respond in the absence of alternatives,
Hieber acknowledged that the purpose of the petition was to create change through market
demand:
Q Could we go back for a minute to the question about a plastic containers ... I've known
in the past Greenpeace has been very active in saying "We don't want these things
washing up." Environmental impact statements aside, or report requests aside, you know,
that's the first thing that people are going to do if people take this seriously -- buy more
plastic, buy less paper.
MS. HIEBER: I would suspect that there would be a very short period of that, because I
think that will drive the paper industry to switch to unbleached paper rather than anything
else.
Q So are you hoping then that market forces will resolve this? Or do you expect that
market forces will resolve this faster than your legal avenues?
1 US Newswire, 1989.
2 Darst, 1989.
3 Hackel, 1989.
4 Reuters News Service, 1989.
5 See Dow Jones Interactive, search for "Greenpeace," "dioxin," and "milk."
6 Federal News Service, 1989.
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MS. HIEBER: We think this is probably one of the first opportunities for the market to
work its will. The consumer had no idea that it was in the product, and if nothing else this
will serve to help the market to actually serve as a free market with an informed
consumer.
While the USDA petition would be denied when the FDA found that dioxins in paper
products held no appreciable risk to consumers, Greenpeace USA had, through the press, begun
to tap into consumer concerns with dioxin contamination in particular and green buying in
general. In the late 1980s American consumers were beginning to buy green. For example,
USA Today published an article in August 1989 titled: "Going for the 'green:' marketers target
environment; companies make products nice to nature."' Bleached coffee filters became the first
dioxin-related paper product casualty in the US. Shortly after Greenpeace USA petitioned the
USDA, Rockline Inc. of Sheboygan, Wisconsin introduced "Natural Brew" coffee filters made
from unbleached filter paper. 2 Then in July, Melitta, the world's largest manufacturer of coffee
filters, introduced unbleached filters in the US: "H. Helmut Radtke, the president of Melitta
North America, said the filter was a response to consumer demand for environmentally safe
nature products." 3
The milk carton crisis, along with the Congressional hearings and further data on dioxin
contamination, did capture the attention of the paper industry. Writing in the journal Dairy
Foods, in June 1989 Alan Levitt reported that "new dioxin-free cartons could be available as
soon as this month, or as late as next year, depending on the availability of the [chlorine dioxide]
generators and how quickly plants can adjust their piping," which must be replaced because of
the corrosivity of chlorine dioxide.4
1 Maney, 1989.




When the FDA released the findings from the report in September 1989, it re-ignited
press interest in the story, this time capturing attention in many of the nation's major daily
newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times ("Traces of Dioxin Leaching from Paper Cartons
into Milk"), New York Times ("Cartons Found Leaching Dioxin to Milk"), and Houston
Chronicle ("FDA Confirms Low Dioxin Levels in Milk"). The FDA found dioxins in "very low
levels that do not pose a threat" to human health. The FDA Commissioner Frank Young stated
that since "'The paper industry committed itself last year to modifying the production of
bleached paper and paperboard so they contribute essentially no dioxin to the milk"', it would
"'closely monitor these efforts to be sure they are accomplished expeditiously."
9.3.5 The weak solution element
In trying to catalyze change in the paper industry Greenpeace USA staff consistently
invoked Sweden as the model for the American paper industry. "Greenpeace ... is hoping
consumers will put pressure on the paper industry by demanding unbleached paper products
similar to those available in Sweden," wrote Seattle Times reporter Dietrich in 1988.2 And at a
news conference in Portland in 1989, "Greenpeace spokesman William Rostov said the U.S.
paper industry should adopt technologies that Sweden has used [oxygen delignification and
hydrogen peroxide] to cut chlorinated organics by 80 percent in two years."I
While Greenpeace USA staff longed for Swedish style change, they did not invest the
resources to identify the unbleached paper products on the US market that competed with
bleached paper products nor did they identify the mills using oxygen delignification. For
example, Greenpeace magazine published a four-page article in 1989 on dioxin in the paper
industry. Only the last two paragraphs in the article discussed unbleached paper products:
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' PR Newswire, 1989.
2 Dietrich, 1988.
the economic weight brought by changing consumer demand for bleached paper products
may be needed to force government and industry in North America to deal with the
problem [of dioxins in the paper industry]. Greenpeace has asked for the immediate
introduction of chlorine-free and/or unbleached paper products, as well as a higher
recycling rate of paper products.2
The article includes a photograph of Renate Kroesa displaying unbleached products available in
Sweden, but does not list or show any products available in the US.
When G6ran Bryntse began promoting unbleached products in Sweden in 1980 he
scoured the market for unbleached paper products, like unbleached paper bags, that could
compete with bleached paper bags. Greenpeace USA never produced a list of alternatives to
bleached paper products; a list that would have helped to substantiate the claim that paper
products do not have to be bleached to be competitive.
Greenpeace USA also demanded that US mills adopt oxygen delignification technology.
For example, after the Greenpeace action at the International Paper mill in Natchez, Mississippi,
Shelly Stewart, US pulp and paper campaign director, said: "Greenpeace wants International
Paper to stop using the chlorine bleaching process" and replace it with "an oxygen bleaching.
system [that] has proved to be safer and economically feasible." 3
Yet at that time 11 pulp mills had oxygen delignification systems in place in the US (see
Table 9.3). Had Greenpeace campaigners known, Shelly Stewart could have said, "International
Paper should install an oxygen system just like Champion's in Pensacola, Florida." Greenpeace
USA did not have the data because they did not invest in collecting it. Having data on
alternative technologies and products would have strengthened their claims for change.
1Goetze, 1989.
2 von Stackelberg, 1989, p. 11.
3 Associated Press, 1988.
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Table 9.3 Pulp mills with oxygen delignificati n systems as of 31 December 1988
Production Production Start-up
Mill Name Location (metric tpd) (1000 metric tpy) Date
Champion International 1,400 490
Pensacola, FL 800 280 1986
Pensacola, FL 600 210 1986
Chesapeake West Point, VA 300 105 1972
Consolidated Papers Wisconsin Rapids, WI 500 175 1986
Louisiana Pacific Samoa, CA 705 247 1988
Pentair (Cross Pointe) Park Falls, WI 101 35 1987
Union Camp 1,380 823
Franklin, VA 720 252 1981
Eastover, SC 660 231 1983
Wausau Paper Brokaw, WI 290 1 102 1988
Weyerhaeuser Ogelthorpe, GA 970 340 1981
Willamette Industries Bennettsville, SC 840 294 1 1988
Source: US EPA, 1993
9.4 Environmental Defense: merging science and law
In the early years of its work to address pollution from pulp and paper mills,
Environmental Defense relied upon its two-pronged strategy of using science to define
environmental problems and legal expertise to negotiate a solution. When the story broke on
dioxins in paper products, reporters called Environmental Defense's toxicologist, Ellen K.
Silbergeld, PhD. Silbergeld began working with Environmental Defense in 1982 on eliminating
lead in gasoline.' Shortly thereafter, with growing concerns over dioxin emissions from garbage
incinerators, Environmental Defense and Silbergeld started working for dioxin reduction.2 In
1984 Environmental Defense and the National Wildlife Federation filed their petition with the
US EPA to regulate dioxins under authority of TSCA (see Chapter 6).
When reporters called after Greenpeace USA released the Deep Pulp papers, Silbergeld




Shabecoff of The New York Times quoted Dr. Silbergeld contesting the "trace" levels argument
of industry and the EPA:
Dr. Ellen K. Silbergeld ... pointed out that the agency required chemical makers to report
the presence of dioxin in their products at levels of 100 parts per trillion. Therefore the
amount found in paper pulp, which is formed into paper products, is not negligible, she
said.
She also said that while there may be a continuing debate on whether dioxin is a cause of
cancer in humans, the weight of evidence shows that it has effects on the human immune
system and causes birth defects and damage to fetuses. "I think we are facing a national
health problem," she said.'
That a scientist with an environmental organization had to make points on the toxicity of
TCDD that were well known at the time -- is a known reproductive toxicant in relevant animal
studies, is toxic at low doses, is persistent, bioaccumulates in the body, and very small exposures
matter -- reflects the extent to which US EPA officials in the Reagan administration sought to
temper concerns over dioxins in the paper industry. It was only years later, once the US EPA
decided to regulate dioxin, that it emphasized many of the points Silbergeld made in 1987:
"Dioxin is a highly toxic chemical and is a probable human carcinogen. Dioxin persists in the
environment and can accumulate in the tissue of fish, other wildlife and humans. It has caused
cancer, liver dysfunction and toxic effects in laboratory animals."2
The prominence reporters in premier national newspapers gave Silbergeld and
Environmental Defense contrasted with the silent treatment given to Greenpeace USA. In the
lead articles that followed the release of the Deep Pulp papers, Shabecoff of The New York Times
and Weisskopf of The Washington Post both quoted Silbergeld and named Environmental
Defense, but neither mentioned Greenpeace. The lack of media attention no doubt irritated
Greenpeace USA staff, especially since they broke the dioxin story and have penchant for media
attention.
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Mark Floegel of Greenpeace stated in general that "We [Greenpeace staff] had a distrust
of Environmental Defense and NRDC [Natural Resources Defense Council]." This distrust
stemmed from the view within Greenpeace that Environmental Defense compromised with
industry and government too often and quickly. Floegel explained that "There is a split within
the environmental community, with the reasonable ones more likely to agree to compromises." 3
The distrust of Environmental Defense was held more broadly than just Greenpeace staff,
extending to grassroots toxics activists as well. For example, the investigative journalist Mark
Dowie found that Environmental Defense stepped into a "nationwide consumer campaign
against McDonald's led by Penny Newman of Concerned Neighbors in Action (Los Angeles)
and Lois Gibbs at the Citizens' Clearing House for Hazardous Waste" to negotiate an agreement
that "fell far short of the expectations of Gibbs, Newman, and other grassroots activists." 4
Environmental Defense staff, on the other hand, saw Greenpeace and other
environmental organizations taking unattainable positions and losing opportunities for greater
gain by refusing to compromise. For example, Lauren Blum, senior scientist with Environmental
Defense, later lamented that environmentalists lost the chance for the US EPA to require oxygen
bleaching because Greenpeace and the grassroots activists only accepted TCF paper as the
solution to bleach mill pollution.5
On the legal side, Environmental Defense and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF)
filed a lawsuit with the US EPA to force the agency to regulate dioxins in 1985 (see Chapter 6).
Initially the US EPA sought to have the case dismissed in its entirety, but the court ruled in favor
1Shabecoff, 1987.
2 US EPA, 1990.
3 Floegel, 1999.
4 Dowie, 1995, p. 139.
5 Blum-, 1997.
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of the plaintiffs and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss March 1987.1 API staff recognized
early in 1987, prior to national media attention, that the lawsuit could have serious implications
for the paper industry. John Festa (API) highlighted in a memo to Mike Farrar (API) provisions
of concern to paper manufacturers:
The outcome of this case could have significant implications for our industry considering
that the long list of petitioner's requests include:
1. That EPA use the authority of Section 307(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act to
promulgate an effluent prohibition for the discharge of dioxins and furans ...
2. Ban the distribution ... of products containing dioxins and furans in concentrations
greater than 100 ppt.
3. Require a warning label for any product which still contains ... concentrations
greater than 10 ppt.2
Under pressure of coming to trial at a time when dioxins in the paper industry were a
national issue, the US EPA negotiated a consent decree with Environmental Defense and NWF
in 1988. The consent decree (Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, DC DC, No. 85-0973,
7/27/88) required the US EPA to:
1. conduct a risk assessment for dioxins in effluent from pulp mills by 30 April 1989
2. within a year after beginning risk assessment the agency must take one of four
actions
a. begin rulemaking under the Clean Water Act to control dioxins in paper mill
discharges
b. refer the matter to another federal regulatory agency
c. decide not to propose regulations nor make a referral, and explain why
d. determine that the agency needs more information to take any of the three above
options.
3. prepare guidance on issuing pollutant discharge permits for pulp mills to address
dioxin in effluent by 30 April 1990.3
At the time the consent decree looked like a major victory for Environmental Defense. As Karen
Florini, attorney for Environmental Defense, remarked: "'The consent decree is a critical means
of ensuring that action will happen [in the paper industry] ... with this remarkably potent class of
' Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 657 F. Supp. 302 (DC DC, No. 85-0973,
1987).
2 Festa, 1987.
3 Bureau of National Affairs, 1988.
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toxics."' The consent decree placed the US EPA on a timeline for completing research and
making decisions; regulations banning dioxin from pulp mills seemed imminent.
The US EPA's next steps implied a quickening of pace towards regulatory action. In
August 1988 the US EPA's acting administrator for water, Rebecca Hanmer, issued an interim
strategy document that called for regulators in the states to develop water quality standards for
dioxin. In the US, states have the option of deciding whether they want to implement federal
water pollution laws and regulations. States that accept this responsibility issue permits to
pollute, called National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. All pulp
mills, because of the scale of their wastewater discharges have NPDES permits unless they
discharge directly to a publicly owned sewage treatment facility. Thirty nine states had the
authority to issue NPDES permits in 1988.
The US EPA's interim strategy document recommended that NPDES permits "be
reissued or reopened for pulp and paper mills to include monitoring requirements for dioxin and
stricter effluent limits if the contaminant is found." 2 The interim strategy was not required by the
consent decree3 nor was it legally binding.4 But it did, as Florini explained, "put permit writers
across the country on notice to take a look at dioxin discharges.' 5
Then in March 1989 The New York Times broke the story (although not on the front page)
on preliminary findings from two studies by the US EPA:
SU.S. EPA/Paper Industry Cooperative Dioxin Screening Study, "The 104-Mill Study:"
statistical findings and analyses6
'Ibid.
2 Bureau of National Affairs, 1988.
3 Ibid.
4 For example, when the API contested EPA Region IV's policy statement to southeastern states that they control
dioxin in wastewater discharges from pulp mills, the US District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ruled:
"'The policy statement issued by Region IV is not binding upon anyone at this stage, and states are under no
obligation to comply"' (Bureau of National Affairs, 1989).
5 Bureau of National Affairs, 1988.
6 US EPA, 1990.
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" National study of chemical residues in fish'
These "Two federal studies have confirmed fears that many paper mills are discharging dioxin
into rivers and that the toxic chemical is accumulating in fish downstream."2 The 104-Mill
Study revealed excessive levels of dioxin discharges from chlorine using pulp mills."3 The
dioxin findings included: 1,390 ppt in sludge at Weyerhaeuser plant in Plymouth, NC and 157
ppt in fish caught near the same plant; and 0.36 ppt in wastewater effluent at Boise Cascade
Corp. plant in Wallula, WA.4
Despite clear evidence of excessive dioxin releases from mills and the consent decree,
Jeff Grubbs in the EPA's Office of Water Regulations and Standards announced in July 1989
that "Guidelines regulating dioxin and other toxic and non-conventional pollutants will be issued
in October 1993."I This was six years since the dioxin-paper industry issue reached the national
press (September 1987) and eight years since the agency knew mills were a source of dioxin
pollution (September 1985). In reality, the US EPA would miss its 1993 goal by five years.
Surprisingly the consent decree had no discernible effect on the rate and content of the EPA's
final regulation on pulp and paper mills. As Van Strum and Merrell presciently stated in 1987 in
No Margin ofSafety, the US EPA "would merely suggest 'levels of concern' as advisories to
individual states, relieving EPA from responsibility for dioxin regulation and enforcement." 2
9.5 Analysis
The issue of dioxins in the paper industry expanded rapidly after Greenpeace USA
released No Margin ofSafety and the Deep Pulp papers. By the end of 1989 the pulp and paper
industry was on the defensive. Dioxins in paper products and effluent were a national issue. The
'US EPA, 1992.
2 New York Times, 1989.
3 Bureau of National Affairs, 1989.
4 Ibid.
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US Congress had held hearings on dioxin contamination of paper products and rivers.
Newspapers across the country, including premier newspapers like The New York Times, The
Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post had reported on the issue. A few companies were
marketing unbleached paper products because they did not contain dioxins. And chlorine use
was on the decline.
At the center of this issue expansion was Greenpeace USA. Greenpeace staff made
dioxin pollution from pulp mills a national issue by capturing media attention and by operating at
multiple levels simultaneously. Consistent with the organizational philosophy, Greenpeace USA
staff displayed an impressive capacity to generate media attention: first with No Margin ofSafety
and the Deep Pulp papers, then with direct actions and milk cartons. The chance occurrences of
leaked papers from individuals within the US EPA and API catalyzed the start of the campaign.
They captured media attention by framing the issue in terms that reporters identified
with: dioxins in paper products. The media, with help from US EPA and API officials, then re-
framed the issue as: are these levels safe? A question that played into the expertise of US EPA
officials, who supported the API's message that these are "trace" levels of little worry. They re-
ignited the dangers of dioxin in paper products by spotlighting dioxins in milk -- a product
associated with purity, wholesomeness, and children. The dioxins in milk message caught the
attention of smaller newspapers across the country, thereby raising the level of individual
consumer awareness. They created events to capture media attention, including: issuing a report
-- No Margin of Safety --, releasing the entire set of Deep Pulp papers to reporters, petitioning the
USDA, as well as hanging banners from tall buildings at pulp mills and posting signs along the
Pigeon River.
'Ibid.
2 Van Strum and Merrell, 1987, p. IV-3.
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Greenpeace USA operated at multiple geographic, institutional, and tactical levels
simultaneously. Internationally they coordinated with the Greenpeace Great Lakes campaign,
which targeted activists in the region and the International Joint Commission. Federally they
targeted the USDA and testified at Congressional hearings. Locally they worked with activists
in Tennessee and North Carolina targeting the Canton mill as well as raising awareness through
direct actions at pulp mills during the Inland Waters Expedition. And through the media they
created consumer awareness of paper products contaminated with dioxins. As change agents
Greenpeace staff planted seeds in places they thought fertile.
Strategically the strength of Greenpeace USA's pulp and paper campaign resided in the
attack on dioxins. Reporters were aware of dioxin's toxicity. The majority of the general public,
as indicated in the API polling data, were fearful of dioxin exposure and would avoid it where
possible, i.e., buy products that did not contain dioxin. And there was a history of grassroots
activism against dioxin contamination from pesticides and hazardous waste sites.
Yet there were significant weaknesses in building from the US anti-dioxin movement.
Absent were campaigns against classes of chemicals, such as organochlorines. When
Greenpeace USA, Greenpeace Canada, and the Greenpeace International Great Lakes campaign
targeted organochlorines, they started from scratch. Absent were previous toxic campaigns
targeted at consumers and consumer products. The anti-dioxin movement had targeted
pesticides used by the US Forest Service and called for cleaning-up hazardous waste sites.
Absent were technical experts who promoted safer alternatives. There was no Goran Bryntse
who had been running a consumer campaign for the past seven years for unbleached paper
products because of concerns with the class of organochlorines released from pulp mill effluent.
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Complementing the chaos of Greenpeace USA's pulp and paper campaign was
Environmental Defense's focus on the US EPA. Building from the organization's strengths in
science -- with Ellen Silbergeld -- and lawyers -- with their lawsuit against the US EPA --
Environmental Defense sought a regulatory decision from the US EPA. Given the mass of
evidence of dioxins from US pulp mills using chlorine and the consent decree, quick regulatory
action from the agency seemed entirely plausible in 1989.
If the agency had quickly promulgated regulations to eliminate dioxins from pulp and
paper mills that would have been a victory. Yet this did not happen. And herein lay the problem
with activist work that focuses on a single institution to create change. It creates an all-or-
nothing situation. Especially with a regulatory agency like the US EPA, whose decision would
be imposed across the entire paper industry, a ruling in favor of Environmental Defense would
create a lasting effect (if enforced). If that institution does not take the desired action, however,
then all is lost, or at least delayed until the institution can be cajoled into revisiting the decision.
The US EPA from 1987-1989 was very deferential to the wishes of the pulp and paper
industry and reluctant to set and implement regulations. Given the Reagan Administration's
aversion to regulation it should not be surprising that senior US EPA officials thought and acted
like officials of pulp and paper corporations. Greenpeace USA dealt with the difficulties of
catalyzing regulatory change through the US EPA by operating on the periphery of the agency
and trying to mobilize the media, citizens, and consumers to prod regulatory action. And
Environmental Defense distanced itself from the consent decree with the US EPA in the 1990s as
the organization shifted resources to a market campaign. But the difficulty in moving the US
EPA highlights the importance to environmental campaigns of trying to effect change through
multiple institutions rather than just one.
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Environmental Defense and Greenpeace USA, the two national environmental
organizations attempting to eliminate dioxins from the pulp and paper from 1987-1989, found
cooperation difficult, although the tension remained private. As will unfold in the following
chapters, Environmental Defense, Greenpeace USA, and other environmental groups cooperated
in a loose fashion to try to effect change through the US EPA in the 1990s. Yet it proved to be a
problem that the environmental community could not develop a better coordinated approach that
maximized the efficient use of very scare resources in a battle against a multi-billion dollar
industry. The efforts to change pulp bleaching processes in the US would reveal the pitfalls of
an environmental movement that emphasizes narrow change that benefits individual
organizations over broad-based change that requires truly working together.
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10 Failed attempts at trying to move markets and regulations to cleaner bleaching
technologies
From 1990 to1998 the two most important activities of the national environmental
organizations to change pulp bleaching in the United States centered on Time Inc and the US
EPA. Time Inc. was critical because it was at the center of the market campaigns of Greenpeace
USA and Environmental Defense. While Time Inc. eventually decided to implement
recommendations developed with the Environmental Defense-led Paper Task Force, they were
too late and too quiet to have any ripple effects on the market. And the efforts of the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Greenpeace USA to promote more stringent
regulations were overwhelmed by a well-coordinated, counter-campaign by the environmental
laggards in the paper industry. The national environmental NGOs did have a few successes, but
none of them catalyzed markets shifts to the cleanest production technologies of ECF-lite and
TCF.
Attempts by national environmental NGOs to catalyze change in US bleached kraft pulp
mills were largely a failure. The reasons for the lack of success are four-fold. Competition
among environmental groups rather than collaboration undermined efforts to create momentum
for change. The paper industry, led by its trade association, outplayed the environmental
community: they strong-armed elements of the supply-chain into silence; mobilized politicians
and regulators to support their goals; manufactured scientific uncertainty on dioxin's toxicity;
and after conceding the need to eliminate chlorine gas, rallied behind chlorine dioxide. In the
face of a sophisticated backlash from the paper industry, environmentalists failed to broaden the
campaign to other groups trying to effect change in the paper industry, notably the recycling
community.
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10.1 Trying to move the market: Greenpeace USA and Environmental Defense target
Time Inc.
The efforts of environmentalists to change Time Inc.'s paper procurement specifications
reflected two different strategic approaches to market campaigns and revealed the pitfalls of a
splintered environmental movement. Greenpeace USA sought market success by defining a
challenging goal, then working to persuade corporate buyers to adopt its goal of TCF paper for
their purchasing specifications. Environmental Defense pursued a different model, what it
called "advocacy organization-business partnerships," where environmental organizations
develop voluntary, cooperative projects with corporations.' In the Environmental Defense
model, goals emerge from joint research between Environmental Defense (or its spin-off
organization, the Alliance for Environmental Innovation) and the collaborating corporation. In
both the Environmental Defense and Greenpeace USA models of market change the
environmental groups worked independently of other environmental groups in their corporate
collaborations.
10.1.1 Greenpeace USA's market campaign: TCF through confrontation
Greenpeace USA's market campaign centered on Time Inc. On the periphery were other,
smaller corporate consumers -- Kinko's copy shops and Jossey Bass book publisher -- as well as
manufacturers of bleached kraft pulp and paper products. In the spring of 1990 Greenpeace USA
decided to target Time Inc., owner of Time magazine. 2 Time Inc. made an apt target because it




was the largest magazine publisher in the United States, purchasing 220,000 tons of paper per
year.' When Time Inc. changed its specifications, papermakers took notice:
Until recently, there was not a large supply of recycled coated stock available. However,
several mills have been waiting for a clear signal that investments in deinking facilities
and capital spent revamping paper machines will result in a competitive advantage. With
our decision to use recycled coated stock on an ongoing basis, we believe that a clear
signal has now been sent.2
Time Inc. was vulnerable on environmental issues because it had made earth, "Planet of
the Year," replacing the magazine's usual "Man or Woman of the Year" for the year 1988. The
lead article in that issue challenged Americans to take action:
Let there be no illusions. Taking effective action to halt the massive injury to the earth's
environment will require a mobilization of political will, international cooperation and,
sacrifice unknown except in wartime. ... Our wasteful, careless ways must become a
thing of the past. We must recycle more, procreate less, turn off lights, use mass transit,
do a thousand things differently in our everyday lives. We owe this not to ourselves and
our children but also to the unborn generations who will one day inherit the earth.3
Did this call for change hold for the magazine itself?
Mark Floegel, pulp and paper campaigner for Greenpeace USA, first tried to gain the
attention of Time Inc. in 1990 when he wrote a letter to the editor of Time magazine:
"'Congratulations on the planet of year, calling attention to important issues, you have the
chance to be a leader on chlorine-free. We'd love to sit down to talk with you."' The editor
declined.4 Then in May 1991 Time publisher Robert Miller highlighted environmental actions
taken at Time: "When we at TIME registered our environmental concern by naming the
endangered earth as Planet of the Year for 1988, we began to look in our own backyard" and
started recycling office paper and soda cans.5 Again Floegel tried to gain the attention of Time
Refkin, 1993, p. 143.
2Refkin, 1994.
3 Sancton, 1989, p. 30.
4 Floegel, 1999.
5 Miller, 1991, p. 4.
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Inc. staff. This time he had Greenpeace USA's executive director, Peter Bahouth, write Miller to
repeat the offer of assistance. Again Time rejected Greenpeace's offer.'
In the fall of 1991 Greenpeace USA turned to direct action. Mark Floegel recalled the
chain of events:
Greenpeace development says, pick a target, send a postcard to company, and send check
to Greenpeace. We selected Time as the target for the postcard campaign. Mailing sent
out to 200,000 supporters. Dear Time, Go TCF. Usually get 4% response rate, we got an
11% response rate.2
Now Greenpeace USA had the attention of Time Inc. staff: "Time Inc. Magazine Co. chairman,
president and CEO Reginald K. Brack has Greenpeace to thank for all those postcards he's been
getting lately urging him to use his flagship magazine, Time, to help create a market for chlorine-
free paper." 3
Mark Floegel and Mike Affieck (Greenpeace International pulp and paper coordinator)
met with Time's executive vice president, Don Barr in November 1991 and asked Barr to
purchase TCF paper. Barr promised to raise the issue with procurement and publishing staff.
Floegel and Affleck were skeptical that Time Inc. would do anything, at least in the near-term.
"We thought nothing will happen. It's the holidays. After Christmas, we see the January issue.
There at the end of the letters section of the January 6th issue, 1992, Time magazine is going
TCF!"4 The editors of Time framed their commitment, under the title, "Improving Magazine
Paper," in these terms:
TIME's publishing company has received more than 22,000 cards and letters protesting
the use of chlorinated paper by Time, Inc. Magazines. This mail was part of a campaign
launched by the environmental group Greenpeace, urging magazine publishers to switch
to paper bleached by other methods. Greenpeace believes chemical by-products from
chlorine bleaching are a major source of US water pollution. We at TIME take this





problem seriously, but we are limited by the availability of paper produced without the
use of dangerous pollutants. Most of our paper suppliers are far along with the plans to
eliminate chlorine-bleached pulp. We will use this alternative paper as soon as it is
practical to do so.'
Mark Floegel immediately called Don Barr: "Thank you this is wonderful. You've done
it. This is great. I'd love to talk with your nuts and bolts people about what to say to mills."2
Yet, by the time Floegel followed up with Time staff to help them buy TCF paper, the
opportunity for persuading Time to purchase TCF paper was quickly fading. As Floegel
recalled: "The big pulp and paper companies freaked out. Time bought paper from Champion
[International] and Consolidated Papers. They called Time and read the riot act. 'How dare you
go behind our backs to Greenpeace!
Lacking specifics from the principals at Time Inc. or the paper manufacturers it is
impossible to ascertain what the papermakers said to Time staff.3 Some of the statements
papermakers probably made to Time are contained in a letter Georgia-Pacific's president and
chief operating officer, A.D. Correll, sent to all of its customers shortly after Time Inc.'s
declaration to "eliminate chlorine-bleached pulp." In that letter Correll denied any problem with
the use of chlorine: "Despite many claims by environmental groups to the contrary, the scientific
evidence indicates that our level of use of chlorine is environmentally safe."4 Yet, Correll
continued, Georgia-Pacific planned to reduce dioxin emissions by partially replacing chlorine
with chlorine dioxide: "Our operating strategy has been to increase use of chlorine dioxide, and
'Time, 1992.
2 Floegel, 1999.
3 In interviews with David Refkin of Time Inc. and Gerard Closset of Champion International, neither provided
information on what the papermakers said at the time.
4 Correll, 1992.
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decrease amounts of elemental chlorine."' Therefore, he concluded, no more action was needed
beyond the substitution of chlorine with chlorine dioxide:
The cost of seeking nonchlorine compounds for the bleaching process would be
enormous without any corresponding health benefit offset and would force Georgia-
Pacific from our position as the largest and most competitive market pulp supplier. We
find no scientific rationale for such an ill-conceived move and have rejected the idea. 2
Finally, Correll stated, if you are a customer of Georgia-Pacific's and want TCF paper, go to
another company: "If you feel you must have 'chlorine-free' bleached pulps which cannot have
used even chlorine dioxide and your markets will accept the differences in quality and
performance, then G-P [Georgia-Pacific] can no longer be a supply source." 3
The final statement reveals the supposed market truisms, "customers are king" and
"manufacturers produce what customers want," for what they are: myths. Instead Correll stated
the reality of the American paper market: it is papermakers who determine what is available for
paper buyers to purchase.
The caveat to this statement is the lack of a choice. If paper buyers have a choice,
somewhere else to purchase TCF paper, then Georgia-Pacific could lose market share. Georgia-
Pacific's strength was the absence of choice for large paper buyers in the US: no North American
mill manufactured TCF bleached kraft pulp in early 1992. Louisiana-Pacific began
manufacturing TCF bleached kraft pulp in September 1992 (for more details see section 10.1.4).
Thus Georgia-Pacific and other US pulp and paper corporations had a huge incentive to ensure





Large firms like Georgia-Pacific controlled markets by controlling the ability to supply
large quantities of paper.' If Time Inc. needed to purchase large quantities of paper on short
notice, it needed to work with a large supplier like Georgia-Pacific or International Paper.
Correll's statement also revealed the arrogance and paternalism of American papermakers to
their buyers. The underlying theme in his message to customers was: "if you disagree with me
you are foolish. Environmentalists have fooled you into believing that dioxins, chlorine, and
chlorine dioxide are a problem. They have fooled you into believing high-quality paper can be
made without chlorine dioxide."
Time immediately came into line with the position of papermakers like A.D. Correll at
Georgia-Pacific. Floegel recalled his conversations with Time Inc. staff in these terms:
[The] Procurement person [at Time] told me, "it ain't going to happen, it won't happen
and go to hell." Called Don [Barr], no call back. David Refkin replied, "that
announcement was a mistake. Editorial department wrote it. That is wrong. It was a
mistake. Does not reflect view of publishing department." I said, "If mistake, then print
a retraction. If no intention [to change, then] print retraction." He refused.2
Ironically Greenpeace USA was a victim of sudden success. Because Time made the
announcement quickly, Floegel did not have the opportunity to "inoculate" Time on the
impending backlash from the paper industry. Inoculation is when organizers inform consumers
of expected negative reactions to an action. The objectives of inoculation are to: "I) frame the
issue; 2) neutralize the impact of adversarial communications; and 3) ensure that key audiences
are not caught off guard by the attack." 3 Inoculation prepares allies for the backlash, reducing
'Blum, 1997.
2 Floegel, 1999. A separate interview with David Refkin (director of paper and environmental affairs, Time Inc)
confirmed Floegel's recollection: "Greenpeace always brings up comment in the January 1992 issue. It was the
editors who said it, not publishers. The editors did not clear that comment with publishing" (Refkin, 1997).
3 Nichols, 2001, pp. 136-137. Note that inoculation is a tool of both environmentalists and their opponents. Nick
Nichols writes about inoculation from the perspective of corporations fighting back against demands from activist
groups, like environmental NGOs.
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the embarrassment of being caught by surprise and creates legitimacy for environmentalists
when they accurately forecast the response of opponents.
Unable to inoculate Time executives, Greenpeace USA lost the trust of Time:
Time thought they were printing something meaningless. The announcement freaked out
the paper industry. The impression in [the paper] industry was: this is a marriage, dealing
with suppliers for 25 years, then in bed with Greenpeace. Hurt feelings, you [Time] have
betrayed us [paper manufacturers] with these hippies. Time was abashed for dealing with
the other side [Greenpeace]. Refkin's attitude was, "you fooled and tricked us. We
[Time] became bad guys [within the paper industry]."'
The ferocious backlash from papermakers took them by surprise and intimidated them.
To regain momentum Greenpeace USA needed to move quickly. They needed to
disprove the arguments of American paper executives, create public pressure on Time to revisit
its January 6* commitment to move away from chlorine-bleached pulp, and show that TCF paper
was technologically and economically viable. Two years passed before Greenpeace USA took
the actions that may have had much different consequences in 1992.
In the summer of 1994 Greenpeace USA pressed Time Inc. to purchase TCF paper. At
the center of a multi-pronged effort was a daring action on the 47-story Time-Life building in
Manhattan. On the morning of 11 July three members of Greenpeace scaled half-way up the 587
foot Time-Life building, unfurling a banner of a mock Time magazine cover with the title:
"Chlorine Kills -- Take the poison out of paper." "The spectacle snarled morning rush-hour
traffic. Passers-by, some with binoculars, stood and watched." 2 Twenty two newspapers and
four wire services across the country picked up the story and photograph.3
1Floegel, 1999.
2Aig, 1994.
3 Dow Jones Interactive, search for "Greenpeace" and "Time magazine."
346
Simultaneous with the Time-Life building stunt, Greenpeace released a mock Time
magazine printed on American-made TCF paper.' It's about TIME included articles on the
effect of pulp mills on communities of color, dioxins and organochlorines from pulp mills,
Time's failure to change, and the need for action. "Floegel said the parody's most important
feature is that it proves beyond doubt -- despite TIME's claims to the contrary -- that it is
technically and economically possible to publish a glossy, four-color magazine using totally
chlorine-free methods, without sacrificing quality or style." 2 It's about TIME and the stunt were
designed to hold Time accountable to its commitment to moving away from chlorine-based
bleaching. "To date, TIME has neither taken any action to purchase chlorine-free paper, nor
admitted to TIME readers that its promise to convert was a hollow one." 3
Despite four years of lobbying and pressuring by Greenpeace, Time Inc. did not agree to
purchase TCF paper. Jack Weinberg, former director of Greenpeace International's Great Lakes
campaign, saw the main shortcoming of Greenpeace's efforts to persuade Time to purchase TCF
paper as resources.
When the International campaign withdrew resources [from the pulp and paper campaign
after 1992], we [Greenpeace USA] didn't have the resources, the technical people. We
couldn't bring authoritative people to the table [with Time]. Direct action and pressure
create inclination to change, then have to convince them [Time] what we were saying
was valid. We were up against serious resources and science. Time said yes, then no.
Pressure from back channel dialogue [with paper manufacturers] changed their
commitment. We couldn't deliver right people [scientists] to them, couldn't show our
staff had [scientific] credibility. We no longer had the resources.4
'Greenpeace also released two technical reports and brought the Rainbow Warrior to New York City. The two
technical reports were: The medium is the message: water pollution, Time magazine, and opportunities for clean
production (Floegel, 1994) printed by Greenpeace USA and Just a matter of TIME: corporate pollution and the
Great Lakes (Palter and Weinberg, 1994) printed by Greenpeace International.
2 U.S. Newswire, 1994.
3 Floegel, 1994, p. 1.
4 Weinberg, 1999.
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While additional resources and scientific capacity are always helpful, a major
impediment to Greenpeace USA succeeding with Time Inc. was a separate initiative of another
environmental organization, Environmental Defense. By waiting until 1994, Greenpeace had
lost its opportunity to catalyze purchasing change within Time Inc. Then Time Inc. was
collaborating with Environmental Defense on a separate purchasing project. Time Inc.
responded to the press after Greenpeace USA's 1994 stunt by stating: "Time plans to use only
chlorine-free paper [i.e., ECF] within two years as their suppliers change their production
process, the company said in a statement. Additionally, the company is part of a task force [with
Environmental Defense] to develop 'an environmentally compatible approach to paper
purchasing."
The Paper Task Force was a joint project initiated by Environmental Defense with large
corporations to increase demand for environmentally preferable purchasing. The details of the
task force are discussed in the next section. The implication of the task force for Greenpeace
USA was, it created a respectable avenue for Time Inc. to opt out of its commitment "to
eliminate chlorine-bleached pulp." Time Inc. agreed to participate in the Paper Task Force in the
summer of 1992. The outcome of Greenpeace USA's July 1994 actions was to drive Time Inc.
further into Environmental Defense's corner. As David Refkin of Time Inc. lamented, "I receive
letters [inspired by Greenpeace actions] from nuns and kids asking, 'why are you still using
chlorine and polluting the environment.' Personally, I'm sick of this." 2 Had Greenpeace USA
performed its 1994 actions two years earlier -- when Time Inc. was not collaborating with




10.1.2 A few TCF successes
Greenpeace USA extended its efforts at promoting TCF purchasing to other smaller
corporations, including Kinko's copy shops and Jossey Bass book publishers. Kinko's with
hundreds of copy shops sprinkled across the US' was a potentially significant target when it
agreed to purchase TCF paper in 1992.2
Tim Martin, Greenpeace USA pulp and paper campaigner approached Kinko's to
purchase TCF paper in the early 1990s, but could not get the company's attention. Then he
organized a picket of a Kinko's store. "That got a swift reaction," Mark Floegel recalled:
Paul [Orfalea] is an old hippie and was horrified to learn one of his stores was being
picketed by GP [Greenpeace]. ... I talked to their tech and marketing folks and we found
a sheet that would work in their copiers, was available in quantities they needed and was
TCF. The HQ folks wrote up a decree that every store was to carry the TCF paper and I
attended a "Kinko's conclave" in Houston where the policy was rolled out to the partners.
Many of the partners were not happy about it (and manage to keep the TCF well hidden
at their stores - they think it's a drag on profits) but Kinko's [i.e., Paul Orfalea] the boss,
he owns 51 percent.3
While the Kinko's' partners carry TCF paper they offer it at a cost of 3-5 cents more,
recalled former Greenpeace pulp and paper campaigner, Billy Stem. "That mark up is ridiculous
given what Kinko's probably pays for the paper. It probably costs Kinko's about 0.2 cents per
sheet of paper more, and here they are marking it up 3-5 cents. That means few people will buy
it. I tried to get them to sell it at a markup of I cent per page," but failed 4
Greenpeace USA also persuaded book publisher Jossey Bass to purchase TCF paper in
1995.5 With its core purpose of "Developing healthy and responsible leaders, communities, and
' http://www.kinkos.com/aboutus/history/historytimeline.php




5 Publishing and Production Executive, 1995.
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organizations,"' Jossey Bass was receptive to environmental issues and Greenpeace USA's
message. Greenpeace magazine went TCF in 1991 when it began using TCF bleached sulfite
pulp from Lyons Falls Pulp and Paper in New York state.2
Many other organizations moved to TCF papers without being targeted by Greenpeace
USA. Seventh Generation started purchasing chlorine-free paper products in the late 1980s.3
Celestial Seasonings switched to TCF for its tea bags in 1990.4 And David Garth, publisher of
Scuba Times, decided to take his publication TCF after "diving in Pensacola Bay [Florida] and
seeing firsthand the effects of pulp mill effluent on a marine ecosystem." 5 Greenpeace USA
helped to find him TCF paper. In 1992 Scuba Times began using TCF paper for black and white
segments of its magazine and in 1995 went completely TCF.6 For Scuba Times to purchase TCF
paper in 1992 was significant because it was the first general circulation magazine to purchase
TCF. An environmental publication, Worldwatch magazine switched to TCF in 19947 and
Patagonia used 50% TCF pulp in its catalogue by 1997.8 Ben & Jerry's pioneered the
development of an unbleached paperboard carton for its ice cream, replacing bleached kraft
paperboard. But that change did not happen until 1999,9 years after Greenpeace USA had
dropped its hope of transforming the US bleached kraft pulp market.
In the early 1990s grassroots groups became more active in the campaign for TCF paper.
These campaigns blossomed after Greenpeace International ended the pulp and paper campaign









9 Abrams, 1998; and Dairy Foods, 1999.
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Reach for Unbleached (a coalition of Northwest groups, including Washington Toxics Coalition,
Washington Citizens for Recycling, People for Puget Sound), Native Forest Network, Women's
Voices for the Earth, Natural Resources Council of Maine, all campaigned for TCF paper
starting in the early to mid-1990s .I
The grassroots groups persuaded a number of government institutions to specify
purchasing preferences for TCF paper, including: State of Oregon (1990); City of Bellevue, WA
(1994); City of Chicago (1994); City of Seattle (1994); State of Minnesota (1994); EPA region
10 (1994); Vermont (1998); and a handful of other cities others including San Francisco, Palo
Alto, and Ann Arbor. 2
The questioning of bleached paper products did reach into American consumer culture.
For example, a small city newspaper in Oklahoma published a newspaper article in 1992 on
green purchasing. It included tips on paper products to avoid:
Look for paper that is unbleached or lightly bleached rather than pure white. White
paper products are processed with chlorine, which creates highly toxic dioxins.
These dioxins, even though processed through a sewage plant, can show up in ground
water, fish, fruits and vegetables.
Use cloth or metal [coffee] filters that can be washed or reused. Or choose unbleached
filters that will not expose you to dioxin contamination.
Use tea bags that have not been treated with chlorine bleach, such as Celestial
Seasonings [emphases added].3
No longer were white, bright paper products unquestionably the best products. Yet as
this article indicates, the terms "chlorine-free" or "TCF" did not reach the American mainstream.
And that's what vendors of TCF paper found. Cross Pointe, which introduced TCF paper in
1993, still found in 1995 that "'Consumers are not really aware of chlorine-free paper yet."' And





Pointe explained: "'There is confusion about chlorine-free in general, as well as TCF versus
ECF. The definitions are becoming as vague as the recycled paper terms commonly bandied
about.""
While the ECF/TCF distinction made selling TCF more complicated, environmental
organizations will often confront these types of challenges as they try to move a resistant
industry to the most advanced cleaner production technologies. More damaging to the
environmental movement was the internal dissension and competition between ECF-lite (e.g.,
Environmental Defense and NRDC) and TCF (e.g., Greenpeace USA) advocates. For
corporations that lacked deep environmental convictions, the environmental split made TCF a
harder sell.
10.1.3 Trying to catalyze market change through collaborative research: Environmental
Defense and its Paper Task Force
When Environmental Defense moved down the path of what executive director Fred
Krupp called the "third stage" of environmentalism, it began collaborating with corporations to
achieve environmental change. Environmental Defense's first collaborative project was with
McDonald's. In 1990, Environmental Defense and McDonald's established a joint waste
reduction task force to "investigate new materials, reusable items, recycling, composting, and
other ways to eliminate McDonald's waste." 2 When McDonald's announced its decision to stop
using polystyrene clamshell packages in late 1990, Environmental Defense claimed it as "the
first fruit of a joint task force between EDF3 and McDonald's" and as a "major victory for all
environmentalists working to reduce fast food restaurant waste." 4
1 Jeffrey, 1995.
2 Krupp, 1990.




The Paper Task Force was next. Officially launched in the summer of 1993 with funding
from the Heinz Family Foundation,' EDF initially approached organizations in the summer of
1992.2 Duke University and five corporate consumers of paper initially agreed to participate in
the Paper Task Force: Johnson & Johnson, McDonald's Corporation, NationsBank, The
Prudential Insurance Company of America, and Time Inc. 3
Time Inc. participated in the Paper Task Force, Refkin said, because it was consistent
with the "Philosophy from the top of the corporation," which emphasized the need to work with
the public, need for continuous environmental improvement, and need for the paper industry to
move to the minimum impact mill. He added that "Companies don't want to be embarrassed," 4
implying that Time Inc. preferred working with the more reasonable EDF, which would not hang
a banner from its office tower. The Paper Task Force became a safe haven for Time Inc., away
from the badgering Greenpeace USA. As Stafford and Hartman (1996) highlight in their article
on corporate-environmental alliances: green "alliances [can] represent an active strategy that
repels attacks from environmental groups and the government." 5 While Time Inc.'s participation
in the Paper Task Force did not "repel" attacks from Greenpeace, it provided a shield to deflect
the attacks.
The purpose of the Paper Task Force was to develop recommendations that would serve
as a model for paper purchasing in participating and other companies: the goals of the task force





' Stafford and Hartman, 1996.
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purchasing model applicable to a broad range of institutions."I And Environmental Defense
emphasized, the Paper Task Force would have "no policy making implications." 2 Yet the
motivations behind the formation of the Paper Task Force were called into question, even by
Folio (a magazine for magazine managers): "A decidedly modest proposal by some of the
nation's biggest paper purchasers -- including Time Inc. -- to study ways of spurring demand for
Earth-friendly products has split the publishing industry." 3 Skeptics (not identified in the article)
"note that the final report, by the task force's own admission, will be non-binding on members"
and "suggest that some Task Force participants hope to blunt regulatory action ..."4
Despite the Paper Task Force being a collaborative project of modest goals, the
environmental laggards in the pulp and paper industry were not assuaged. They were determined
to make sure that the task force's recommendations mirrored the outcome they were willing to
accept: ECF bleached pulp. Refkin diplomatically explained the response of pulp and paper
manufacturers: "The paper companies were clear. They wanted a well-balanced book [report]."
To achieve their "well-balanced" report, the pulp and paper industry intensely lobbied the
members of the task force; so intensely that "In September 1995, NationsBank pulled out under
pressure from the paper industry." 5 With its headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina,
NationsBank was located in the heart of the paper industry. An anonymous source involved with
the Paper Task Force explained what happened: "They [NationsBank] have loans to a lot of
southern mills. Companies put pressure on NationsBank to buy the corporate line" of ECF only,
PR Newswire, 1993.
2 Blum, 1995.




or we pull our business from your bank. Tired of handling industry pressure for the "right"
recommendations, NationsBank exited from the Paper Task Force.
The direct product of the task force was a monumental report: Paper Task Force
Recommendations for Purchasing Using Environmentally Preferable Paper. The final report
was 250 pages long and supported by 16 supplemental technical reports totaling 1,200 pages.
Lauren Blum, PhD, senior scientist, at Environmental Defense coordinated the writing and
research for the report.I
The report included recommendations for three types of paper -- printing and writing
papers, corrugated boxes, and folding cartons -- across their entire lifecycle: forest management,
pulp and paper manufacturing, and recycling. The lifecycle approach enabled the task force to
identify opportunities for improving the environmental profile of products across their entire life.
For example, if the Paper Task Force had only focused on the environmental impacts of pulp and
paper manufacturing, it would have ignored the benefits of using recycled rather than virgin
paper: "compared to virgin paper production and disposal, recycled paper production and
recovery generally result in significantly lower environmental releases of numerous air and water
pollutants, less solid waste and lower consumption of energy and forest resources." 2
For pulp and paper manufacturing, the Paper Task Force developed eight
recommendations (see Appendix 2) that defined an environmental spectrum for pulping
technologies from least to greatest environmental impacts (see Chapter 5), ranging from the
dirtiest of ECF to ECF-lite to TCF. The data revealed a clear trajectory from dirtier to cleaner
technologies as pulp mills moved away from chlorine and chlorine dioxide to greater reliance on
oxygen, ozone, and hydrogen peroxide.
1Paper Task Force, 1995, p. 226.
2 Ibid., p. 17.
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TCF, despite having the best environmental profile and identified as probably the most
efficient route to minimizing bleach plant effluent, was excluded from the Paper Task Force's
recommendations. Instead the task force recommendations stated that "Mills that recirculate the
filtrates from the first bleaching and extraction stages of the bleach plant make additional
progress toward the minimum-impact mill." This obscure statement, understood by only the
cognoscenti of bleached kraft pulping, referred to two technologies: TCF bleaching and
enhanced ECF with chloride removal. And "enhanced ECF with chloride removal" was an
experimental technology that never became economically viable,' whereas TCF was in
commercial use in Sweden, the US, and other nations. The decision to exclude TCF from the
recommendations, despite what the data showed, indicates how effective pulp and paper
manufacturers were in intimidating Time Inc., Environmental Defense, and the other members of
the task force.
The majority of American pulp and paper manufacturers did not invest in oxygen
delignification, despite its cost savings, because they could capture a higher return on investment
by investing in faster paper machines. As the technical director for a bleached kraft pulp
manufacturer remarked: the expected "ROI [return on investment] for non-environmental
projects is 20%. The ROI on OD is only 2-3%.",2 Joel Hirschhorn, author of articles and a book
on pollution prevention (P2), saw this trend more broadly in the manufacturing sector: "The
more significant competition [for P2 projects] takes place completely outside the P2 sphere,
where established and more familiar and trusted opportunities compete for investment money." 3
' Enhanced ECF with chlorine removal was developed by the former Champion International mill on the Pigeon
River in North Carolina; but was never used in another mill.
2 Hise, 1995.
3 Hirschhorn, 1997, p. 24.
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The Paper Task Force released its report in December 1995 with little press attention.
Even the trade press was largely silent.' The only significant discussion of the report to appear
in the pulp and paper press was in a side-bar column by Lauren Blum in an article on trends in
the industry.2 The low-key trade press attention reflected the impact of the report in the world.
At best the report had a marginal impact on a few companies. David Refkin of Time Inc.
lamented the outcome: "There was no follow-up for implementation planned on the report other
than what the companies [members of the task force] have done." 3 The most significant
outcomes from the Paper Task Force related to bleaching technology emerged from Time Inc.
After the release of the Paper Task Force report Time Inc. moved quietly to purchase
ECF-lite from American mills and later purchased TCF paper from SCA in Sweden in 1998.4
Time Inc. also persuaded one of its suppliers, Consolidated Papers, to invest in ozone bleaching.5
But Time Inc.'s quiet changes had no ripple effects on the market.
The model of the Paper Task Force and its spin-off, the Alliance for Environmental
Innovation,6 was that the best practices of corporate environmental leaders would be adopted by
other corporations. But outside of Time Inc., there is no evidence that the Paper Task Force
catalyzed market demand for ECF-lite papers, which in turn might have affected technology
investments in American bleached kraft pulp mills. To have had any chance of success in
shifting to the cleanest kraft bleaching technologies (i.e., ECF-lite with ozone and TCF),
The first mention of the "Paper Task Force" to appear in any paper industry journal was when an author in Pulp
and Paper cited David Refkin in an article on closing the water loop (Bihani, July 1996).
2 Blum, Pulp and Paper, September 1996.
3 Blun, 1997.
4 Ruston, O'Brien, and Tsang, 1999.
5 As Blum recalled, "Consolidated Papers implemented ozone because of pressure from Time" (Blum, 1997).
' The Alliance for Environmental Innovation is a joint project of Environmental Defense and the Pew Charitable
Trusts.
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Environmental Defense needed to organize corporate consumers to implement the Paper Task
Force recommendations.
Environmental Defense could have extended the lifecycle approach (used to developed
recommendations for purchasing environmentally preferable paper) to organizing and aligned
with recycling advocates to promote both higher recycled content and more environmentally
friendly bleaching processes. Advocacy for reducing solid waste was at its height in the US
from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, with waste management officials in cities and towns, local
recycling groups, and national environmental groups like the now defunct Environmental Action
promoting greater post-consumer recycled content in paper and catalyzing laws mandating
recycled content in newspapers.'
The demand for environmentally preferable paper did reach magazine publishers, but it
focused almost entirely on recycled content: chlorine remained a secondary or non-issue. For
example, writing in 1995 for Folio, Tim Bogardus reported:
A short two years ago, recycled paper was an option considered seriously only by highly
committed eco-pioneers. For the rest of the magazine industry, its use was out of the
question because of inconsistent quality, higher price and erratic availability. Now,
however, it looks like recycled paper use in magazines may outstrip virgin-fiber paper
within the next two or three years.
Why is recycled paper suddenly hot? Magazine publishers are attracted by significant
improvements in its quality and functionality; are lured by prices that approximate those
of virgin-fiber paper; and, in some cases, are spurred by reader demand. Magazine-
industry executives are discovering that recycled paper makes public-relations and
environmental sense, and--even more important--economic sense.2
As for chlorine bleaching, Tom Wolf, vice president and general manager Rodale Press,





Neither Environmental Defense nor Greenpeace USA tried to unite the anti-toxics
activists targeting paper bleaching with the solid waste activists working to reduce garbage
creation. And Environmental Defense, like Greenpeace USA, sought to change corporate
purchasing initiatives alone, with no help from other environmental or solid waste activists.
The competition between Environmental Defense and Greenpeace USA over Time Inc.
and their different goals -- the ECF-lite of Environmental Defense v. the TCF of Greenpeace
USA -- fractured the American environmental movement in the midst of intense opposition from
paper industry laggards. When Environmental Defense inserted itself between Time Inc. and
Greenpeace USA, it mitigated the need for Time Inc. to quickly change purchasing specifications
and moved Time Inc. out of the public spotlight. In icing the need for action until after finishing
the Paper Task Force report, from 1993 to 1995, Environmental Defense froze the momentum
for change.
10.1.4 Manufacturers
Over the course of the pulp and paper campaign, Greenpeace USA targeted many of the
major producers of bleached kraft pulp and paper products, including: International Paper,
Georgia-Pacific, Champion International, and Weyerhaeuser. Greenpeace USA hung banners
from International Paper's mill in Natchez, Mississippi (1988); Weyerhaeuser's mill in Everett,
Washington (1989);1 and Georgia-Pacific's headquarters in downtown Atlanta (1990).2
Downstream of Champion International's mill in Canton, North Carolina, Greenpeace USA





The outcomes from the actions were primarily local media attention. The Baton Rouge
papers -- The Baton Rouge State Times and The Baton Rouge Morning Advocate --covered the
Natchez mill action. The Atlanta Journal covered the Georgia-Pacific action. The Seattle Times
covered the Weyerhaeuser action. The Champion International action received national press
attention because the Canton mill's water pollution flowed from North Carolina into Tennessee,
sparking a dispute between the two states, involving politicians, community groups, workers, as
well as the corporations. Press coverage included: US. News and World Report,' the Associated
Press,2 Los Angeles Times,3 and The Christian Science Monitor.4
Beyond media attention and raising public awareness to the pollution from the mills, the
direct actions only led to serious dialogue with one of the pulp and paper corporations:
Weyerhaeuser. The perception of environmentalists within pulp and paper manufacturers was
overwhelmingly negative, even among the corporations that were the best environmental
performers in bleaching. In my interviews with senior executives and mill managers at
Champion International, Union Camp, and Westvaco, the common response was, "we meet with
community groups, but not the national groups." As then executive vice president for Union
Camp, William Trice remarked: "We speak with environmental groups at the local level, and
some of the national groups around natural resource [i.e., forestry] issues. ... In general, we are
more attuned to market demand than to the demands of environmental groups."s When Robert
Galin, news editor for Pulp and Paper titled in op-ed article, "Environmentalists no longer fringe







"Perhaps it is too much to ask for both sides to work together for compromise. Yet, it remains
for the industry to realize that environmentals (and the public) are becoming more sophsiticated
in their knowledge and tactics."I
Reflecting the more environmentally enlightened philosophy of Weyerhaeuser, senior
executives agreed to meet with staff from Greenpeace USA. As Floegel recalled
Weyerhaeuser's CEO, Jack Creighton and vice president of manufacturing and technology,
Richard Erickson stating that:
"with the minimum impact mill we will get to TCF and TEF. But Wall Street gets all
over our backs for making these investments. You don't need to spend money on this.
Wall Street loves Georgia-Pacific and International Paper because they don't spend
money where they don't need to. We think TCF and TEF are inevitable. And when
forced to make these investments we will." 2
Neil McCubbin, a long-time consultant to the pulp and paper industry on environmental
issues, corroborated Floegel in that Weyerhaeuser was positioning its mills to be TEF: "Weyco's
[short for, "Weyerhaeuser Company"] vision is that all plants of the future will be TEF.
Therefore all technologies are being examined to see how they can move the company to TEF
production." 3 Yet Weyerhaeuser refused to produce TCF paper.
Only one bleached kraft pulp manufacturer in the US produced commercial quantities of
TCF pulp: Louisiana-Pacific at its Samoa, California mill. Louisiana-Pacific had avoided
installing a secondary wastewater treatment system because of its location (discharging into a
very large body of water, the Pacific Ocean) and good politicking. The corporation had a
variance inserted into the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1983 that allowed it to continue




4 See Section 301(m) of the Clean Water Act amendments of 1983.
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installing a secondary treatment system, it failed to comply with its permit; creating leverage for
surfers to contest pollution from the mill. Tired of surfing in polluted waters, surfers filed a
lawsuit against water pollution from the mill through their association, the Surfrider Foundation.
In its consent decree with the Surfrider Foundation, Louisiana-Pacific agreed to reduce water
pollution by switching to a TCF bleaching process. In agreeing to TCF, Louisian-Pacific saw
itself leapfrogging over old pollution control technology to prevention technology that would
help it to capture market share in what it foresaw as an emerging market for TCF pulp.2
Another mill in the US produced TCF pulp, but it was sulfite, not kraft pulp. The Lyons
Falls Pulp and Paper mill had been producing TCF pulp since its inception in 1969.3 With sulfite
mills representing a small slice of bleached pulp production, generally producing lower quality
papers, and Lyons Falls being a small producer, it was not a competitor with the bleached kraft
pulp mills. Environmentalists did have access to the TCF converts like Lyons Falls and
Louisiana Pacific. As Mark Floegel explained, "we worked with companies like Lyons Falls
P&P, Louisiana-Pacific, etc. who were making TCF pulp."'
Two other manufacturers, Weyerhaeuser and Union Camp, ran mill scale trials on TCF
pulp, but never marketed TCF pulp.5 Union Camp was best positioned to produce TCF pulp
because it had a bleaching line of oxygen, ozone, and chlorine dioxide at its Franklin, VA mill.





5 Beaton, 2001; Floegel, 1999.
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dioxide with hydrogen peroxide in its last bleaching stage.1 But demand never became strong
enough in the US to inspire Union Camp to produce TCF paper.2
And the industry environmental laggards did their best to keep a market from emerging
for TCF products. In 1993 there were 104 mills with bleaching operations in the US. These mills
operated 176 physical bleach lines (some mills had more than one bleach line). Of the 104 mills
with bleaching operations, 87 manufactured bleached kraft pulp.3 The industry laggards in
installing oxygen or extended delignification facilities were International Paper, Georgia Pacific,
James River, Bosie Cascade Mead, and SD Warren. These six corporations owned 34 bleached
kraft pulp mills, yet had only installed six extended and zero oxygen delignification systems by
1993 (see Table 10.1).
Table 10.1 Cleaner bleaching technology laggards (based on number of bleached kraft pulp mills
and installations of oxygen and extend d delignification systems, 1993)
Number of Number of Number of Number of
bleached oxygen and oxygen extended
kraft pulp extended delignification delignification
mills delignification installations installations
installations
International 12 2 0 2
Paper
Georgia 7 2 0 2
Pacific
James River 5 1 0 1
Boise 4 0 0 0
Cascade
Mead 3 0 0 0
SD Warren 3 1 0 1
Total 34 6 0 6
Total number 57 27 30
of installations




3 US EPA, 1993, p. 8-24.
* US EPA, 1993.
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The environmental leaders in bleached kraft pulping technologies were Union Camp,
Champion International, Westvaco Corp, Weyerhaeuser, and Consolidated Papers,I with
Louisiana-Pacific joining this group after signing the consent decree with the Surfriders
Foundation. These six corporations, with only 17 bleached kraft pulp mills, had installed 32
oxygen or extended delignification facilities (see Table 10.2), over 50% of total installations in
the US by 1994.
Table 10.2 Cleaner bleaching technology leaders (based on number of bleached kraft pulp mills
and installations of oxygen and extended delignification systems, 1993)
Number of Number of Number of Number of
bleached oxygen and oxygen extended
kraft pulp extended delignification delignification
mills delignification installations installations
installations
Champion 5 10 7 3
international
Weyerhaeuser 5 8 4 4
Westvaco 3 4 1 3
Union Camp 2 7 4 3
Consolidated 1 2 1 1
Papers
Louisiana- 1 1 1 0
Pacific
Total 17 32 18 14
Total number 57 27 30
of installations
in the US I
Source: 2
Within the environmental community there were many anecdotal stories of pulp and
paper laggards intimidating other pulp and paper manufacturers from producing TCF paper. As
Jessica Landman of NRDC remarked:
I cannot prove to you that industry engaged in such heavy-handed tactics because there is
no paper trail. It came close to the edge of monopolistic practices. We asked the Federal
Trade Commission to examine practices of the industry, but nothing ever came of that.
To evoke anti-trust action need to show price fixing, and we had no evidence of that.
Collusion is legal when it concerns regulation.3
'McCubbin, 1995.
2 US EPA, 1993.
3 Landman, 2001.
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The laggards certainly had an interest in keeping demand and production of TCF paper
from emerging because they could not have produced TCF paper without sizable investments.
As Bob Simpson, Louisiana-Pacific's western division manager explained: "'If TCF becomes the
standard, companies integrated into both pulp and paper production would face substantial
expenditures to convert their own pulp mills to chlorine-free bleaching. As a result, they are
reluctant to make chlorine-free paper products and have an interest in keeping us from
succeeding." Because Louisiana-Pacific only manufactured pulp, it had to find papermakers to
purchase its TCF pulp. And since papermakers would never rely on a single pulp supplier, the
papermakers were vulnerable to threats from the laggards supplying them with their pulp.
Rumors swirled around the environmental community of laggards threatening papermakers who
purchased Louisiana-Pacific TCF pulp: "If you buy LP [Louisiana-Pacific] TCF pulp to make
paper, we won't supply you with pulp." 2 In 1993, Georgia-Pacific and International Paper were
the first and third largest producers of bleached kraft market pulp (with Weyerhaeuser the second
largest producer).3
For integrated pulp and paper producers like Weyerhaeuser and Union Camp, the threat
was roughly, if you market TCF paper, we will sell our paper at a loss to buyers of your paper.4
Union Camp was the fourth largest manufacturer of uncoated freesheet (which includes copy
paper), while Weyerhaeuser was the eighth largest producer. So it is conceivable if the big three
manufacturers of uncoated freesheet allied together, International Paper (#1), Georgia-Pacific
(#2), and Champion International (#3), they could have intimidated Union Camp. Such an
'Pulp and Paper, 1994.
2 Hind, 2001.
3 Miller Freeman, 1994.
4 Floegel, 1999.
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alliance was conceivable because Champion International, which supported ECF-lite, opposed
TCF.1
The US industry even threatened S6dra Cell with market sanctions if it testified in
support of TCF regulations in the US. When the Natural Resources Council of Maine invited
Roland L6vblad of S6dra Cell to Maine to testify on behalf of its bill for TCF bleaching, he
initially said "yes." But "American companies in Europe buy S6dra Cell's pulp. They
threatened to stop buying S5dra Cell's TCF pulp if they testified in Maine. 2
Whether it was the threats that prevented other environmental leaders from joining
Louisiana-Pacific in manufacturing TCF paper, the lack of a market demand from emerging
(which the laggards helped to dampen), or a combination of both cannot be ascertained. But the
paper industry is renowned for being a technologically conservative industry, and a reluctance to
take chances in an uncertain market is not surprising. I speculate that if Time Inc. had demanded
TCF paper and been willing to pay a price premium for it, manufacturers like Union Camp or
Weyerhaeuser might have stepped forward.
10.2 Pursuing chlorine bans through government politics: lobbying the International Joint
Commission (IJC) and US Congress
In the early 1990s the International Joint Commission (IJC) and US Congress became
hosts to debates over whether to ban the use of chlorine and chlorine-containing substances,
especially in the pulp and paper industry. The IJC proved to be one of the few bright spots for
American campaigners, while the US Congress was the sight of yet another failed attempt at
trying to achieve broad change in American bleaching practices.
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'Bennett, 1997; Floegel, 1999.
2 Bennett, 1997.
10.2.1 International Joint Commission (IJC)
In 1992 the International Joint Commission (IJC) recommended that Canada and the
United States: "in consultation with industry and the other affected interests, develop timetables
to sunset the use of chlorine and chlorine-containing compounds as industrial feedstocks and that
the means of reducing or eliminating other uses be examined."' With this recommendation the
UC became the first government-authorized body to call for the sunsetting, the phasing-out, of
chlorine and chorine-containing chemicals. It was a major victory for Greenpeace and other
environmental organizations campaigning against chlorine and organochlorine pollution.
In the mid-1980s Greenpeace International established its Great Lakes campaign with the
purpose of improving the ecological health of the region and unifying the work of Greenpeace
USA and Greenpeace Canada. To advance its regional agenda Greenpeace focused on the
International Joint Commission (UC). In targeting the UC, Greenpeace joined other
environmental organizations active with the Commission, including: Great Lakes United,
National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, and the Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and
Policy.
An early highlight for Greenpeace came in 1989 when Joyce McLean, director of the
Great Lakes campaign, gave the keynote address at the biennial meeting of the IJC in Hamilton,
Ontario. "About a dozen Greenpeace members kicked off McLean's luncheon speech with a
colorful demonstration. Carrying a coffin and wearing masks of diseased fish and deformed
birds, the activists paraded to the strains of a funeral march. They unfurled a banner, which read
'The Great Lakes: No Time to Waste!' 2 Nearly a thousand people attended the meeting,
' International Joint Commission, 1992, p. 30.
2 Israelson, 1989.
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including many concerned citizens. The business community was largely absent from the 1989
meeting.'
Environmentalists centered their work on achieving the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement goal of zero discharge of persistent toxic substances. In the late 1980s
environmentalists in the region formed the "Zero Discharge Alliance," which included hundreds
of groups.2 The Zero Discharge Alliance had a number of quick successes prior to the 1991
biennial meeting that was held in Traverse City, Michigan, including persuading the UC to: host
a Zero Discharge Roundtable in Hanover, New Hampshire and establish a Virtual Elimination
Task Force.3
In the months preceding the September 1991 biennial meeting in Traverse City,
Michigan, Greenpeace worked to create public support for strong water protection action in the
Great Lakes through its "Great Lakes Zero Discharge" boat tour. The Zero Discharge tour
centered around three goals:
1) End chlorine-based bleaching by the paper industry. Chlorine and chlorine
compounds, which are used by the paper industry to bleach paper white, result in the
discharge of hundreds of millions of pounds of deadly poisons into the lakes each year.
2) Ban new incinerators in or near the Great Lakes basin. As much as half of all persistent
toxic inputs into the Great Lakes comes from airborne sources, and garbage and
hazardous waste incineration is the fastest growing new source.
3) Establish a system of sunset permits for industrial processes that use or produce
persistent toxic substances. These permits would set an end date by which they processes
must be changed. Strict interim goals would also be established.4
The pulp and paper mills were a prime target for the Moby Dick boat tour. Greenpeace
held actions at Canadian and American pulp and paper mills, including: Domtar's Cornwall,
' Botts and Muldoon, 1996.
2 Muldoon and Jackson, 1994.
3 Ibid.
4 PR Newswire, 1992.
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Ontario mill; Great Lakes Forest Products, Thunder Bay, Ontrario mill; and SD Warren's
Muskegon, Michigan mill.' "The Thunder Bay action made it onto national TV news in Canada,
and the image of the blockade at the Thunder Bay mill became a wire photo in the major
Canadian newspapers."2
With Greenpeace and the other organizations generating public concern, citizens in the
Great Lakes region turned out in large numbers for the Traverse City meeting. The 1991
biennial meeting had the greatest number of participants to date, with 1,600 attendees, including
for the first time "a significant number of industry representatives." 3 Caught off-guard by the
success of the environmentalists, the pulp and paper industry learned that the IJC was about to
recommend banning the use of chlorine and chlorine-containing chemicals in pulp and paper
mills. Realizing they could not persuade IJC commissioners to not issue a chlorine ban, the
paper "Industry convinced the IJC," Jack Weinberg recalled, "to expand the ban to include all
uses of chlorine and chlorine containing chemicals. 'Why pick on us,' they asked."4 It was a
clever ploy to create outrage among other users of chlorine and chlorine-containing products. As
Weinberg noted, "When the IJC expanded the ban to not target pulp and paper, it created a
political backlash." 5
When the IJC released its Sixth Biennial report in 1992 with the call for a chlorine phase-
out, it "became the most controversial" report for the IJC.6 As Lee Botts and Paul Muldoon
wrote in their report on The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: the recommendation
"galvanized industry to lobby against the recommendation inside and outside the IJC. From
1 See Peerla, 1997; and PR Newswire, 1991.
2 Peerla, 1997, pp. 163-164.
3 Botts and Muldoon, 1996.
4 Weinberg, 1999.
' Ibid.6 Botts and Muldoon, 1996.
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1992 on, industry and particularly through the Chlorine Institute, took notice of the work of the
Commission and devoted considerable financial resources (reportedly over $10 million per year)
to discrediting the recommendation. About 300 representatives of industry attended the 1993
biennial meeting in Windsor, Ontario."' Neither the Canadian or American government
implemented the recommendation. 2
10.2.2 Chlorine Zero Discharge Act dies quickly death in Congress
Following the success with the IJC, Greenpeace USA allied with other national
environmental organizations, including NRDC , and World Wildlife Fund to promote a chlorine
ban in the US Congress. In August 1993 Representative Bill Richardson (D-NM) introduced
House Resolution 2898, the "Chlorine Zero Discharge Act of 1993."3 The bill targeted pulp and
paper mills: "Effective within 5 years of the enactment of this section, it shall be unlawful to
discharge into water or other media a waste stream containing any organochlorine compounds,
byproducts, or metabolites formulated as a result of the use of chlorine or any other chlorinated
oxidizing agents in the pulp and paper manufacturing process." 4
Then in January 1994 the US EPA made a surprising recommendation as part of its
proposed language for reauthorizing the Clean Water Act: it recommended developing a
"'national strategy for substituting, reducing, or prohibiting the use of chlorine and chlorinated




3 Floegel, 1994, p. 21.
4 103T Congress, 1" Session, H.R. 2898.
5 Bergeson, 1994, p. 326.6 lIbid., p. 326.
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The anti-chlorine bills mobilized the chemical and pulp and paper industries. The
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), with an annual operating budget of $26 million per
year, was joined by the American Plastics Council, with a budget of $50 million per year, and the
American Forest and Paper Association in opposing the chlorine bans in both the Senate and
House of Representatives.' The Chlorine Chemistry Council (CCC), a division of the CMA,
replied: "'We're aggressively asking our members and their employees to fight this," said
Deborah Schwartz, spokesperson for CCC.2 The CCC mobilized the mailing of "more than a
million letters" to Congress "by employees of companies that make or use chlorinated
products." 3 Joining the chemical and paper industries in opposing the chlorine language in the
Clean Water Act reauthorization bill was "Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, Maine
Democrat, whose state is home to numerous chlorine-using paper mills."4
While the JC recommendation created momentum for change, the environmental
organizations and the US EPA were not prepared for the ferocity of the industry backlash the
chlorine proposals generated in the US Congress. The Chlorine Zero Water Discharge bill, the
chlorine language in the Clean Water Act reauthorization, as well as the entire Clean Water
reauthorization failed to pass in the 1994 Congress.5 And the ascendancy of the Republican
Party to the leadership of the House and Senate in 1995 effectively stopped further legislation
targeted at chlorine.
Greenpeace USA, NRDC, World Wildlife Fund, and a few other organizations were not
going to succeed against the entire chlorine and chlorine-related industry without a huge






groundswell of public opinion in their favor. In trying to target a broad class of chemicals, a
strategy that makes sense from the perspective of trying to avoid the slow process of addressing
one toxic chemical at a time as well as the substitution of a toxic chemical with another toxic
chemical, Greenpeace USA and its allies created a swarm of resource-rich opponents.
A footnote to the legislative work to change bleaching practices in the pulp and paper
industry was an effort by environmental groups in Maine, including the Natural Resources
Council of Maine (NRCM), to pass a bill that would have required Maine's mills to use TCF
bleaching processes. The TCF bill came before the Maine legislature in 1997 and was defeated
amidst intensive lobbying by the pulp and paper industry. As Nick Bennett, staff scientist for
NRCM recalled, "Maine mills gambled that they could win it all [and they did]. ... Pulp and
paper mills have a lot of power in Maine. Labor came down hard against environmentalists.
The paper industry is extremely powerful in Maine."I
10.3 The US EPA and its "Cluster Rules"
Having lost at market and Congressional politics, regulation was the last significant
chance for environmentalists to create national change in the industry. The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) and Greenpeace USA were the national leaders in lobbying for
stronger environmental regulation. The goal of NRDC was ECF-lite, while the goal of
Greenpeace USA was TCF. They ended up playing an "insider game" with the US EPA, where
they tried to win with minimal media attention to the pollution from pulp and paper mills; relying
instead on trying to mobilize broad support and develop persuasive arguments. It was a game in
which the paper industry routed environmentalists. When the US EPA promulgated its final
regulations on water discharges from bleached kraft pulp mills in 1998, environmentalists were
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handed a defeat and the paper industry laggards a victory. Environmentalists lost because of a
combination of factors: delay (which dimmed the media spotlight); effective counter-campaign
by the paper industry; Congressional politics (the Republican-led Congress opposed to any
environmental regulation); and disagreement within the environmental movement over goals.
10.3.1 Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC): a quick introduction
Joined by the incentive of a Ford Foundation grant, two senior attorneys from a New
York law firm and a group of recent law school graduates from Yale University formed the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in 1970. Stephen Duggan and Whitney Seymour --
senior attorneys in the Wall Street law firm of Simpson, Thatcher, and Bartlett -- became
interested in forming an environmental law firm after they successfully represented citizens in
the Hudson River Valley opposed to the construction of a power plant and associated water
storage facility (known as the Storm King case). The recent graduates from Yale were in search
of funding to establish an environmental law practice when the Ford Foundation suggested they
unite with the Wall Street lawyers.' The lawyers hired John Adams, a former lawyer with the
U.S. Attorney's office in New York, to be the executive director.2 Thus began the non-profit
environmental law firm, NRDC.
By the end of the 1970s the NRDC was known for initiating lawsuits to pressure
government agencies to implement laws. For example, the NRDC "filed thirty-five of the first
forty Clean Air Act-related lawsuits." 3 In 1976 the NRDC's administrative petition to the US
EPA helped to win a phase-out in the use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) as aerosol propellants.4
And in a legal settlement with the US EPA in the 1970s, known as the "NRDC consent decree,"
Gottlieb, 1993, pp. 140-141.
2 Borrelli, 1987.
3 Gottlieb, 1993, p. 142.
4 Maclin, 1988.
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the Agency agreed to write "water pollution controls covering 24 major industries and 126 toxic
'priority' pollutants."'
As the NRDC grew, it added scientists and lobbyists to its professional staff. "Over time,
the NRDC became the environmental organization most identified with the technical expertise
needed to draft legislation, issue reports, and use litigation as a tool in the policy process." 2 With
its principal focus on litigation, the NRDC developed an eclectic agenda, addressing: pollution
control (Clean Air and Clean Water acts), nuclear energy and weapons, toxic chemicals,
international environmental issues, and urban environmental issues. 3 By the 1990s the NRDC
was a multi-million dollar organization with offices in New York City (headquarters),
Washington, D.C., and San Francisco. In 1990 the NRDC had revenues of $16 million and
125,000 members. 4
The NRDC took a leadership role on pulp and paper lobbying in the early 1990s when
Environmental Defense shifted its pulp and paper work from litigation to the Paper Task Force.
The NRDC chose to target pulp and paper regulations because, as Jessica Landman, senior
attorney at NRDC recalled: "The paper industry water effluent guidelines were worth battling
for. The industry is a major polluter of water and prevention technologies were available for the
paper industry. It was a ripe industry for prevention because manufacturers could leapfrog to a
new technology." 5
10.3.2 The US EPA and the proposed Cluster Rules of 1993 and 1996
'Chemical Marketing Reporter, 1989, p. 3 .
2 Gottlieb, 1993, p. 143.
3 Ibid., pp. 142-143; and Garland, 1990.
4 Bosso, 1994, p. 13.
5 Landman, 2001.
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By order of a consent decree with Environmental Defense and National Wildlife
Federation (NWF)), the US EPA was legally bound to propose regulations addressing dioxin
discharges from pulp and paper mills by 31 October 1993.1 To minimize cross-media (air, water,
and soil) impacts, 2 the US EPA decided in 1990 to write simultaneously air and water regulations
for the pulp and paper industry. These became known as the "Cluster Rules." 3
When writing regulations under authority of the Clean Water Act the US EPA typically
does not set technology standards: e.g., all bleached kraft pulp mills must use ECF technology by
2001. Instead the US EPA sets a performance standard, e.g., all bleached kraft pulp mills must
limit their discharges of AOX to a monthly average of 0.623 kg AOX per ton of bleached kraft.
But the Agency determines the performance standard based on specific technologies. While
manufacturers can legally meet the performance standard using any technology they choose, they
usually choose the technology used by the US EPA to set the performance standard.
The three principal technologies that were under consideration in the 1990s were ECF,
ECF-lite, and TCF. ECF technology would achieve roughly 0.6 kg AOX/ton of pulp. 4 ECF-lite
would achieve 0.16 kg AOX/ton of pulp.5 And TCF would achieve 0.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp. 6
In the proposed 1993 Cluster Rules the Agency considered five technology options for
establishing the performance standards for bleached kraft pulp mills:
Option 1: Split addition of chlorine -- increase efficiency of elemental chlorine use in
the first bleaching stage by adding chlorine in two steps rather than one step
Option 2: Substitution of chlorine dioxide for chlorine (ECF)
'US EPA, 1993, p. 2-9.
2 A "cross-media" impact is when an effort to solve an environmental problem in one medium, such as air pollution,
results in greater pollution to another medium, such as water.
3 Prothro, 1993, p. 231.
4 For example, see the final US EPA regulations for the paper industry: US EPA, 1998.
5 For example, see the proposed US EPA regulations for the paper industry: US EPA, 1993.
6 For example, see the final US EPA regulations for the paper industry: US EPA, 1998.
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Option 3: Oxygen delignification or extended delignification with partial substitution
of chlorine dioxide for chlorine
Option 4: Oxygen or extended delignification with complete substitution of chlorine
dioxide for chlorine (ECF-lite)
Option 5: Oxygen and extended delignification with complete substitution of chlorine
dioxide for chlorine'
The Agency did not develop a TCF option because it did not consider TCF bleaching to be an
available technology. This was because, in the US EPA's words, "of the limited worldwide
experience with and data for TCF bleaching of softwood in papergrade kraft and soda mills" 2
Option 4 (ECF-lite) was the US EPA's preferred option "because no other option that
was both technically feasible and economically achievable resulted in greater effluent
reductions" of dioxins, furans, and AOX. 3 The performance standards proposed by the US EPA
based on ECF-lite were:
TCDD (dioxin) = non-detect at end of bleach plant
TCDF (furan) = 359 nanograms (ng) per metric ton (kkg) at end of bleach plant
AOX (adsorbable organic halides) = 0.156 kg/kkg at end of pipe for entire mill 4
"The Agency estimated that Option 4 would result in a range of one to three plant closures and
an estimated employment effect in the range of 500 to 4,400 lost jobs." 5 The total capital
investments for implementing the Cluster Rules overall, both air and water regulations, were
estimated by the US EPA to cost $4.0 billion and annual operations and maintenance costs would
be $0.4 billion.
When the proposed regulations were released in December 1993, the industry pounced.
Leading the attack on the US EPA was the industry's trade association, the American Forest and
'US EPA, 1993, p. 66110.
2 Ibid., p. 66109.
3 Ibid., p. 66110.
4 Ibid., p. 66196.
5 Ibid., p. 66111.
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Paper Association (AFPA); formerly the API. Lending significant support to the AFPA was the
industry "laggards:" the corporations with the fewest investments in environmentally advanced
bleaching technologies (i.e., oxygen delignification, extended delignification, and ozone).' The
paper "Industry was led by Georgia-Pacific and International Paper," recalled Rick Hind,
legislative director with Greenpeace USA. These were "the laggards with the least amount of
investments in oxygen delignification. International Paper hired Tom Jorling [former
commissioner of Department of Environmental Conservation in New York State]. Georgia-
Pacific hired Lee Thomas [former EPA Administrator]. They did heavy duty arm twisting [at the
EPA].")2
International Paper and Georgia-Pacific would have borne the largest burden in
implementing an ECF-lite regulation. The estimated costs of installing extended and oxygen
delignification systems varied depending on the state of technological investments within a mill.
Retrofitting a mill with an extended delignification system was estimated to cost $1 to $40
million3 and an oxygen delignification system was estimated to cost $8 to $25 million.4 Despite
the opportunities for operations and maintenance (O&M) savings, the upfront capital costs
investment implications for industry laggards of ECF-lite, however, were large. Assuming for
illustration purposes that compliance with Option 4 (ECF-lite) for International Paper would
have entailed installing only one extended or oxygen delignification system per mill that had
neither (which was 10 mills) and the cost was $20 million per mill, complying with the water
'McCubbin, 1995.
2 Hind, 2001.
3 US EPA, 1993, p. 4-20.
4 Ibid., p. 4-42.
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regulation would have cost International Paper $200 million;' and for Georgia-Pacific the cost
would have been $100 million. Because these corporations were operating mills that were not
using the most advanced bleaching technologies, they were at an environmental disadvantage.
Thus they had a huge incentive to invest millions of dollars in studies, lobbyists, and lawyers to
avoid investments in the tens or hundreds of million dollars.
The strategy of the industry laggards and the AFPA was four-fold. First, concede
elemental chlorine. Second, intimidate the US EPA by publicly rebuking it for betrayal and
technical incompetence. Third, contest every technical detail in the Cluster Rules that supported
ECF. Fourth, leverage Congressional muscle to pressure the Agency.
Recognizing that they had a public relations problem with dioxin pollution, the paper
industry laggards conceded the elimination of elemental chlorine. By eliminating elemental
chlorine mills were able to reach non-detect levels of dioxin. And by committing to ECF ahead
of required regulations, they were in essence defining the acceptable regulation for the industry.
International Paper, for example, set a goal in 1993 of converting all of its bleached mills to ECF
by 1996.2
In an article in Pulp and Paper, reporter Ken Patrick portrayed the outrage of Tom
Jorling, International Paper's vice president of environmental affairs:
The industry was caught by surprise, having heavily supported the initiative, and then
seeing the final product, Jorling explains. Since then it has been actively sending out the
message that the 'Cluster Rule did not work.'
This message, that 'something has gone awry with the Cluster Rule,' has reportedly
found a receptive audience in several influential politicians and lawmakers, and
indications are that the 'Cluster,' as proposed, will not be what is finally promulgated.
International Paper estimated compliance costs for the entire Cluster Rules in 1994 at $0.7-1.4 billion (Patrick,
1994); although it is important to note that it is standard practice for industry's to overestimate the costs of
compliance with regulations.
2 Pulp and Paper, 1995.
3 Patrick, 1994.
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Another article in Pulp and Paper emphasized how the conclusions reached by the US EPA
illustrated the Agency's incompetence: the data differences between the paper industry and US
EPA "can be summarized as a lack of understanding from those outside the paper industry [i.e.,
US EPA staff]."'
Yet the environmental leaders had a much different response. Champion International
was alone among paper manufacturer to publicly proclaim support for ECF-lite. In a press
release the company stated: "'Champion recognizes the environmental benefits of OD100 [i.e.,
ECF-lite] 2 and has pledged to make the necessary steps to bring us to full compliance in 1996."'
Weyerhaeuser, while it did not publicly support the Cluster Rules, emphasized that
"'With all of these [public] pressures, we feel like mills must drive toward closure through
time,"' said Richard Erickson, vice president of manufacturing and technology. "'The
minimum-impact mill, for Weyerhaeuser, is a vision that during the next 15 to 20 years we will
install technologies that will take us toward closing our mills.' 4 And Union Camp's corporate
vice president, William Trice believed the "EPA's Cluster concept to be valid, because if done
right, it will lead to a set of regulations that are compatible and will help industries make cost-
efficient changes." Also he thought the "EPA had a good database and a good understanding of
what the they [the data] were about."
Determined to beat the US EPA back to ECF, the paper industry laggards "began
flooding the EPA with new data."5 On the scientific side the paper industry contested the US
EPA's use of AOX as a measure of pollution. Operating from the perspective that it is the
' Pulp and Paper, 1994.
2 "OD100" is shorthand for oxygen delignification ("OD") and 100% substitution of chlorine with chlorine dioxide
("100"), i.e., ECF-lite.
3 Business Wire, 1993.
4 Ferguson, 1994.
5 Ferguson and Finchern, 1997.
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government's responsibility to show harm from the pollution -- i.e., industry has the right to
pollute until it is shown to be harmful -- John Festa, director of chemical control and health
programs, for AFPA argued that "The agency was unable to show correlation between toxicity
and AOX contaminants."I
On the economic side the industry roundly disagreed with the Agency, asserting it under-
estimated costs. The industry estimated that the Cluster Rules "would shut down 30 mills, cost
an additional $10 billion in capital expenditures, and could eliminate 275,000 jobs, including
19,000 on the mill level."2 Catherine Marshall, director of environmental affairs had an
apocalyptic perspective on the consequences of ECF-lite: "The EPA severely underestimated
economic impacts. .. If the EPA had required OD there would have been job loss and mill
closure, and killed international competition." 3
The paper industry laggards demanded that the US EPA sit down and meet with them, to
hear their perspective on the data, and naturally to adopt their view. The laggards' pressure had
its desired effect on the Agency. As Catherine Marshall recalled, after the proposed regulations
"We had loads of technical meetings with the EPA. We had an on-going dialogue." And "Bob
Perciasepe [assistant administrator for the Office of Water] at the EPA was the leader behind
us."4 After the US EPA finalized the Cluster Rules in industry's favor, Perciasepe made a
presentation to the executive directors of the Environmental Defense and NRDC saying their rule
was good for the environment and business.5
1Festa, 1987.





In 1995 the political environment in Washington, DC changed when the Democratic
Party lost control of both the House of Representatives and Senate to the Republican Party.
Taking power with an anti-government, anti-regulation, anti-environmental agenda, the
Republicans had "plans for sweeping regulatory reform" that would "change federal
environmental rules and regulations."' The pulp and paper industry quickly became "intimately
involved with the rewriting of the Clean Water Act," wrote the editors for Pulp and Paper
International.2 For the US EPA and its Administrator, Carol Browner, this meant "unrelenting
attacks by Republican lawmakers," reported Gary Lee of The Washington Post.3
With the pulp and paper industry's access to the new Congressional leadership, the result,
as Catherine Marshall emphasized, was "Congressional members came down hard on EPA. Our
members have a mill in every state, almost a mill in every Congressional district." 4 Rick Hind,
legislative director for Greenpeace USA attested to the new found Congressional power of the
industry: the "EPA received Congressional letters [in support of the industry] from [Senator]
Jesse Helms and [Representative] Rick White. That didn't help."5
By the mid-1990s media attention to water pollution from pulp and paper mills had
reverted back to the pre-dioxin days of the early 1980s. The bulk of articles were in newspapers
in communities with pulp and paper mills, with the major dailies only covering the proposed
regulatory changes.
Confronting a politically mobilized and connected industry in the face of high
compliance costs (even though there was a return on investment for the delignification






technologies) and Congressional leadership opposed to regulation in the absence of media
attention to a salient environmental problem, the US EPA stepped back from its support for ECF-
lite.
In 1996 the US EPA published another set of proposed regulations. This time the
Agency indicated that it was leaning to ECF: "Although the final detailed analysis and decisions
are not yet complete, the post [1993]-proposal analysis to date has demonstrated to the Agency
that the first option" -- ECF -- "should be given equal weight [as ECF-lite] as a possible
technology basis for the BAT [best available technology] effluent limitations" because "both
options appear to reduce dioxins and furans in wastewaters to concentrations at or below the
current analytical minimum levels."' Note that the purpose of the water regulations are now
directly solely at the reducing dioxin and furan emissions, the industry position, while the other
benefits of delignification technologies were minimized as "incremental benefits." "The
incremental environmental benefits that the Agency can attribute to" ECF-lite included: "reduced
chronic toxicity to some aquatic life species," which resulted from reducing COD and AOX
discharges.2 The US EPA also noted that "Even though dioxin and furan are no longer
measurable at the end-of-pipe at many mills [with ECF], the potential for formation of these
pollutants continues to exist at pulp and paper mills as long as any chlorine-containing
compounds (including chlorine dioxide) are used in the bleaching process." 3
In the 1996 update the US EPA estimated that in terms of cost, ECF and ECF-lite were
nearly identical. While ECF-lite cost would require much greater capital investments, it saved
mills money in operations and maintenance costs because of reduced chemical and energy use
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'US EPA, 1996, p. 36837-36838.
2 Ibid., p. 36838.
3 Ibid., p. 36839.
(see Table 10.3). "When the costs of Options A [ECF] and B [ECF-lite] are compared on a pre-
tax annualized basis, Option B is slightly less expensive that Option A for the sum of all direct
dischargers" because "oxygen delignification reduces operating costs at certain mills. At some
of these mills, the operation and maintenance cost savings of Option B are sufficiently large that
they outweigh that option's higher capital costs."' The Agency estimated that ECF would result
in one mill closure and ECF-lite would result in three mill closures. 2
Table 10.3 US EPA cost estimates for ECF and ECF-lite in 1996
Costs ECF ECF-lite(Option A) (Option B)
Capital ($ million) 998 2,036
Operations and maintenance ($ million) 109 -7
TCF was still not an option because "The limited range of papergrade TCF products
currently produced and sold in the U.S. market indicates that TCF technology is not yet available
to make the fall range of products produced by ECF or similar chlorine-based processes." 3
European TCF mills did not count because "EPA consistently requested but obtained only
limited process and pollutant removal performance data for TCF mills in Europe." 4 The success
of the paper industry laggards in keeping a TCF market from developing in the US, which
prevented incentives from emerging for manufacturers to produce TCF paper, had a feedback
loop to the regulatory process: with TCF bleaching barely in use in the US, the Agency would
not consider it a viable technology. This illustrates how regulators follow rather than lead the
market. And the lesson for environmentalists that want to diffuse the most advanced
environmental technologies into an industry sector is they must first succeed in the market before
Ibid., p. 36844.
2 Ibid., p. 36843.
3 Ibid., p. 36839.
4 Ibid., p. 36839.
383
trying to persuade a regulatory agency, or at least the US EPA, to require the best performing
technology.
To silence the environmental leaders in the industry, the AFPA worked with the US EPA
in developing incentives for further environmental improvements. The incentives provided
regulatory relief for mills that went beyond compliance.' In reality, they were for the mills
already beyond compliance. "The chief attraction of the incentives," Catherine Marshall of the
AFPA explained, was "that the government will go away and not bother" the manufacturers. 2
Jessica Landman of NRDC saw the incentive program as effective in silencing the support of
environmental leaders for ECF-lite: "Within the membership of the AF&PA there were some
companies that could have lived with OD regulation. Those firms agreed not to support OD
regulation if the others agreed to support voluntary incentives for companies that invested in OD.
A deal was cut internally to lobby in this manner: no OD regulations, but voluntary incentives
for OD."3
10.3.3 Strategy of environmentalists
When the US EPA revealed its intent to only require ECF bleaching in 1996, the
environmental community had only a tiny window of opportunity for increasing pressure on the
Agency to change its position. Given the unified position of the industry (or at least the silenced
environmental leaders), the political leadership of the US Congress, the lack of national media
attention to water pollution from the industry, and Robert Perciasepe's (head of US EPA's Office
of Water) support for the industry position, the environmental community confronted a major
challenge.




They started this challenge divided. The goals of the two leading environmental groups
were at odds. There was a private split in the environmental movement with the NRDC and
Environmental Defense willing to accept ECF-lite, while Greenpeace USA and the grassroots
groups wanted TCF. As Jessica Landman, senior attorney with NRDC recalled:
Lauren [Blum of Environmental Defense] and I advocated for OD [oxygen
delignification] as standard operating practice because it is the first step to TCF. Support
for OD was viewed by some as a sell out. While our technology rationale was sound, a
mill must have OD to have TCF, it was not welcomed. I'm a lawyer and was involved
with developing legal standards for best available technology and new source
performance standards. Lauren is technical expert. We were advocating for OD because
it was, and still may be, legally attainable. We can make a solid legal case for OD, but
not for TCF. The environmental community was not happy with our focus on OD.'
In public the NRDC supported TCF. For example, in a press release following the US
EPA's proposed 1993 regulations, the NRDC criticized the Agency for not proposing "the use of
chlorine-free technologies in any kraft mills." Landman emphasized that chlorine-free (i.e., TCF)
technology was necessary to eliminate "'the discharge of dioxin and other toxic organochlorines
in wastewater from this industry.' 2
The split in goals for the environmental community, while a technologically minor
distraction -- oxygen delignification is necessary for TCF bleaching -- reflected the distrust and
competition among the environmental organizations. Environmental Defense had already
intervened with Time Inc., undermining Greenpeace USA's TCF initiative. And there were the
deeper resentments among grassroots anti-toxic activists that national groups like NRDC and
Environmental Defense were willing to "sell-out" to achieve access and "victories." Writing in
his weekly newsletter, Rachel's Environment and Health Weekly, Peter Montague explained:
Currying favor with this President led the environmental community into several deep
traps. For example, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) blundered into a terrible
dilemma. To support President Clinton, NRDC caved in on Delaney. Instead of
385
'Ibid.
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supporting prevention, NRDC is now pushing the "one-in-a-million" risk standard that
the food chemical industry favors; NRDC is calling for elaborate "risk assessments" to be
completed for every pesticide used on our food.'
Despite the differences in goals, Rick Hind of Greenpeace USA and Jessica Landman of
NRDC were able to work together. As Hind concluded, "We always had a strong ally in NRDC"
on the Cluster Rules. 2 The conflict over ECF-lite versus TCF illustrated the larger problem
environmentalists faced, they had not defined and agreed upon a clear message of the problem
and the solution.
The tactics environmentalists used with the US EPA were: technical information,
coalitions, litigation, and direct action. The arguments for oxygen delignification were easy to
make and were already supported by US EPA data as well as data collected by the Paper Task
Force. To foster scientific legitimacy for its goal of zero AOX discharges (i.e., TCF bleaching)
Greenpeace USA emphasized the disproportionate impact of water pollution on communities of
color. "Our EPA strategy," Hind explained, "was to push them [the US EPA] to document the
hazards to people of color and anglers who ate the fish." 3 Recreational and subsistence anglers
eat more fish than the average American. While the average American consumed an average of
6.5 grams of fish per day, recreational anglers consumed 30-140 grams/day and subsistence
anglers consumed as much as 300 grams/day.4 The US EPA, Hind emphasized "has previously
estimated that these populations face an unprecedented 1 in 1,000 cancer risk." 5 Furthermore,
the "EPA's 1993 regulatory impact report on the proposed Cluster Rule estimated that between




4 Hind (1997) citing US EPA data.
'Ibid.6 Ibid.
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Environmental justice issues were of, at least rhetorical concern to the Clinton
administration. On February 11, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, Federal
actions to address environmental just in minority populations and low-income populations.
Executive Order 12898, which proclaimed that:
Each Federal agency shall conduct its programs, policies, and activities that substantially
affect human health or the environment, in a manner that ensures that such programs,
policies, and activities do not have the effect of excluding persons (including
populations) from participation in, denying persons (including populations) the benefits
of, or subjecting persons (including populations) to discrimination under, such, programs,
policies, and activities, because of their race, Color, or national origin.
To protect recreational and subsistence anglers from exposure to persistent
bioaccumulative toxics like dioxins and furans in the wastewater effluent Greenpeace USA
advocated for TCF bleaching.' Environmental justice groups among the active coalition partners
advocating TCF included the Indigenous Environmental Network, Penobscot Nation,
Washington Office for Environmental Justice, Oneida Environmental Resources Board, and the
Tribal Operations Committee.2 These organizations were part of a broad coalition that Hind and
Landman organized to support more stringent Cluster Rule regulations. Other national
environmental groups included: American Canoe Association, Center for Health, Environment
and Justice, 3 Clean Water Network, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, National Wildlife
4Federation, Sierra Club, and US Public Interest Research Group (PIRG). State and local groups
included: Washington Toxics Coalition, Natural Resources Council of Maine, Montana
Environmental Inforamtion Center, South Carolina Environmental Law Project, Columbia Basin
Institute, Friends of the Upper Willamette River, and Women's Voices for the Earth (Montana).'
'Ibid.
2 Greenpeace USA, 1997.
3 Then known as the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste (CCHW).
" Robins, 1997.
5 Greenpeace USA, 1997.
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And a group of 13 executive directors from national environmental and public health
organizations wrote a letter to Vice President Al Gore in support of ECF-lite. As Laurie
Valeriano of the Washington Toxics Coalition recalled, "In late 1997 & 1998, groups across the
country mobilized to pressure EPA to adopt a cluster rule based on chorine-free technologies.
We held simultaneous news conferences, attended meetings together and pursued numerous
sign-on letters." 2
The environmental groups also persuaded a handful of corporations to write letters to
administrator Browner, vice president Gore, or president Clinton in support of more stringent
regulations. The CEO of Time Inc. and director of environmental affairs at McDonald's
supported ECF-lite by writing letters to Carol Browner. And the CEO's of Ben & Jerry's,
Kinko's, and Seventh Generation, and publisher of Scuba magazine all sent letters to President
Clinton in support of TCF.
The debate over the Cluster Rules in the mid-1990s occurred largely in the absence of
any media on the issue. Greenpeace USA tried to create media attention on the issue when it
tagged the US EPA's, Washington, DC headquarters with a banner in May 1997. "The men
hung a 36-by-24-foot banner -- reading 'Eco-racism & Dioxin Kill: Chlorine-free Papermills
Now!' 3 wrote The Washington Post, which covered the action. The action received little other
press. By 1997 the Congressional chlorine debates of 1993 and 1994 were three to four years old
and the dioxin concerns of the late 1980s were ten years old. The issues concerning paper mill
pollution were so old the media had forgotten them. As a Washington Post reporter began her
1 The 13 were: American Oceans Campaign, Center for Marine Conservation, Environmental Defense,
Environmental Information Center, Environmental Working Group, Izaak Walton League, National Wildlife
Federation, NRDC, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Populaiton Action International, Sierra Club, US PIRG,
and Zero Population Growth.
2 Valeriano, 1998.
3 Washington Post, 1997.
388
story on the issue in April 1997, "You've probably never heard of organochlorine pollution, but
it's part of the debate over an impending regulatory decision that, figuratively, is being beat to a
pulp."1
And at the same the US EPA was about to finalize the Cluster Rules, Administrator
Browner was in a public fight for more stringent air quality regulations and expanding the right-
to-know (RTK) program on chemical reporting. In a meeting with environmentalists on the
Cluster Rules, Administrator Browner closed the January 1997 meeting by making it "very clear
(she had just come from the Senate) that the Hill is extremely unfriendly [to environmental
regulation] and is looking to overturn any and all of the three major rules EPA is working on
(cluster rule, air, RTK)." 2
When the US EPA finally issued its regulations for water pollution in 1998, 13 years after
the discovery of dioxin in mills and 11 years after dioxin pollution became a public issue, the
Agency sided firmly with the pulp and paper industry laggards: it only required mills to reduce
AOX discharges to 0.623 kg AOX/ton of pulp, a performance standard equivalent to ECF
bleaching. As Sheila Frace, acting director of engineering analysis in the US EPA's Office of
Water concluded:
Industry proposed ECF and argued it would be just as protective [as ECF and OD].
We [EPA] are seeing mills getting low levels of pollutants at the bleach plant with ECF.
The incremental differences are too small to justify OD. There is decreased [water] flow
with OD. The principal differences are in AOX, color, and COD. From the national
standpoint if is hard to justify a lot of expenditure when there's a variety of receiving
streams.3
The capital cost difference between Options A [ECF] and B [ECF-lite] is $1 billion. We
have a lot of concern about the economic ramifications [of Option B]. In our bankruptcy





what will really happen. But the environmental impacts are too small relative to the
economic costs.
The "bankruptcy analysis" Frace refers to concluded that one of the largest pulp and
paper corporations in the US would go bankrupt if required to implement ECF-lite.2 The two
most vulnerable corporations to the oxygen delignification requirement, as noted above, were
International Paper and Georgia-Pacific. While the US EPA, citing confidential business data,
never released the bankruptcy analysis or named the corporation,3 the word on the environmental
street was: International Paper. Given the number of bleached kraft pulp mills owned by
International Paper and the corporation's lack of investment in advanced bleaching technologies,
International Paper was the logical corporation to be most vulnerable to ECF-lite. NRDC "tried
to get that data, but the EPA has refused to release it. Using the EPA's formula and public data,
we found that half of all paper companies should have been predicted to go bankrupt, not just
one. The economic analysis is clearly flawed,"4 said an outraged Jessica Landman.
The irony is that shortly after the US EPA promulgated the Cluster Rule's, International
Paper bought Union Camp Corporation and Champion International. International Paper
purchased Union Camp for $6.6 billion in 1998 and Champion International for $9.3 billion in
2000. And Georgia-Pacific purchased FortJames for $11 billion in 2000. Given the financial
capacity of Georgia-Pacific and International Paper to make multi-billon acquisitions after
passage of the Cluster Rules, reveals the lie that either of these corporations could have been






As Jessica Landman concluded, "The EPA caved in to industry pressure. It was massive,
relentless, technical, and political. They had a concerted campaign. They lobbied congress to
lobby the EPA. They lobbied EPA directly on technical, economic, and scientific issues. And
they silenced their environmentally advanced members."' And environmentalists had lost any
opportunity to mobilize public opinion to support more stringent regulations because it had been
years since dioxins and organochlorines were in the media.
The NRDC joined the National Wildlife Federation and other environmental
organizations in appealing the US EPA's decision in the US Court of Appeals, District of
Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals sided with the US EPA in 2002.2
10.4 Challenges to success
Environmentalists had many individual successes in their campaigns to transform the
American paper industry. They raised public awareness of the problems with paper bleaching in
general and elemental chlorine in particular. They achieved a significant policy success with the
International Joint Commission (IJC). And they persuaded Time Inc., Kinko's, Scuba Times,
Ben & Jerry's and others to change their purchasing specifications.
The IJC success arose when environmental groups formed a broad coalition, developed a
unified message ("zero discharge"), operated in the context of clear environmental harm (the
degradation of wildlife because of exposure to persistent toxic substances), and operated in the
absence of industry opposition. The few TCF purchasing successes (Kinko's, Scuba Times, Ben
& Jerry's, Jossey Bass) arose when Greenpeace USA targeted or worked with executives
sympathetic to the goal of TCF bleaching. Time Inc. was a Pyrrhic success because it emerged
from the competition of two environmental groups.
' Ibid.
2 No. 99-1452, National Wildlife Federation, Et Al., V. Environmental Protect Agency, 2002.
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Yet the paper industry laggards succeeded when it counted. They prevented market
demand for TCF paper from growing beyond a few small isolated businesses. They blocked
legislative action for phasing-out the use of chlorine and chlorine dioxide in pulp mills at both
the federal and state levels. They delayed regulatory action for 13 years. And when the
regulations were finalized they were written to their specification. The paper industry laggards
succeeded by contesting every decision made by any organization that was opposed to its goal of
ECF bleaching, squelching the dissent of environmental leaders in pulp and paper
manufacturing, and trying to intimidate those opposed to ECF. Together these actions delayed
decisions and slowed momentum.
The industry laggards also made a number of savvy decisions when events were turning
against them. When dioxins were initially found in their wastewaters, they quickly co-opted the
US EPA through cooperation. When the UC was set to recommend a phase-out of chlorine and
chlorine dioxide in pulp and paper mills, they persuaded the Commission to expand the phase-
out to all users of chlorine and chlorine-containing chemicals. And when the Cluster Rules
threatened to divide the industry, they developed voluntary incentives to silence the
environmental leaders.
Outside of the UC where industry opposition was absent until it was too late, the
environmental organizations were unable to successfully counter the paper industry laggards.
Different goals and competition among the lead environmental organizations hampered
opportunities for success in the face of a mobilized, aggressive, and comparatively resource-rich
opposition. A fractured coalition is no way to approach an opponent like the paper industry
laggards. When Environmental Defense intervened in Greenpeace USA's market campaign with
Time Inc., it hampered factors important to success in environmental campaigns: a unified goal
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and quick success. With Environmental Defense supporting oxygen delignification (ECF-lite)
over TCF, it confused the message to corporate consumers over what is the environmentally
preferred paper. If Time Inc. had stayed the course of its 1992 editorial to purchase TCF paper,
it would have created momentum for manufacturers like Union Camp to produce TCF paper.
But when Environmental Defense intervened, pulling Time Inc. into a multi-year Paper Task
Force research project, it delayed action by Time Inc., drastically slowing momentum for market
change. When Time Inc. finally made its purchasing decisions, they were made outside of the
public spotlight that would have contributed momentum to the diffusion of cleaner bleaching
technologies.
There is nothing wrong with Environmental Defense's pragmatic approach and desire for
workable solutions. The problem becomes when Environmental Defense enters into issues
cultivated by other environmental groups and tries to negotiate a victory on its own by
compromising on the goals of the environmental organization that initiated the campaign.'
Finally the US EPA proved to be a huge energy sink for environmental activists. After
the paper industry laggards succeeded in silencing the industry's environmental leaders and
preventing the diffusion of market demand for TCF paper, and environmentalists could not re-
create (as they had in the late 1980s) media attention to the problems of paper mill water
pollution, the Cluster Rules became a lost cause.
Dowie (1995) cites a similar example when Environmental Defense intervened with a nationwide consumer
campaign by Citizens' Clearing House for Hazardous Waste and Concerned Neighbors in Action against the use of
styrofoam containers by McDonald's.
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11 The social construction of strategic choices: the underlying factors that affected
pulp and paper campaigns
I argue in this chapter that the strategic choices of environmental organizations are
socially constructed. Neither values/ideology nor sources of funding, the primary factors
traditionally emphasized as affecting environmental NGO behavior (see Chapter 2), sufficiently
explained the choices environmental groups made during their pulp and paper campaigns.
Rather their strategic choices emerged from the confluence of the values and experiences of
staff, their interactions with the external environment, and organizational values, ideology, and
history.
The political scientist Russell Dalton (1994), in his model of ideologically structured
action, concluded that by knowing the ideology of an environmental organization we could
predict its actions. "The environmental identity [i.e., ideology] of a group ultimately culminates
in its choice of political strategies."' Using data from Dalton as well as Dowie (1995) and
Gottlieb (1993), I developed in Chapter 2 a set of characteristics for mainstream and alternative
ecological organizations (see Table 2.2). Dalton would consider Environmental Defense,
NRDC, and SSNC as mainstream groups because they are less challenging of the sociopolitical
order, and would consider the Greenpeace organizations as alternative groups.
For researchers of the environmental movement like Dowie (1995) and Gottlieb (1993),
who see money as the principal factor affecting organizational behavior, they would identify the
national groups running pulp and paper campaigns as mainstream organizations; they have multi-
million dollar budgets and offices in their nation's capitol. Yet, as revealed in Table 11.1, the
' Dalton, 1994, p. 250. Dalton saw organizational "identity" and "ideology" as being synonymous.
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national environmental groups involved with the pulp and paper campaigns do not fit neatly into
either categorization, as a mainstream or alternative ecological organization.
Table 11.1 Comparison of predicted strategic choices to actual choices made by
environmental groups during their pulp and paper campaigns
Strategic Predicted Actual choices Predicted
choices choices for choices for:
Malnseam GP Sw GP Alternative
Goals ecologIcal ED NRDC SSNC USA ecological
Targets
National Yes
regulatory agency Yes then Yes
or legislative body No
Other levels of No No No
government
Corporations No Yes No
Notes on the table:
'Weak Yes" = the action happened with individual staff, but was not a major part of the organization's strategy.
- ED = Environmental Defense; NRDC = Natural Resources Defense Council; SSNC = Swedish Society of Nature
Conservation; NRCM = Natural Resources Council of Maine; GP Sw = Greenpeace Sweden; and GP USA =
Greenpeace USA.
- Shaded columns: the actions predicted by Dalton (1994) in his model of ideologically-shaped action.
- Shaded rows: actions predicted by Dalton to be strongly associated with an organization's ideology.
Table 11.1 compares the predicted behavior of mainstream and alternative ecological
organizations to the actual behavior of the national environmental organizations in their pulp and
paper campaigns. The shaded columns in Table 11.1 are the predicted behaviors from Table 2.2.
Each of the actual choices made during the pulp and paper campaigns is labeled yes, no, weak
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yes. "Yes" means the organization clearly made the specified choice or action. "No" means the
organization did not make that choice. "Weak yes" means staff in the organization made the
choice, but it was not a major part of the organization's strategy. An example of a "weak yes" is
when Lauren Blum of Environmental Defense supported the Natural Resources Council of
Maine (NRCM) in its legislative campaign for TCF. While allying with grassroots groups was
not a core element of Environmental Defense's campaign, Lauren Blum helped grassroots
groups when she could.
The two shaded rows in Table 11.1 represent the decisions and actions of environmental
organizations that Dalton (1995) sees as strongly associated with alternative organizations:
setting the most demanding goals and direct action. For Dowie and Gottlieb, as well as for
Dalton, a mainstream organization would not have the most challenging environmental goal.
Yet, at times all the environmental groups with the exception of NRDC had the most
environmentally challenging goal. Note that the campaign goals for all of the organizations
(excepting NRDC) evolved over time. That is why under SSNC for "Set most demanding goal"
the cell is: "Yes then No then Yes." See Table 11.2 for details of the evolution of the SSNC's
technology goal. And the most challenging goals of the national environmental organizations
Table 11.2 The SSNC's bleached kraft pulp goals over time
Among the most
Time period Pulp and paper goal demanding goals at
the time?
Environmentally friendly -
1986 - 1989 chlorine reduced paper (1.0 Yes
kg AOX/ton of pulp)
1990-1992 "Chlorine-free" definition that No
allowed chlorine dioxide use
1993-1998 TCF Yes
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were shared by the grassroots groups in the US; i.e., the most challenging goals of the national
environmental organizations were among the most challenging goals held by any environmental
organization, local or national, campaigning on the issue.
The use of direct action did follow the prediction of Dalton, with the groups he identifies
as "mainstream" (Environmental Defense, NRDC, and SSNC) avoiding direct action, while his
"alternative" groups (the Greenpeace organizations) used it. However, the data on alternative
groups is limited, reflecting the work of only one organization, Greenpeace, in two different
nations. Excluded from Table 11.1 were the campaigns of state and local groups because I did
not examine them in the same detail as the campaigns of the national organizations. But it is
worth noting that two grassroots groups (alternative ecological organizations) involved in pulp
and paper campaigns, the Dead Pigeon River Council and Pigeon River Action Group,' did not
use direct action;2 further highlighting the limited predictive value of Dalton's ideologically
structured model of environmental organizational behavior. For all the other strategic choices
listed in Table 11.1 there is no clear association between predicted and actual choices.
The pragmatic and opportunistic nature of environmental organizations severely limits
the value of trying to associate certain types of organizations with specific types of choices. The
conclusion of the environmental historian Samuel Hays (1987) on the pragmatic use of ideas by
environmentalists also holds true for their actions. Hays concluded that "Environmental inquiry
did not lead to a single system of thought such as social theorists might prefer, and it would be
difficult to reduce its varied strands to a single pattern."3 And I would amend Hays conclusion to
state that: environmental organizations with different ideological orientations (or sources and
They campaigned against water pollution from the Canton mill in North Carolina (Bartlett, 1995).
2 Although Greenpeace USA did perform an action at the Canton mill; see chapter 10.
3 Hays, 1987, p. 247.
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amounts of money) often engage in similar actions, making it difficult to associate ideology (or
resources) with specific types of actions as social theorists might prefer.
The limited predictive power of both money- and ideologically-oriented theories of behavior
arises from the failure to see strategic behavior as emerging from a confluence of factors. Based
on the evidence from the pulp and paper campaigns I conclude that the factors affecting strategic
choices are, as depicted in Figure 11.1: the "internal factors" of "staff," "founding conditions,"
and "organizational values and ideology;" the "external organizations" that environmental
groups interact with in trying to achieve their (including sources of funding, opponents, allies,
and government agencies); and the "contextual factors" that shape the environment they try to
effect change in. I call this the "social construction of strategic choices" because choices emerge
from multiple influences, including the external environment. As Berger and Luckmann (1966)
wrote in The Social Construction ofReality, "it is impossible for man to develop as man in,
isolation,"2 and this holds true for environmental organizations: their strategic choices emerge
from the confluence of both internal and external factors rather than emerging from a single
source, be it internal organizational ideology or external sources of funding. Below I review
how the interplay of these factors affected the strategic choices, especially the setting of goals, of
the Greenpeace organizations, NRDC, Environmental Defense, and SSNC during their pulp and
paper campaigns.
I"Founding conditions" encompass a range of factors present during the formation of an organization. They include
the values and professional training of founders, sources of money, tactics used, goals set, and environmental issues
addressed.
2 Berger and Luckmann, 1966.
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Figure 11.1 The social construction of strategic
environmental organizations


















To begin with, an important contextual factor influencing the initial goals and causal
stories of the pulp and paper campaigns were prior campaigns ("historical events"). Previous
campaigns became the roots of future campaigns. The dioxins of grassroots environmentalists
influenced Greenpeace USA and the organochlorines df Bryntse at the Environmental Federation
influenced the SSNC and Greenpeace Sweden. .
The goal and actions of the Greenpeace organizations were strongly influenced by
founding conditions, organizational values, the external environment, and in the collaborative
project with IKEA, by staff. Formed as part of a Canadian protest against the American testing
of nuclear bombs in 1971, Greenpeace has used direct action and media attention as a means for
amplifying its provocative environmental demands ever since. And the pulp and paper campaign
was no exception. Direct action, media attention, and challenging environmental goals were all
part of the organization's Swedish and American campaigns. All the major pulp and paper
targets of Greenpeace Sweden and Greenpeace USA were subjected to a direct action, with one
notable exception: IKEA. And the decision to target IKEA without direct action and with little
media attention, a project of Margaret Rainey's, caused strife within Greenpeace Sweden and
prompted her to quit the organization. That Greenpeace Sweden worked collaboratively without
direct action and media attention illustrates how staff influence strategic choices.
Consistent with its rebellious self-image, the Greenpeace pulp and paper campaign was
always among the organizations with the most demanding environmental goal. Over the course
of the pulp and paper campaign Greenpeace revised its goal three times, with each revision
representing a more challenging goal (see Table 11.3). When Greenpeace Sweden began
campaigning to reduce pulp and paper mill effluent in 1985 the goal was the same as that set by
Gbran Bryntse, then of the Environmental Federation: reduce organochlorine discharges by 80
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percent. After the discovery of dioxin in 1987, Greenpeace International launched the pulp and
paper campaign with the goal of "chlorine-free" production. Whether "chlorine-free" meant
eliminating chlorine dioxide as well as chlorine was not specified at the time. However, when
firms began marketing paper bleached with chlorine dioxide but without elemental chlorine as
"chlorine-free" in 1989, Greenpeace clarified its goal as "totally" chlorine-free (TCF): no
chlorine and no chlorine dioxide. When parts of the paper industry countered, "there is no
environmental difference between elemental chlorine-free (ECF) and TCF," Greenpeace
amended its TCF goal, arguing that TCF is the only path to what should be the industry's goal of
totally effluent-free (TEF) production. The evolving goals of Greenpeace reflected both the
organizational values of Greenpeace that have existed since the organization's founding -- to
have the most challenging yet attainable environmental goals -- as well as the dynamic process
of goal setting as organization's interact with their environment.
Table 11.3 The bleached kraft pulp goals of the Greenpeace organizations
Among the most
Time period Pulp and paper goal demanding goals at
the time?
1985-1986 1.0 kg AOX/ton of pulp Yes(Greenpeace Sweden)
Chlorine-free Yes
1987-1990 (Greenpeace International and
all national Greenpeace
organizations)





The NRDC's goal of ECF-lite emerged from the combination of founding conditions,
organizational values, and external environment. Founded by lawyers with the support of the
Ford Foundation in 1970, the NRDC was and remains an organization that tries to bring about
change by working with government institutions through its professional staff (primarily lawyers
and scientists) and raises money from foundations and individuals to run the organization.
NRDC staff generally set goals that they think regulators and legislators will perceive as
reasonable. And the NRDC's goal for the pulp and paper industry was: pressure the US EPA to
set a standard that would require ECF-lite. Since it was clear that the US EPA would at least
require mills to adopt ECF bleaching (the elimination of chlorine gas as a bleaching agent),
Jessica Landman (the lead organizer of NRDC's lobbying effort) saw oxygen delignification as a
reasonable addition: because oxygen reduced operating costs for many mills, the investment in
oxygen delignification would pay for itself over time. While Landman was not opposed to TCF
in principle and worked collaboratively with Rick Hind (legislative director) of Greenpeace
USA, she viewed oxygen delignification as the priority issue because it was a cost-effective
stepping stone technology to TCF as well as TEF.
Environmental Defense's final goal of ECF-lite and its collaborative Paper Task Force
project reflected the decision of executive director, Fred Krupp, to reposition Environmental
Defense in the 1980s as a "third-wave" organization -- one that solves problems through
collaboration. Changes in the goal and tactics of Environmental Defense's pulp and paper
campaign mirrored the Krupp-led transformation of the organization. When dioxins in mill
effluent first came to public light in 1987, Environmental Defense called for their elimination by
ending chlorine use. This initial goal of eliminate chlorine meant Environmental Defense had
the same challenging goal as Greenpeace in 1987. And to address the dioxin pollution,
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Environmental Defense initially turned to litigation with the US EPA. Using litigation reflected
the organization's founding conditions, where staff lawyers and scientists helped achieved a ban
on DDT use through litigation.
Then in the early 1990s Environmental Defense shifted from litigation to a collaborative
research project, the Paper Task Force, with corporate purchasers of paper. The goal for pulp
bleaching mills that emerged from the Paper Task Force report was ambiguously defined as:
"give preference to paper manufactured by suppliers who demonstrate continuous environmental
improvement toward minimum-impact mills by installing pollution prevention technologies."' In
practice the goal Environmental Defense advocated for was ECF-lite; same as the NRDC.
Some argue that Environmental Defense's transformation was motivated more by money
than values. 2 And the Paper Task Force was a successful money raiser, with eleven foundations3
helping to fund the project. Yet I found no evidence, nor did I hear rumors within the
environmental community, that financial supporters of the Paper Task Force either encouraged
Environmental Defense to undertake the project in the first place or influenced its final goals.
The creation of the Paper Task Force and Environmental Defense's support for ECF-lite
reflected more the direction Krupp set for Environmental Defense than a direction advocated for
by any major funder. What the financial support for the Paper Task Force indicates is the
receptivity of foundations to such collaborative projects. As Donald Sch6n concluded, when
ideas rise in prominence they have "good currency:" i.e., they enable organizations to raise
'Paper Task Force, 1995, p. 191.
2 For example, see Dowie (1995).
3 The eleven foundations were: The Mary Duke Biddle Foundation, Carolyn Foundation, The Education Foundation
of America, Heinz Family Foundation, Hillsdale Fund, Inc., Lyndhurst Foundation, The Moriah Fund, Newman's
Own, Inc., C.D. Spangler Foundation, Inc., Surdna Foundation, Inc., and Turner Foundation Inc. (Paper Task Force,
1995).
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money. Thus financial resources support (and conversely the lack of resources undermine) the
values of an organization.
The SSNC's strategic choices were strongly influenced by staff and the external
environment. Founded in 1909, the SSNC is Sweden's oldest environmental organization.
Established during the conservation era, the SSNC is a mainstream organization engaged
primarily in trying to bring about change at the national level through lobbying. Yet, the
SSNC's pulp and paper campaign was more characteristic of an alternative ecological group.
GLran Bryntse tried to create change outside of the national government, targeted corporations
directly, and organized municipal authorities. The pulp and paper work represented a new area
of work for the SSNC, of trying to effect environmental change through purchasing rather than
lobbying. At the heart of this new approach was new staff, especially Bryntse and later Eva
Eiderstr6m.
The SSNC is another example of where staff leadership played a principal role in
defining organizational goals. When Bryntse brought the paper campaign to the SSNC from the
Environmental Federation, he set the goals for the campaign. And when Bryntse placed the
SSNC in the compromised position of being attacked by the pulp manufacturer Stdra Cell for
having a weak environmental goal in 1992, the SSNC removed Bryntse and changed its goal to
TCF paper.
The pulp and paper campaigns illustrate the social construction of strategic choices,
where founding conditions, organizational values, and staff combined with the external
environment (organizations and contextual factors) to shape strategic choices. Founding
conditions, especially values and tactics, persisted over time to influence strategic choices made
by the national Greenpeace organizations and the NRDC. When strategic approaches differed
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from those present at an organization's founding, they were strongly associated with new staff
and interactions with the external environment. Staff, with their own experiences and values,
operating in different contexts, made strategic choices out of character for the organization.
Margaret Rainey, for example, led Greenpeace Sweden to work collaboratively with a
corporation without direct action and media attention.
Interactions with the external environment caused technology goals to evolve over time.
Conflict with S~dra Cell, for example, prompted the SSNC to change its technology goal and
Bryntse to leave the organization. And evolving market conditions, technology developments,
and scientific data led Greenpeace to revise its goal three times.
The dynamic environment in which strategic choices are made as well as the influence of
staff and founding conditions, help to explain the limited predictive value of both the
ideological- and resource-based models of environmental organizational behavior. To
understand why organizations make their choices we need to look beyond ideology, values, and
money.
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12 The politics of bleached paper production: environmental groups succeed in
(Swedish) markets, fail in government politics
Environmental organizations traditionally have tried to effect technology change through
government politics, changing manufacturing through 'legislation, regulation, or litigation. While
the environmental organizations did try to bring about change in the pulp and paper industry
through government politics, it was through market politics that they achieved their greatest
successes. Environmental market politics is when organizations try to bring about environmental
change by directly targeting and working with manufacturers and consumers. The pulp and
paper campaigns represented at the time the most ambitious attempts by environmental
organizations to transform an industry sector through market politics.I
When the environmental organizations succeeded in implementing their technology
goals, they did it through market politics: by developing collaborative working relationships with
consumers and proving the technical viability of alternatives. These two factors were critical to
the success of environmental organizations in persuading most consumers to implement their
goals. Overall the Swedish environmental organizations, with help from Greenpeace Germany,
were far more successful than the NRDC, Environmental Defense, and Greenpeace USA in
achieving their goals through market politics. In the US, ideologically motivated environmental
laggards in the pulp and paper industry organized to oppose market change by successfully
intimidating potential environmental leaders among manufacturers and corporate consumers,
appealing to common values among corporate executives, and contesting the environmental,
economic, and technological arguments of environmentalists.
' Simultaneous with the pulp and paper market campaigns were other much smaller market initiatives, including
Environmental Defense helping to green McDonald's (EDF, 1990) and Greenpeace Germany working with
manufacturers to produce an environmental friendly refrigerator (Verheul and Vergragt, 1994).
407
This chapter begins by describing how environmental organizations tried to catalyze the
development and diffusion of cleaner production technologies. It then assesses why the national
environmental organizations in Sweden and the US succeeded and failed in their attempts to
green paper production through government and market politics. Within each institutional
context I assess the level of responsiveness of targets to the goals of environmental organizations
and the causal conditions affecting outcomes. In the analyses of the responsiveness of targets
and causal conditions I examine all the cases together (not distinguishing between those in
Sweden and those in the US) and comparatively (comparing different national outcomes).
12.1 Trying to effect technology change: the strategic choices of environmental
organizations
During their pulp and paper technology campaigns the national environmental
organizations made the following strategic choices. They:
= defined goals, i.e., technological solutions
= developed causal stories based on scientific evidence
= raised public awareness, especially through the media
= raised money
= cultivated alliances
" identified and pursued targets in government and market institutions
= used the tactics of lobbying (providing technical information), litigation, direct action, or
alternatives development
The environmental groups did not make these strategic choices in a linear, step-wise fashion.
Many were revisited and revised over the course of the campaign in response to arguments made
by opponents, technology changes made by manufacturers, actions taken by other environmental
organizations, and changes in campaign staff.
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Causal stories, public awareness, and money were all necessary for environmental
organizations to generate legitimacy among regulators, politicians, and consumers for their
demands that manufacturers reduce pollution by adopting cleaner production technologies (i.e.,
the technology goals of the environmentalists). In trying to effect change in bleached kraft pulp
production environmental organizations sought out multiple allies and targeted many different
actors and institutions. Figure 12.1 illustrates the diversity of allies and institutions the national
environmental organizations cultivated in trying to change pulp and paper production.
The arrows in Figure 12.1 are two-way, reflecting the dynamic reality of the pulp and
paper campaigns. The interactions of staff in environmental organizations with decision makers
in different types of institutions affected the actions of environmentalists and vice-versa; it was
not a one-way flow from environmental groups to all other organizations. The line between
"Environmental organizations" and "Labor" in Figure 12.1 is dotted because none of the
environmental groups made allying with labor a primary goal. A central impediment to
environmental change was "Opponents" -- primarily environmental laggards among pulp and
paper manufacturers and their trade associations -- and their presence is noted in Figure 12.1.
Who national environmental organizations allied with varied depending on their goals
and the institution targeted. They allied with: a) national and grassroots groups with similar
organizational values when targeting government institutions; b) grassroots groups when
targeting material manufacturers at the point of production; and c) corporate and government
purchasers, not environmental organizations (be it grassroots or national), when targeting
consumers.
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When the environmental organizations targeted institutional and individual consumers
they formed alliances with corporations and municipalities, not with other environmental groups.
These market campaigns lent themselves to a "go-it-alone" approach because success emerged
from environmentalists creating trust and credibility with corporate staff and decisions are easier
to reach with fewer participants. In a movement where organizations seek opportunities to
distinguish themselves from the pack by creating successes they alone can take credit for, the go-
it-alone consumer campaigns are alluring. And when combined with implementation, market
campaigns can be very effective. While effective for individual organizations, the go-it-alone
approach to targeting institutional consumers can be destructive to the wider diffusion of
environmental technologies, as occurred in the US.
The tactics used by the environmental groups varied with the institutional setting of
targets as well as with the historical predisposition of the environmental group. Alternatives
development, for example, was important when engaging legislative bodies and consumers, but
was largely unavailable when targeting regulatory agencies.
Government politics did not foster the diffusion of the cleanest production technologies
in either Sweden or the US. Given the capital intensity of the industry and the size of the
industry within Sweden and the US, regulators and politicians were receptive to the claims of
economic duress from environmental laggards and their trade associations. Thus they refused to
require performance standards that the industry laggards did not agree to. There was, however, a
false allure to government institutions because of the relative ease of access with legislators and
regulators (in comparison to corporate executives). It is ironic that in the institutional setting
where environmentalists had the greatest ease of access, government institutions, they had least
success in achieving their goals.
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When it became clear that the government institutions, especially regulatory agencies,
would not take a leadership role in diffusing the cleanest production technologies the
environmental groups turned to the market. Engaging in market politics changed the organizing
approach of environmental organizations relative to government politics. Now they had to
develop a thorough understanding of pulp and paper markets and technologies, work harder to
gain access to decision makers, and engage in alternatives development.
In selecting corporate consumers to target environmental organizations sought out both
market leaders -- corporations who have the capacity to influence the decisions of both
manufacturers as well as other corporations in their business sector by virtue of their size (e.g.,
Time Inc.) -- and environmental leaders -- typically smaller corporations that define themselves
as green businesses (e.g., Kinko's). Access became more difficult and required more creativity
in capturing the attention of key decision makers. While access was more constrained in market
politics, when environmentalists gained access it became an advantage: the barriers to access
switched from environmentalists to their opponents.
The pulp and paper campaigns revealed an important distinction in market politics
between manufacturers of materials (pulp and paper producers) and consumers of materials (e.g.,
IKEA). The manufacturers of materials were much more difficult to access and to work
collaboratively with than the consumers. Whereas corporate consumers, with brand names and
high public visibility, were more receptive to meeting and working with environmental
organizations.
During their market campaigns the environmental organizations engaged in what I call,
alternatives development: they defined a solution and/or provided technical support to help
consumers make the transition to cleaner products. Unlike government politics, especially
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regulatory politics, where environmental organizations seldom have a role in helping define the
solution, in market politics consumers often need technical assistance: they need help in defining
specifications for cleaner products and finding suppliers that offer products that meet their needs.
When the environmental groups succeeded with consumers, they demonstrated that alternative
products were available and/or helped consumers in the transition to more environmentally
friendly products.
By turning to the market, environmentalists expanded politics to encompass consumers
(as well as manufacturers) and moved the geography of action away from national capitols to
corporate headquarters, households, and communities. By engaging consumers the
environmental organizations created new opportunities for change. Consumers in households
and institutions were more likely than manufacturers to have values more closely aligned with
the environmental groups than the laggards among the pulp and paper manufacturers. And, since
corporate consumers are not invested in production technology, it is much easier for them to
change products than it is for manufacturers change production technologies. Table 12.1
summarizes the similarities and differences of government and market politics.
An advantage of market politics is it creates positive incentives for change among
manufacturers. When the environmentalists were successful in their pulp and paper campaigns
they created a price premium for TCF pulp -- pulp is typically a commodity product with little
market differentiation -- and opportunities for increased market share.- A few Swedish
manufacturers leapt at the opportunity to realize a first mover advantage.
A downside to market politics is, once the pressure for change from environmental
organizations recedes, diffusion of the cleaner production technologies may stall or even be
reversed unless governments develop regulations or laws that require use of the new
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technologies. For example, the diffusion of TCF bleaching in Sweden stalled at roughly 35%
because Greenpeace stopped campaigning for TCF paper, thinking they had reached critical
mass, the point at which technology diffusion becomes self-sustaining.'
Table 12.1 Comparison of the strategic elements surrounding technology change
through government and market politics
Strategic elements Government politics Market politics
Causal story: Necessary for action Necessary for action
problem and
responsible parties
Access Legal requirements and informal Gaining access to corporations,
contacts guarantee a base level of especially manufacturers of materials is
access often difficult
Technical - Scientific evidence of harm - Scientific evidence of harm
information
- Some technological data, - Technological data on alternative
although detailed data on products or processes, including
availability of products not availability, performance (cost and
necessary product quality), and environmental
impact comparison with existing
product or process
- Environmental organization provides
technical assistance to organizations
interested in change
Decision makers - Politicians - Governments as consumers;
targeted purchasing offices
- Regulatory authorities
- Businesses throughout the entire
- Courts product supply chain
- Individuals as both activists and
consumers
Geography of A nation's capitol (e.g., - Local - location of manufacturing
political action Washington, DC, or Stockholm) facilities and/or corporate
headquarters; and mobilizing citizens
as both consumers and activists
- Global -- target corporations with
similar products & production
processes across the globe
Also, as discussed in section 12.4, consumer campaigns lend themselves to national
environmental groups going it alone rather than working collaboratively with other
environmental organizations. The "go-it-alone" approach created competition among
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environmental organizations, slowing the diffusion of cleaner production technologies in Europe
and undermining opportunity change in the US.
Finally, market and government politics are not mutually exclusive. For example,
Greenpeace International and its national organizations tried to play in every arena -- be it
international commissions, national legislative bodies and regulatory agencies, and market
politics -- they saw opportunities for change. And in the US, Greenpeace USA and
Environmental Defense used their contacts with corporate consumers to write letters to the US
EPA in support of more stringent regulation.
12.2 The challenge of government politics: legislators and regulators favor the
goals of pulp and paper manufacturers
The NRDC was the only national organization that tried to effect technology change in
pulp and paper mills solely through government politics: it lobbied the US EPA and filed
lawsuits to overturn decisions of the agency. All the other national environmental organizations
-- Greenpeace Sweden, Greenpeace USA, Environmental Defense, and the SSNC -- engaged in a
mixture of government and market politics. Together the NRDC and Greenpeace USA
mobilized supporters and allies to send letters to US EPA Administrator Carol Browner in
support of ECF-lite (NRDC) and TCF (Greenpeace USA). Staff from the NRDC, Greenpeace
USA, Environmental Defense and a few other environmental organizations had multiple
meetings with EPA staff, including Administrator Browner. In Sweden, the SSNC also engaged
in traditional lobbying after GLran Bryntse left (he saw no value in trying to effect change
through legislation and regulation), when it tried to persuade the Nordic Swan ecolabeling
program to adopt TCF bleaching as part of its criteria for papers eligible for the Swan ecolabel.
Greenpeace Sweden targeted the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament), Licensing Board, and the
Helsinki Commission.
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Only the Greenpeace organizations combined direct action and confrontation with
traditional lobbying activities. For example, Greenpeace USA participated in meetings with the
Administrator of the US EPA and hung a banner on the US EPA's headquarters in Washington,
DC. For Greenpeace, using direct action to capture media attention was a means for trying to
create leverage on regulatory agencies that would otherwise be unwilling to take action. By
bringing to light what government inaction continued to allow, Greenpeace tried to embarrass
regulators (and corporations) into action.
Together the five national environmental groups targeted seven government-related
institutions in their pulp and paper campaigns. The institutions included legislative bodies
(Riksdag and US Congress), regulatory agencies (Swedish Licensing Board and US EPA),
regional-multinational commissions (International Joint Commission and Helsinki Commission),
and the regional ecolabeling organization for the Scandinavian nations (Nordic Swan). Table
12.2 lists the institutions targeted and the environmental groups that targeted them. The Swedish
Licensing Board has three sub-listings because Greenpeace Sweden targeted it on multiple
occasions: each occasion centered on public hearings for revising a mill's operating permit. The
US EPA appears in two separate rows because the NRDC and Greenpeace USA had different
goals: the NRDC sought ECF-lite and Greenpeace USA sought TCF.
Table 12.2 also includes the responsiveness of the government institutions to the goals of
the environmental groups. I divided responsiveness into three levels: access, decision, and
implementation.' I sub-divided "decision" into three parts: a) did the institution reach a decision
related to pulp and paper pollution; b) did the decision adopt the goal advocated by the
environmental organization; and c) did the decision adopt the goal of opponents? I added the
For a more detailed description of these levels see Chapter 3.
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question on opponents to determine whether the decision represented a win, loss, or compromise
for environmentalists.
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The column "Government adopts goal of environmental organization?" in Table 12.2 is
shaded to highlight the near complete lack of success with government institutions in both
Sweden and the US. This contrasts with the many successes of the opponents (see column
"Government adopts goal of opponents?"), who were often the laggards among the bleached
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Access?
kraft pulp manufacturers and their trade associations. The row "International Joint Commission"
row is shaded to highlight the one notable success of the environmentalists.
In every single government institution targeted by environmental organizations they had
access to key decision makers. They met with legislators, regulators, or commissioners to press
their problem definition and solution. And in every case, excepting the zero discharge bill
introduced in the US Congress, the government institution issued a decision related to pulp and
paper pollution. In only one case, however, did a government institution issue a decision that
adopted an environmental organization's goal. The International Joint Commission (IJC)
recommended that manufacturers avoid the use of chlorine and chlorine compounds in the Great
Lakes watershed. With no legal authority to require implementation of its recommendations, the
UC did not implement its recommendation, nor did the US or Canada, the signatory nations to
the IJC.
The UC decision differed from all the other cases because environmentalists were
organized and present while the pulp and paper industry (as well as the chemical industry) was
absent until it was too late to change the decision. Industry was not paying attention to the UC at
the same time that environmental organizations were well-prepared, mobilized, and united in the
region. Greenpeace International, Greenpeace USA, Greenpeace Canada, Sierra Club, National
Wildlife Federation, and Great Lakes United (a regional coalition) had been working the UC for
years. The combination of being well-organized with a broad coalition of environmental
organizations working towards the same goal in the absence of industry counter-pressure enabled
environmental NGOs to succeed with the IJC. Noteworthy is that the pulp and paper and
chemical industries paid close attention to the IJC in the years following the passage of the
recommendation to phase-out chlorine use.
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In government politics, scientific information has been viewed as the principal factor in
success. Yet in the only case where environmentalists achieved their goal with a government
institution (the UC), they also developed ad hoc alliances, performed direct actions, and helped
develop the solution. The ad hoc alliances among environmental organizations and the
development of a solution (virtually eliminate organochlorine pollution from the Great Lakes
watershed) were equally as important to success with the UC as scientific information. While
only a single example, the UC illustrates how success depends upon the presence of multiple
causal conditions; a facet of success true in market politics as well.
Table 12.3 illustrates the association between presence/absence of industry opposition
and failure/success of environmentalists in achieving their goals. In all the cases where
environmental organizations did not achieve their goal (see the shaded "Outcome" column in
Table 12.3), the opposition was present (see the shaded "Opposition" column). And in the only
case where the opposition was absent, environmental organizations succeeded (see the shaded
"IJC" row).
The presence/absence of having a political party in office that was more likely to favor
stronger regulation -- Democratic Party in the US and Social Democratic Party in Sweden -- did
not help the environmental organizations achieve their goal (see "Favorable political party in
office" column). In fact, the successful case of the UC occurred when Gordon Durnil was the
US co-chairman, an appointee of Republican President George Bush. Note that targets with the
exact same "No/Yes" distribution across each column Table 12.3 are listed on the same row.
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Table 12.3 Comparative analysis: government institutions targeted by environmental groups,
outcomes, and potential causal conditions































Yes No No Yes No Yes
Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Yes Yes No No No Yes
onal Joint Commission
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Yes Yes No No Yes No
Yes Yes Yes No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
The presence of industry opposition made a significant difference: industry achieved its
goals in nearly every case. To achieve their goals industry did make some concessions. In the
US the pulp and paper manufacturers agreed to reduce dioxin emissions by eliminating chlorine
gas use and in Sweden they agreed to make serious reductions in AOX discharges.
Two clear cut victories for the industry in the US were the final regulations promulgated
by the US EPA in 1998 and the zero discharge bill in the US Congress. The regulations
promulgated by the US EPA were completely in line with what the industry laggards wanted.
And opponents prevented the zero discharge bill from moving out of committee in the House of
Representatives (of the US Congress).
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In Sweden the decisions of government institutions were also generally in line with what
industry was willing to accept. While the Swedish Licensing Board required some mills to meet
permit levels more restrictive than what the mills wanted, the levels were never as restrictive as
desired by Greenpeace Sweden. And all the mills, including the high media profile mills, where
Greenpeace Sweden performed direct actions, reduced AOX discharges below the levels
required by their permit in order to catch the market for TCF products (which Greenpeace
organizations in Europe, including Greenpeace Sweden had catalyzed -- see next section for
details).
Regulatory agencies in both the US and Sweden resisted requiring significant changes in
production processes at the mills. Instead they were only willing to press for incremental
changes (with the exception of Munksj6 Aspa Bruk), despite the availability of much cleaner
production technologies in use at the most environmentally advanced mills. The regulatory
agencies did not attempt to require significant environmental improvements because of the
economic costs to the mills and lack of political support for more stringent regulations.
The delegation of decision making to regulatory agencies actually puts environmental
organizations in a bind. While they have access to the agency staff, the transformative capacity
of the agencies is limited without further legislative support. The implication for environmental
organizations is to be wary of the allure of relatively easy access to regulatory agencies.
The failure to win with government institutions slowed the further diffusion of oxygen
delignification in the US and TCF in Sweden. For example, if the SSNC had persuaded the
Nordic Swan to adopt TCF bleaching as part of its criteria for environmentally friendly papers, it
would have significantly increased TCF production in Sweden since nearly all paper sold in
Sweden carries the Nordic Swan ecolabel.
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While I do not see the environmental agencies as wholly captured by the interests they
regulate, there has been, as Hays (1987) concluded, "a persistent tendency among agencies to be
more sympathetic to the argument that the nation needed increased production and development
more than it needed further environmental progress."' And this was certainly the case in both
Sweden and the US concerning regulations for bleached kraft pulp mills.
12.3 Material manufacturers: listening (eventually) to Swedish consumers, telling
American consumers what they can buy
Gaining access to decision makers in corporations manufacturing pulp and paper
products was a challenge for environmental groups. Initially most targeted manufacturers of
pulp and paper products saw little value in meeting with environmentalists. I emphasize targeted
because environmental organizations did develop close relations with a few pulp and paper
manufacturers that were not targets. For example, Greenpeace USA developed close relations
with staff in Lyons Falls Pulp and Paper (a manufacturer of TCF-bleached sulfite pulp in New
York state) and Louisiana-Pacific (a manufacturer of TCF-bleached kraft pulp). The
manufacturers targeted by environmental organizations for change are typically more resistant to
change. By choice, targets are harder corporations to gain access to and to persuade to change.
The SSNC, Greenpeace Sweden, and Greenpeace USA were the national environmental
organizations that targeted pulp and paper manufacturers. The NRDC did not run a market
campaign and Environmental Defense only targeted institutional consumers. The environmental
organizations selected manufacturing targets using two primary criteria: the corporation was a)
perceived to be open to change and/or b) a major player in the bleached kraft pulp market. The
SSNC, for example, targeted Munkedals AB was because it was an unintegrated paper mill.2
1 Hays, 1987, p. 409.
2 "Integrated mills" include both pulping and paper making facilities, located at the same site and owned by the
same corporation.
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Not owning a pulp mill Munkedals did not need to invest in new technologies; it just had to
purchase pulp that met the criteria for environmentally friendly papers. And the SSNC targeted
Stora because it was among largest manufacturers of copy paper in Sweden in the 1980s.
With the exception of Munkedals, all the targeted manufacturers initially denied
environmentalists access (see Table 12.4, "access" column). The initial response of
manufacturers was roughly, "We know how to make our product, there is nothing to be learned
from you environmentalists." There was a definite hubris in the manufacturing sector that was
held on both sides of the Atlantic at the beginning of the pulp and paper campaigns. Over time,
however, the arrogance of manufacturers began to break down in Sweden as manufacturers
became more receptive to meeting with environmental activists. This is seen in Table 12.4
Table 12.4 Levels of responsiveness among pulp and paper manufacturers to
goals of environmental organizations
Levels of Responsiveness
Pulp and paper manufacturers
(environmental organization) Favorable Implement
Access? decision? decision?
Sweden
Munkedals AB (SSNC) Yes Yes Yes - 1986
Stora Yes - 1987(SSNC)
Munksi6 Aspa Bruk Yes - 1990
(Greenpeace Germany and Sweden) No then Yes Yes
S6dra Cell Yes-1991(Greenpeace Sweden)










Weyerhaeuser (Greenpeace USA) No then Yes No No
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where all of the targeted Swedish manufacturers eventually decided to meet with environmental
organizations, while only Weyerhaeuser in the US became more receptive to environmentalists
over time.
To try to capture the attention of manufacturers the SSNC used market demand: it
organized the Association of Local Authorities to request environmentally preferable products.
In their attempts at capturing the attention of manufacturers, Greenpeace Sweden and
Greenpeace USA used direct action. For example, Greenpeace Sweden dumped a ton of dead
fish in front of the entrance gate to S6dra Cell's Vard mill in 1986. And Greenpeace USA,
draped Georgia-Pacific's headquarters in Atlanta with a banner in 1990 that read: "Take the
Poison out of Pulp." Greenpeace Sweden and Greenpeace USA also targeted manufacturers by
trying to create market demand for TCF paper.
Market demand was the principal reason why manufacturers adopted the goals of
environmental organizations, as clearly revealed in Table 12.5. Compare the shaded "Outcome"
column with the shaded "Market demand" column. Market demand was both positively and'
negatively associated with outcome. When market demand was present, manufacturers adopted
the goal of environmental organizations. Conversely, when market demand was absent,
manufacturers did not adopt the goal of environmental organizations.
While responding to the presence of market demand may seem intuitively obvious, that
was not the case. First, the presence of market demand was an outcome of the strategic actions
of environmental organizations, and its absence was facilitated by the strategic actions of pulp
and paper manufacturers. Critical to creating market demand was persuading large consumers to
incorporate environmental goals into their purchasing specifications. Environmental groups
"persuaded" consumers to change purchasing specifications by forming collaborative ad hoc
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alliances or direct action. Greenpeace Sweden, for example, helped IKEA purchase TCF paper.
While Greenpeace Germany embarrassed Axel Springer Verlag (owner of the newsweekly
magazine, Der Spiegel) into purchasing TCF paper (see next section for details). Environmental
laggards, especially in the US, worked hard to ensure that corporate-environmental alliances
failed. Pulp and paper manufacturers persuaded Time Inc. to rescind its decision to purchase
TCF paper by arguing that the TCF paper was inferior, more costly, and produced no
environmental benefits.
Second, laggards in the US were not responsive to consumer demand. For example, the
second largest manufacturer of bleached paper products, Georgia-Pacific, sent a letter to all of its
customers telling them, "If you feel you must have 'chlorine-free"' paper, "then G-P [Georgia-
Pacific] can no longer be a supply source."' With negligible market demand the environmental
leaders among American pulp and paper manufacturers had no incentive to produce TCF paper.
This does not mean that no bleached kraft pulp manufacturer adopted TCF bleaching or that no
manufacturer made changes because of market demand for environmentally preferable bleached
papers. As noted above, the tables do not address the entire story of technology diffusion, just
the targeted corporations. It does mean the number corporations adopting TCF or making
changes because of consumer demand were small.
Louisiana-Pacific was the first and only US bleached kraft pulp mill to commercially
manufacture TCF-bleached pulp. It did so under legal pressure from the Surfriders Foundation.2
And Consolidated Papers was the only manufacturer to invest in cleaner production technologies
(ozone bleaching) under pressure from its customer, Time Inc. Time Inc., as discussed in the
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2 See Chapter 10 for details.
next section, was pressured by Greenpeace USA to purchase TCF paper and worked
collaboratively with Environmental Defense on the Paper Task Force.
An argument has been made by TCF activists like Jack Weinberg of the Greenpeace
Great Lakes campaign' that US mills did not adopt TCF bleaching in part because they were not
invested in oxygen delignification (which is necessary for TCF bleaching). However, a handful
of American corporations had invested in oxygen delignification in the 1970s and 1980s and they
did not move to TCF pulp. One of them, the Union Camp Corporation, actually produced small
batches of TCF pulp that it never marketed as TCF. Environmental leaders like Union Camp
never moved to commercial-scale production of TCF pulp because the market did not emerge in
the US and Union Camp was concerned with the backlash from the major manufacturers. The
backlash was, according to anecdotal evidence from environmentalists and Archie Beaton of the
Chlorine Free Products Association,2 that laggards threatened to undercut manufacturers of TCF
paper by bidding below cost for contracts that TCF manufacturers held with large buyers.
Of the tactics used by environmental organizations to persuade manufacturers to change,
there was only one case where environmentalists actually worked with a manufacturer to define a
solution: Munkedals collaborated with SSNC. Gran Bryntse, a pulp and paper engineer by
training and coordinator of the SSNC's paper campaign, worked with Munkedals in defining the
SSNC's criteria for environmentally preferable paper. Bryntse's expertise in production
combined with Munkedals not manufacturing pulp helped to overcome the arm's length distance
most manufacturers established between environmentalists and their productions processes.
While Munkedals was an exception among manufacturers in its willingness to collaborate
with environmentalists, Swedish manufacturers as a whole became more receptive to meeting
'Weinberg, 1999.
2 Floegel, 1999; Landman, 2001; and Beaton, 2001.
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with environmentalists over time (as indicated in Table 12.4). In a major transformation S6dra
Cell became the leading advocate for TCF pulp and paper in Europe. S6dra Cell promoted TCF
by developing glossy materials, presenting at conferences, and attacking the SSNC for being
weak on the environment (because the SSNC defined "chlorine-free" as the equivalent of ECF-
lite technology).
A combination of factors made the Swedish firms more receptive to environmental
organizations. Certainly the capacity of environmental organizations to develop markets for
environmentally preferable paper was recognized and respected among some manufacturers,
notably Munkedals, Munksj6 Aspa Bruk, and Sbdra Cell. But more importantly, market demand
created a price premium for a commodity product: bleached kraft pulp. Additionally, the
ecological crises of 1988 made manufacturers aware of the potential ecological and political
perils of massive pollution into the Baltic. Finally, there was a sense among many of the
Swedish executives I interviewed that they have a responsibility of being better environmental
stewards and that this was something their families and communities expected of them. Even the
environmental head of the Swedish industry's trade association -- trade associations are known
for representing the lowest environmental common denominator among industries -- remarked:
"We cannot wait for a response from the Baltic before we act. If we wait too long and have
large-scale effects such as killing seals and fish, then we have gone too far. Problems must be
discovered and preventive actions taken earlier."'
With no strong market demand and the absence of a national ecological crisis, the
average American pulp and paper mill did not experience an increased sense of environmental
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stewardship between the 1980s and 1990s.' Rather environmentalism for most American pulp
and paper firms remained a competition, to be won or lost, rather than a way of seeing nature that
could be shared. From this perspective environmentalists are the enemy, as the director of
environmental affairs for the American industry's trade association explained: "The
environmental community wants us to stop manufacturing paper."2 Thus there was no reason to
engage in dialogue with environmental organizations.
Over the time of the pulp and paper campaigns the Swedish pulp and paper
manufacturers moved towards adopting what Lawrence Susskind and Patrick Field (1996) call a
mutual-gains approach in their interactions with environmentalists. They showed a willingness
to "Acknowledge the concerns of the other side" as well as to "Accept responsibility"3 for their
role in protecting the environment. The environmental laggards among American pulp and paper
manufacturers, however, saw no value in a mutual-gains approach; for them there was no
incentive to compromise beyond ECF bleaching.
An irony of environmental campaigns to transform industrial sectors is that industry
opponents to change become technological pessimists -- "this product cannot be produced, and if
it is, it will be vastly inferior" -- while environmentalists become technological optimists: "we
can make this product of equal quality with new, more environmentally friendly materials and
processes."
There were a few notable firms with a stronger commitment to environmental performance relative to the industry
average, including Union Camp Corp. and Weyerhaeuser.
2 Marshall, 1997.
3 These are two of six principles of the mutual gains approach identified by Susskind and Field (Susskind and Field,
1996). The other four principles are: encourage joint fact finding, offer contingent commitments to minimize
impacts, act in a trustworthy fashion, and build long-term relationships (pp. 37-38).
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12.4 Consumers: market leaders create momentum for change in Sweden, but not
in the US
The SSNC, Greenpeace Sweden, Greenpeace USA, and Environmental Defense all ran
market campaigns targeted at consumers. The SSNC was the only group to run both a retail
campaign -- targeting household consumers -- and a wholesale campaign -- targeting major
institutional consumers. All the other groups ran wholesale campaigns.
The success of the SSNC's retail campaign hinged upon the media coverage of the
ecological crises of the summer of 1988. National media coverage of the problems and how to
reduce pollution from mills by changing purchasing habits was critical to the SSNC's retail
campaign. The SSNC developed criteria for identifying environmentally friendly paper products
and developed a list of environmentally friendly paper products that it updated regularly until
establishing its own ecolabeling program with support from the three largest supermarket chains
in Sweden -- ICA, KF, and Dagab. Of all the environmental organizations running market
campaigns, the SSNC did the best job of identifying products available for institutional or
individual consumers to purchase.
Greenpeace Sweden worked collaboratively with IKEA to help it find TCF paper.
Greenpeace Germany coordinated the manufacture of the first magazine ever made with TCF
paper: Das Plagiat, which was a mock version of the newsweekly magazine Der Spiegel (owned
by Axel Springer Verlag). Das Plagiat transformed the market for TCF in Europe because it
exposed the fallacy behind the argument of Axel Springer Verlag and pulp and paper
manufacturers that manufacturing high quality magazine-grade paper with TCF pulp was not
possible. Greenpeace USA used direct action and/or collaboration to capture the attention of and
to try to catalyze change within Time Inc., Kinko's, and Jossey-Bass. It also created a magazine
made with TCF paper.
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Environmental Defense convened a collaborative project -- the Paper Task Force -- with
major corporate buyers of paper to develop recommendations for environmentally preferable
paper products; although it did not work with Paper Task Force members to implement the
recommendations related to bleached paper products. Together the participants developed
recommendations for environmentally friendly paper products across the lifecycle of impacts,
including paper bleaching. Somewhat surprising for a process where all the organizations
voluntarily participated and helped define the solution, was the outcome: only one company,
Time Inc., altered its specifications for bleached printing and writing papers. Certainly the Paper
Task Force was broader than just bleaching and McDonald's did buy more paper products with
recycled-content as a result. Yet on the most controversial issue before the Paper Task Force,
bleaching of paper, the outcome was disappointing.
The corporate consumers of paper products were more receptive to meeting with
environmentalists than manufacturers. Of the 13 corporations targeted, only two initially denied
access to the environmental groups (see Table 12.6, "access" column). And those two eventually
agreed to meet with Greenpeace USA after being subjected to direct actions. Table 12.6
addresses the dynamics of decision making by noting when decisions changed. For example, in
Table 12.6 the "access" cell for Kinko's and Time Inc. (targeted by Greenpeace USA) is, "No
then Yes," reflecting the decisions of these organizations to initially deny access to Greenpeace
USA, then to allow access after direct actions.
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Table 12.6 Levels of responsiveness among consumers to goals of
environmental organizations
Consumers targeted Levels of responsiveness
(environmental organization) Access? Favorable Implementdecision? decision?(year implemented)
Sweden
Association of Local Authorities Yes (1985)(SSNC)
ICA Yes (1988)
(SSNC)




Individual buyers not Yes Yes (beginning in
(SSNC) applicable 1988)
Axel Springer Verlag Yes No then Yes Yes (1992)
(Greenpeace Germany)
United States




NationsBank Yes then No No No
(Environmental Defense)
Time, Inc. Yes (1995)
(Environmental Defense) Yes Yes
Jossey-Bass Yes (1995)
(Greenpeace USA)
Time, Inc. No then Yes Yes then No No
(Greenpeace USA)
Kinko's No then Yes Yes Yes (1992)
(Greenpeace USA)I
Note: Cells with "Yes then No" and "No then Yes" indicate when consumers changed a decision
based upon pressure from environmentalists or opponents.
Figure 12.2 illustrates the dynamic, iterative interactions between environmental
organizations, their allies, consumers, and opponents. Figure 12.2 is circular because
interactions with consumers are iterative and vary as consumers interact with opponents to
environmental change as well as other environmental organizations. When environmental
groups succeed in gaining agreement to adopt their goal, consumers became targets for counter
pressure from opponents. Opponents ask: "who do you trust? These environmentalists who
have never manufactured paper, or us, who have supplied you with high quality paper for 20
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years?" For example, Time Inc. initially refused to meet with Greenpeace USA, then relented
after being receiving 20,000 postcards urging it purchase chlorine-free paper. Time Inc. then
agreed to purchase chlorine-free paper, but retracted that decision under pressure from
opponents. Then Time Inc. allied with another environmental organization, Environmental
Defense.
All of the corporate consumers sold products directly to individuals. For them, creating
and maintaining a brand name and image was important: they wanted consumers to buy their
products or shop in their stores, and to keep doing so over time. For corporations where brand
name matters, any action, especially negative publicity, that could tarnish brand image needed to
be addressed. "A company's brand name is its stock-in-trade. Some companies spend millions
of dollars trying to build awareness of their brands and create positive associations for the brands
in the minds of consumers."i If consumers have negative associations with a brand name they
will avoid it. That translates into lost sales. And some of the targeted corporations wanted to
cultivate a greener image. By the 1990s, IKEA, McDonald's, Kinko's, and Time Inc. were in the
process of trying to green their names. For example, both Time Inc. and Kinko's initially
rebuffed requests from Greenpeace USA staff to meet to discuss bleached paper products. But
after being subjected to direct actions, they moved quickly to meet with Greenpeace USA.
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Figure 12.2 The dynamics of market politics: environmental organizations trying to persuade consumers to adopt their goals
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Material manufacturers, however, were more impervious to direct action because of their
distance from individual consumers. Among pulp and paper manufacturers, corporate brand
names known to household consumers were rare.' For most pulp and paper manufacturers
interactions with individuals relate to their manufactuiing facilities and the people who live in
the shadows of the mill or downwind and downstream of mill pollution. International Paper, for
example, is the world's largest pulp and paper corporation (headquartered in the US), yet it is
much more obscure to the American public than McDonald's or even IKEA. Thus direct actions
had little effect upon material manufacturers beyond being a local media story that public
relations had to handle.
Developing collaborative working relationships with consumers and/or proving technical
viability of alternatives were critical to the success of environmental organizations in persuading
consumers to implement their goals. As with government institutions, the presence of opposition
made achieving success more difficult.
Table 12.7 lists the causal conditions important to success and failure in consumer
campaigns. Shaded in Table 12.7 are five columns. The first shaded column is the "Outcome:
implement goal of environmental group." Environmental groups had 10 successes, seven in
Sweden and three in the US (note that consumers with the same "yes/no" pattern in the same
country are on listed on a single row). The second shaded column is "Outcome: form alliance
with environmental group." For environmentalists to succeed they needed, with the exception of
Axel Springer Verlag, to develop a working relationship with consumers.
A rare example of an initiative among pulp and paper manufacturers to create a branded product was Union
Camp's introduction of Great White paper in the 1990s. Reflecting the perceived marketing strengths of the
environment, Union Camp sought to distinguish its paper through recycled content, marketing Great White as: "state
of the art recycled paper" (Greiner, 1995).
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Table 12.7 Comparative analysis: consumers targeted by environmental groups, outcomes, and potential causal conditions
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Critical to the success of the environmental-consumer alliances was trust, creditability,
and legitimacy. IKEA staff, for example, were willing to work with Greenpeace because they
viewed Margaret Rainy (Greenpeace Sweden) and Christoph Thies (Greenpeace Germany) as
experts on environmentally friendly papers. The IKEA staff looked to Greenpeace for guidance
on defining environmentally preferable paper and trusted the advice of Greenpeace staff in the
face of contrary advice from their paper suppliers. Whereas the exact opposite happened
between Time Inc. and Greenpeace USA. Influenced by pulp and paper manufacturers, Time
Inc. staff came to distrust Greenpeace USA: they thought Greenpeace staff deceived them into
agreeing to purchase chlorine-free paper and saw Greenpeace staff as uncredible sources of
information.
When the environmental groups established a working relationship they helped
consumers define the problem ("Scientific information" column), solution (third shaded column)
and, in some cases, helped implement the solution (fourth shaded column). The ideal
relationship for environmental groups was to help consumers implement the goal. When
environmentalists reached that degree of trust with a consumer they succeeded. This contrasts
with the role of environmental groups with regulators and manufacturers, where they rarely
helped define the solution.
The rows for the Association of Local Authorities, IKEA, Axel Springer Verlag, and
Time Inc. (Environmental Defense) are shaded because they were four market leaders, buyers
with significant purchasing power whose decisions had the capacity to shape markets. When the
Association of Local Authorities, IKEA, and Axel Springer Verlag implemented the goals of the
environmental groups they created a "snowball effect:"' they created momentum for change
within the industry. Other buyers seeing the opportunity to position themselves as environmental
' Rogers, 1995, p. 302.
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leaders and manufacturers seeing market opportunities moved quickly to adopt the purchasing
specifications or production technologies of leaders. When the SSNC linked the Association of
Local Authorities with Munkedals AB they created a market for environmentally preferable
papers that had never existed before in Sweden; catalyzing other buyers and manufacturers to
follow suit. When the Greenpeace organizations persuaded IKEA and Axel Springer Verlag to
purchase TCF paper, they defined environmental leadership among buyers and created
significant demand for TCF paper; which catalyzed others to buy and manufacture TCF papers.
Time Inc.'s decision to purchase more environmentally friendly papers did not create a
snowball effect because Time Inc. did not implement its decisions until after 1995, when the
furor over chlorine bleaching was on the decline and did not publicize its actions. Implementing
the decisions years after concerns were raised and without media attention meant no opportunity
to catalyze others to adopt their leadership position.
Axel Springer Verlag was the only success where the consumer did not form an ad hoc
alliance with an environmental organization. While Greenpeace Germany staff never developed
a working relationship with Axel Springer Verlag staff, they embarrassed Axel Springer Verlag
into purchasing TCF paper. In initial meetings, Axel Springer Verlag said it would purchase
TCF paper for its magazines, but no technically viable alternative was on the market. By
demonstrating the viability of producing high quality magazine grade paper with TCF pulp,
Greenpeace proved Axel Springer Verlag wrong. To produce magazine grade TCF paper
Greenpeace Germany united the market for a green goal, bringing together a manufacturer, paper
maker, and printer to manufacture the paper. With no bleached kraft pulp mills in Germany and
all of the German bleached sulfite mills producing TCF pulp, there was no German opposition to
TCF papers.
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The fifth shaded column, "Opposition to goal," highlights the increased level of difficulty
opponents create. Of the 10 successes, only three encountered opposition from manufacturers,
Time Inc. (with Environmental Defense), IKEA, and the Association of Local Authorities. Both
IKEA and Time Inc. agreed to purchase chlorine-free paper under pressure from a national
Greenpeace organization.
Time Inc. moved forward in the face of opposition because of intensive campaigning by
Greenpeace USA for action. Yet Time Inc. moved forward under the imprimatur of a
compromise initiative, the Paper Task Force, developed by Environmental Defense. After
announcing its decision to purchase chlorine-free paper, Time Inc. staff were immediately
attacked by their paper suppliers. Anecdotal evidence suggests suppliers threatened to stop
supplying Time Inc. with paper if it purchased TCF paper, expressed dismay that Time Inc.
would ally with the enemies of corporations, environmentalists, and argued that there was no
scientific, technological, or economic merit to the positions of environmentalists. Intimidated by
suppliers, Time Inc. refused to implement its decision to purchase chlorine-free papers and
turned to Environmental Defense for a compromise position. Time Inc. was not the only large
American paper buyer to be intimidated by pulp and paper manufacturers (see next section). The
competition between Environmental Defense and Greenpeace USA highlights a challenge
environmental organizations confront in trying to attain their technology goals: competition
among themselves.
IKEA moved forward in the face of opposition because it had a strong pre-disposition to
environmental leadership. Its executives saw their bottom-line more closely aligned with the
values of the environmental movement rather than the values of pulp and paper industry
laggards. When IKEA's suppliers refused to manufacture TCF paper, the staff were outraged that
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its suppliers refused to provide the paper the company wanted. IKEA had previously lost sales
when some of its products were found to not meet the environmental standards the corporation
asserted. It did not want to be tagged again with an anti-environmental label. IKEA staff broke
contracts and found new suppliers willing to provide TCF paper.
In summary, developing collaborative working relationships with consumers and proving
technical viability of alternatives were critical to the success of environmental organizations in
persuading consumers to implement their goals. In addition, environmental organizations
revealed a sophisticated capacity to learn how to move markets in the absence of opposition.
They learned about markets and identified market leaders. They defined criteria for
environmentally friendly paper and scoured the industry for manufacturers producing the paper.
When they did not find the paper, they linked environmental leaders in bleached kraft pulp
production with papermakers. To inform consumers of the environmentally friendly products,
they published product lists. The result, they greened the paper supply chain, from pulp
manufacturers to papermakers to institutional consumers to household consumers.
Five key elements of success in the market emerged from the pulp and paper campaigns:
" Identify, educate, and/or pressure key market players.
" Define criteria for environmentally preferable products.
- Identify and promote viable alternatives on the market (diffusion).
= Catalyze development of new products and processes (innovation)
" Connect the environmental leaders among consumers and suppliers.
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12.5 Laggards among the raw material manufacturers: organized to prevent
environmental change in the US
When new technologies enter channels that threaten existing markets, they stir up
conflict. The opposition to environmentally preferable bleached paper products in the US was
led by environmental laggards in pulp and paper manufacturing and their trade associations: the
American and Forest Paper Association (trade association for pulp and paper manufacturers) and
the Alliance for Environmental Technology (trade association for promoting ECF bleaching, led
by manufacturers of sodium chlorate, feedstock for chlorine dioxide). The laggards among the
manufacturers were primarily International Paper and Georgia Pacific. In Sweden the opponents
were led by the Swedish Forest Industries Association and Eka Nobel, a sodium chlorate
manufacturer.
The response of environmental laggards among pulp and paper manufacturers differed
between Sweden and the US. While the initial response of Swedish manufacturers was the'same
as American manufacturers, oppose demands for more environmentally friendly papers, the
resistance in Sweden receded as a few manufacturers changed production processes to meet
consumer demands. In this section I first examine the factors important to the success of
American manufacturers in opposing change. Then I explain why these differences arose.
Business needs to show up, as David Vogel (1996) emphasized, to have any chance of
winning against environmental organizations. When the pulp and paper industry showed up to
contest environmental organizations, they proved to be formidable opponents. They were
effective at achieving their goals in government institutions in Sweden and the US, as well as
winning in market politics in the US. To achieve their goals opponents did concede elemental
chlorine gas, agreeing to ECF bleaching.
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Overall the American opponents were more effective than their Swedish counterparts in
both delaying change and stopping the diffusion of more advanced pollution prevention
technologies like oxygen delignification, ozone, and hydrogen peroxide. For example, the use of
elemental chlorine ended at all Swedish mills in 1992, whereas some American mills used
elemental chlorine up to 2001, the date the US EPA required them to comply with new bleaching
regulations. Important to their success in the US was aggressively contesting any environmental
victory, no matter how small. By pushing back hard against any decision, the industry stopped
momentum for change from developing. The American laggards successfully insulated
themselves from the changes sweeping across Europe by stopping market demand from
emerging in the US. They did this by intimidating environmental leaders among corporate
consumers and pulp and paper manufacturers, appealing to common values, and sowing doubt
with consumers on the arguments of environmental organizations. Their strident opposition
succeeded in keeping the US pulp and paper industry united, or at least silenced the dissidents,
and delayed regulatory action. In addition, the American opponents successfully managed the
media and made a few key concessions.
Intimidation. While substantiating threats is difficult, as noted in Chapter 10, there is
anecdotal evidence that suggests the paper industry successfully intimidated: Time Inc. from
purchasing TCF paper; papermakers from purchasing TCF pulp from Louisiana-Pacific; Union
Camp from manufacturing TCF paper; NationsBank from participating in the Paper Task Force;
and Sdra Cell from testifying before the Maine legislature for TCF paper. The market threats
included: "we will not supply you with any paper if you purchase TCF paper" (laggards to Time
Inc.); "we will not supply you with any pulp if you purchase TCF pulp from Louisiana-Pacific"
(laggards to papermakers); "we will sell our paper to your customers at below cost if you
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manufacture TCF paper" (laggards to Union Camp); and "you will lose our business" (laggards
to NationsBank and Stdra Cell). Because Georgia-Pacific and International Paper were (and still
are) the largest manufacturers of bleached kraft paper products in the US, they had substantial
market clout. Lagging far behind the environmental leaders in cleaner production investments,
the laggards had the incentive to use that clout to try to block market change.
Appeal to common values. Environmental opponents appealed to common values and a
history of contractual relations to sow doubt: "Who do you trust? Us, your fellow business
partners for the past 10 years? Or these environmental extremists?" Within a segment of the
American business community is the perception that environmentalists are socialists under green
cover, and that corporations must unite against this threat to their vitality. Nick Nichols, CEO of
the public relations firm Nichols-Dezenhall Communications Management Group, articulates
this position in his book, Rulesfor Corporate Warriors: "Karl Marx had a word for what the
Green Party is advocating. The socialist movement's color may have changed, but the agenda
hasn't."' Thus, for a corporate consumer or manufacturer to work with environmentalists is to
endanger capitalism.
Contest every scientific, technological, and economic argument of environmentalists and
regulators. Any evidence used to support environmental improvements was attacked as wrong.
Dioxins were less toxic than believed. Paper made with oxygen or ozone, or without chlorine
dioxide was inferior to those bleached only with chlorine dioxide. The lower operations and
maintenance costs for oxygen delignification were overstated, etc.
Most people want to see environmental issues as clear-cut problems and solutions. When
opponents to environmental change contest every position in favor of environmental change,
staff in organizations considering change may begin to wonder, "what it is the right thing to do?"
'Nichols, 2001, p. 78.
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Strident opposition can make them re-think their decision. Changing their decision will also stop
the onslaught of pressure from opponents. Contesting science and technology also serves to
delay action, especially by regulatory agencies (see below).
Unity. The combination of contesting every position of environmentalists, appealing to
common values, and using market muscle to intimidate stopped the snowball effect from
emerging in the US and maintained industry unity. No other manufacturer joined Louisiana-
Pacific to manufacture TCF paper and no large paper purchaser requested TCF paper during the
heart of the pulp and paper campaigns.1 In US regulatory politics the AFPA developed a
compromise, a voluntary measure to lessen government oversight of environmental leaders,
which silenced regulatory support for oxygen delignification among environmental leaders in the
paper industry.
In Sweden, the defection of major consumers (IKEA and Axel Springer Verlag) and
major manufacturers (Stora for SSNC's chlorine-reduced paper and S6dra Cell for Greenpeace
Sweden's TCF paper), completely undermined the efforts of the Swedish Forest Industries
Association to retain unity against better environmental performance.
Delay and economic duress. Delay is a central strategy of choice for opponents with
government institutions. The goal is to stop momentum for change from building by moving
conversations for action from the spotlight of the media and Congressional hearings to the
backrooms of regulatory agencies. In the US, the AFPA succeeded in delaying action on
regulating dioxins and AOX discharges by 14 years. By the time the US EPA promulgated its
regulations on pulp bleaching the story was so old that it was forgotten by the media. As a
Washington Post reporter began her article on the regulations in 1997: "You've probably never
heard of organochlorine pollution, but it's part of the debate over an impending regulatory
1 Time Inc. quietly began purchasing TCF paper in the late 1990s.
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decision" on the paper industry.' Also by delaying action, it provided time for opponents to
amass their substantial financial and staff resources to their advantage.
In the US, the paper industry delayed regulatory action through cooperation, science, and
claims of inferior products. In the early years of the discovery of dioxin pollution, the pulp and
paper industry delayed action by helping the US EPA study, rather than act on, the problem. To
completely undermine any action, the paper industry with help from the chemical industry forced
a reassessment of the toxicity of dioxin: in 1991 the US EPA agreed to reassess the toxicity of
dioxin. That study is still not complete, 12 years later. In challenging science the industry went
to the strength of the environmental organizations by attempting to undermine their causal story.
The counter to environmentalists' causal story is opponents no causal story: e.g., dioxin is not
toxic.
Another argument for delay is, alternative technologies are inferior, cost more, and will
result in massive job layoffs. This argument has been perfected in opposition to the
implementation of pollution control regulations. Because manufacturers have the financial data,
regulators rely on their cost estimates and job impacts of implementing new technologies. For
example, the US EPA concluded that a major manufacturer would have gone bankrupt if it
required the implementation of oxygen delignification.
There is a reality to the argument that new technologies are often inferior and cost more.
Although, over time quality typically increases quickly and costs decline as manufacturers
achieve economies of scale. Additionally, as a general rule in the innovation and diffusion
process, manufacturers often stretch the performance of old technologies to prevent loss of
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market share. This is only a delay tactic as the new technologies are quickly improved and soon
overtake the old technologies.'
Manage the media. In the heat of the dioxin crisis in the US, from 1987-1989, the AFPA
was able to keep the US media roughly to its message: these are small amounts of dioxins that
pose no threat to human health. The large amounts of organochlorine discharges from mills
never became an issue worthy of press attention and the problems of persistent organochlorines
like dioxins in the Great Lakes region did not become national news. Then beginning in the late
1980s the paper and chemical industries scored a major media coup with prominent news
coverage of stories that dioxins are less toxic than formerly believed. This story line climaxed
when Keith Schneider reported in the New York Times that dioxin might be no more toxic than
sunbathing.2 Certainly the industry suffered stories that were damaging to its credibility,
including a detailed story in the Washington Post by Weisskopf reporting the US EPA-paper
industry cooperation in keeping dioxin pollution out of the public eye.3 Yet overall industry
succeeded in keeping the media from creating momentum for demands for broad changes in the
industry.
Concede then fight. The pulp manufacturers in Sweden and the US both conceded the
use of elemental chlorine gas. After making that concession, however, the laggards in the
American industry allied with the manufacturers of sodium chlorate to promote ECF bleaching.
This created a situation where environmentalists had to be the "hair splitters," calling for TCF
not ECF; making their work more difficult in the public sphere. Environmentalists like Jack
Weinberg of Greenpeace USA argued that the American industry won when it created the





Europe and there was a heated battle between the SSNC and Greenpeace Sweden over how to
define "chlorine-free." That battle ended when one of Sweden's largest bleached kraft pulp
manufacturers, Sdra Cell attacked the SSNC for being environmentally weak. No S6dra Cell-
type defection occurred in the US to promote TCF bleaching.
The strength of the ECF position was it nearly eliminated dioxins, the principal concern
of American environmentalists in 1987, and there was no clear cut toxic pollutant in the soup of
organochlorines remaining from ECF bleaching that could create public outrage against the
industry. In adopting and defending ECF, the American opponents slowed momentum for
adopting the cleaner production technologies of oxygen, ozone, and hydrogen peroxide.
Overall the conditions affecting success in business opposition reinforced Vogel's (1996)
findings as discussed in Chapter 2, including: presence and manage media (Vogel: run well-
organized campaign), unity (Vogel: coalitions), and claims of economic duress and make some
initial concessions (Vogel: make convincing arguments). Missing from Vogel's analysis are the
use of uncertainty to delay action and market muscle to curb market-based change.
The use of uncertainty to delay action did not arise in Vogel's analysis because he
examined the US Congress not regulatory agencies. The pulp and paper manufacturers used
scientific, technological, and economic uncertainty to delay regulatory action. The slow moving
process of regulatory agencies cools the passion of public demand for change by moving
decisions out of the public spotlight (in contrast to congressional hearings) and shifting decision
making authority to experts and away from elected representatives. And because Vogel only
considered government politics, he could not have foreseen how environmental laggards are
using their market muscle to try to impede environmental change.
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I attribute the greater opposition to cleaner paper production technologies in the US as
arising from the ideological opposition to any public, be it government or NGO, influence of
corporate investment decisions. As David Vogel (1986) concluded in the context of government
regulation, American corporations are inclined to be "both extremely jealous of their autonomy
and highly mistrustful of public authority."' At its most extreme this ideological opposition
manifests itself in Nichols' (2001) accusation that environmentalists are socialists in disguise,
intent on destroying rather than transforming capitalism.
From this perspective, initiatives to create green paper markets are perceived as an attack
that must be repelled. As Nichols (2001) warns:
American businesses had better wake up and smell the menacing dogs before their execs
find themselves in the same boat as their brethren across the Atlantic. Corporate
executives who understand the threat posed by attackers like the Green Party,
Greenpeace, Sierra Club, Health Care Without Harm [etc.] ... must also recognize that
efforts to launch a counter-attack will require a dramatic shift in how they conduct
battlefield operations. 2
This ideological opposition to regulation in general and environmentalism in particular
certainly was present in the paper industry's trade association, the AFPA, where
environmentalists were viewed as trying to end paper manufacture in the US. In addition to the
ideological opposition, the largest manufacturers of bleached kraft pulp in the US, Georgia-
Pacific and International Paper (as detailed in Chapter 10) had the greatest to lose if market
demand for cleaner products blossomed in the US. Together these two factors combined to
create strident opposition among the laggards and the industry's trade to cleaner production
technologies.
A striking difference that emerged between the US and Sweden was how easily suppliers
intimidated Time Inc. in comparison to IKEA. IKEA was bolstered by a much stronger green
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consumer movement in northern Europe, where Sweden and Germany have a high percentage of
green shoppers,' while Time Inc. did not have the same level of green consumer support among
Americans.2 Although it is important to note that simultaneous to the efforts of the
environmental groups to create demand for environmentally friendly bleached papers, market
demand did emerge in the US for paper with recycled content. Recycled content was the
environmental issue most prominent on the minds of magazine publishers, not chlorine content.3
Also I hypothesize that the relative weakness of green markets in the US, like the weak demand
for chlorine-free papers, was more a result of business opposition than lack of consumer interest.
The frequent refrain in the US is, "there is little demand for environmentally friendly products."
The reality is, that demand must grow in harsh conditions.
12.6 Comparing pulp and paper campaigns: key causal conditions affecting success
and failure in market politics
The successes of environmental organizations in Sweden and the difficulties of
environmental organizations in the US offer an opportunity to compare at a national level the
opportunities and barriers to success through market politics.
The key conditions affecting market success in Sweden were:
= Environmental roots in pulp and paper campaigns, stretching back to 1980. When
the media spotlight turned on in 1987 and 1988, environmentalists were ready to
discuss pollution problems and propose solutions.
" Media attention to dioxins in 1987 and the ecological crises of 1988 in the seas
surrounding Sweden. This heightened public sensitivity in Sweden to the problems
associated with water pollution in general and pollution from pulp and paper mills in
particular.
= Alliances with corporations to define, develop, and promote alternative products
(development tactics). The SSNC allied with ICA, KF, and Dagab to create an
ecolabeling program for supermarkets. IKEA allied with Greenpeace Sweden to
purchase TCF paper in the face of industry opposition. Greenpeace Germany allied




with Munksj6 Aspa Bruk, a papermaker, and a printer to produce a high quality TCF
magazine.
- Innovative development tactics at the right time. Das Plagiat, Greenpeace
Germany's mock magazine of Der Spiegel, was the right action at the right time. It
exploded the myth that quality paper could not be made with TCF-bleached pulp.
" The creation of market demand for environmentally preferable papers through the
combination of media attention, alliances, and innovative development tactics.
Market demand then created a price premium, which created first mover advantages
for innovative manufacturers like Munksj6 Aspa Bruk and S6dra Cell.
= Absence of opposition to TCF paper in Germany, the largest consumer of Swedish
pulp and paper outside of Sweden. Pulp and paper manufacturers in Germany
supported the transition to TCF production.
Seeing opportunities for purchasing environmentally preferable paper products and
pitfalls in not doing so, a handful of large consumers of paper products adopted the goals of the
environmental organizations in Sweden and Germany. When pulp manufacturers realized they
could receive a price premium for more environmentally friendly pulp, a few leapt at the chance
and changed manufacturing processes. When large producers like Stora produced SSNC's
environmentally preferable paper in 1987 and Sdra Cell produced the TCF pulp wanted by the
Greenpeace organizations, the market shifted. The large defections from the corporate status quo
splintered industry opposition to change in Sweden. The Swedish and German corporations,
both consumers and material manufacturers were more likely to see the power of green markets,
for both the positive (first mover advantage) and negative (lost sales) than their American
counterparts. Finally, US opponents saw the successes in Europe and worked hard to make sure
they were not replicated in the US.
In contrast, failure in US market politics hinged upon:
= No national environmental roots in pulp and paper campaigns prior to 1987.
When Greenpeace USA captured media attention on dioxin pollution from paper
mills in 1987, the environmentalists had no clear solution to offer -- pulp and paper
pollution was a "new" issue.
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" Strong opposition from paper industry laggards that overwhelmed the environmental
organizations.
- No alliances with major institutional consumers to purchase environmentally friendly
bleached papers. Although Time Inc. collaborated with Environmental Defense on
the Paper Task Force; after the task force finished its report, Environmental Defense
did not work with Time Inc. to implement recommendations in the report.
= Competition among environmental organizations reduced the overall effectiveness
of the environmental movement.
Unity in a movement, especially when confronting a well-funded and motivated
adversary, at a minimum increases the chances for success. With their scarce resources of time
and money, environmental organizations can ill afford to squander them fighting with each other.
If national environmental organizations are to stand any chance of winning in the face of strident
opposition they will need to work together.
A lesson from the pulp and paper campaigns is that success with the "go-it-alone"
strategy, when confronting a major industry sector opposed to change, depends on good fortune
and timing as well as savvy organizers. In the absence of these conditions, environmental
organizations will need to do a better job of organizing, both within and outside the movement.
Ironically, the hardest part is likely to be gaining agreement within the movement.
What the successes and failures of the pulp and paper campaigns do not reveal is how
environmental organizations can succeed in either government or market politics when the
opposition is well-organized, well-funded, and willing to fight every detail, down to whether
dioxin is a toxic chemical. The lead campaigners for the American environmental organizations
were all rather glum about the possibility of how they could have won, with reactions ranging
from: allying with labor unions to having more money for scientists or lawyers to we were over
our heads, we never stood a chance.
451
For the US environmental organizations to have catalyzed the same level of diffusion as
in Sweden -- in the face of the savvy counter-campaign run by AFPA and the Alliance for
Environmental Technology -- they needed to change campaigning strategy. They needed to shift
from the largely "go-it-alone" strategy to a broader coalition (while this started to happen in the
mid-i 990s, it was too little too late) and the overall focus of their campaigns needed to expand
beyond just bleaching. In the next chapter I propose how environmental organizations might
succeed in the face of intense industry opposition.
12.7 Production pluralism emerges first with corporate consumers
Are we moving to production pluralism, where the public, or at least NGOs like
environmental groups, have input into corporate decisions? In Chapter 2, I defined production
pluralism as arising when NGOs have access to decision makers in corporations. The pulp and
paper campaigns revealed two factors affecting the ability of environmental groups to access
corporations: corporate environmental values and whether the corporation is a consumer or
producer of raw materials.
The first characteristic, that the presence of strong environmental values within a
corporation creates greater opportunities for accessing corporate executives is obvious:
corporations with strong environmental values will be more likely to meet with environmental
groups. What deserves note here is, the activities of environmentalists can cultivate
environmental values. When Gtran Bryntse began campaigning for environmental
improvements in Swedish pulp and paper mills in 1980, he had no access to corporate
executives. But by the 1990s, after a decade of campaigns by environmentalists and public
concern with pollution from the industry, Swedish pulp and paper manufacturers were willing to
meet with environmentalists to discuss their concerns. This did not mean Swedish manufacturers
would act on environmentalist concerns, it just meant they had become open to dialogue. The
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implication is, the activities of environmental organizations affect corporate values, thereby
affecting future access opportunities.
Second, corporations that are consumers of raw materials are more receptive to
environmental concerns than those than manufacture raw materials. Opportunities for access
were greatest among corporate consumers -- corporations that manufacture and/or sell products,
but do not manufacture the raw materials used in the products. Corporate consumers, with their
brand names, were more concerned than raw material manufacturers with their environmental
image. Trying to sell their products to household consumers, corporate consumers do not want
their products to be tarnished with a negative environmental image. To avoid a negative
environmental image, corporate consumers were more willing than raw material manufacturers
to meet with environmental groups to discuss their products as well as to work collaboratively
with environmentalists in defining a solution.
Corporate consumers were also more likely to share common environmental values with
the environmentalists. The CEO's and senior executives of Ben & Jerry's, Kinko's, and IKEA
viewed themselves and their corporations as more in alignment with the environmental groups
than with the raw material manufacturers. The alignment of values created opportunities for
dialogue and change within the corporate consumers, who then found suppliers that provided
new, more environmentally friendly products that performed as well as the prior products at
comparable cost. Even among corporate consumers that were initially reluctant to dialogue, like
Time Inc., they were much more susceptible to being embarrassed into dialogue.
Raw material manufacturers, with their greater distance from household consumers, lack
of household brand names, sunk investments in capital, and depth of technical knowledge were
much less willing to engage in dialogue with environmental groups. The majority of American
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pulp and paper manufacturers staunchly resisted meeting with environmentalists, and some were
even unwilling to engage in dialogue over bleaching processes with their customers. The
American pulp and paper producers viewed market accountability from the same perspective as
government regulation: an adversarial process in which there are winners and losers.' Demands
for greater environmental accountability, even from their corporate consumers, were greeted as
an extension of adversarial regulatory politics and as an affront to corporate autonomy. Even
environmental leaders like Champion International and Union Camp Corporation were wary and
distrustful of environmental groups. Only the Weyerhaeuser Company was willing to engage in
dialogue with the environmental groups.
The resistance of American manufacturers and eventual openness of Swedish
manufacturers to granting access to environmental organizations reveals the importance of strong
market demand in creating opportunities for accessing raw material manufacturers. The strength
of environmental organizations in market politics depends on their capacity to influence
purchasing decisions. It is large consumers like Time Inc., Axel Springer Verlag, and IKEA that
can alter the investment decisions of raw material manufacturers.
The emergence of production pluralism will depend on opposition politics. As David
Vogel concluded in the context of government politics, pluralism flourishes when opposition to
business-as-usual is active. And so it will be with corporations. If NGOs, such as environmental
groups, are engaged in a campaign to transform a corporation or an industry sector,
environmental organizations are likely to gain access to corporate consumers. Thus, we see
production pluralism emerging most strongly within corporate consumers and more weakly,
although on occasion, within manufacturers of raw materials.
1 On the adversarial American regulatory process see Vogel, 1986.
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13 Moving to the cleanest production technologies: the need for sectoral and lifecycle
organizing
Since the pulp and paper campaigns offer only limited guidance on how to succeed in the
face of strident industry opposition, I speculate here on how American environmental
organizations may have succeeded by changing their organizing strategy. The guidance that the
pulp and paper campaigns offer is that common goals, NGO unity, and environmental-consumer
alliances are important to success in technology campaigns in the face of opposition.
Environmentalists succeeded when they developed working relationships with institutional
consumers to implement their technology goal (e.g., IKEA) and when they developed broad-
based coalitions united on around a similar goal (e.g., IJ).
The pulp and paper campaigns were what I call chemical campaigns: where
environmental organizations target a problem chemical or class of chemicals -- e.g., dioxins or
organochlorines -- and work to eliminate them. The environmental organizations succeeded in
their chemical campaigns within the pulp and paper industry when targeted organizations
adopted their goal: e.g., IKEA purchasing TCF paper. But when American consumers balked in
the face of industry opposition and a divided environmental movement, the American pulp and
paper campaigns floundered.
To improve chances of success in the face of serious opposition, environmental
organizations will need to unite rather than compete, strengthen their alliances with corporate
consumers, and broaden their alliances. The go-it-alone approach of Environmental Defense and
the Greenpeace organizations will seldom succeed in the face of a well-organized opposition.
By forming broader advocacy networksi environmental organizations will: increase staff
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resources working on a campaign; create multiple points of action, making it more difficult for
industry opposition to follow-up on every success; and create new opportunities for success with
consumers.
To facilitate forming successful alliances with corporate consumers and broader
advocacy networks environmental organizations will need to engage in what I call sectoral and
h'fecycle organizing. In sectoral organizing environmental organizations work to create a more
environmentally sustainable business sector by simultaneously targeting multiple environmental
problems within that sector (rather than a single environmental problem, such as organochlorines
in water pollution from pulp mills). In lifecycle organizing environmental groups try to effect
technology change by working with actors across the lifecycle of a product or material. Sectoral
and lifecycle organizing overlap with each other, and depending on the industry sector, may be
identical.
For the pulp and paper industry, lifecycle and sectoral organizing would have been the
same. If the pulp and paper campaigns had been based on sectoral/lifecycle organizing, they
would have targeted environmental problems across the lifecycle of paper products, including:
forestry, pulp and paper manufacturing, paper consumption, and recycling. Environmental
Defense moved in this direction with its Paper Task Force report, but it never organized a
campaign to implement the recommendations of its report. Sectoral and lifecycle organizing
overlap because the business sector -- forestry and paper products -- and the product lifecycle of
paper are the same.
An example that illustrates the differences between sectoral and lifecycle organizing is
the Health Care Without Harm campaign. Health Care Without Harm is a coalition of
environmental, public health, and health care organizations working to make the health care
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sector more environmentally sustainable across the globe, with members in Europe, North
America, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The environmental issues Health Care Without Harm
addresses include working to eliminate the incineration of hospital waste and to eliminate the use
of mercury- and PVC- (polyvinyl chloride) containing products in health care settings. The
initiative to eliminate incineration is an example of lifecycle organizing, where Health Care
Without Harm members work with hospitals in trying to reduce the volume and toxicity of their
waste as well as their reliance on incinerators as a disposal option, communities in trying to close
incinerators, and owners of incinerators in developing and using alternative disposal
technologies.'
In the absence of a sectoral organizing strategy, a problem environmental groups confront
with consumers is a limited number of solutions, often limited to just one. For example, during
the pulp and paper campaign Time Inc. had only one choice that would satisfy Greenpeace USA:
purchase TCF paper. The combination of Greenpeace USA's challenging goal and refusal to
compromise, and Time Inc.'s reluctance to interact with Greenpeace, created no opportunity for
Greenpeace staff to develop legitimacy, trust, and credibility with Time Inc. Yet these are the
characteristics of environmental-corporate alliances that are most likely to result in consumers
implementing the goals of environmental groups.
An alternative approach within the chemical campaign model is to compromise on the
goal. This was the approach of Environmental Defense, which gained legitimacy and trust with
Time Inc. because it was willing to accept a less demanding goal than Greenpeace USA for
bleached paper products.
Sectoral organizing, however, creates opportunities for achieving challenging
environmental goals without compromise by adopting the strategic approach used by
For further details on Health Care Without Harm, see Straus (Straus, 2000) and www.noharm.org.
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corporations implementing pollution prevention measures in their facilities. When businesses
first start implementing pollution prevention measures, they usually pick the "low hanging fruit"
-- the easy to reach prevention actions -- first. By succeeding with the low hanging fruit,
organizations create confidence and capacity that enables them to achieve more complex and
challenging prevention goals.'
This is the strategy behind sectoral organizing. Identify low hanging fruit opportunities
where environmental groups can work with consumers in changing purchasing specifications;
first addressing environmental problems where alternative products or technologies are readily
available and the potential for environmental harm is clear and relatively uncontested. For
Health Care Without Harm, the low hanging fruit was helping hospitals remove of mercury-
containing medical devices, including thermometers, from hospitals.2
Lifecycle organizing creates opportunities to expand alliances. For example, during the
height of the pulp and paper campaigns (late 1980s to early 1990s), environmentalists in the US
and Germany were demanding the greater use of recycled content in paper products. Solid waste
activists in the US -- who included waste management officials in cities and towns, local
recycling groups, and national environmental groups like the now defunct Environmental Action
-- succeeded in defining criteria for post-consumer content in paper and catalyzed laws
mandating recycled content in newspapers in ten states.3 Yet, the pulp and paper campaigns did
not unite with recycling advocates. Demands for more environmentally friendly bleached paper
(reduced toxicity) remained separate from demands for paper with recycled content (reduced
material use). By keeping recycling and bleaching initiatives separate, American
For example, see Hirschhorn and Oldenburg (Hirschhorn and Oldenburg, 1991) chapter 3.
2 "Since knowledge of mercury poisoning is widespread, HCWH has had a fairly easy time convincing its
constituencies that change is in order" (Straus, 2000).
3 Paper Recycler, 1994.
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environmentalists missed an opportunity to create a broad coalition for defining and advancing
an agenda for environmentally friendly paper that encompassed toxicity and material issues. It
would have been a lot harder for Time Inc. to resist united demands for increased recycled
content -- which had greater public recognition than chlorine use in bleaching' -- and TCF
bleaching.
In addition to not uniting with the recycling community, in their initiatives to create
market change in bleached paper products Environmental Defense, the national Greenpeace
organizations, and the SSNC all chose to go-it-alone rather than in coalition with other NGOs.
To achieve its goals Health Care Without Harm (HCWH) has brought together over 260
organizations from 22 countries. "Many, like Colin Greer of The New World Foundation,
attribute HCWH's success to its coalition work. ... Perhaps more importantly, says Greer, whose
foundation does not fund the group, HCWH has proved that effecting change in the increasingly
profit-oriented public health industry requires the tactics of a nimble yet cohesive army."2
Table 13.1 outlines the key elements of a sectoral campaign. Many of these elements
have already been addressed in Chapter 12. A few deserve additional comment here. The
second element listed in Table 13.1, "Establish a suite of challenging goals," emerges from my
position that environmental organizations should play a leadership role in defining "stretch"
goals -- a business term for a challenging yet attainable goal -- for business sectors. When
environmentalists do not advocate for stretch goals they abdicate environmental leadership to
To illustrate the environmental prominence of recycled content, when Union Camp Corp. decided to introduce a
brand name copy paper for retail consumers -- "Great White" paper -- it chose recycled content not bleaching
method (e.g., TCF bleached paper) as the criterion for distinguishing its paper (Greiner, 1995).
2 Straus, 2000.
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Table 13.1 Elements of a sectoral campaign
" Identify industry sector
" Define and agree to a suite of challenging goals
= Commit to 10-15 years of organizing and funding
- Create momentum for change
o Define causal story for each goal
1 Generate media attention to problems
= Develop alliances across lifecycle of each target material or product
- Enqaqe in market politics
o Identify, educate, and/or pressure key market players
O Create market demand
- Define cleaner product specifications
- Identify alternative products
- Form alliances with consumers, especially market leaders
" Change supply
- Identify manufacturers of alternative products
- Create opportunities for increasing market share or capturing price
premium
o Green product supply chain
- Connect environmental leaders among consumers with manufacturers
- Enaaae in government Dolitics
Look to legislatures rather than regulatory agencies for support for major
technological transformations.
- Outmaneuver the Opposition
O Surprise and innovation
3 Maintain perception of harm
3 Inoculate supporters against counter-claims of opponents
3 Create divisions among opponents by catalyzing "sufficient" supply and
demand
a Maintain unity within environmental movement
corporations and visionary consultants. As Kenneth Geiser writes in Materials Matter, "For too
long advocates for environmental and public health have settled for too little.",
For example, when the NRDC and Environmental Defense advocated for ECF-lite
instead of TCF bleaching, they placed themselves behind the leading corporations in the US and
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Sweden who were producing and buying TCF bleached products. And a few visionary
consultants are working with corporations to bring them to a much higher level of environmental
performance. For example, when William McDonough and Michael Braungart (the principals in
the environmental consulting firm of McDonough Branngart Design Chemistry) worked with
Steelcase on upholstery fabric, they "decided to design a fabric that would be safe enough to eat:
it would not harm people who breathed it in, and it would not harm natural systems after its
disposal."' McDonough and Braungart are not compromising on environmental goals when they
work with corporate clients like Steelcase. They are defining a bold vision of sustainability and
working with corporations who want to achieve it. Defining environmentally challenging goals
does not make for irrelevance. In fact, the opposite may be more the case: in defining
environmentally weak goals environmental groups will become increasingly irrelevant to
environmental leaders in corporations (although increasingly relevant to industry laggards).
I include the third element, "Commit to 10-15 years of organizing and funding" to
emphasize that success in sectoral organizing often depends on long-term organizing.
Greenpeace USA and Environmental Defense campaigned on pulp and paper issues for 11 years,
from 1987 to 1998. The SSNC campaigned on pulp and paper bleaching issues from 1986 to
1997. And Gran Bryntse campaigned for environmental friendly papers first with the
Environmental Federation, then with the SSNC from 1980-1992. When committing to sectoral
campaigns both national environmental organizations and foundations need to recognize upfront
that quick successes are unlikely and creating legitimacy and trust with corporate consumers will
take time. To assume that sectoral campaigns are a 1-5 year commitment is to be unrealistic in
the amount of time it takes to catalyze significant technological change.
' McDonough and Braungart, 2002, pp. 106-107.
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Engaging in both market and government politics (the sixth and seventh bullets in Table
13.1) is necessary for broad-based success. I see success in technology change emerging initially
from market institutions, with follow-up support from government institutions. Winning in
market politics will require empowering consumers, both individual and institutional, to stand up
and confront raw material manufacturers with their demands for cleaner and safer products.
While market campaigns can achieve initial successes, to increase the odds that these
successes will be retained after a sectoral campaign ends they need to be institutionalized.
Institutionalizing environmental goals is a strength of regulatory institutions.
Finally, within the last bulleted element, "Outmaneuver the opposition," I want to
emphasize "surprise and innovation." Given the successes of opponents to the pulp and paper
campaigns, a lesson for market politics is that environmental organizations should engage in
more "stealth organizing," where environmental organizations wait until a goal is implemented,
rather than decided, before making a public announcement. To create momentum for change by
capturing media attention environmental organizations often announce decisions of corporate
consumers to change purchasing specifications. Yet when environmental organizations
announce a decision by a consumer to change they create a backlash from opponents who try to
persuade consumers to retract their decision. In stealth campaigning environmental
organizations wait until the decision is implemented, then make the announcement -- when it is
too late to be retracted. Environmental organizations need to recognize that there is a tension
between media attention and success in market campaigns. Media attention is not always
necessary for success, and may impede success by alerting opponents to impending success.
Also "Create divisions among opponents by catalyzing 'sufficient' supply and demand"
requires further explanation. Critical to the pulp and paper successes in Sweden was that market
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leaders, very large consumers (e.g., IKEA and Axel Springer Verlag) and major manufacturers
(e.g., Stora and S6dra Cell), adopted the technology goals of environmentalists. When the
market leaders adopted the goal, it splintered the opposition. However, when only small
purchasers (e.g., Scuba Times) and manufacturers (e.g., Louisiana-Pacific) adopt the technology
goal, it enabled opponents to maintain unity against change.
The success of sectoral organizing will depend upon the capacity of environmental
organizations to build trust, legitimacy, and credibility with large consumers and to broaden their
alliances to other NGOs. Creating trust, legitimacy, and credibility, however, does not require
compromising on environmental goals. What it will entail is working with consumers over time
to nurture the capacities to meet the more challenging environmental goals. As Laws, et al.
(2001) emphasize in their recent research work on public entrepreneurship networks, success in
promoting radical, greener technologies, will depend upon a network of actors "that spans the
public, private, and civic spheres."'
While sectoral and lifecycle organizing present opportunities for success in the face of
organized opposition, they will also present challenges to national environmental organizations.
Different values, the need for name recognition to raise money, and personality conflicts will
create a set of steep barriers to crafting common goals and structures for coordinating work
among environmental organizations. When these barriers are overcome, as they have been with
the Health Care Without Harm campaign, the potential for success can be realized. Sectoral
coalitions that span the many grievances spawned by corporate activity are the antidote to
corporate resources.
Laws, et al. (2001) in their research on sustainable technology development and the role
of public entrepreneurship networks conclude that it is government agencies, not environmental
1Laws et al., 2001, p. 4.
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groups, who will be central to success: "Government must participate to ensure that public
entrepreneurship networks function effectively and stay oriented to publicly endorsed goals" of
technology development.' The pulp and paper campaigns, however, revealed that government
agencies were unwilling to promote the cleanest production technologies in the face of
opposition. I see government agencies as having an important role in diffusing the cleanest
technologies and products once the conflicts over the science and the performance of the
technologies have largely been resolved; or at least by the time diffusion has reached the early
majority stage of diffusion. Government agencies are effective in promoting the cleanest
production technologies when there is no or minimal opposition.
It is my position that environmental organizations need to be the leaders of sectoral
campaigns because they have shown the capacity to promote the cleanest production
technologies in the face of opposition. In emphasizing the coordinating role of environmental
organizations, I agree with Keck and Sikkink's (1998) conclusion that NGOs have a central role
to play in advocacy networks.2 Keck and Sikkink defined the central role of NGOs in advocacy
networks as quickly moving information to the actors and situations where it would be most
effective. While acting as disseminators of information is an important role of NGOs, that is not
what makes them unique.
What makes environmental organizations uniquely positioned to play the leadership role
in sectoral campaigns is their willingness to press for challenging goals in the face of political
opposition. Actors in the private sector, be they companies or consultants, are vulnerable to
1 Ibid., p. 5.
2 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) who developed the similar although slightly different concept of advocacy
coalitions, did not specify who would unify a coalition, but rather emphasized that common beliefs (values) would
cause "people from various governmental and private organizations" to "act in concert." While common values and
beliefs help to bind coalitions together, to form a coalition requires someone or some organization to unite the
various actors together (i.e., to organize them) (p. 18).
464
threats to their bottom-line. The same is true of environmental organizations that receive
corporate funding.
For example, in the pulp and paper campaigns, S6dra Cell developed a sophisticated
marketing campaign for TCF papers in Europe, creating glossy materials and presenting at
conferences. But when S6dra Cell agreed to present at public hearings for law requiring TCF
production in the State of Maine, it was pressured (successfully) by paper industry laggards in
the US to not present. The threat to S6dra Cell was from American manufacturers with paper
mills in Europe: "our paper mills will stop purchasing your pulp if you present in Maine."
And the pulp and paper campaigns revealed that government institutions are unlikely to
take a leadership role in trying to diffuse the cleanest production technologies in the face of
opposition. Regulators and politicians in Sweden and the US were only willing to press for
incremental changes, enough to state they had taken action, but were unwilling to press the entire
industry to achieve the levels possible with the cleanest technology, TCF, because of resistance
from manufacturers. TCF bleaching virtually eliminated organochlorine pollution, resulted in
the greatest reductions of BOD and COD, and created the greatest opportunities for recycling
wastewater. Yet proving the environmental benefits of eliminating organochlorine pollution and
reducing BOD and COD below compliance levels was difficult. It was much easier to claim
bleached kraft pulp mills harmed the environment when they used elemental chlorine and
discharged dioxin (2,3,7,8-TCDD), which is persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic at very low
doses. However, when the mills stopped using elemental chlorine (ECF bleaching) and nearly
eliminated dioxin discharges (but continued to discharge a soup of organochlorines that scientists
know little about), it became difficult to define the environmental benefits of TCF beyond the
common sense notion that less pollution is better for the environment. Conversely, it was easier
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for opponents to contest TCF by arguing that the technology changes were too costly relative to
the environmental benefits.
As technologies become cleaner, resulting in significantly less pollution, the harm
avoided becomes more difficult to prove, the costs of achieving the benefits higher, and the
political resistance greater. Thus the cleanest commercially available technologies, which result
in the greatest reductions in pollution and move us furthest along the path to sustainable material
cycles, are likely to confront the greatest resistance from the laggards among the raw material
manufacturers. At each step in the process of trying to effect change, opponents, especially raw
material manufacturers, will attempt to thwart efforts by environmentalists to create momentum
for change. Causal stories will be assailed as lacking scientific evidence. Environmental
organizations will be attacked for lacking credibility. And new technology will be maligned as
worse than existing technology.
In the pulp and paper campaigns, only the environmental organizations were willing to
step into the conflict-filled void between the presence of the cleanest production technologies
and the absence of these technologies diffusing into the market. As the environmental historian
Samuel Hays concluded in his book on American environmentalism: "It was a curious twist that
environmentalists were the purveyors of optimism about the possibilities of human achievement
while the administrative and technical leaders were the constant bearers of bad news."I
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Appendix 1. List of interviewees (sorted by organization)
Organization Last Name First Name Title Interview date Location(during the pulp
and paper
campaigns)
Alliance for Pryke Douglas Executive Director 29 January 2001 Telephone
Environmental
Technology
American Forest Festa, Ph.D. John Senior Scientist 01 October 1997 Washington, DC
and Paper
Association
American Forest Marshall Catherine Director, Environmental 01 October 1997 Washington, DC
and Paper Affairs
Association
American Forest Seiler Elizabeth Senior Director Fiber 01 October 1997 Washington, DC
and Paper Recovery and Utilization
Association
Champion Antonucci Frank R. Manufacturing operations 03 October 1997 West Nyack,
International support and applied New York
Corporation technologies
Champion Steltenkamp Michael S. Portfolio Manager - 03 October 1997 West Nyack,
International Technology Development New York
Corporation Applied Technologies
Chlorine Free Beaton Archie Executive director 22 January 2001 Telephone
Products
Association
Environmental Blum Lauren Senior Scientist 01 August 1995 Telephone
Defense
Environmental Blum Lauren Senior Scientist 30 September New York, New
Defense 1997 York
Greenpeace Kroesa Renate International Coordinator, 16 October 1999 Telephone
Intemational Pulp and Paper Campaign
Greenpeace Thies Christoph Director, Toxics Campaign 04 November Telephone
International 1999
Greenpeace Weinberg Jack Great Lakes Coordinator 15 June 1999 Chicago, Illinois
International
Greenpeace Leithe- Rune Toxics Campaigner 22 June 1998 Gdteborg,
Sweden Ericksen Sweden
Greenpeace Nordin HAken Director, Toxics Campaign 16 June 1998 Telephone
Sweden
Greenpeace Rainey Margaret Pulp and Paper Campaigner 04 November Telephone
Sweden 1999
Greenpeace Rosander Per Toxics Campaigner 09 June 1998 Stockholm,
Sweden Sweden
Greenpeace USA Floegel Mark Pulp and Paper Campaigner 10 November Telephone
1999
Greenpeace USA Floegel Mark Pulp and Paper Campaigner 18 November Telephone
1999
Greenpeace USA Hind Rick Legislative Director 26 January 2001 Telephone
Greenpeace USA Van Strum Carol Consultant 17 February 2001 Telephone
IKEA Hildorsson Hans Catalogue Group Head 24 November Telephone
1998




Institute of Paper Heindel, Theodore Assistant Professor, 29 September Atlanta, Georgia
Science and Ph.D. Engineering and Paper 1997
Technology Materials
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Institute of Paper McDonough Tom Professor 29 September Atlanta, Georgia
Science and 1997
Technology
Institute of Paper Robbins Wayne Associate Professor, Director 29 September Atlanta, Georgia
Science and of Research Services 1997
Technology
KF Baumann Per Environmental Director 26 June 1998 Stockholm,
Sweden
MacMillan Bloedel Chmelauskas Al Director of Environmental 04 January 1996 Telephone
Services
MacMillan Bloedel Procter Alan Director of Pulp and Paper 08 August 1995 Telephone
Research
Munksjd Aspa Bruk Fasten Hans Mill Manager 29 June 1998 Aspa Bruk,
Sweden
Munksj6 Aspa Bruk Wiklund Sam Marketing Director 29 June 1998 Aspa Bruk,
Sweden
N. McCubbin McCubbin Neil President 14 July 1995 Telephone
Consultants
National Council for Gellman Isaiah Director 14 July 1995 Telephone
Air and Stream
Improvement
Native Forest Stem Billy Pulp and Paper Strategist 29 January 2001 Telephone
Network
Natural Resources Bennett Nick Staff Scientist 1997 Augusta, Maine
Council of Maine
Natural Resources Hagstrom Anne Staff Attorney 1997 Augusta, Maine
Council of Maine
Natural Resources Landman Jessica Senior Attomey 09 March 2001 Telephone
Defense Council
SCA Graphic Morin Roine Environmental Manager 08 June 1998 Sundsvall,
Sweden










S6dra Cell Lovblad Roland Environmental Manager 06 June 1998 Telephone
Swedish Fallenius Ulla-Britta Director Monitoring and 30 June 1998 Stockholm,
Environmental Evaluation Department Sweden
Protection Agency
Swedish Lagergren Staffan Head of Heavy Industry 30 June 1998 Stockholm,
Environmental Section Sweden
Protection Agency
Swedish Nystrom Erik Principal Technical Officer, 27 May 1998 Stockholm,
Environmental Industry and Ecocycles Sweden
Protection Agency Department
Swedish Nystrom Erik Principal Technical Officer, 10 June 1998 Stockholm,
Environmental Industry and Ecocycles Sweden
Protection Agency Department
Swedish Forest Jirval Nils Vice President Environmental 03 June 1998 Stockholm,
Industries Policy Sweden
Association
Swedish Ministry of Dahl Birgitta Environment Minister 25 June 1998 Stockholm,
Environment Sweden
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Swedish National Rosengardten Anna-Lena Chief Engineer 17 June 1998 Stockholm,
Licensing Board for Sweden
Environment
Protection
Swedish National Svedberg Rolf Chief Engineer 17 June 1998 Stockholm,
Licensing Board for Sweden
Environment
Protection
Swedish Pulp and AxegArd Peter Associate Professor 11 June 1998 Stockholm,
Paper Research Sweden
Institute (STFI)
Swedish Pulp and Axegird Peter Associate Professor 26 May 1998 Stockholm,
Paper Research Sweden
Institute (STFI)
Swedish Society for Andersson Helena Project Coordinator, Good 23 June 1998 G6teborg,
Nature Green Buy Sweden
Conservation
Swedish Society for Bryntse G6ran Director Paper Group 15 June 1998 Telephone
Nature
Conservation
Swedish Society for Eiderstr6m Eva Department Head For 23 June 1998 G6teborg,
Nature Ecolobeling Sweden
Conservation
Time, Inc. Refkin David Director of Paper and 30 September New York, New
Environmental Affairs 1997 York
Union Camp Eachus Spencer Assistant Research Director, 30 September Princeton, New
Corporation Paper 1997 Jersey
Union Camp Greiner Charles Senior Vice President 10 November Franklin, Virginia
Corporation 1995
Union Camp Matthews Christopher Director, R&D Projects 30 September Princeton, New
Corporation H. 1997 Jersey
Union Camp Matthews Christopher Director, R&D Projects 21 September Princeton, New
Corporation H. 1995 Jersey
Union Camp Raymond Dale R. Director of Quality and 10 November Franklin, Virginia
Corporation Technology 1995
Union Camp Trice William H. Executive Vice President 21 September Wayne, New
Corporation 1995 Jersey
Union Camp Nutt Wells E. President 10 November Franklin, Virginia
Technology, Inc. 1995








US Environmental Frace Sheila Acting Director of 01 October 1997 Washington, DC
Protection Agency, EngineeringaAnd Analysis
Office Of Water
Washington Toxics Valeriano Laurie Policy Director 05 February 2001 Telephone
Coalition
Westvaco Corp Andrews Lee Senior Vice President 15 August 1995 New York, New
Marketing York
Westvaco Corp Burton Richard N. Vice President 15 August 1995 New York, New
York





Westvaco Corp Hintz, Ph.D. Harold Technical Assistant to Vice 15 August 1995 New York, New
President Corporate Research York
Director
Westvaco Corp Hise Ron Technical Director 09 November Covington,
1995 Virginia
Westvaco Corp Wallinger R. Scott Senior Vice President 15 August 1995 New York, New
York
Weyerhaeuser Panco David Program Manager, Corporate 18 July 1995 Telephone
R&D
World Resources Banks Darryl Program Director, Technology 02 October 1997 Washington, DC
Institute and the Environment
Appendix 2. Paper Task Force recommendations for pulp and paper manufacturing
Recommendation 1. Purchasers should give preference to paper manufactured by
suppliers who have a vision of and a commitment to minimum-impact mills ...
Recommendation 2. Purchasers should give preference to paper manufactured by
suppliers who demonstrate a commitment to implementing sound environmental
management of their mills. ...
Recommendation 3. Purchasers should give preference to paper manufactured by
suppliers who demonstrate continuous environmental improvement toward minimum-
impact mills by installing pollution-prevention technologies.
- The substitution of chlorine dioxide for elemental chlorine in the first stage of the
bleaching process reduces the discharge of chlorinated organic compounds.
- The installation of oxygen delignification and extended cooking, two available and
proven cost-effective manufacturing technologies that maximize lignin removal in
the pulping process, forms a foundation for further progress towards the minimum-
impact mill.
- Mills that recirculate the filtrates from the first bleaching and extraction stages of the
bleach plant make additional progress toward the minimum-impact mill. These low-
effluent processes represent the most advanced current technologies.
- Future technologies may emerge that make additional progress toward the minimum-
impact mill.
Recommendation 4. Purchasers of paper packaging, such as corrugated boxes and
folding cartons, should seek to purchase paper products made of unbleached kraft
paperboard rather than bleached kraft paperboard ...
Recommendation 5. Purchasers of coated printing and writing papers should express
their preference for paper that increases the substitution of mechanical pulp for bleached
kraft pulp ...
Recommendation 6. Purchasers of printing and writing papers should express their
preference for paper that substitutes bleached kraft for bleached sulfite pulps ...
Recommendation 7. Purchasers of coated and uncoated freesheet paper should consider
paper products that contain bleached chemithermomechanical pulp (BCTMP) as a partial
substitute for hardwood kraft pulp ...
Recommendation 8. Purchasers should be open to considering paper products that
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